At the early coming of light in these latitudes (about 3 A. M., June 1)
the British fleet was to the southward and westward of the Horn Reef,
about ninety miles from the battlefield. The British fleet then retraced
its course to the battlefield. This return of the British fleet, by the
same lane it followed in the night, did not give much opportunity to
regain touch with the German fleet. Admiral Jellicoe reports that he
remained in the vicinity of the battlefield until 11 A. M. when he was
"reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the High Seas Fleet had
returned into port." Soon afterward the British fleet proceeded to its
bases.
In the early accounts of the battle there were fanciful tales of pursuit
of the German ships through the night, and even after Admiral Jellicoe's
report, the British public did not at first realize the situation at the
end of the action. But, after a time, when this was better understood,
there arose one of the greatest naval controversies that have ever
agitated Great Britain, centred around the alleged "defensive" naval
policy for maintaining the supremacy of Great Britain on the seas--the
pros and cons as to closing the Germans while there was light, and
keeping in touch through the dark hours. With that discussion this
article has nothing to do, but the tactical situation at the end of the
battle should be stated.
At 9 o'clock the German fleet was to the westward. The British fleet was
between it and all its bases. The British fleet was superior in speed,
and had such an overwhelming superiority in ships and guns that it could
afford to discard its damaged ships without impairing this superiority.
The British Admiral had plenty of light cruisers and destroyers to throw
out a screen and to maintain touch with the German fleet. There
undoubtedly was a proportion of damaged ships in the German fleet; and
this, with its original inferior fleet speed, would have made it a hard
task for the German fleet to attempt to ease around the British fleet
and reach its bases. These conditions were in favor of keeping in touch
with the German fleet--and it is needless to point out the great results
that would have come from a successful action with the German fleet in
the morning.
On the other hand, one should state the elements which influenced
Admiral Jellicoe's decision, first of all to safeguard his ships, and
yet remain at a distance in the direction of a German base. Upon his
fleet depended the established British control of the seas. Many of his
ships had received hard knocks--and many were short of ammunition and
fuel. Above all, there was the ominous threat of torpedo attacks in the
night.
These were the conditions of the problem that confronted the British
Admiral, brought about by the culminating tactics of the battle. Admiral
Jellicoe's decision was that the situation did not justify him in
imperiling his fleet and with it the naval supremacy of Great Britain.
In this greatest of all naval actions it is interesting to study the
course of the battle in comparison with pre-war calculations. The
outstanding feature, the collapse of the three British battle cruisers,
was not entirely unexpected by naval opinion. The battle cruiser had
found a great vogue, especially in England, but before this battle a
reaction had already set in, aided by the fact that the Lion had been
put out by weaker gunfire in the Dogger Bank chase. Many naval men had
come to believe that the battle cruiser was only a cruiser after
all--though a valuable cruiser--and not up to taking a place in a real
line of battle.
More surprising was the fact that at no stage of the action did the
heavier British guns dominate the German guns. This was evident in the
first phase, when Admiral Beatty's six battle cruisers were fighting on
parallel courses with Admiral Hipper's five battle cruisers. The British
ships carried thirty-two 13.5-inch and sixteen 12-inch guns, against
their enemy's twenty-four 12-inch guns and twenty 11-inch guns.
In the second stage of the action on northerly courses, when Admiral
Beatty's command was engaging the van of the German fleet, the four
Queen Elizabeths, with their thirty-two 15-inch guns, were in position,
and there was nothing heavier than a 12-inch gun in the German fleet.
In the third phase, after Vice Admiral Beatty's command had joined the
main body of Admiral Jellicoe's fleet, the superiority of the British in
heavy guns was enormous, as can be seen from the table on Page 338. It
is true that the Germans took advantage of the mist and smoke as
described. Yet, from Admiral Jellicoe's report, it is evident that there
were many chances to let off salvos at the enemy ships, and he reports
the ranges as very moderate, ("between 9,000 and 12,000 yards.")