First of all, it should be said that any criticism of Admiral Jellicoe
as to the makeup of the British advance force is not justified. The
Queen Elizabeth class of dreadnoughts had been designed with the great
speed of 25 knots for the purpose of working with battle cruisers on
such service. This gave them a speed that was uniform with the fleet
speed of Vice Admiral Beatty's battle cruiser squadrons, although the
individual ships of the Lion class were faster. The name ship of this
battleship class, the Queen Elizabeth, had been through a long, racking
service in the Dardanelles operations, and was not with the fleet. The
other four ships of the class made up the fifth battle squadron under
Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, which was under Vice Admiral Beatty's command.
This disposition of Admiral Jellicoe's fleet, with the advance force
flung out ahead, seems sound from every tactical point of view, with the
assumption that the advance was to be in touch with the main fleet, or,
if out of touch, tactical possibilities had been provided for and plans
of action prearranged.
In the sweep through the North Sea, with the main body of the British
Grand Fleet some fifty miles astern, Vice Admiral Beatty's advance force
was cruising to southward of Admiral Jellicoe May 31, 1916, when, at
2:20 P. M., the presence of enemy ships was reported by a light cruiser.
Admiral Beatty altered course "to the eastward and subsequently to
northeastward, the enemy being sighted at 3:31 P. M. Their force
consisted of five battle cruisers."[2]