Expert British Admiralty writers do not concur in all the conclusions of
our contributor, Mr. Frothingham, especially where he refers to the
withdrawal of the British fleet.
The official report of Admiral Jellicoe states that "German vessels were
entirely out of the fight at 9 o'clock," and that "the withdrawal of the
British fleet was a 'manoeuvre' so as to remain between the Germans and
their bases."
Sir Cyprian Bridge, a British naval expert, in referring to the
situation of the German fleet when darkness fell after the battle,
writes: "It was a beaten and a broken fleet that escaped from the trap,"
(referring to the British Battle Fleet at the north and the battle
cruisers at the south, acting in strategic harmony.) "Many of its units
had been lost. Its gunnery had become demoralized, and no one can blame
its discretion in making for home at its top-most speed and leaving the
British fleet once more in undisputed command of the North Sea. For
this, in a word, was the result of the battle. * * * Whatever their
effort signified, it failed to shake our hold upon the sea. * * * We
have fought many indecisive actions, * * * few which have more fully
freed us of all fear of what the enemy fleet might be able to
accomplish. By such standards the battle off Jutland will well hold its
own against all but a few of our most famous victories."
John Buchan published a description of the battle of Jutland by
authority of the British Government. He, a historical authority, says:
"The result of the battle of Jutland was that Britain was more confirmed
than ever in her mastery of the sea. * * * From a technical point of
view the battle appears as an example of a tactical division of the
fleet, undertaken in order to coax a laggard enemy to battle. * * * It
defeated, utterly defeated, the German plan. If it was not--as with two
hours more daylight it would have been--a complete destruction of
Germany's sea power, it was a complete demonstration of Britain's
crushing superiority."
Arthur Pollen, an expert naval writer in British periodicals, referred
to the results of the battle in these words: "Thus the Germans, who had
entered the North Sea, according to their own account, to engage and
destroy the British ships that have been systematically sweeping the
waters north and east of the Horn Reef, attained the first part of their
objective only. They did succeed in engaging. But the consequences were
disastrous. The plan of overwhelming the British fast division with
superior numbers was defeated by the masterly handling of the British
force, combined with the effective use that force made of its artillery.
So far from Sir David Beatty having been overwhelmed, he succeeded
admirably in his main object, which was to draw the German fleet into a
position where Sir John Jellicoe's squadrons could engage it. The enemy
was only saved from total destruction by mist and by the approach of
night. Not only did his whole plan miscarry, but he was driven
ignominiously from the field, and with a very heavy loss in ships and
men."