Lichnowsky states that a few days after the Serajevo murder of June 28,
1914, he was in Berlin, and from interviews with Chancellor von Bethmann
Hollweg he found that the latter did not share the Prince's belief that
peace might be maintained, and complained of Russian armaments. The
memorandum continues:
I then went to Dr. Zimmermann, who was representing Herr von
Jagow, [Foreign Secretary,] and from him learned that Russia was
about to raise 900,000 fresh troops. His words showed an
unmistakable animosity toward Russia, which, he said, was
everywhere in our way. Of course, I was not told that General
von Moltke was pressing for war. I learned, however, that Herr
von Tschereschky [the German Ambassador in Vienna] had received
a rebuke because he reported that he had advised moderation in
Vienna toward Serbia.
Subsequently I learned that at a decisive conversation in
Potsdam July 5 an inquiry addressed to us by Vienna found
positive assent among all personages in authority. Indeed, they
added that there would be no harm if war with Russia were to
result. I received instruction that I was to induce the English
press to take up a friendly attitude if Austria gave the
deathblow to the Great Serbian movement, and as far as possible
I was, by my influence, to prevent public opinion opposing
Austria.
I gave warning against the whole project, which I described as
adventurous and dangerous, and I advised that moderation be
recommended to the Austrians because I did not believe in
localization of conflict.
Herr von Jagow answered me that Russia was not ready, that there
doubtless would be a certain amount of bluster, but that the
more firmly we stood by Austria the more would Russia draw back.
He said Austria already was accusing us of want of spirit and we
must not squeeze her; and that, on the other hand, feeling in
Russia was becoming ever more anti-German and so we must simply
risk it.
I knew that Sir Edward Grey's influence in Petrograd could be
turned to use in favor of peace, so I used my friendly relations
with Sir Edward, [British Foreign Secretary,] and in confidence
begged him to advise moderation in Russia if Austria demanded
satisfaction from Serbia.
At first the attitude of the English press was calm and friendly
to the Austrians because the murder was condemned, but gradually
more and more voices were heard to insist that, however
necessary it was to punish the crime, exploitation of crime for
political purposes could not be justified. Austria was strongly
urged to show moderation.
When the ultimatum appeared, all the papers, except The
Standard, which was always like slow water and apparently was
paid by the Austrians, were as one in their condemnation. The
whole world, except in Berlin and Vienna, understood that it
meant war, and indeed a world war.
The British fleet, which chanced to be assembled for review, was
not demobilized.