The shortage of aircraft for the American Army in France has been the
subject of investigation by the Military Affairs Committee of the
Senate, following the sensational disclosures regarding German control
of the air in the sector held by the Americans, [see CURRENT HISTORY
MAGAZINE, April, 1918, Pp. 12-14.] The Senate Committee was not
unanimous, and two reports were presented on April 12, 1918, differing
as to the causes of delay in the execution of the airplane program.
The substance of the majority report is contained in the following
extracts:
The Signal Corps has established and is now conducting twenty
aviation training schools in the United States. Four additional
schools are in process of construction and are expected to be
finished in June next.
The aggregate capacity of the schools now in operation is
something over 3,000 cadets; 1,926 have thus far been graduated
from this primary training course and commissioned as reserve
military aviators. Very few of these have received their
advanced training in this country.
In addition to the above, the Signal Corps, acting upon the
invitation of the several Entente Governments, dispatched some
1,200 cadets to England, France, and Italy last year, who were
to receive primary and advanced training in aviation schools of
those countries. The experience of a great many of these men has
been most unfortunate in that at some of the schools a very
serious delay has occurred in providing them with the training
planes, which it was expected would be manufactured in foreign
factories in sufficient numbers. As a result, several hundred of
the American cadets have been practically idle and have made no
progress. About 450 of them are reported as having completed the
primary training, after long delay.
The Signal Corps is giving serious consideration to the
advisability of bringing the remainder back to the United States
to be trained. With the exception of this severe disappointment,
the primary training of our aviators, according to the testimony
of the aviation officials, appears to be progressing favorably.
For some time after the inception of the work the output of
primary training planes in this country for use in our schools
gave ground for grave concern. In recent weeks, however, the
output has been greatly increased, and there seems to be no
doubt of the Signal Corps having an amply sufficient number in
the future. On April 1, 1918, 3,458 primary training planes had
been completed. The advanced training planes are being turned
out in accordance with the schedule and estimates laid down at
the inception of their manufacture. In advanced training planes
four types are being made, the total number up to date
manufactured being 342. In these planes three types of engines
will be used, of which 965 have been completed. The Liberty
motor is not suitable for use in these planes.
It is apparent from the evidence that the twelve-cylinder
Liberty motor is just emerging from the development or
experimental stage. Since the original design and the setting up
of the first completed motor in July, 1917, a large number of
changes have been found necessary, many of them causing delay in
reaching quantity production. Within the last two months changes
of considerable importance have been made which, it is hoped,
will make the motor serviceable for combat planes of the
defensive type and for bombing and observation planes.
Twenty-two thousand five hundred Liberty motors have been
ordered, 122 have been completed for the army, and 142 for the
navy. Four have been shipped overseas. Some of those already
delivered are being altered to overcome the defects ascertained
during the last few weeks. It is understood, however, that these
alterations will consume but a very short time.
The production of Liberty motors to date is, of course, gravely
disappointing. The Government officials having the manufacture
of the Liberty motor in charge have made the mistake of leading
the public and the allied nations to the belief that many
thousands of these motors would be completed in the Spring of
1918.
The production of combat planes in the United States for use in
actual warfare has thus far been a substantial failure and
constitutes a most serious disappointment in our war
preparations. We had no design of our own; neither did we adopt
any one of the European designs until months after we entered
the war. In all, five types, at one time or another, have been
adopted. Two of them have been abandoned after the expenditure
of much time and money. The three remaining types still left
upon our program are now in the course of manufacture. Of these
the largest and most powerful is the Handley-Page heavy bombing
machine, designed to carry as many as six men, eight machine
guns, and a heavy load of bombs, and to be driven by two Liberty
motors. The testimony before your committee shows that the
Signal Corps finally decided upon the manufacture of a number of
sets of parts of this machine about Jan. 1, 1918. Officials of
the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps testify that they do
not expect the completion of the first set of parts in this
country before June, 1918.
Another type of combat plane, known as the De Haviland, is
included in our program. This machine habitually carries two
men, four machine guns, a moderate load of bombs and other
apparatus and is driven by one Liberty motor. Fifteen have been
completed; one has been shipped to France; the remaining
fourteen have been very recently completed in this country.
The third type upon the program is known as the Bristol fighter.
This machine is lighter and faster than the De Haviland. Its
speed is expected to be in the neighborhood of 125 miles per
hour. It is what is known as a reconnoissance machine. Another
term which might be properly applied to it is "defensive
fighter." It carries two men, four machine guns, and is driven
by one Liberty motor. The decision to make this type was reached
on Nov. 7, 1917. The manufacturers completed the first of these
machines during the week ended March 30, 1918. The machine was
tested once during that week with a Liberty motor, and,
according to the testimony of the aviation officials, met its
preliminary test successfully. This machine, a few hours after
its flight, caught fire while standing upon the aviation ground
and was entirely destroyed. The officials of the Signal Corps
assured the committee that another machine would soon be
finished by the manufacturer, and that if it met the tests
satisfactorily quantity production might be expected within a
reasonable period.
In addition to the American production of engines and airplanes
as herein set forth, considerable orders for combat airplanes
and engines were last Summer placed with European manufacturers
by General Pershing, and we have furnished quantities of
material and numbers of mechanics to aid in their construction.
Your committee is convinced that much of the delay in producing
completed combat airplanes is due to ignorance of the art and to
failure to organize the effort in such a way as to centralize
authority and bring about quick decision.
Further light is thrown on the production of aircraft for the American
Army by the minority report. One passage reads:
Soon after the war began the Signal Corps arranged with the
French Government for the making of 6,100 combat planes at a
total cost of $127,000,000, the planes to be produced as rapidly
as American fliers could be trained to operate them. As the
American aero squadrons reach the front ready for duty, battle
planes are being supplied them under this arrangement. To aid in
this foreign manufacture of planes for American fliers, the
Signal Corps has shipped to France 11,000 tons of various
materials and has sent 7,000 mechanics to release, for French
factories making planes for our American fliers, the French
workers on motor transports. The Signal Corps then arranged for
the making of about 11,500 combat planes in the United States,
the term combat plane being here used to embrace all kinds of
planes, both offensive and defensive, except training planes.
Let it be said here that when the war began the United States
Government had purchased altogether less than 200 airplanes in
its entire history, and that of the few airplane factories in
this country probably not one was making over five or six a
month. It is hardly possible to grasp the magnitude of the task
the factories contracting to make the 11,500 combat planes found
before them.