At 4:15 there was an attack "simultaneously"[4] by British and German
destroyers which resulted in a lively fight, but no damage to any of the
capital ships. Yet the possibilities of such torpedo attacks were so
evident, here and later in the battle, that the destroyer at once
attained a greater value as an auxiliary of the battleship. It should
also be noted that German submarines were reported present at this
stage, but they accomplished nothing against the screened fighting
ships. A British airplane had been sent up from a mother ship just
before the engagement, though Admiral Beatty reports that it was forced
to fly low on account of the clouds, and had a hard task "to identify
four enemy light cruisers." There was apparently no chance of a wide
observation that would have warned Admiral Beatty of the approaching
German High Seas Fleet. In this short hour were concentrated many new
problems of naval warfare.
The advancing German High Seas Fleet was reported at 4:38 by a light
cruiser, and sighted at 4:42 by the British battle cruisers. A few
minutes later Vice Admiral Beatty's ships turned right about (180
degrees) in succession. The German battle cruisers also turned to a
northwesterly course, closely followed up by the van of the German High
Seas Fleet, and the action was continued on this course.
The report of Admiral Beatty and his conduct in this part of the action
show that he had not suspected the presence of the German High Seas
Fleet, but the lavish criticism of his turn in succession is without
reason. In the first place, his ships met no disaster at the turn, and
the manoeuvre is absolutely justified by the fact that it brought the
four Queen Elizabeth battleships into position to fight a rearguard
action against the greatly strengthened enemy. Any other disposition of
Admiral Beatty's command would have been a mistake.
It also follows that, against the turn made in this way, it would have
been an error for Vice Admiral Hipper to try for a capping position,
with the object of smothering Admiral Beatty's cruisers in detail at
their pivoting point. Such an attempt would have exposed his own battle
cruisers to the 15-inch guns of the approaching dreadnoughts of Admiral
Evan-Thomas's squadron. Admiral Hipper's conduct in turning to the
northwest ahead of the van of the German High Seas Fleet seems the best
thing he could have done at the time. The leading German battleships,
which were of the König class, fell into line, closely following Admiral
Hipper's battle cruisers, and the battle was continued at 14,000 yards
on a northwest course.
On the British side the brunt of the action was sustained by Admiral
Evan-Thomas's fifth battle squadron, which from this time was in line
astern of Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers. The German battle cruisers
could not stand up with the same effectiveness against the heavy guns of
the fifth battle squadron, and this, with an increase to full speed,
enabled Admiral Beatty to draw ahead. He again opened up a gap between
his battle cruisers and the fifth battle squadron, taking a course that
curved to the north and northeast, in search of Admiral Jellicoe's
battle fleet, which was hastening to his assistance. The leading ships
of the Grand Fleet were sighted at 5:56, and Admiral Beatty altered his
course to the east at extreme speed. The German van also turned to
eastward.
In the meantime from the north the British Grand Fleet had been closing
at utmost fleet speed on a southeast by south course. Ahead of the
battle fleet was the squadron of three battle cruisers under Rear
Admiral Hood. This squadron, well in advance of the main body, took
position ahead of Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers, which had turned to
their southerly course, as shown by the diagram.
In the second phase of the action, which has just been described, there
were clashes of light cruisers and isolated torpedo attacks, none of
which had any tactical effect on the battle. It is now evident from the
conduct of the German command that the German fleet was not led into a
trap, and that Admiral Scheer deliberately chose to engage the British
Grand Fleet, thinking the conditions favorable, although his course
necessarily curved away to the southwestward and left the British Grand
Fleet between the German fleet and all its bases. It is also evident
that the ships of the German van had not been damaged by the fifth
British battle squadron to the extent of demoralizing the German
gunfire. The immediate damage inflicted on the advance of the British
Grand Fleet is proof enough of this.
[Illustration: Make-Up and Armament of British Grand Fleet
In addition the Grand Fleet comprised Rear Admiral Hood's squadron of
three battle cruisers and Rear Admiral Arbuthnot's squadron of four
armored cruisers.]