In the year 1899 Haeckel published a new work, which he intended as a
kind of testament; for with the close of the nineteenth century the
author desired to put a finishing touch to his life-work.
In the Preface Haeckel states with very remarkable modesty that his
book cannot reasonably claim to present a complete solution of the
riddles of existence; that his answer to the great questions can
naturally be only subjective and only partly correct; that his
attainments in the different branches is very unequal and imperfect;
and that his book is really only a sketch book of studies of very
unequal value. In this way the author naturally gains at once the
confidence of his reader who is thus prepared to yield assent when the
author makes pretense to sincerity of conviction and an honest search
after truth. The reader's surprise at the contents of the book and at
the manner of its presentation is, however, only increased by this
ruse. All modesty has vanished, monistic doctrines are presented as
absolute truth, every divergent opinion is contemptuously branded as
heretical; in short, the book reveals a Darwinian orthodoxy of the
purest type, with all the signs of blind bigotry and odious intolerance
which the author imagines he discovers in his Christian adversaries. It
is difficult to see where, in view of such a contradiction between the
work and its Preface, there is room for an honest striving after truth.
Personally I do not wish to deny Haeckel all honesty of purpose, for it
is my endeavor to understand the _whole_ man. The one prominent
feature of the "Weltraetsel" is the fact that, owing to a very marked
deficiency in philosophical training, Haeckel has become so completely
absorbed in his system that he has lost all interest in everything else
and takes cognizance only of what suits his purpose. What he lacks
above all, is the ability to appreciate even the "honest" opinion of
others; hence, from the very outset he brings into the discussion that
bitterness of which he complains in others (in the Weltraetsel he once
makes this accusation against me). Notwithstanding all this, honest
conviction may be present, but if so, it is joined with total
blindness. But what is to be thought of his search after truth since he
completely ignores his adversaries? For instance, in spite of Loofs'
attacks, he continues to have his book reprinted without alteration,
without submitting it to revision. The "Reichsbote" is perfectly in the
right when it says: Haeckel, in fact, takes account only of what suits
his purpose.
As regards the contents of the "Weltraetsel," it is not my intention to
enter here upon a criticism of it but merely to discuss it as
illustrating the general status of the theory of Descent. It is to be
noted, in the first place, that it is really not a scientific book at
all; for of its 472 pages, the first or "Anthropological Part," with
which alone we are here concerned, occupies only 74 (from pages 27 to
100), even less than one-sixth of the whole, whereas the "Theological
Part" is almost twice as long. The book is, in fact, rather a
theologico-natural-philosophical treatise than a work of natural
science. The scientific part is, however, the foundation on which
Haeckel builds up his natural philosophy, and which he uses as the
starting point of his criticism of theology. Hence it is worth our
while to discuss it.
How then fares it with the anthropological basis of Haeckel's whole
system? As an attentive student of his age the naturalist-philosopher
of Jena must have perceived the true position of Darwinism, namely,
that the foremost naturalists of to-day have no more than an historical
interest in it. Since, in accordance with the well known tendency of
old men to persevere in the position they have once assumed and not
easily to accept innovations, Haeckel is still an incorrigibly orthodox
Darwinian, we should naturally expect him to embody in this testament
some new cogent evidence of the truth of Darwinism. But nothing of that
nature is to be found in the book.
The first chapter of the "Anthropological part" is taken up with a
"general history of nineteenth century culture," in itself a sign of
peculiar logical acumen, that he should include this and the "struggle
regarding world-views" in the "anthropological part" instead of
embodying it in a general introduction. The remaining chapters treat:
"Our Bodily Structure," "Our Life," "Our Embryonic-history," "Our
Family-history." It is not to be supposed, however, that any arguments
are here adduced, nothing but assertions; a large part of the chapter
is taken up with historical sketches, in which Haeckel again proves
himself utterly devoid of all appreciation of history and all sense of
justice. He attributes the decay of the natural sciences to the
"flourishing condition of Christianity" and dares to speak of the
unfavorable influence of Christianity on civilization. Apart from the
historical sketch, each chapter presents only the quintessence of
Darwinism, fairly bristling with assertions, which are boldly put forth
as incontrovertible truths. In view of the author's demand to have at
least his sincere love of truth recognized, we can but throw up our
hands out of sheer astonishment. To illustrate Haeckel's "love of
truth" let it suffice to observe that in the second chapter he asserts
that man is not only a true vertebrate, a true mammal, etc.--which
indeed is passable--but even a true ape (having "all the anatomical
characteristics of true apes"). With a wonderful elasticity he passes
over the differences. What, indeed, is to be said, when he states as a
"fact" that "physiologically compared (!), the sound-speech of apes is
the preparatory stage to articulate human speech." It is so simply
monstrous, that even Garner's famous book of ape-speech, cannot surpass
it. As a third illustration of Haeckel's method of argumentation, if we
are still justified in speaking of such a thing, we may mention his
assertion (p. 97) as a "certain historical fact," "That man is
descended directly from the ape, and indirectly from a long line of
lower vertebrates." If, in view of the results of research during the
last forty years any one can assert this as a "certain historical fact"
and can still wish to be credited with honest conviction and love of
truth, there remains, to adopt Haeckel's own expression, but one
explanation for this psychological enigma, namely, intellectual
_marasmus senilis_, which may very easily have set in with a man
of sixty-six, who himself complains (p. 7) of "divers warnings of
approaching age."
Thus, the anthropological part of the "Weltraetsel" contains nothing
new; always the same old story, the same threadbare assertions without
a shred of evidence to corroborate them.
The remaining parts also contain various scientific assertions, which
are proposed as facts without being such, but these parts do not
immediately pertain to our theme. Suffice it to say that, after reading
Haeckel's "Weltraetsel," one would be led to think that there is no
question of a "deathbed of Darwinism," but that on the contrary
Darwinism, as remodeled by Haeckel, is more in the ascendant to-day
than ever. Let us judge of its prestige by the reception accorded the
"Weltraetsel."
One unaltered edition after the other, thousand after thousand, the
book is given to the public. Hence it must meet with approval. It does
indeed meet with approval, but the question is, from whom? Immature
college and university students will doubtless receive it with
reverential awe, just as they received the "Natural History of
Creation" twenty-five years ago. Bebel accepts the book as an
infallible source of truth, and after him the social democrats and
free-church members will add it to the list of their "body and stomach
books," which alone will afford it a respectable clientele, at least in
number. In no one of my "deathbed articles," however, have I as yet
ever maintained that Darwinism was decadent in _these_ circles. I
know full well, that Darwinism has filtered down into that sphere and
there satisfies the anti-Christian and anti-religious demands of
thousands.
Nothing, however, really depends on these senseless blind adherents of
Haeckel's unproved assertions. We are now intent upon investigating how
the world of eminent thinkers and natural science regards the latest
product of Haeckel's fancy. That alone is of importance in ascertaining
the real status of Darwinism.
As regards, in the first place, the other parts of the book, it is well
known that all of them were vigorously attacked. Loofs in particular
exposed Haeckel's theology, according to its deserts, in the clear
light of truth, and convicted Haeckel of "ignorance" and "dishonesty;"
while the philosopher Paulsen made short work of the "Weltraetsel" from
his own standpoint, ("if a book could drip with superficiality, I
should predicate that of the 19th chapter"). Harnack also condemned the
theological section in the "Christliche Welt," and Troeltsch,
Hoenigswald, and Hohlfeld took Haeckel severely to task on philosophic
grounds. The naturalists have thus far maintained silence.
Scientific journals, and, I believe, only the more popular ones, pass a
varying judgment on the book according to the intellectual bent of
their book reviewers; but no one of the eminent and leading naturalists
has publicly expressed his opinion regarding it. They all maintain a
very significant silence, which speaks for itself. Now, however, just
at the proper time a book, _Die Descendenz-theorie_ has appeared
from the pen of the zoologist, Professor Fleischmann of Erlangen, in
which Haeckel is severely condemned. (See Chapter IX.)
The press-notices of the Weltraetsel, which are quoted in the book will
be considered presently. It appears that with reference to natural
science, only "laymen" discuss the book and approve of Haeckel's views.
This is a point of great importance since it proves satisfactorily that
men of science will have nothing to do with the "Weltraetsel." The
large number of replies would, however, not allow Haeckel's friends to
remain silent. The most extensive defense forthcoming was a pamphlet
published by a certain Heinrich Schmidt of Jena. It cannot be gathered
from his book (Der Kampf um die Weltraetsel, Bonn, E. Strauss 1900) to
what profession the author belongs, hence I am unable to judge whence
he derives the right to treat Haeckel's opponents in summary a manner.
It is significant to note what class of men, according to Schmidt,
received the "Weltraetsel" with enthusiasm and joy. They are August
Specht, the free-church editor of "Menschentum" and of the "Freien
Glocken," Julius Hart, Professor Keller-Zuerich, the philosopher and
"Neokantian" Professor Spitzer of Graz, the popular literateur W.
Boelsche, W. Ule, and a few unknown great men, Dr. Zimmer, Th.
Pappstein, R. Steiner, A. Haese; but stay, I came very near forgetting
the great pillar, Dodel of Zuerich. But where is there mention of the
professional colleagues of Haeckel whose testimonies could be taken
seriously? Under the heading "Literary Humbug," which evidently has
reference to the contents of his own work, Schmidt then meets numerous
objections. Here vigorous epithets are bandied about, as, for instance,
"absolute nonsense," "muddler," "foolish and senseless prattle," "idle
talk," etc.; and from Dodel he copies the words with which the latter
once sought to annihilate me: Job, verse 10, "Thou hast spoken like one
of the foolish women." And he ventures to express indignation at Loofs'
"invectives." As a compliment to Lasson he declares that he could
easily conceive of the possibility of an ape ascending the professor's
chair and speaking as intelligently as he (Lasson); which remark he
probably intended as a witticism. He informs his readers that the
criticism of Haeckel by men like Virchow, His, Semper, Haacke, Baer,
and Wigand have been examined by professional specialists and proved
practically worthless. This statement alone so clearly reveals
Schmidt's lack of critical faculty and judgment that by it he at once
forfeits his right to be taken seriously.
The whole book is nothing more than a collection of quotations from the
reviews of the "Weltraetsel," interspersed with characteristic
expressions like "idle talk," "nonsense," etc., as exemplified above. A
really pertinent reply and refutation of objections is entirely beyond
Schmidt's range; he waives the demand for a direct reply, for instance,
in the following amusing way (p. 28): "Two reasons, however, prevent me
from being more explicit: In the first place I do not like to dispute
with people who adduce variant readings and church-fathers as proofs
and can still remain serious. In the second place I would not like to
fall into the hands of a Loofs." In this manner it is indeed easy to
evade an argument, which for good reasons one is not able to pursue.
Loofs' criticism is so serious and destructive that it should be of the
utmost concern to Haeckel's friends to refute it. Since they are unable
to do so, they content themselves with references to Loofs' caustic
style, which he should indeed have avoided. There are, nevertheless,
cases in which one must employ trenchant phraseology, and Haeckel
himself has given an occasion for it; a dignified style is simply out
of the question in his case. Haeckel extricated himself with even
greater ease, by declaring that he had "neither time nor inclination"
for reply, and that a mutual understanding with Loofs was impossible
because their scientific views were entirely different. Could anything
be more suggestive of the words of Mephistopheles:
"But in each word must be a thought--
There is,--or we may so assume,--
Not always found, nor always sought.
While words--mere words supply its room.
Words answer well, when men enlist 'em,
In building up a favorite system."
There are two other points in Schmidt's book that are of interest to
us. The first of these is the manner in which the author treats the
Romanes incident. Romanes ranks, as is well known, among the first of
Haeckel's authorities. Hence it is a very painful fact that, but a
short time before the publication of the first edition of the
"Weltraetsel," my translation into German of Romanes' "Thoughts on
Religion" should have appeared. From this book it was evident that
Haeckel and his associates could no longer count this man among their
number since he--a life-long seeker after truth--had abandoned atheism
for theism, and died a believing Christian. Troeltsch and the
"Reichsbote" asked whether Haeckel had purposely concealed this fact,
and Schmidt now explains that Haeckel first became acquainted with the
"Thoughts on Religion" through him towards the end of January, 1900.
Unfortunately he does not add that since then a number of new editions
of the "Weltraetsel" have appeared, in which Haeckel could have
explained himself in an honorable manner. Schmidt has therefore not
been successful in his attempt to clear up this matter.
But how does he settle with Romanes? He says: "_We are assured_
that the thoughts were written down by the English naturalist George
John Romanes"; and again: "The thoughts are published by a Canon of
Westminster, Charles Gore, to whom _they are said_ to have been
handed over after the death of Romanes in the year 1894." Then he has
the audacity to place Romanes in quotation marks. And finally he
asserts that they would abide by Romanes' former works as their
authority, the more so, because these were not, like the "Thoughts,"
"published and glossed by a Canon only after his (Romanes') death." By
means of all this and of a comparison with the "Letters of the
Obscurantists" he wishes to create the suspicion that there might be
question here of forgery. Such an insinuation, (I employ Schmidt's own
words) "cannot be characterized otherwise than as contemptible." "Here
it is even worse than contemptible." I must beg my reader's pardon for
overstepping the bounds of reserve with these caustic words, although
they originated with Schmidt; but really the flush of anger rightfully
mounts to one's cheeks when a man, from the mere fact that he is a
disciple of the "great" Haeckel assumes the right to charge Canon Gore
and indirectly myself with forgery. It is really very significant that
these men should have to resort to such base and despicable expedients
to extricate themselves from their unpleasant predicament. Apart from
this, it was very amusing to me personally to think that for the sake
of my unworthy self, Schmidt should have borrowed from his lord and
master the epithet "pious," which Haeckel in his turn has drawn from
his cherished friend Dodel. In all probability they will continue to
hawk it about in order to bring me into disrepute with the rest of
their kind. The few remarks Schmidt still finds it proper to make
regarding the "Thoughts," betray his inability to understand the book.
But as I stated in the preface it was a difficult book to read and
understand. It is obviously not reading matter for shallow minds. I
refer Schmidt to the biography of Romanes, published by his wife, (The
Life and Letters of G. J. Romanes, London, Longmans, Green & Co.,
1898), where he will find Romanes' religious development described by a
well-informed hand. This development began as early as 1878, hence
during the time of his intimate friendship with Darwin. In this book on
pages 372 and 378 Schmidt will also find the words in which,
_before_ his death, Romanes begged that, if he were personally
unable to publish the "Thoughts," they should be given to his friend
Canon Gore after his own death. But why waste so many words on Mr.
Schmidt, for since all these things must be doubly disagreeable and
painful to him and Haeckel, he will very probably resort without delay
to personal insinuation and accuse Mrs. Romanes of forgery.
To us, however, who thoroughly appreciate the situation, it is a matter
of great moment that of one of the few really eminent naturalists, to
whom Haeckel thought to be able to lay full and exclusive claim, for
the last twenty years of his life should have been moving towards the
Christian faith in his eager search for truth and should die not a
monist, but a convinced Christian. Neither did he die an old man, to
whom the adherents of monism would certainly have the effrontery to
impute feeble-mindedness, but at the early age of forty-six years. Nor
was his a sudden deathbed conversion--an impression which Schmidt
attempts to create (p. 62) in order to be able with H. Heine to
relegate the conversion to the domain of pathology--but followed after
many years of diligent and honest study and research. The other point
of which we must treat here, is the manner in which, after the example
of Dr. Reh, Schmidt attempts in the "Umschau" to exonerate Haeckel in
the matter of the "History of the three cliches." To begin with, it is
at the very least dishonest on the part of Schmidt to say that, "in
default of scientific arguments, theological adversaries have for the
last thirty years been using it as the basis of their attacks." That is
untrue, the "theological adversaries" have not had knowledge of it for
that length of time. On the contrary Haeckel's own scientific
colleagues were the first to discover and publish the matter some time
in the seventies, and in consequence excluded Haeckel from their
circle. Why does Schmidt not mention here the names of Ruetimeyer, His,
and Semper? Furthermore Schmidt writes as if Haeckel had satisfied his
colleagues in the matter of his forgery by declaring soon after (1870)
that he had been "guilty of a very ill-considered act of folly." Why
does Schmidt not mention the fact that the weighty attacks of His (Our
Bodily Form and the Physiological Problem of its Origin, Leipzig, 1875)
dates from the year 1875, five years after Haeckel's forced, palliative
explanation? Besides, this incident of the three cliches is only one
instance; the other examples of Haeckel's sense of truthfulness are for
the most part entirely unknown to his "theological adversaries," who
have nowhere to my knowledge made use of them; but _all_ of them
have been brought to light and held up before Haeckel by naturalists,
namely, by Bastian (1874), Semper and Kossmann (1876 and 1877), Hensen
and Brandt (1891), and Hamann (1893). Does this in any way tend to
establish Schmidt's honesty? (Dr. Dennert has entered into a more
searching criticism of Haeckel in his book, _Die Wahrheit ueber
Haeckel_. 2 Aufl Halle a. S., 1902.)
In a word, the manner in which the "Weltraetsel" was received and in
which Haeckel has been defended by Schmidt, are valuable indications of
the decay of Darwinism. I repeat that I am speaking of course of the
leading scientific circles. Those who hold back are never lacking, and
one cannot be surprised that, in the case of Darwinism, their number is
considerable: for on the one hand, to understand it an extraordinarily
slight demand is made on one's mental capacity; and on the other hand
it is a very convenient and even a seemingly scientific means of
obviating the necessity of belief in God. These facts appeal very
strongly to the multitude.
In concluding this section, we shall quote a positive testimony to the
decay of Darwinism. On page 3 of his "Outlines of the History of the
Development of Man and of the Mammals" (Leipzig, W. Engelmann, 1897)
Prof. O. Schultze, Anatomist in Wuerzburg, says: "The idea entertained
by Darwin, that the development of species may be explained by a
natural choice--Selection--which operates through the struggle of
individuals for existence, cannot permanently satisfy the spirit of
inquiry. Even the factors of variability, heredity, and adaptation,
which are essential to the transformation of species, do not offer an
exact explanation."