BEYOND SCIENCE
_Metaphysics--Early Attitude to Religion--Increased Sympathy with
Religion_
Spencer was always clear that "life is not for work and learning, but
work and learning are for life." Thus he valued science because it is
"_fructiferous_," to use Bacon's word, making for the amelioration of
life; but he valued it still more because it is "_luciferous_," "for the
light it throws on our own nature and the nature of the Universe." He
spoke with regret of "the ordinary scientific specialist, who, deeply
interested in his speciality, and often displaying comparatively little
interest in other departments of science, is rarely much interested in
the relations between Science at large and the great questions which lie
beyond Science." He ranked himself with those who, "while seeking
scientific knowledge for its proximate value, have an ever-increasing
consciousness of its ultimate value as a transfiguration of things,
which, marvellous enough within the limits of the knowable, suggests a
profounder marvel than can be known." Thus it is not surprising to find
that he had a metaphysical system of his own, and if he had not a
religion he had at least "a humility in presence of the inscrutable,"
and a reverence for Nature deeper than many religious minds exhibit.
_Metaphysics._--"Metaphysician" was with Spencer a term of reproach,
"employed (as Prof. Sidgwick says) exclusively to designate a class of
thinkers who have followed an erroneous method to untenable
conclusions," yet he himself had a metaphysical system--which Sidgwick
defines as "a systematic view of the nature and relations of finite
minds to the material world, and to the Primal Being or ultimate ground
of Being." A critical discussion of Spencer's metaphysical and
epistemological doctrines will be found in Sidgwick's "Philosophy of
Kant and other Lectures," 1905.
In his doctrine of "the Unknowable," in which experts discover the
influence of Kant through Hamilton and Mansel, Spencer reached the
conclusion that "no tenable hypothesis can be formed as to the origin or
nature of the Universe regarded as a whole." He offered for the
reconciliation of Religion and Science the "Supreme Verity," that "the
reality underlying appearances is totally and for ever inconceivable to
us... but we are obliged to regard every phenomenon as the manifestation
of an incomprehensible power, called Omnipresent from inability to
assign its limits, though Omnipresence is unthinkable." Similarly when
we try to understand Time, Space, Matter, Force, Consciousness, we have
to confess that the "reality underlying appearances is and must be
totally and for ever inconceivable by us." At the same time Spencer was
able to attain to some knowledge of his Unknowable, concluding, for
instance, in spite of the antithesis between subject and object, never
to be transcended while consciousness lasts, that "it is one and the
same Ultimate Reality that is manifested to us subjectively and
objectively"; that while "the manifestations, as occurring either in
ourselves or outside of us, do not persist: that which persists is the
Unknown Cause of these manifestations"--"an unconditioned Reality
without beginning or end."
_Early attitude to Religion._--Spencer came of a religious stock, but
the traditional beliefs took no grip of him. Even as a boy he had what
may be called a cosmic outlook, but he tells us of no religious
tendrils, and if there were any they found no support in the faith of
his fathers. Though surrounded in early life by a religious atmosphere,
he never seems to have moved or even drawn breath in it. He passed by
theological beliefs as if he were immune; he developed into an agnostic
without passing through any crisis or perplexity; he had not even what
Prof. James has called "the religion of healthy-mindedness."
The explanation of this may be looked for partly in the self-sufficiency
of his strong intellect, partly in the limitations of the emotional side
of his nature, and partly in his fine heritage of natural goodness. When
the religious mood does not arise naturally as an almost spontaneous
expression of inherited disposition and nurture-influences, it is
usually reached by one of three paths, or by more than one of these at
once. These paths to religion, which apply to the racial as well as to
the individual history, may be called the practical, the emotional, and
the intellectual approaches to faith. When men reach the limits of their
practical endeavours and find themselves baffled, when they feel the
impotence of their utmost strength, when they are filled with fear of
the past, the present, and the future, then they sometimes become
religious. When men reach the limits of their emotional strength, and
the tension of joy or of sorrow, of delight in nature or love of kin
becomes almost an oppression, then they sometimes become religious. When
men reach the limit of their intellectual endeavours after clearness and
unity and are baffled, they sometimes become religious.
As Spencer was never at his wit's end practically, and was born too good
to be troubled by a sense of sin, and as he had a somewhat lukewarm
emotional nature, and was singularly devoid of any poetical or mystical
sense, he was not likely to approach religion by either the practical or
the emotional path. The third path, reached by baffled intelligence, was
more or less closed by Spencer's postulate of the Unknowable, though
there was even in this some tinge of religious feeling.
He had been brought up among those who held almost as an axiom to the
belief that "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," but
this never seems to have meant anything practically or emotionally to
him, while as a cosmological statement it seemed quite unverifiable.
Most thinkers have tried by searching to find out God, to find some way
of thinking of the ultimate origin, nature, and purpose of things, but
at an early age Herbert Spencer foreclosed this quest, and was quite
comfortable in so doing, chiefly, it must be suspected, because it never
appealed to him save as a purely intellectual puzzle. "_Nur was du
fuehlst, das ist dein Eigenthum._"
Thus when he was twenty-six (1848) he wrote to his father, "As
regards 'the ultimate nature of things or origin of them,' my
position is simply that I know nothing about it, and never can know
anything about it, and must be content in my ignorance. I deny
nothing, and I affirm nothing, and to any one who says that the
current theory _is not_ true, I say just as I say to those who
assert its truth--you have no evidence. Either alternative leaves
us in inextricable difficulties. An _uncaused_ Deity is just as
inconceivable as an uncaused Universe. If the existence of matter
from all eternity is incomprehensible, the creation of matter out
of nothing is equally incomprehensible. Thus finding that either
attempt to conceive the origin of things is futile, I am content to
leave the question unsettled as _the insoluble mystery_"...
(_Autobiography_, i. p. 346).
This was written in 1848, twelve years before _First Principles_, in
which he afterwards sought more fully to justify the position which
Huxley called "agnostic."
Just because his emotions were so little engaged, the agnostic position
seemed to him a very simple and satisfactory one, and we find no
evidence that he ever tried to get below the surface of theistic or
Christian doctrine. He was so much repelled by particular
anthropomorphic and superstitious expressions or formulae of religious
belief that he never appreciated their true inwardness or value.
Otherwise, he would never have spoken of "the radical incongruity
between the Bible and the order of Nature." Otherwise he would never
have written the following passage, "The creed of Christendom is
evidently alien to my nature, both emotional and intellectual. To many,
and apparently to most, religious worship yields a species of pleasure.
To me it never did so; unless, indeed, I count as such the emotion
produced by sacred music.... But the expressions of adoration of a
personal being, the utterance of laudations, and the humble professions
of obedience, never found in me any echoes."
_Later Attitude to Religion._--But while it seems to us preposterous to
speak of "the religion of Herbert Spencer," beyond a reverence for the
mysteries beyond science, it is important to note that in his later
years he became more appreciative of the important role that religion
has filled, and continues to fill in human life. The 'Reflections' at
the close of the _Autobiography_ illustrate this change of outlook.
In his earlier days Spencer was an uncompromising critic of many of the
established governmental forms, such as the monarchy; in later years,
while he did not change his views, he became more acquiescent, feeling
that institutions must be judged by their relative fitness to the
average characters and conditions of the citizens at any given time. He
saw, moreover, that mere morphological changes matter little since the
temper of a people alters so slowly. There is a rhythm of change in
external forms, but the actual constitution of the social organism
varies very little.
"We have been living in the midst of a social exuviation, and the
old coercive shell having been cast off, a new coercive shell is in
course of development; for in our day, as in past days, there
co-exist the readiness to coerce and the readiness to submit to
coercion. Here, then, I see a change in my political views which
has become increasingly marked with increasing years. Whereas, in
the days of early enthusiasm, I thought that all would go well if
governmental arrangements were transformed, I now think that
transformations in governmental arrangements can be of use only in
so far as they express the transformed natures of citizens" (1893).
A similar change marks his ideas about religious institutions. In early
days he was an uncompromising critic of particular theological doctrines
and religious customs, but a wider knowledge convinced him almost
against his will that some sort of religious cult has been an
indispensable factor in social progress. Quite aware of the great
changes in theological thought which had taken place during his
life-time, he looked forward to a stage in which, "recognising the
mystery of things as insoluble, religious organisations will be devoted
to ethical culture." As Prof. Henry Sidgwick puts it, "Spencer
contemplates complacently the reduction of religious thought and
sentiment to a perfectly indefinite consciousness of the Unknowable and
the emotion that accompanies this peculiar intellectual exercise."
"Thus I have come more and more to look calmly on forms of
religious belief to which I had, in earlier days, a pronounced
aversion. Holding that they are in the main naturally adapted to
their respective peoples and times, it now seems to me well that
they should severally live and work as long as the conditions
permit, and, further, that sudden changes of religious
institutions, as of political institutions, are certain to be
followed by reactions.
"If it be asked why, thinking thus, I have persevered in setting
forth views at variance with current creeds, my reply is the one
elsewhere made: It is for each to utter that which he sincerely
believes to be true, and, adding his unit of influence to all other
units, leave the results to work themselves out."
Largely, however, Spencer's change of mood in regard to religious creeds
and institutions resulted from "a deepening conviction that the sphere
occupied by them can never become an unfilled sphere, but that there
must continue to arise afresh the great questions concerning ourselves
and surrounding things; and that, if not positive answers, then modes of
consciousness standing in place of positive answers must ever remain."
"An unreflective mood, he said, is general among both cultured and
uncultured, characterised by indifference to everything beyond
material interests and the superficial aspects of things."... "But
in both cultured and uncultured there occur lucid intervals. Some,
at least, either fill the vacuum by stereotyped answers, or become
conscious of unanswered questions of transcendent moment. By those
who know much, more than by those who know little, is there felt
the need for explanation. Whence this process, inconceivable
however symbolised, by which alike the monad and the man build
themselves up into their respective structures? What must we say of
the life, minute, multitudinous, degraded, which, covering the
ocean-floor, occupies by far the larger part of the Earth's area;
and which yet, growing and decaying in utter darkness, presents
hundreds of species of a single type? Or, when we think of the
myriads of years of the Earth's past, during which have arisen and
passed away low forms of creatures, small and great, which,
murdering and being murdered, have gradually evolved, how shall we
answer the question--To what end? Ascending to wider problems, in
which way are we to interpret the lifelessness of the greater
celestial masses--the giant planets and the Sun; in proportion to
which the habitable planets are mere nothings? If we pass from
these relatively near bodies to the thirty millions of remote suns
and solar systems, where shall we find a reason for all this
apparently unconscious existence, infinite in amount compared with
the existence which is conscious--a waste Universe as it seems?
Then behind these mysteries lies the all-embracing mystery--whence
this universal transformation which has gone on unceasingly
throughout a past eternity and will go on unceasingly throughout a
future eternity? And along with this rises the paralysing
thought--what if, of all that is thus incomprehensible to us, there
exists no comprehension anywhere? No wonder that men take refuge in
authoritative dogma!"
"So is it, too, with our own natures. No less inscrutable is this
complex consciousness which has slowly evolved out of infantine
vacuity--consciousness which, during the development of every
creature, makes its appearance out of what seems unconscious
matter; suggesting the thought that consciousness in some
rudimentary form is omnipresent. Lastly come the insoluble
questions concerning our own fate: the evidence seeming so strong
that the relations of mind and nervous structure are such that
cessation of the one accompanies dissolution of the other, while,
simultaneously, comes the thought, so strange and so difficult to
realise, that with death there lapses both the consciousness of
existence and the consciousness of having existed."
"Thus religious creeds, which in one way or other occupy the sphere that
rational interpretation seeks to occupy and fails, and fails the more
the more it seeks, I have come to regard with a sympathy based on
community of need: feeling that dissent from them results from inability
to accept the solutions offered, joined with the wish that solutions
could be found" (1893).
CONCLUSION
Even those who have criticised Spencer's system most severely have been
generous in recognising the grandeur of his aim. Thus Principal James
Iverach, while never sparing in his disclosure of what he regards as the
weaknesses and inconsistencies of the Synthetic Philosophy, writes as
follows: "It is a great thing to be constrained to recognise that a
system is possible which may bring all human thought into unity, that
there may be a formula which may express the law of change in all
spheres where change happens, and that the universe as a whole and in
all its parts forms one system. Suppose that the particular formula of
Mr Spencer is inadequate, is a failure, yet is it not something worthy
of recognition, that a man has lived who gave his life to the
elaboration of this thought, and has so far succeeded as to make men
think that such a consummation is possible and desirable? He has widened
the thoughts of men, has enabled them to think in larger terms, and has
done something to enable men to overcome a mere provincialism of
thought. In an age of specialism he endeavoured to be universal. And
such an endeavour is worthy of the highest admiration."
Perhaps the greatest of Spencer's services was his insistence on the
Unity of Science, on the ideal of a unified outlook and inlook. It may
be that his "Synthetic Philosophy" left most of the problems of
philosophy out, but no one will deny the grandeur of his aim in seeking
to present a unified system of scientific knowledge. As Prof. A. S.
Pringle-Pattison has said: "It was much to hold aloft in an age of
specialism the banner of completely unified knowledge; and this is,
perhaps, after all, Spencer's chief claim to gratitude and remembrance.
He brought home the idea of philosophic synthesis to a greater number of
the Anglo-Saxon race than had ever conceived the idea before. His own
synthesis, in the particular form he gave it, will necessarily crumble
away. He speaks of it himself, indeed, at the close of _First
Principles_ (ed. i.), modestly enough as a more or less rude attempt to
accomplish a task which can be achieved only in the remote future and by
the combined efforts of many, which cannot be completely achieved even
then. But the idea of knowledge as a coherent whole, worked out on
purely natural (though not, therefore, naturalistic) principles--a whole
in which all the facts of human experience should be included--was a
great idea with which to familiarise the minds of his contemporaries. It
is the living germ of philosophy itself."
HERBERT SPENCER'S WORKS
(PUBLISHED BY MESSRS WILLIAMS & NORGATE)
_A System of Synthetic Philosophy._
First Principles. 1862 and 1900.
Principles of Biology. 2 vols. 1864 and 1898-9.
Principles of Psychology. 2 vols. 1855 and 1876.
Principles of Sociology, Vol. I. 1877.
Do. Vol. II. 1886.
Do. Vol. III. 1896.
Principles of Ethics, Vol. I. 1879.
Do. Vol. II. 1892.
Justice.
An Autobiography. 2 vols. 1904.
_Other Works._
The Study of Sociology. 1873.
Education. 1861.
Essays. 3 vols.
Social Statics. 1850.
The Man _v._ The State.
Facts and Comments. 1902.
Various Fragments. 1897.
Reasons for dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte. 1864.
A Rejoinder to Prof. Weismann. 1893.
Weismannism once more.
Factors of Organic Evolution. 1886.
_Descriptive Sociology._
Compiled and abstracted by Dr Duncan, Dr Scheppig, and Mr Collier.
Folio. Boards.
English.
Ancient American Races.
Lowest Races, Negritos, Polynesians.
African Races.
Asiatic Races.
American Races.
Hebrews and Phoenicians.
French.
SOME REFERENCES TO LITERATURE
1876. Bowne, E. P. The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer: being an
examination of the "First Principles" of his System. Nelson and
Philipps, New York.
1897. Clodd, Edward. Pioneers of Evolution. Grant Richards, London. Pp.
250.
1889. Collins, F. Howard. An Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy.
1904. Crozier, J. B. Mr Herbert Spencer and the Dangers of Specialism.
_Fortnightly Review_, lxxv. Pp. 105-120.
1875. Fischer. Ueber das Gesetz der Entwickelung mit Ruecksicht auf
Herbert Spencer.
1874. Fiske, John. Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, based on the Doctrine
of Evolution. MacMillan & Co., London.
1904. Gribble, Francis. Herbert Spencer: His Autobiography and His
Philosophy. _Fortnightly Review_, lxxv. Pp. 984-995.
1879. Guthrie, Malcolm. On Mr Spencer's Formula of Evolution as an
exhaustive statement of the changes of the universe. Truebner & Co.,
London. Pp. 267.
1882. Guthrie, Malcolm. On Mr Spencer's Unification of Knowledge.
Truebner, London. Pp. 476.
1884. Guthrie, Malcolm. On Mr Spencer's Data of Ethics, London. Pp. 122.
Green. Mr Herbert Spencer and Mr G. H. Lewes: their application of the
Doctrine of Evolution to Thought. _Contemporary Review._ December 1877,
March and July, 1878.
1894. Hudson, W. H. An introduction to the philosophy of Herbert
Spencer. Popular Edition. Watts & Co., 1904. Pp. 124.
1904. Hudson, W. H. Herbert Spencer's Autobiography. _Independent
Review_, July.
1904. Hudson, W. H. Herbert Spencer. A Character Study. _Fortnightly
Review_, January.
1904. Iverach, James. Herbert Spencer. _The Critical Review_, xiv. Pp.
99-112, 195-209.
1899. Mackintosh, Robert. From Comte to Benjamin Kidd. The appeal to
biology or evolution for human guidance. Macmillan & Co., London. Pp.
287.
1900. Macpherson, Hector. Herbert Spencer. The man and his work. Chapman
& Hall, London. Pp. 227.
1872. Martineau, James. The Place of Mind in Nature. Williams & Norgate,
London.
1879. Martineau, James. Essays. 2 vols. Truebner & Co., London.
1882. Michelet. Spencer's System der Philosophie. Spencer's Lehre von
dem Unerkennbaren. Leipzig, 1891.
1898. Morgan, C. Lloyd. Mr Herbert Spencer's Biology. Natural Science,
xiii. pp. 377-383.
1900. Pearson, K. The Grammar of Science, 2nd. Edition. A. & C. Black,
London. Pp. 548.
1904. Pringle-Pattison, A. S. The Life and Philosophy of Herbert
Spencer. _The Quarterly Review_, vol. 200, pp. 240-267.
1902. Sidgwick, Henry. Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Mr Herbert
Spencer and J. Martineau. Macmillan & Co., London, Pp. 374.
1905. Sidgwick, Henry. The Philosophy of Mr Herbert Spencer. In "The
Philosophy of Kant and other lectures." Macmillan & Co., London. Pp.
475.
1904. Sorley, W. R. The Ethics of Naturalism: a criticism, 2nd Edition,
Blackwood, Edinburgh. Pp. 338.
1892. Sorley, W. R. Herbert Spencer. Article in Chambers's Encyclopaedia.
1879. Sully, James. Article, "Evolution." Encyclopaedia Britannica, ninth
edition.
1899. Ward, James. Naturalism and agnosticism. 2 vols. A. & C. Black,
London. Pp. 302 and 291.
_British Quarterly Review._ October 1873, and January 1877.
INDEX
Acquired Characters, transmission of, 177
Adaptation, 119
America, visit to, 49
"Anti-Aggression League," 48
Athenaeum Club, 42
Autobiography, 52
Baer's, Von, Law, 139, 140
Bateson, 190
Biologist, Spencer as, 93
_Biology, Principles of_, 94
"Blastodermic," 39
Body and Mind, 236
Born's experiments, 163
Carlyle, 30
Cell-life, 120
Comte, August, 29, 243
Creation, 145
Darwin, 165, 180
Darwinian Theory, 263
Death, 51
Descent, theory of, 146
Development, 113
_Development Hypothesis_, 31
Driesch, 163
Duncan, Prof., "The New Knowledge," 210
Dynamic element in life, 102
_Economist, The_, Spencer as sub-editor of, 28
_Education_, Spencer's, 259
Equilibration, direct, 197
Indirect, 198
_Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative_, 35
Evolution, factors of, 180
External factors, 195
Internal, 196
Universal, 209
Inorganic, 210
Evolutionism, summary of Spencer's, 212
Ewart, Prof. Cossar, 191
Experience and Intuitions, 238
_First Principles_, 38
Geddes, Prof., 31
Genesis, 123
George Eliot, friendship with, 31
Germ-cells, 150
Germ-cells and Sperm-cells, 167
Giddings, Prof. F. H., 250
Gribble, Francis, 83, 86
Growth, 110
Heredity, problems of, 156
Hudson, Prof., 51, 80, 85, 212, 239
Huxley, friendship with, 32
_Illogical Geology_, 36
"Inconceivability," 174
Individual Organism, comparison between it and Society, 253
Intuitions, Experience and, 238
Invalid bed, invention of, 41
Isolation, 190
Italy, tour in, 42
Iverach, Prof. James, 219
Jennings, H. S., 235
Joly, Prof., 259
Lewes, G. H., 30
Life, definition of, 98
dynamic element in, 102
mechanism of, 107
origin of, 220
Malthusianism, 262
Neo-malthusianism, 264
Man, Ascent of, 224
_Manners and Fashions_, 33
Mendelism, 208
Metabolism, 98
Metaphysics, Spencer's, 270
Mill, J. S., 39
Mind, evolution of, 221, 233
Body and, 236
_Method in Education_, 33
Morgan, Prof. Lloyd, 93, 105, 171
_Music, the origin and function of_, 34
Nutrition and Reproduction, 125
Organic matter, 96
Pearson, Prof. Karl, 108, 217
_Philosophy of Style_, 70
Physiological Units, 157
_Physiology of Laughter_, 36
Population, a theory of, 192
question, 260
Pringle-Pattison, Prof. A. S., 89
_Prison ethics_, 36
_Progress, its Law and Cause_, 34, 193
_Psychology, Principles of_, 33, 235
_Railway Morals and Railway Policy_, 33
Regeneration, 118
"Reader, The," 39
Religion, early attitude to, 271
Religion, later attitude, 274
Reproduction, Nutrition and, 125
Schaeffle, 254
_Science, the Genesis of_, 33
Selection, 186, 194, 196, 204
Sidgwick, Prof., 241, 243-5
_Social Organism, The_, 36, 252
Special Creation, 145
_Social Statics_, 29
Sociological Society, 246
Sociology, 44, 242
criticism of, 243
and history, 247
data of, Spencer's, 249
Spencer, Herbert, ancestry, 1;
boyhood, 7;
characteristics, emotional and ethical, 74;
intellectual, 54;
physical, 52;
engineering, 17;
human relations, 82;
inventions, 18, 27;
limitations, 59;
methods of work, 65;
delight in nature, 81
Stout, Prof. G. F., 233, 237
Structure and function, 115
_Synthetic Philosophy_, finished, 50
_Transcendental Physiology_, 34, 193
Truth, test of, 241
Variations, 182
Vries, H. de, 165, 190
Wallace, A. R., 180, 227
Ward, Prof. James, 218, 237
Waste and Repair, 116
Weismann, germ-plasm theory, 159
sexual reproduction, 129
germinal selection, 186
"X" Club, 39
Youmans, Prof., 40
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