From the 25th to the 27th there was a lull in the north, evidently
conceived by the Germans for bringing their heavier guns up to new
emplacements, but in the south during this time the enemy heavily
concentrated against the new French troops that were appearing upon the
lengthening line and forced them to give up Lihons and Noyon. When the
German pressure was renewed in the north Albert became the obvious
objective, on account of the massed attacks made upon Ablainville near
by. In the battle of the Somme, Albert, as a junction and depot,
performed for the British in a minor degree what Cambrai later performed
for the Germans in the present battle. On March 27 the British began a
retreat on a wide front on both sides of the Somme, and in the evening
Albert was evacuated. The next day came the great French counterattack
between Lassigny and Noyon, already mentioned in connection with the
geographical development of the battle.
On the 28th the German attack was renewed on the Somme, where it pressed
back the British near the Chippily crossing, and before Arras, where a
frontal attack was repulsed with great enemy loss. This attack was
renewed for three successive days. Then on April 3 the French again won
near Lassigny and repulsed heavy German attacks around Moreuil.
[Illustration: DETAIL MAP OF FLANDERS SECTOR AND BATTLE AROUND
ARMENTIERES]
On April 4 a frightful battle developed, where on a narrow ten-mile
front, between Grivesnes, near the vertex of the Montdidier salient, and
the Roye-Amiens road, the Germans sacrificed thousands of men in a vain
attempt to drive a wedge between the newly discovered junction of the
French and British Armies.
From the 4th until the 7th, with the exception of the check the enemy
met with at Bucquoy on the latter date, he made a reconsolidation of his
lines, partially digging in on the sector before Amiens. The British
positions around Arras, to the north of the great salient, which had
again and again repelled frontal attacks, and the French positions on
the Montdidier salient and the Oise-Aisne watershed on the south, now
warned him of the danger of further progress west without augmented
protection of his flanks.
[Illustration: BENEDICT CROWELL
Assistant Secretary of War and, during Mr. Baker's absence in Europe,
Acting Secretary of War
(© _Harris & Ewing_)]
[Illustration: AMERICAN ARMY CHIEFS AND EXPERTS
Maj. Gen. George O. Squier,
_Chief of Signal Corps_]
[Illustration: Lieut. Col. Edward A. Kreger,
_Judge Advocate General in France_
(© _Harris & Ewing_)]
[Illustration: Col. Palmer E. Pierce,
_Director of Purchases for the War Department_
(© _Harris & Ewing_)]
[Illustration: Maj. Gen. Evan M. Johnston,
_Temporary Commander at Camp Upton, N. Y._
(_Press Illustrating Service_)]
Hence, on April 9, the reason for his sudden concentration and attack on
the Lille front, and particularly upon the junction of the British and
Portuguese lines near La Bassée Canal to a point east of Armentières,
which is still in progress. The geographical as well as the strategic
features of this phase of the battle have already been described.
Complete success had marked the German efforts on this sector up to
April 17.
During the entire period covered the airplanes employed on the
battlefront were in the ratio of seven to five in favor of the Allies,
whose killings have been in the ratio of five to two. This, taken in
connection with the destruction of a great German plant and airdrome at
Friedrichshafen on April 15, is believed to place the dominance of the
air with all it includes as to observation and the bombing of transport
and arsenal in the hands of the Allies.