The former Foreign Minister of Germany, Herr von Jagow, published a
reply to Prince Lichnowsky in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, in
which he virtually confirmed the Prince's main assertions. He applied
such phrases as "an unheard-of assertion," "a mass of inaccuracies and
perversions," to Lichnowsky's memorandum, but he did not meet the former
Ambassador's charges with any new evidence, merely referring his readers
to former publications of the German Government.
Von Jagow's reply bears out the assertion that in 1913 England was
prepared to enter into friendly agreements with Germany. She was "ready
to meet us." A Bagdad railway agreement was almost completed when
Germany drew the sword. Negotiations about the future of the African
colonies of Portugal in certain contingencies had been resumed, and the
German Foreign Secretary looked forward to further agreements in the Far
East and elsewhere.
The former Foreign Minister refuses to adopt the Pan-German view that
"England laid all the mines which caused the war." On the contrary, he
bears witness with former Ambassador Lichnowsky to Sir Edward Grey's
"love of peace and his serious wish to reach an agreement with us." He
says that it is true that Sir Edward could have prevented war, but he is
careful not to indicate how. Presumably he means he could have done it
by following Germany's example and treating England's engagements as
"scraps of paper."
He agrees that the war was not popular with the British people, and that
Belgium had to serve as a battlecry. Germany, on the other hand, had to
maintain her prestige. It had been damaged by her political defeat in
Morocco. A fresh diminution of it would have been, he remarks,
"intolerable for our position in Europe and in the world."
In one point of fact he corrects Prince Lichnowsky. He denies that he
himself visited Vienna at any time between the Spring of 1913 and the
outbreak of the war. He confirms, as far as he remembers, all the
expressions attributed to him by Lichnowsky.
His only reference to the Potsdam Council of July 5, 1914, (when, it is
asserted, the Teuton leaders made the final decision for war,) is not a
denial that the meeting took place, but a single sentence: "On July 5 I
was absent from Berlin."
In regard to Lichnowsky's main charges, Herr von Jagow talks of
"unheard-of" assertions and "inaccuracies and perversions," but he does
not bring forward any fresh arguments to meet the charges, and merely
refers to the publications of the German Government concerning the
conversations which took place in June, 1914, between the Kaiser and
Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Herr von Jagow says:
At Konopischt no plan was laid down (festgelegt) for an active
policy against Serbia. Archduke Francis Ferdinand was not at all
an advocate of a policy leading to war, although he was often
reckoned as such. During the London conference he advised
moderation and avoidance of war.
Herr van Jagow here avoids the issue raised by Lichnowsky, who did not
say that a definite scheme was arranged at Konopischt, but that the
indication was, not that Archduke Francis Ferdinand was in favor of war,
but that his death was a positive relief to the advocates of war.
In the course of his statement Herr von Jagow, who remained Foreign
Secretary until late in 1916, says:
When I was appointed State Secretary in January, 1913, it seemed
to me that a German-English rapprochement was desirable, and an
understanding upon those points where our interests touched and
sometimes even crossed, and this I deemed feasible. At least, it
was my intention to work on this.
With regard to the Bagdad question Herr von Jagow says:
If England insisted upon excluding us from Mesopotamia, it
appeared to me that a conflict would be avoided with difficulty.
We were met in a conciliatory manner by the English Government,
and an agreement had almost been reached just previous to the
outbreak of the world war.
He meets Lichnowsky's assertion that Germany drove Russia "into the arms
of France and England by our Oriental and Balkan policy" with the
contention that the Pan-Slavism which governed Russian politics was
directly anti-German. Upon the London conference on Algeciras he says:
We no more desired war on Albania's account than did Sir Edward
Grey. That is why, in spite of our former experiences at
Algeciras, we consented to the conference. The merit of a
conciliatory attitude at the conference must not be denied to
Sir Edward Grey, but it is going a little too far to say that he
in nowise took up his stand on the side of the Entente. He
certainly often urged St. Petersburg to give way, and found
principles of accord (Einigungs Formeln) suitable to this end.
But outwardly he represented the Entente, as he could no more
leave his associates in the lurch than could we. Nor did he wish
to do so.
On the other hand, the assertion that we adopted without
exception the standpoint prescribed for us by Vienna is
absolutely untrue. We played, as England did, a conciliatory
rôle, and urged moderation upon Vienna far more than Lichnowsky
seems to be aware of, or at any rate admits. Vienna thereupon
made a variety of the most far-reaching concessions, Dibra and
Djakowa.