CHAPTER VI

ROMANTIC LOVE

What first strikes one in Rousseau’s attitude towards love is the

separation, even wider here perhaps than elsewhere, between the ideal

and the real. He dilates in the “Confessions” on the difference of

the attachment that he felt when scarcely more than a boy for two

young women of Geneva, Mademoiselle Vulson and Mademoiselle Goton. His

attachment for the latter was real in a sense that Zola would have

understood. His attachment for Mademoiselle Vulson reminds one rather

of that of a mediæval knight for his lady. The same contrast runs

through Rousseau’s life. “Seamstresses, chambermaids, shop-girls,” he

says, “attracted me very little. I had to have fine ladies.”[144] So

much for the ideal; the real was Thérèse Levasseur.

We are not to suppose that Rousseau’s love even when most ideal is

really exalted above the fleshly level. Byron indeed says of Rousseau

that “his was not the love of living dame but of ideal beauty,” and

if this were strictly true Rousseau might be accounted a Platonist.

But any particular beautiful object is for Plato only a symbol or

adumbration of a supersensuous beauty; so that an earthly love can be

at best only a stepping-stone to the Uranian Aphrodite. The terrestrial

and the heavenly loves are not in short run together, whereas the

essence of Rousseauistic love is this very blending. “Rousseau,” says

Joubert, “had a voluptuous mind. In his writings the soul is always

mingled with the body and never distinct from it. No one has ever

rendered more vividly the impression of the flesh touching the spirit

and the delights of their marriage.” I need not, however, repeat here

what I have said elsewhere[145] about this confusion of the planes of

being, perhaps the most important aspect of romantic love.

Though Rousseau is not a true Platonist in his treatment of love, he

does, as I have said, recall at times the cult of the mediæval knight

for his lady. One may even find in mediæval love something that is

remotely related to Rousseau’s contrast between the ideal and the

actual; for in its attitude towards woman as in other respects the

Middle Ages tended to be extreme. Woman is either depressed below the

human level as the favorite instrument of the devil in man’s temptation

(_mulier hominis confusio_), or else exalted above this level as the

mother of God. The figure of Mary blends sense and spirit in a way that

is foreign to Plato and the ancients. As Heine says very profanely,

the Virgin was a sort of heavenly _dame du comptoir_ whose celestial

smile drew the northern barbarians into the Church. Sense was thus

pressed into the service of spirit at the risk of a perilous confusion.

The chivalric cult of the lady has obvious points of contact with the

worship of the Madonna. The knight who is raised from one height of

perfection to another by the light of his lady’s eyes is also pressing

sense into the service of spirit with the same risk that the process

may be reversed. The reversal actually takes place in Rousseau and his

followers: spirit is pressed into the service of sense in such wise as

to give to sense a sort of infinitude. Baudelaire pays his homage to a

Parisian grisette in the form of a Latin canticle to the Virgin.[146]

The perversion of mediæval love is equally though not quite so

obviously present in many other Rousseauists.

I have said that the Middle Ages inclined to the extreme; mediæval

writers are, however, fond of insisting on “measure”; and this

is almost inevitable in view of the large amount of classical,

especially Aristotelian, survival throughout this period. But the two

distinctively mediæval types, the saint and the knight, are neither

of them mediators. They stand, however, on an entirely different

footing as regards the law of measure. Not even Aristotle himself would

maintain that the law of measure applies to saintliness, and in general

to the religious realm. The saint in so far as he is saintly has

undergone conversion, has in the literal sense of the word faced around

and is looking in an entirely different direction from that to which

the warnings “nothing too much” and “think as a mortal” apply. Very

different psychic elements may indeed appear in any particular saint. A

book has been published recently on the “Romanticism of St. Francis.”

The truth seems to be that though St. Francis had his romantic side,

he was even more religious than romantic. One may affirm with some

confidence of another mediæval figure, Peter the Hermit, that he was,

on the other hand, much more romantic than religious. For all the

information we have tends to show that he was a very restless person

and a man’s restlessness is ordinarily in inverse ratio to his religion.

If the saint transcends in a way the law of measure, the knight on

the other hand should be subject to it. For courage and the love of

woman--his main interests in life--belong not to the religious but

to the secular realm. But in his conception of love and courage the

knight was plainly not a mediator but an extremist: he was haunted

by the idea of adventure, of a love and courage that transcend the

bounds not merely of the probable but of the possible. His imagination

is romantic in the sense I have tried to define--it is straining,

that is, beyond the confines of the real. Ruskin’s violent diatribe

against Cervantes[147] for having killed “idealism” by his ridicule

of these knightly exaggerations, is in itself absurd, but interesting

as evidence of the quality of Ruskin’s own imagination. Like other

romanticists I have cited, he seems to have been not unaware of his own

kinship to Don Quixote. The very truth about either the mediæval or

modern forms of romantic love--love which is on the secular level and

at the same time sets itself above the law of measure--was uttered by

Dr. Johnson in his comment on the heroic plays of Dryden: “By admitting

the romantic omnipotence of love he has recommended as laudable and

worthy of imitation that conduct which through all ages the good have

censured as vicious and the bad have despised as foolish.”

The man of the Middle Ages, however extravagant in his imaginings,

was often no doubt terrestrial enough in his practice. The troubadour

who addressed his high-flown fancies to some fair châtelaine (usually

a married woman) often had relations in real life not unlike those

of Rousseau with Thérèse Levasseur. Some such contrast indeed between

the “ideal” and the “real” existed in the life of one of Rousseau’s

favorite poets, Petrarch. The lover may, however, run together the

ideal and the real. He may glorify some comparatively commonplace

person, crown as queen of his heart some Dulcinea del Toboso. Hazlitt

employs appropriately in describing his own passion for the vulgar

daughter of a London boarding-house keeper the very words of Cervantes:

“He had courted a statue, hunted the wind, cried aloud to the desert.”

Hazlitt like other lovers of this type is in love not with a particular

person but with his own dream. He is as one may say in love with love.

No subject indeed illustrates like this of love the nostalgia, the

infinite indeterminate desire of the romantic imagination. Something of

this diffusive longing no doubt came into the world with Christianity.

There is a wide gap between the sentence of St. Augustine that Shelley

has taken as epigraph for his “Alastor”[148] and the spirit of the

great Greek and Roman classics. Yet such is the abiding vitality of

Greek mythology that one finds in Greece perhaps the best symbol of

the romantic lover. Rousseau could not fail to be attracted by the

story of Pygmalion and Galatea. His lyrical “monodrama” in poetical

prose, “Pygmalion,” is important not only for its literary but for its

musical influence. The Germans in particular (including the youthful

Goethe) were fascinated. To the mature Goethe Rousseau’s account of the

sculptor who became enamored of his own creation and breathed into it

actual life by the sheer intensity of his desire seemed a delirious

confusion of the planes of being, an attempt to drag ideal beauty down

to the level of sensuous realization. But a passion thus conceived

exactly satisfies the romantic requirement. For though the romanticist

wishes to abandon himself to the rapture of love, he does not wish to

transcend his own ego. The object with which Pygmalion is in love is

after all only a projection of his own “genius.” But such an object is

not in any proper sense an object at all. There is in fact no object in

the romantic universe--only subject. This subjective love amounts in

practice to a use of the imagination to enhance emotional intoxication,

or if one prefers, to the pursuit of illusion for its own sake.

This lack of definite object appears just as clearly in the German

symbol of romantic love--the blue flower. The blue flower resolves

itself at last, it will be remembered, into a fair feminine

face[149]--a face that cannot, however, be overtaken. The color

typifies the blue distance in which it always loses itself, “the

never-ending quest after the ever-fleeting object of desire.” The

object is thus elusive because, as I have said, it is not, properly

speaking, an object at all but only a dalliance of the imagination

with its own dream. Cats, says Rivarol, do not caress us, they caress

themselves upon us. But though cats may suffer from what the new

realist calls the egocentric predicament, they can scarcely vie in the

subtle involutions of their egoism with the romantic lover. Besides

creating the symbol of the blue flower, Novalis treats romantic love

in his unfinished tale “The Disciples at Saïs.” He contemplated two

endings to this tale--in the one, when the disciple lifts the veil

of the inmost sanctuary of the temple at Saïs, Rosenblütchen (the

equivalent of the blue flower) falls into his arms. In the second

version what he sees when he lifts the mysterious veil is--“wonder of

wonders--himself.” The two endings are in substance the same.

The story of Novalis’s attachment for a fourteen-year-old girl, Sophie

von Kühn, and of his plans on her death for a truly romantic suicide--a

swooning away into the night--and then of the suddenness with which

he transferred his dream to another maiden, Julie von Charpentier,

is familiar. If Sophie had lived and Novalis had lived and they had

wedded, he might conceivably have made her a faithful husband, but she

would no longer have been the blue flower, the ideal. For one’s love

is for something infinitely remote; it is as Shelley says, in what is

perhaps the most perfect expression of romantic longing:

The desire of the moth for the star,

Of the night for the morrow,

The devotion to something afar

From the sphere of our sorrow.

The sphere of Shelley’s sorrow at the time he wrote these lines to Mrs.

Williams was Mary Godwin. In the time of Harriet Westbrook, Mary had

been the “star.”

The romantic lover often feigns in explanation of his nostalgia

that in some previous existence he had been enamored of a nymph--an

Egeria--or a woman transcending the ordinary mould--“some Lilith or

Helen or Antigone.”[150] Shelley inquires eagerly in one of his letters

about the new poem by Horace Smith, “The Nympholept.” In the somewhat

unclassical sense that the term came to have in the romantic movement,

Shelley is himself the perfect example of the nympholept. In this

respect as in others, however, he merely continues Rousseau. “If it had

not been for some memories of my youth and Madame d’Houdetot,” says

Jean-Jacques, “the loves that I have felt and described would have been

only with sylphids.”[151]

Chateaubriand speaks with aristocratic disdain of Rousseau’s Venetian

amours, but on the “ideal” side he is not only his follower but perhaps

the supreme French example of nympholepsy. He describes his lady of

dreams sometimes like Rousseau as the “sylphid,” sometimes as his

“phantom of love.” He had been haunted by this phantom almost from his

childhood. “Even then I glimpsed that to love and be loved in a way

that was unknown to me was destined to be my supreme felicity. … As a

result of the ardor of my imagination, my timidity and solitude, I did

not turn to the outer world, but was thrown back upon myself. In the

absence of a real object, I evoked by the power of my vague desires a

phantom that was never to leave me.” To those who remember the closely

parallel passages in Rousseau, Chateaubriand will seem to exaggerate

the privilege of the original genius to look on himself as unique when

he adds: “I do not know whether the history of the human heart offers

another example of this nature.”[152] The pursuit of this phantom of

love gives the secret key to Chateaubriand’s life. He takes refuge in

the American wilderness in order that he may have in this primitive

Arcadia a more spacious setting for his dream.[153]

If one wishes to see how very similar these nympholeptic experiences

are not only from individual to individual, but from country to

country, one has only to compare the passages I have just been quoting

from Chateaubriand with Shelley’s “Epipsychidion.” Shelley writes of

his own youth:

There was a Being whom my spirit oft

Met on its visioned wanderings, far aloft,

In the clear golden prime of my youth’s dawn,

Upon the fairy isles of sunny lawn,

Amid the enchanted mountains, and the caves

Of divine sleep, and on the air-like waves

Of wonder-level dream, whose tremulous floor

Paved her light steps; on an imagined shore,

Under the gray beak of some promontory

She met me, robed in such exceeding glory,

That I beheld her not, etc.

At the time of writing “Epipsychidion” the magic vision happened to

have coalesced for the moment with Emilia Viviani, though destined soon

to flit elsewhere. Shelley invites his “soul’s sister,” the idyllic

“she,” who is at bottom only a projection of his own imagination, to

set sail with him for Arcady. “Epipsychidion,” indeed, might be used as

a manual to illustrate the difference between mere Arcadian dreaming

and a true Platonism.

Chateaubriand is ordinarily and rightly compared with Byron rather

than with Shelley. He is plainly, however, far more of a nympholept

than Byron. Mr. Hilary, indeed, in Peacock’s “Nightmare Abbey” says

to Mr. Cypress (Byron): “You talk like a Rosicrucian, who will love

nothing but a sylph, who does not believe in the existence of a sylph,

and who yet quarrels with the whole universe for not containing a

sylph.”[154] Certain distinctions would have to be made if one were

attempting a complete study of love in Byron; yet after all the love of

Don Juan and Haidée is one that Sappho or Catullus or Burns would have

understood; and these poets were not nympholepts. They were capable

of burning with love, but not, as Rousseau says of himself, “without

any definite object.”[155] Where Chateaubriand has some resemblance

to Byron is in his actual libertinism. He is however nearer than

Byron to the libertine of the eighteenth century--to the Lovelace who

pushes the pursuit of pleasure to its final exasperation where it

becomes associated with the infliction of pain. Few things are stranger

than the blend in Chateaubriand of this Sadic fury[156] with the new

romantic revery. Indeed almost every type of egotism that may manifest

itself in the relations of the sexes and that pushed to the superlative

pitch, will be found in this theoretical classicist and champion of

Christianity. Perhaps no more frenzied cry has ever issued from human

lips than that uttered by Atala[157] in describing her emotions when

torn between her religious vow and her love for Chactas: “What dream

did not arise in this heart overwhelmed with sorrow. At times in fixing

my eyes upon you, I went so far as to form desires as insensate as

they were guilty; at one moment I seemed to wish that you and I were

the only living creatures upon the earth; and then again, feeling a

divinity that held me back in my horrible transports, I seemed to want

this divinity to be annihilated provided that clasped in your arms I

should roll from abyss to abyss with the ruins of God and the world.”

Longing is here pushed to a pitch where it passes over, as in Wagner’s

“Tristan and Isolde,” into the desire for annihilation.

Actual libertinism is no necessary concomitant of nympholeptic longing.

There is a striking difference in this respect between Poe, for

example, and his translator and disciple, Baudelaire. Nothing could be

less suggestive of voluptuousness than Poe’s nostalgia. “His ecstasy,”

says Stedman, “is that of the nympholept seeking an evasive being of

whom he has glimpses by moonlight, starlight, even fenlight, but never

by noonday.” The embodiments of his dream that flit through his tales

and poems, enhanced his popularity with the ultra-romantic public in

France. These strange apparitions nearly all of whom are epileptic,

cataleptic, or consumptive made a natural appeal to a school that was

known among its detractors as _l’école poitrinaire_. “Tender souls,”

says Gautier, “were specially touched by Poe’s feminine figures, so

vaporous, so transparent and of an almost spectral beauty.” Perhaps

the nympholepsy of Gérard de Nerval is almost equally vaporous and

ethereal. He pursued through various earthly forms the queen of Sheba

whom he had loved in a previous existence and hanged himself at last

with what he believed to be her garter: an interesting example of the

relation between the extreme forms of the romantic imagination and

madness.[158]

The pursuit of a phantom of love through various earthly forms led

in the course of the romantic movement to certain modifications

in a famous legend--that of Don Juan. What is emphasized in the

older Don Juan is not merely his libertinism but his impiety--the

gratification of his appetite in deliberate defiance of God. He is

animated by Satanic pride, by the lust of power as well as by the lust

of sensation. In Molière’s treatment of the legend we can also see

the beginnings of the philanthropic pose.[159] With the progress of

Rousseauism Don Juan tends to become an “idealist,” to seek to satisfy

in his amorous adventures not merely his senses but his “soul” and his

thirst for the “infinite.”[160] Along with this idealistic Don Juan we

also see appearing at a very early stage in the movement the exotic

Don Juan who wishes to have a great deal of strangeness added to his

beauty. In his affair with the “Floridiennes,” Chateaubriand shows the

way to a long series of exotic lovers.

I said to my heart between sleeping and waking,

Thou wild thing that always art leaping or aching,

What black, brown or fair, in what clime, in what nation,

By turns has not taught thee a pit-a-pat-ation?

These lines are so plainly meant for Pierre Loti that one learns

with surprise that they were written about 1724 by the Earl of

Peterborough.[161]

Byron’s Don Juan is at times exotic in his tastes, but, as I have

said, he is not on the whole very nympholeptic--much less so than the

Don Juan of Alfred de Musset, for example. Musset indeed suggests in

many respects a less masculine Byron--Mademoiselle Byron as he has

been called. In one whole side of his art as well as his treatment

of love he simply continues like Byron the eighteenth century. But

far more than Byron he aspires to ideal and absolute passion; so that

the Musset of the “Nuits” is rightly regarded as one of the supreme

embodiments, and at the same time the chief martyr, of the romantic

religion of love. The outcome of his affair with George Sand may

symbolize fitly the wrecking of thousands of more obscure lives by this

mortal chimera. Musset and George Sand sought to come together, yet

what they each sought in love is what the original genius seeks in all

things--self-expression. What Musset saw in George Sand was not the

real woman but only his own dream. But George Sand was not content thus

to reflect back passively to Musset his ideal. She was rather a Galatea

whose ambition it was to create her own Pygmalion. “Your chimera is

between us,” Musset exclaims; but his chimera was between them too.

The more Titan and Titaness try to meet, the more each is driven back

into the solitude of his own ego. They were in love with love rather

than with one another: and to be thus in love with love means on the

last analysis to be in love with one’s own emotions. “To love,” says

Musset, “is the great point. What matters the mistress? What matters

the flagon provided one have the intoxication?”[162] He then proceeds

to carry a love of this quality up into the presence of God and to

present it to him as his justification for having lived. The art of

speaking in tones of religious consecration of what is in its essence

egoistic has never been carried further than by the Rousseauistic

romanticist. God is always appearing at the most unexpected

moments.[163] The highest of which man is capable apparently is to put

an uncurbed imagination into the service of an emancipated temperament.

The credo that Perdican recites at the end of the second act of “On ne

badine pas avec l’Amour”[164] throws light on this point. Men and women

according to this credo are filled with every manner of vileness, yet

there is something “sacred and sublime,” and that is the union of two

of these despicable beings.

The confusion of ethical values here is so palpable as scarcely to call

for comment. It is precisely when men and women set out to love with

this degree of imaginative and emotional unrestraint that they come

to deserve all the opprobrious epithets Musset heaps upon them. This

radiant apotheosis of love and the quagmire in which it actually lands

one is, as I have said, the whole subject of “Madame Bovary.” I shall

need to return to this particular disproportion between the ideal and

the real when I take up the subject of romantic melancholy.

The romantic lover who identifies the ideal with the superlative thrill

is turning the ideal into something very transitory. If the _summum

bonum_ is as Browning avers the “kiss of one girl,” the _summum bonum_

is lost almost as soon as found. The beautiful moment may however be

prolonged in revery. The romanticist may brood over it in the tower of

ivory, and when thus enriched by being steeped in his temperament it

may become more truly his own than it was in reality. “Objects make

less impression upon me than my memory of them,” says Rousseau. He is

indeed the great master of what has been termed the art of impassioned

recollection. This art is far from being confined in its application

to love, though it may perhaps be studied here to the best advantage.

Rousseau, one should note, had very little intellectual memory, but

an extraordinarily keen memory of images and sensations. He could

not, as he tells us in the “Confessions,” learn anything by heart,

but he could recall with perfect distinctness what he had eaten for

breakfast about thirty years before. In general he recalls his past

feelings with a clearness and detail that are perhaps more feminine

than masculine. “He seems,” says Hazlitt, one of his chief disciples

in the art of impassioned recollection, “to gather up the past moments

of his being like drops of honey-dew to distil a precious liquor from

them; his alternate pleasures and pains are the bead-roll that he tells

over and piously worships; he makes a rosary of the flowers of hope

and fancy that strewed his earliest years.”[165] This highly developed

emotional memory is closely associated with the special quality of the

romantic imagination--its cult of Arcadian illusion and the wistful

backward glance to the vanished paradise of childhood and youth when

illusion was most spontaneous. “Let me still recall [these memories],”

says Hazlitt, “that they may breathe fresh life into me, and that I

may live that birthday of thought and romantic pleasure over again!

Talk of the ideal! This is the only true ideal--the heavenly tints

of Fancy reflected in the bubbles that float upon the spring-tide of

human life.”[166] Hazlitt converts criticism itself into an art of

impassioned recollection. He loves to linger over the beautiful moments

of his own literary life. The passing years have increased the richness

of their temperamental refraction and bestowed upon them the “pathos of

distance.” A good example is his account of the two years of his youth

he spent in reading the “Confessions” and the “Nouvelle Héloïse,” and

in shedding tears over them. “They were the happiest years of our life.

We may well say of them, sweet is the dew of their memory and pleasant

the balm of their recollection.”[167]

Rousseau’s own Arcadian memories are usually not of reading, like

Hazlitt’s, but of actual incidents, though he does not hesitate to

alter these incidents freely, as in his account of his stay at Les

Charmettes, and to accommodate them to his dream. He neglected the real

Madame de Warens at the very time that he cherished his recollection of

her because this recollection was the idealized image of his own youth.

The yearning that he expresses at the beginning of his fragmentary

Tenth Promenade, written only a few weeks before his death, is for this

idyllic period rather than for an actual woman.[168] A happy memory,

says Musset, repeating Rousseau, is perhaps more genuine than happiness

itself. Possibly the three best known love poems of Lamartine, Musset,

and Hugo respectively--“Le Lac,” “Souvenir,” and “La Tristesse

d’Olympio,” all hinge upon impassioned recollection and derive very

directly from Rousseau. Lamartine in particular has caught in the “Le

Lac” the very cadence of Rousseau’s reveries.[169]

Impassioned recollection may evidently be an abundant source of genuine

poetry, though not, it must be insisted, of the highest poetry. The

predominant rôle that it plays in Rousseau and many of his followers

is simply a sign of an unduly dalliant imagination. Experience after

all has other uses than to supply furnishings for the tower of ivory;

it should control the judgment and guide the will; it is in short the

necessary basis of conduct. The greater a man’s moral seriousness,

the more he will be concerned with doing rather than dreaming (and

I include right meditation among the forms of doing). He will also

demand an art and literature that reflect this his main preoccupation.

Between Wordsworth’s definition of poetry as “emotion recollected in

tranquillity,” and Aristotle’s definition of poetry as the imitation

of human action according to probability or necessity, a wide gap

plainly opens. One may prefer Aristotle’s definition to that of

Wordsworth and yet do justice to the merits of Wordsworth’s actual

poetical performance. Nevertheless the tendency to put prime emphasis

on feeling instead of action shown in the definition is closely related

to Wordsworth’s failure not only in dramatic but in epic poetry, in all

poetry in short that depends for its success on an element of plot and

sustained narrative.

A curious extension of the art of impassioned recollection should

receive at least passing mention. It has been so extended as to lead

to what one may term an unethical use of literature and history. What

men have done in the past and the consequences of this doing should

surely serve to throw some light on what men should do under similar

circumstances in the present. But the man who turns his own personal

experience into mere dalliance may very well assume a like dalliant

attitude towards the larger experience of the race. This experience

may merely provide him with pretexts for revery. This narcotic use of

literature and history, this art of creating for one’s self an alibi as

Taine calls it, is nearly as old as the romantic movement. The record

of the past becomes a gorgeous pageant that lures one to endless

imaginative exploration and lulls one to oblivion of everything except

its variety and picturesqueness. It becomes everything in fact except a

school of judgment. One may note in connection with this use of history

the usual interplay between scientific and emotional naturalism.

Both forms of naturalism tend to turn man into the mere product and

plaything of physical forces--climate, heredity, and the like, over

which his will has no control. Since literature and history have no

meaning from the point of view of moral choice they may at least be

made to yield the maximum of æsthetic satisfaction. Oscar Wilde argues

in this wise for example in his dialogue “The Critic as Artist,” and

concludes that since man has no moral freedom or responsibility, and

cannot therefore be guided in his conduct by the past experience of the

race, he may at least turn this experience into an incomparable “bower

of dreams.” “The pain of Leopardi crying out against life becomes

our pain. Theocritus blows on his pipe and we laugh with the lips of

nymph and shepherd. In the wolf-skin of Pierre Vidal we flee before

the hounds, and in the armor of Lancelot we ride from the bower of the

queen. We have whispered the secret of our love beneath the cowl of

Abelard, and in the stained raiment of Villon have put our shame into

song,” etc.

The assumption that runs through this passage that the mere æsthetic

contemplation of past experience gives the equivalent of actual

experience is found in writers of far higher standing than Wilde--in

Renan, for instance. The æsthete would look on his dream as a

substitute for the actual, and at the same time convert the actual

into a dream. (_Die Welt wird Traum, der Traum wird Welt._) It is

not easy to take such a programme of universal dreaming seriously.

In the long run the dreamer himself does not find it easy to take it

seriously. For his attempts to live his chimera result, as we have

seen in the case of romantic love, in more or less disastrous defeat

and disillusion. The disillusioned romanticist continues to cling to

his dream, but intellectually, at least, he often comes at the same

time to stand aloof from it. This subject of disillusion may best be

considered, along with certain other important aspects of the movement,

in connection with the singular phenomenon known as romantic irony.

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