The general plan of attack was to dispense with previous artillery
preparation, and to depend instead on tanks to smash through the enemy's
wire, of which there was a great quantity protecting his trenches.
As soon as the advance of the tanks and infantry, working in close
co-operation, began, the artillery was to assist with counter battery
and barrage work; but no previous registration of guns for this purpose
could be permitted, as it would rouse the enemy's suspicions. The
artillery of our new armies was therefore necessarily subjected to a
severe test in this operation, and proved itself entirely worthy of the
confidence placed in it.
The infantry, tanks, and artillery thus working in combination were to
endeavor to break through all the enemy's lines of defense on the first
day. If this were successfully accomplished and the situation developed
favorably, cavalry were then to be passed through to raid the enemy's
communications, disorganize his system of command, damage his railways,
and interfere as much as possible with the arrival of his
reinforcements. It was explained to all commanders that everything
depended on secrecy up to the moment of starting, and after that on
bold, determined, and rapid action. Unless opposition could be beaten
down quickly, no great results could be looked for.
The Commander in Chief of the French Armies, to whom I secretly
communicated my plans, most readily agreed to afford me every
assistance. In addition to the steps taken by him to engage the enemy's
attention elsewhere, he arranged for a strong force of French infantry
and cavalry to be in a position whence they could be moved forward
rapidly to take part in the exploitation of our success, if the
situation should render it possible to bring them into action. On Nov.
20 certain of these French units were actually put in motion. The course
of events, however, did not open out the required opportunity for their
employment, but the French forces were held in readiness and within easy
reach so long as there appeared to be any hope of it. Had the situation
on Nov. 20 developed somewhat more favorably in certain directions, the
nature of which will become apparent in the course of this report, the
presence and co-operation of these French troops would have been of the
greatest value.