In order to judge of the present status of Darwinism it is of primary
importance to note the position assumed by the few really eminent
investigators, who as pupils of Haeckel still seem to have remained
true to him. Among these I reckon Oskar Hertwig, the well known Berlin
anatomist.
As early as 1899 in an address at the University on, _Die Lehre vom
Organismus und ihre Beziehung zur Sozialwissenschaft_, Hertwig gave
expression to views which are very little in harmony with the doctrines
proceeding from Jena, and which are also put forth in his manual,
_The Cell and the Tissue_. In that address we read (p. 8): "With
the same right, with which, for the good of scientific progress, an
energetic protest has been raised against a certain mysticism which
attaches to the word Vitality, I beg to give warning against an
opposite extreme which is but too apt to lead to onesided and unreal,
and hence also, ultimately to false notions of the vital process,
against an extreme which would see in the vital process nothing but a
chemico-physical and mechanical problem and thinks to arrive at true
scientific knowledge only in so far as it succeeds in tracing back
phenomena to the movements of repelling and attracting atoms and in
subjecting them to mathematical calculation."
With right does the physicist Mach, with reference to such views and
tendencies, speak of a 'mechanical mythology in opposition to the
animistic mythology of the old religions' and considers both as
"improper and fantastic exaggerations based on a one-sided judgment."
"My position on the question just stated becomes apparent from the
consideration that the living organism is not only a complex of
chemical materials and a bearer of physical forces, but also possesses
a special organization, a structure, by means of which it is very
essentially differentiated from the inorganic world, and in virtue of
which it alone is designated as living."
Here, then, the distinction between living and non-living nature is
clearly and definitely expressed, and Hertwig expresses himself just as
definitely when he says (p. 21): "Whereas, but a few decades ago a
scientific materialistic conception of the world issuing from a
onesided, unhistorical point of view, misjudged the significance of the
historic religious and ethical forces in the development of mankind, a
change has become apparent in this regard."
To this gratifying testimony against materialism the distinguished
naturalist added an equally valuable testimony regarding Darwinism on
the occasion of the naturalists' convention in 1900. He there sketched
an excellent summary of the "Development of Biology in the Nineteenth
Century," in which he decidedly opposes the materialistic-mechanical
conception of life. In so doing he also touches upon Haeckel's
carbon-hypothesis, to which the latter still clings, and says: "That
from the properties of carbon, combined with the properties of oxygen,
hydrogen, nitrogen, etc., in certain proportions albumen should result,
is a process which in its essence is as incomprehensible as that a
living cell should arise from a certain organization of different
albumina." Then the speaker is inevitably led to speak of the doctrine
of Descent and Darwinism.
In the first place he declares definitely that ontogeny alone, i.e.,
the development of the individual being, is "capable of a direct
scientific investigation." On the other hand we move in the domain of
hypotheses in dealing with the further question: "How have the species
of organisms living to-day originated in the course of the world's
history?" This is a very valuable admission in view of Haeckel's
dogmatic assertion that the descent of man from the ape is a "certain
historical fact." Very moderate and pertinent are also the further
words of the speaker: "Of course, a philosophically trained
investigator will regard it as axiomatic that the organisms which
inhabit our earth to-day did not exist in their present form in earlier
periods of the earth and that they had to pass through a process of
development, beginning with the simplest forms."
"But in the attempt to outline in detail the particular form in which a
species of animals of our day existed in remote antiquity, we lose the
safe ground of experience. For out of the countless millions of
organisms, that lived in earlier periods of the earth, the duration of
which is measured by millions of years, only scanty skeleton remains
have by way of exception been preserved in a fossil state. From these
naturally but a very imperfect and hypothetical representation can be
formed of the soft bodies with which they were once clothed. And even
then it remains forever doubtful whether the progeny of the prehistoric
creature, the scant remains of which we study, has not become entirely
extinct, so that it can in no way be regarded as the progenitor of any
creature living at present." I should like to know wherein this differs
radically from Fleischmann's contention in his "Descendenztheorie" (p.
10.) For we find stated here what Fleischmann emphasizes so much, viz.,
that with the problem of Descent we leave the domain of experience. It
is worthy of special note in this connection that Hertwig likewise
evidently regards as the sole really empirically and inductively
serviceable proof of Descent, that which is drawn from palaeontology,
from prehistoric animal and plant remains. He makes not the least
mention of the indirect proofs taken from ontogenetic development or
comparative anatomy, to which the Darwinians and advocates of Descent
love so much to appeal, because they feel that the real inductive proof
is lacking and totally fails to sustain their position. Hertwig next
points out that the problem of Descent stirred scientific as well as
lay circles twice during the past century. He then pays Lamarck and
Darwin the necessary tribute, at which we cannot take offense since he
was reared in the Darwinian atmosphere of Jena. I also willingly admit
that Darwinism served science as a "powerful ferment," even if I must
emphasize just as decidedly how harmful it was that this "ferment" was
introduced into lay circles at an unseasonable time by the apostles of
materialism. For while it was very well adapted to bring about in
educated circles a fermentation which produced beneficial results, in
uncritical lay-circles this ferment produced nothing but a corruption
of world-views.
Hertwig then designates "Struggle for Existence," Survival of the
Fittest, and Selection, as "very indefinite expressions." "With too
general terms, one does not explain the individual case or produces
only the appearance of an explanation whereas in every case the true
causative relations remain in the dark. But it is the duty of
scientific investigation to establish for each observed effect the
prevenient cause, or more correctly, since nothing results from a
single cause, to discover the various causes."
"The origin of the world of organisms from natural causes, however, is
certainly an unusually complicated and difficult problem. It is just as
little capable of being solved by a single magic formula as every
disease is of yielding to a panacea. By the very act of proclaiming the
omnipotence of natural selection, Weismann found he was forced to the
admission that: "as a rule we cannot furnish the proof that a definite
adaptation has originated through natural selection," in other words:
We know nothing in reality of the complexity of causes which has
produced the given phenomenon. So we may on the contrary, with Spencer,
speak of the "Impotence of Natural Selection.""
"In this scientific struggle with which the past century closed, it
seems necessary to distinguish between the doctrine of evolution and
the theory of selection. They are based on entirely different
principles. For with Huxley we can say: "Even if the Darwinian
hypothesis were blown away, the doctrine of Evolution would remain
standing where it stood." In it we possess an acquisition of our
century which rests on facts, and which undoubtedly ranks amongst its
greatest."
This last sentence affirms exactly what I have repeatedly asserted: the
doctrine of Descent remains, Darwinism passes away. Hertwig then is
decidedly of opinion that Darwinism entirely fails in the individual
case because in its application the basis of experience vanishes.
Indeed, according to him, phylogeny is not at all capable of direct
scientific investigation. These are all important admissions which one
would certainly have considered impossible twenty years ago; they
unequivocally indicate the decline of Darwinian views, and in a certain
way also harmonize with Fleischmann's work.
True, Hertwig still clings to the thought of Descent, but apparently no
longer as to a conclusion of natural science. This appears from the
assertion: "Ontogeny alone is capable of a direct scientific (he
evidently speaks of natural science) investigation," and from the other
statement that a _philosophically_ trained investigator will accept it
(Descent) as axiomatic although it belongs to the domain of hypothesis.
What else does this mean but that: We have no specific knowledge of
Descent but we believe in it. In short, this is not natural science but
natural philosophy; it forms no constituent part of our certain
knowledge of nature but it is one aspect of our world-view.
All the above-quoted assertions of Hertwig are calm and well-considered
and show a decided deviation from the Darwinian position. Above all we
are pleased to note that he appropriates Spencer's phrase regarding the
"Impotence of Natural Selection" and that in the citation from Huxley
he at least admits the possibility that the Darwinian doctrine will be
"wafted away."
It is also proper to mention here the fact that in another place
Hertwig no longer recognizes so fully the dogma set up by Fritz Mueller
and Haeckel which is so closely bound up with Darwinism. I mean the
so-called "biogenetic principle" according to which the individual
organism is supposed to repeat in its development the development of
the race during the course of ages.
In his book: "The Cell and the Tissue" (Die Zelle und die Gewebe, II.
Jena 1898, p. 273) Hertwig says: "We must drop the expression:
'repetition of forms of extinct ancestors' and employ instead:
repetition of forms which accord with the laws of organic development
and lead from the simple to the complex. We must lay special emphasis
on the point that in the embryonic forms even as in the developed
animal forms general laws of the development of the organized
body-substance find expression."
Any one can subscribe to these statements; in truth they contain
something totally different from the "biogenetic principle"; for
Haeckel has really no interest in so general a truth, but is intent
only upon a proof of Descent.
Hertwig continues: "In order to make our train of thought clear, let us
take the egg-cell. Since the development of every organism begins with
it, the primitive condition is in no way recapitulated from the time
when perhaps only single-celled amoebas existed on our planet. For
according to our theory the egg-cell, for instance, of a now extant
mammal is no simple and indifferent, purposeless structure, as it is
often represented, (as according to Haeckel's "biogenetic principle" it
would necessarily be); we see in it, in fact, the extraordinarily
complex end-product of a very long historic process of development,
through which the organic substance has passed since that hypothetical
epoch of single-celled organisms."
"If the eggs of a mammal now differ very essentially from those of a
reptile and of an amphibian because in their organization they
represent the beginnings only of mammals, even as these represent only
the beginnings of reptiles and amphibians, by how much more must they
differ from those hypothetical single-celled amoebas which could as yet
show no other characteristics than to reproduce amoebas of their own
kind."
This is a view which has frequently been clearly expressed by
anti-Darwinians: The egg-cells of the various animals are in themselves
fundamentally different and can therefore have nothing in common but
similarity of structure. In opposition to Hertwig, Haeckel in his
superficial way deduces from it an internal similarity as well. After a
few polite bows before his old teacher, Haeckel, Hertwig thus
summarizes his view: "Ontogenetic (that is, those stages in the
individual development) stages therefore give us only a greatly changed
picture of the phylogenetic (i.e., genealogical) stages as they may
once have existed in primitive ages, but do not correspond to them in
their actual content." This is a very resigned position, very far
removed from Haeckel's certainty and orthodoxy.
To sum up: O. Hertwig has become a serious heretic in matters
Darwinian. Will Haeckel, in his usual manner try to cast suspicion on
Hertwig also? For Haeckel himself says (Free Science and Free Doctrine,
Stuttgart, 1878, p. 85): "Since I am not bound by fear to the Berlin
Tribunal of Science or by anxieties regarding the loss of influential
Berlin connections, as are most of my like-minded colleagues, I do not
hesitate here as elsewhere to express my honest conviction, frankly and
freely, regardless of the anger which perhaps real or pretended privy
councillors in Berlin may feel upon hearing the unadorned truth."
Verily, it is a matter of suspense to know whether his school will now
pour forth their wrath upon O. Hertwig, or whether finally the
discovery will not be made in Jena that Hertwig secretly possessed
himself of his position in Berlin, in the same manner as Fleischmann
obtained his at Erlangen, viz., by a promise of desertion from
Darwinism.
CONCLUSION.
We may conveniently summarize what we have said in the foregoing
chapters in the following statement: The theory of Descent is almost
universally recognized to-day by naturalists as a working hypothesis.
Still, in spite of assertions to the contrary, no conclusive proof of
it has as yet been forthcoming. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that
the theory provides us with an intelligible explanation of a series of
problems and facts which cannot be so well explained on other grounds.
On the other hand, Darwinism, i.e., the theory of Natural Selection by
means of the Struggle for Existence, is being pushed to the wall all
along the line. The bulk of naturalists no longer recognizes its
validity, and even those who have not yet entirely discarded it, are at
least forced to admit that the Darwinian explanation now possesses a
very subordinate significance.
In the place of Darwinian principles, new ideas are gradually winning
general acceptance, which, while they are in harmony with the
principles of adaptation and use, (Lamarck) enunciated before the time
of Darwin, nevertheless attribute a far-reaching importance to _internal
forces of development_. These new conceptions necessarily involve
the admission that _Evolution has not been a purely mechanical
process_.
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End of Project Gutenberg's At the Deathbed of Darwinism, by Eberhard Dennert