THEAETETUS: And why should that be shameless?
SOCRATES: You seem not to be aware that the whole of our discussion from
the very beginning has been a search after knowledge, of which we are
assumed not to know the nature.
THEAETETUS: Nay, but I am well aware.
SOCRATES: And is it not shameless when we do not know what knowledge is,
to be explaining the verb 'to know'? The truth is, Theaetetus, that we
have long been infected with logical impurity. Thousands of times have
we repeated the words 'we know,' and 'do not know,' and 'we have or have
not science or knowledge,' as if we could understand what we are saying
to one another, so long as we remain ignorant about knowledge; and at
this moment we are using the words 'we understand,' 'we are ignorant,'
as though we could still employ them when deprived of knowledge or
science.
THEAETETUS: But if you avoid these expressions, Socrates, how will you
ever argue at all?
SOCRATES: I could not, being the man I am. The case would be different
if I were a true hero of dialectic: and O that such an one were present!
for he would have told us to avoid the use of these terms; at the same
time he would not have spared in you and me the faults which I have
noted. But, seeing that we are no great wits, shall I venture to say
what knowing is? for I think that the attempt may be worth making.
THEAETETUS: Then by all means venture, and no one shall find fault with
you for using the forbidden terms.
SOCRATES: You have heard the common explanation of the verb 'to know'?
THEAETETUS: I think so, but I do not remember it at the moment.
SOCRATES: They explain the word 'to know' as meaning 'to have
knowledge.'
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: I should like to make a slight change, and say 'to possess'
knowledge.
THEAETETUS: How do the two expressions differ?
SOCRATES: Perhaps there may be no difference; but still I should like
you to hear my view, that you may help me to test it.
THEAETETUS: I will, if I can.
SOCRATES: I should distinguish 'having' from 'possessing': for example,
a man may buy and keep under his control a garment which he does not
wear; and then we should say, not that he has, but that he possesses the
garment.
THEAETETUS: It would be the correct expression.
SOCRATES: Well, may not a man 'possess' and yet not 'have' knowledge
in the sense of which I am speaking? As you may suppose a man to have
caught wild birds--doves or any other birds--and to be keeping them in
an aviary which he has constructed at home; we might say of him in one
sense, that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And yet, in another sense, he has none of them; but they are
in his power, and he has got them under his hand in an enclosure of his
own, and can take and have them whenever he likes;--he can catch any
which he likes, and let the bird go again, and he may do so as often as
he pleases.
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: Once more, then, as in what preceded we made a sort of waxen
figment in the mind, so let us now suppose that in the mind of each man
there is an aviary of all sorts of birds--some flocking together apart
from the rest, others in small groups, others solitary, flying anywhere
and everywhere.
THEAETETUS: Let us imagine such an aviary--and what is to follow?
SOCRATES: We may suppose that the birds are kinds of knowledge, and that
when we were children, this receptacle was empty; whenever a man has
gotten and detained in the enclosure a kind of knowledge, he may be
said to have learned or discovered the thing which is the subject of the
knowledge: and this is to know.
THEAETETUS: Granted.
SOCRATES: And further, when any one wishes to catch any of these
knowledges or sciences, and having taken, to hold it, and again to let
them go, how will he express himself?--will he describe the 'catching'
of them and the original 'possession' in the same words? I will make
my meaning clearer by an example:--You admit that there is an art of
arithmetic?
THEAETETUS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: Conceive this under the form of a hunt after the science of
odd and even in general.
THEAETETUS: I follow.
SOCRATES: Having the use of the art, the arithmetician, if I am not
mistaken, has the conceptions of number under his hand, and can transmit
them to another.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And when transmitting them he may be said to teach them, and
when receiving to learn them, and when receiving to learn them, and when
having them in possession in the aforesaid aviary he may be said to know
them.
THEAETETUS: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Attend to what follows: must not the perfect arithmetician
know all numbers, for he has the science of all numbers in his mind?
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: And he can reckon abstract numbers in his head, or things
about him which are numerable?
THEAETETUS: Of course he can.
SOCRATES: And to reckon is simply to consider how much such and such a
number amounts to?
THEAETETUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: And so he appears to be searching into something which he
knows, as if he did not know it, for we have already admitted that he
knows all numbers;--you have heard these perplexing questions raised?
THEAETETUS: I have.
SOCRATES: May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the
chase after knowledge is of two kinds? one kind is prior to possession
and for the sake of possession, and the other for the sake of taking and
holding in the hands that which is possessed already. And thus, when a
man has learned and known something long ago, he may resume and get hold
of the knowledge which he has long possessed, but has not at hand in his
mind.
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: That was my reason for asking how we ought to speak when an
arithmetician sets about numbering, or a grammarian about reading? Shall
we say, that although he knows, he comes back to himself to learn what
he already knows?
THEAETETUS: It would be too absurd, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Shall we say then that he is going to read or number what he
does not know, although we have admitted that he knows all letters and
all numbers?
THEAETETUS: That, again, would be an absurdity.
SOCRATES: Then shall we say that about names we care nothing?--any one
may twist and turn the words 'knowing' and 'learning' in any way which
he likes, but since we have determined that the possession of knowledge
is not the having or using it, we do assert that a man cannot not
possess that which he possesses; and, therefore, in no case can a man
not know that which he knows, but he may get a false opinion about it;
for he may have the knowledge, not of this particular thing, but of some
other;--when the various numbers and forms of knowledge are flying about
in the aviary, and wishing to capture a certain sort of knowledge out
of the general store, he takes the wrong one by mistake, that is to say,
when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the ring-dove which
he had in his mind, when he wanted the pigeon.
THEAETETUS: A very rational explanation.
SOCRATES: But when he catches the one which he wants, then he is not
deceived, and has an opinion of what is, and thus false and true opinion
may exist, and the difficulties which were previously raised disappear.
I dare say that you agree with me, do you not?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And so we are rid of the difficulty of a man's not knowing
what he knows, for we are not driven to the inference that he does not
possess what he possesses, whether he be or be not deceived. And yet I
fear that a greater difficulty is looking in at the window.
THEAETETUS: What is it?
SOCRATES: How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become
false opinion?
THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: In the first place, how can a man who has the knowledge of
anything be ignorant of that which he knows, not by reason of ignorance,
but by reason of his own knowledge? And, again, is it not an extreme
absurdity that he should suppose another thing to be this, and this to
be another thing;--that, having knowledge present with him in his mind,
he should still know nothing and be ignorant of all things?--you might
as well argue that ignorance may make a man know, and blindness make him
see, as that knowledge can make him ignorant.
THEAETETUS: Perhaps, Socrates, we may have been wrong in making only
forms of knowledge our birds: whereas there ought to have been forms of
ignorance as well, flying about together in the mind, and then he who
sought to take one of them might sometimes catch a form of knowledge,
and sometimes a form of ignorance; and thus he would have a false
opinion from ignorance, but a true one from knowledge, about the same
thing.
SOCRATES: I cannot help praising you, Theaetetus, and yet I must beg you
to reconsider your words. Let us grant what you say--then, according to
you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion--am I right?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion?
THEAETETUS: Of course not.
SOCRATES: He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that
he knows the things about which he has been deceived?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not
ignorance?
THEAETETUS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: And thus, after going a long way round, we are once more face
to face with our original difficulty. The hero of dialectic will retort
upon us:--'O my excellent friends, he will say, laughing, if a man knows
the form of ignorance and the form of knowledge, can he think that one
of them which he knows is the other which he knows? or, if he knows
neither of them, can he think that the one which he knows not is another
which he knows not? or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think
the one which he knows to be the one which he does not know? or the one
which he does not know to be the one which he knows? or will you tell me
that there are other forms of knowledge which distinguish the right and
wrong birds, and which the owner keeps in some other aviaries or graven
on waxen blocks according to your foolish images, and which he may be
said to know while he possesses them, even though he have them not at
hand in his mind? And thus, in a perpetual circle, you will be compelled
to go round and round, and you will make no progress.' What are we to
say in reply, Theaetetus?
THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know what we are to say.
SOCRATES: Are not his reproaches just, and does not the argument truly
show that we are wrong in seeking for false opinion until we know what
knowledge is; that must be first ascertained; then, the nature of false
opinion?
THEAETETUS: I cannot but agree with you, Socrates, so far as we have yet
gone.
SOCRATES: Then, once more, what shall we say that knowledge is?--for we
are not going to lose heart as yet.
THEAETETUS: Certainly, I shall not lose heart, if you do not.
SOCRATES: What definition will be most consistent with our former views?
THEAETETUS: I cannot think of any but our old one, Socrates.
SOCRATES: What was it?
THEAETETUS: Knowledge was said by us to be true opinion; and true
opinion is surely unerring, and the results which follow from it are all
noble and good.
SOCRATES: He who led the way into the river, Theaetetus, said 'The
experiment will show;' and perhaps if we go forward in the search, we
may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for; but if we stay
where we are, nothing will come to light.
THEAETETUS: Very true; let us go forward and try.
SOCRATES: The trail soon comes to an end, for a whole profession is
against us.
THEAETETUS: How is that, and what profession do you mean?
SOCRATES: The profession of the great wise ones who are called orators
and lawyers; for these persuade men by their art and make them think
whatever they like, but they do not teach them. Do you imagine that
there are any teachers in the world so clever as to be able to convince
others of the truth about acts of robbery or violence, of which
they were not eye-witnesses, while a little water is flowing in the
clepsydra?
THEAETETUS: Certainly not, they can only persuade them.
SOCRATES: And would you not say that persuading them is making them have
an opinion?
THEAETETUS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about matters
which you can know only by seeing them, and not in any other way, and
when thus judging of them from report they attain a true opinion about
them, they judge without knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if
they have judged well.
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts and
knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have judged rightly
without knowledge; and therefore I must infer that they are not the
same.
THEAETETUS: That is a distinction, Socrates, which I have heard made
by some one else, but I had forgotten it. He said that true opinion,
combined with reason, was knowledge, but that the opinion which had
no reason was out of the sphere of knowledge; and that things of which
there is no rational account are not knowable--such was the singular
expression which he used--and that things which have a reason or
explanation are knowable.
SOCRATES: Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things
which are and are not 'knowable'? I wish that you would repeat to me
what he said, and then I shall know whether you and I have heard the
same tale.
THEAETETUS: I do not know whether I can recall it; but if another person
would tell me, I think that I could follow him.
SOCRATES: Let me give you, then, a dream in return for a
dream:--Methought that I too had a dream, and I heard in my dream that
the primeval letters or elements out of which you and I and all other
things are compounded, have no reason or explanation; you can only name
them, but no predicate can be either affirmed or denied of them, for in
the one case existence, in the other non-existence is already implied,
neither of which must be added, if you mean to speak of this or that
thing by itself alone. It should not be called itself, or that, or each,
or alone, or this, or the like; for these go about everywhere and are
applied to all things, but are distinct from them; whereas, if the first
elements could be described, and had a definition of their own, they
would be spoken of apart from all else. But none of these primeval
elements can be defined; they can only be named, for they have nothing
but a name, and the things which are compounded of them, as they are
complex, are expressed by a combination of names, for the combination
of names is the essence of a definition. Thus, then, the elements or
letters are only objects of perception, and cannot be defined or known;
but the syllables or combinations of them are known and expressed, and
are apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, any one forms the true
opinion of anything without rational explanation, you may say that his
mind is truly exercised, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give
and receive a reason for a thing, has no knowledge of that thing; but
when he adds rational explanation, then, he is perfected in knowledge
and may be all that I have been denying of him. Was that the form in
which the dream appeared to you?
THEAETETUS: Precisely.
SOCRATES: And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with
definition or rational explanation, is knowledge?
THEAETETUS: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that to-day, and in this
casual manner, we have found a truth which in former times many wise men
have grown old and have not found?
THEAETETUS: At any rate, Socrates, I am satisfied with the present
statement.
SOCRATES: Which is probably correct--for how can there be knowledge
apart from definition and true opinion? And yet there is one point in
what has been said which does not quite satisfy me.
THEAETETUS: What was it?
SOCRATES: What might seem to be the most ingenious notion of all:--That
the elements or letters are unknown, but the combination or syllables
known.
THEAETETUS: And was that wrong?
SOCRATES: We shall soon know; for we have as hostages the instances
which the author of the argument himself used.
THEAETETUS: What hostages?
SOCRATES: The letters, which are the clements; and the syllables, which
are the combinations;--he reasoned, did he not, from the letters of the
alphabet?
THEAETETUS: Yes; he did.
SOCRATES: Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather, test
ourselves:--What was the way in which we learned letters? and, first of
all, are we right in saying that syllables have a definition, but that
letters have no definition?
THEAETETUS: I think so.
SOCRATES: I think so too; for, suppose that some one asks you to spell
the first syllable of my name:--Theaetetus, he says, what is SO?
THEAETETUS: I should reply S and O.
SOCRATES: That is the definition which you would give of the syllable?
THEAETETUS: I should.
SOCRATES: I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the S.
THEAETETUS: But how can any one, Socrates, tell the elements of an
element? I can only reply, that S is a consonant, a mere noise, as
of the tongue hissing; B, and most other letters, again, are neither
vowel-sounds nor noises. Thus letters may be most truly said to be
undefined; for even the most distinct of them, which are the seven
vowels, have a sound only, but no definition at all.
SOCRATES: Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in
our idea about knowledge?
THEAETETUS: Yes; I think that we have.
SOCRATES: Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables
can be known, but not the letters?
THEAETETUS: I think so.
SOCRATES: And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are
more, all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination
of them?
THEAETETUS: I should say that we mean all the letters.
SOCRATES: Take the case of the two letters S and O, which form the first
syllable of my own name; must not he who knows the syllable, know both
of them?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: He knows, that is, the S and O?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both
together?
THEAETETUS: Such a supposition, Socrates, is monstrous and unmeaning.
SOCRATES: But if he cannot know both without knowing each, then if he is
ever to know the syllable, he must know the letters first; and thus the
fine theory has again taken wings and departed.
THEAETETUS: Yes, with wonderful celerity.
SOCRATES: Yes, we did not keep watch properly. Perhaps we ought to have
maintained that a syllable is not the letters, but rather one single
idea framed out of them, having a separate form distinct from them.
THEAETETUS: Very true; and a more likely notion than the other.
SOCRATES: Take care; let us not be cowards and betray a great and
imposing theory.
THEAETETUS: No, indeed.
SOCRATES: Let us assume then, as we now say, that the syllable is
a simple form arising out of the several combinations of harmonious
elements--of letters or of any other elements.
THEAETETUS: Very good.
SOCRATES: And it must have no parts.
THEAETETUS: Why?
SOCRATES: Because that which has parts must be a whole of all the parts.
Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a
single notion different from all the parts?
THEAETETUS: I should.
SOCRATES: And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or
different?
THEAETETUS: I am not certain; but, as you like me to answer at once, I
shall hazard the reply, that they are different.
SOCRATES: I approve of your readiness, Theaetetus, but I must take time
to think whether I equally approve of your answer.
THEAETETUS: Yes; the answer is the point.
SOCRATES: According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ
from all?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well, but is there any difference between all (in the plural)
and the all (in the singular)? Take the case of number:--When we say
one, two, three, four, five, six; or when we say twice three, or three
times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we speaking of
the same or of different numbers?
THEAETETUS: Of the same.
SOCRATES: That is of six?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six?
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: Again, in speaking of all (in the plural) is there not one
thing which we express?
THEAETETUS: Of course there is.
SOCRATES: And that is six?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then in predicating the word 'all' of things measured by
number, we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural?
THEAETETUS: Clearly we do.
SOCRATES: Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are
they not?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar
cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing?
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: And the number of each is the parts of each?
THEAETETUS: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts?
THEAETETUS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire
number is the all?
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the
all, if consisting of all the parts?
THEAETETUS: That is the inference.
SOCRATES: But is a part a part of anything but the whole?
THEAETETUS: Yes, of the all.
SOCRATES: You make a valiant defence, Theaetetus. And yet is not the all
that of which nothing is wanting?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent?
but that from which anything is absent is neither a whole nor all;--if
wanting in anything, both equally lose their entirety of nature.
THEAETETUS: I now think that there is no difference between a whole and
all.
SOCRATES: But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the
parts will be a whole and all?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then, as I was saying before, must not the alternative be that
either the syllable is not the letters, and then the letters are not
parts of the syllable, or that the syllable will be the same with the
letters, and will therefore be equally known with them?
THEAETETUS: You are right.
SOCRATES: And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different
from them?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of
any other parts of syllables, which are not letters?
THEAETETUS: No, indeed, Socrates; for if I admit the existence of parts
in a syllable, it would be ridiculous in me to give up letters and seek
for other parts.
SOCRATES: Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our
present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form?
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: But do you remember, my friend, that only a little while ago
we admitted and approved the statement, that of the first elements out
of which all other things are compounded there could be no definition,
because each of them when taken by itself is uncompounded; nor can one
rightly attribute to them the words 'being' or 'this,' because they
are alien and inappropriate words, and for this reason the letters or
elements were indefinable and unknown?
THEAETETUS: I remember.
SOCRATES: And is not this also the reason why they are simple and
indivisible? I can see no other.
THEAETETUS: No other reason can be given.
SOCRATES: Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or
letters, if it has no parts and is one form?
THEAETETUS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: If, then, a syllable is a whole, and has many parts or
letters, the letters as well as the syllable must be intelligible and
expressible, since all the parts are acknowledged to be the same as the
whole?
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the
letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason?
THEAETETUS: I cannot deny that.
SOCRATES: We cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion of him who says
that the syllable can be known and expressed, but not the letters.
THEAETETUS: Certainly not; if we may trust the argument.
SOCRATES: Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with
him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read?
THEAETETUS: What experience?
SOCRATES: Why, that in learning you were kept trying to distinguish the
separate letters both by the eye and by the ear, in order that, when
you heard them spoken or saw them written, you might not be confused by
their position.
THEAETETUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: And is the education of the harp-player complete unless he can
tell what string answers to a particular note; the notes, as every one
would allow, are the elements or letters of music?
THEAETETUS: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Then, if we argue from the letters and syllables which we know
to other simples and compounds, we shall say that the letters or simple
elements as a class are much more certainly known than the syllables,
and much more indispensable to a perfect knowledge of any subject; and
if some one says that the syllable is known and the letter unknown,
we shall consider that either intentionally or unintentionally he is
talking nonsense?
THEAETETUS: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And there might be given other proofs of this belief, if I am
not mistaken. But do not let us in looking for them lose sight of the
question before us, which is the meaning of the statement, that right
opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most perfect form
of knowledge.
THEAETETUS: We must not.
SOCRATES: Well, and what is the meaning of the term 'explanation'? I
think that we have a choice of three meanings.
THEAETETUS: What are they?
SOCRATES: In the first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one's
thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging an opinion in the
stream which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Does not
explanation appear to be of this nature?
THEAETETUS: Certainly; he who so manifests his thought, is said to
explain himself.
SOCRATES: And every one who is not born deaf or dumb is able sooner or
later to manifest what he thinks of anything; and if so, all those who
have a right opinion about anything will also have right explanation;
nor will right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart from knowledge.
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: Let us not, therefore, hastily charge him who gave this
account of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word; for perhaps he
only intended to say, that when a person was asked what was the nature
of anything, he should be able to answer his questioner by giving the
elements of the thing.
THEAETETUS: As for example, Socrates...?
SOCRATES: As, for example, when Hesiod says that a waggon is made up
of a hundred planks. Now, neither you nor I could describe all of
them individually; but if any one asked what is a waggon, we should be
content to answer, that a waggon consists of wheels, axle, body, rims,
yoke.
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And our opponent will probably laugh at us, just as he would
if we professed to be grammarians and to give a grammatical account of
the name of Theaetetus, and yet could only tell the syllables and not
the letters of your name--that would be true opinion, and not knowledge;
for knowledge, as has been already remarked, is not attained until,
combined with true opinion, there is an enumeration of the elements out
of which anything is composed.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: In the same general way, we might also have true opinion about
a waggon; but he who can describe its essence by an enumeration of the
hundred planks, adds rational explanation to true opinion, and instead
of opinion has art and knowledge of the nature of a waggon, in that he
attains to the whole through the elements.
THEAETETUS: And do you not agree in that view, Socrates?
SOCRATES: If you do, my friend; but I want to know first, whether you
admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational
explanation of them, and the consideration of them in syllables or
larger combinations of them to be irrational--is this your view?
THEAETETUS: Precisely.
SOCRATES: Well, and do you conceive that a man has knowledge of any
element who at one time affirms and at another time denies that element
of something, or thinks that the same thing is composed of different
elements at different times?
THEAETETUS: Assuredly not.
SOCRATES: And do you not remember that in your case and in that of
others this often occurred in the process of learning to read?
THEAETETUS: You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the
syllables?
SOCRATES: Yes.
THEAETETUS: To be sure; I perfectly remember, and I am very far from
supposing that they who are in this condition have knowledge.
SOCRATES: When a person at the time of learning writes the name of
Theaetetus, and thinks that he ought to write and does write Th and e;
but, again, meaning to write the name of Theododorus, thinks that he
ought to write and does write T and e--can we suppose that he knows the
first syllables of your two names?
THEAETETUS: We have already admitted that such a one has not yet
attained knowledge.
SOCRATES: And in like manner be may enumerate without knowing them the
second and third and fourth syllables of your name?
THEAETETUS: He may.
SOCRATES: And in that case, when he knows the order of the letters and
can write them out correctly, he has right opinion?
THEAETETUS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still
be without knowledge?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And yet he will have explanation, as well as right opinion,
for he knew the order of the letters when he wrote; and this we admit to
be explanation.
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: Then, my friend, there is such a thing as right opinion united
with definition or explanation, which does not as yet attain to the
exactness of knowledge.
THEAETETUS: It would seem so.
SOCRATES: And what we fancied to be a perfect definition of knowledge
is a dream only. But perhaps we had better not say so as yet, for were
there not three explanations of knowledge, one of which must, as we
said, be adopted by him who maintains knowledge to be true opinion
combined with rational explanation? And very likely there may be found
some one who will not prefer this but the third.
THEAETETUS: You are quite right; there is still one remaining. The first
was the image or expression of the mind in speech; the second, which has
just been mentioned, is a way of reaching the whole by an enumeration of
the elements. But what is the third definition?
SOCRATES: There is, further, the popular notion of telling the mark or
sign of difference which distinguishes the thing in question from all
others.
THEAETETUS: Can you give me any example of such a definition?
SOCRATES: As, for example, in the case of the sun, I think that you
would be contented with the statement that the sun is the brightest of
the heavenly bodies which revolve about the earth.
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Understand why:--the reason is, as I was just now saying, that
if you get at the difference and distinguishing characteristic of each
thing, then, as many persons affirm, you will get at the definition or
explanation of it; but while you lay hold only of the common and not of
the characteristic notion, you will only have the definition of those
things to which this common quality belongs.
THEAETETUS: I understand you, and your account of definition is in my
judgment correct.
SOCRATES: But he, who having right opinion about anything, can find out
the difference which distinguishes it from other things will know that
of which before he had only an opinion.
THEAETETUS: Yes; that is what we are maintaining.
SOCRATES: Nevertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer view, I find myself
quite disappointed; the picture, which at a distance was not so bad, has
now become altogether unintelligible.
THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain: I will suppose myself to have
true opinion of you, and if to this I add your definition, then I have
knowledge, but if not, opinion only.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: The definition was assumed to be the interpretation of your
difference.
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: But when I had only opinion, I had no conception of your
distinguishing characteristics.
THEAETETUS: I suppose not.
SOCRATES: Then I must have conceived of some general or common nature
which no more belonged to you than to another.
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: Tell me, now--How in that case could I have formed a judgment
of you any more than of any one else? Suppose that I imagine Theaetetus
to be a man who has nose, eyes, and mouth, and every other member
complete; how would that enable me to distinguish Theaetetus from
Theodorus, or from some outer barbarian?
THEAETETUS: How could it?
SOCRATES: Or if I had further conceived of you, not only as having nose
and eyes, but as having a snub nose and prominent eyes, should I have
any more notion of you than of myself and others who resemble me?
THEAETETUS: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: Surely I can have no conception of Theaetetus until your
snub-nosedness has left an impression on my mind different from the
snub-nosedness of all others whom I have ever seen, and until your other
peculiarities have a like distinctness; and so when I meet you to-morrow
the right opinion will be re-called?
THEAETETUS: Most true.
SOCRATES: Then right opinion implies the perception of differences?
THEAETETUS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explanation to
right opinion? If the meaning is, that we should form an opinion of
the way in which something differs from another thing, the proposal is
ridiculous.
THEAETETUS: How so?
SOCRATES: We are supposed to acquire a right opinion of the differences
which distinguish one thing from another when we have already a right
opinion of them, and so we go round and round:--the revolution of the
scytal, or pestle, or any other rotatory machine, in the same circles,
is as nothing compared with such a requirement; and we may be truly
described as the blind directing the blind; for to add those things
which we already have, in order that we may learn what we already think,
is like a soul utterly benighted.
THEAETETUS: Tell me; what were you going to say just now, when you asked
the question?
SOCRATES: If, my boy, the argument, in speaking of adding the
definition, had used the word to 'know,' and not merely 'have an
opinion' of the difference, this which is the most promising of all the
definitions of knowledge would have come to a pretty end, for to know is
surely to acquire knowledge.
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: And so, when the question is asked, What is knowledge? this
fair argument will answer 'Right opinion with knowledge,'--knowledge,
that is, of difference, for this, as the said argument maintains, is
adding the definition.
THEAETETUS: That seems to be true.
SOCRATES: But how utterly foolish, when we are asking what is knowledge,
that the reply should only be, right opinion with knowledge of
difference or of anything! And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither
sensation nor true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation
accompanying and added to true opinion?
THEAETETUS: I suppose not.
SOCRATES: And are you still in labour and travail, my dear friend, or
have you brought all that you have to say about knowledge to the birth?
THEAETETUS: I am sure, Socrates, that you have elicited from me a good
deal more than ever was in me.
SOCRATES: And does not my art show that you have brought forth wind, and
that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up?
THEAETETUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: But if, Theaetetus, you should ever conceive afresh, you will
be all the better for the present investigation, and if not, you will be
soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, and will be too modest
to fancy that you know what you do not know. These are the limits of my
art; I can no further go, nor do I know aught of the things which great
and famous men know or have known in this or former ages. The office
of a midwife I, like my mother, have received from God; she delivered
women, I deliver men; but they must be young and noble and fair.
And now I have to go to the porch of the King Archon, where I am to meet
Meletus and his indictment. To-morrow morning, Theodorus, I shall hope
to see you again at this place.