THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS
_Introductory_
Most persons who have written about the emotions and man's conduct of
life seem to discuss, not the natural things which follow the common
laws of Nature, but things which are outside her. They seem indeed to
consider man in Nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. For they believe
that man disturbs rather than follows her order; that he has an absolute
power over his own actions; and that he is altogether self-determined.
They then proceed to attribute the cause of human weakness and
changeableness, not to the common power of Nature, but to some vice of
human nature, which they therefore bewail, laugh at, mock, or, as is
more generally the case, detest; whilst he who knows how to revile most
eloquently or subtilely the weakness of the mind is looked upon as
divine.
It is true that very eminent men have not been wanting, to whose labor
and industry we confess ourselves much indebted, who have written many
excellent things about the right conduct of life, and who have given to
mortals counsels full of prudence. But no one so far as I know has
determined the nature and strength of the emotions, and what the mind is
able to do towards controlling them. I remember, indeed, that the
celebrated Descartes, although he believed that the mind is absolute
master over its own actions, tried nevertheless to explain by their
first causes human emotions, and at the same time to show the way by
which the mind could obtain absolute power over them. But in my opinion
he has shown nothing but the acuteness of his great intellect, as I
shall make evident in the proper place, for I wish to return to those
who prefer to detest and scoff at human affects and actions than
understand them.
To such as these it will doubtless seem a marvelous thing for me to
endeavor to treat by a geometrical method the vices and follies of men,
and to desire by a sure method to demonstrate those things which these
people cry out against as being opposed to reason, or as being vanities,
absurdities, and monstrosities. The following is my reason for so doing.
Nothing happens in Nature which can be attributed to any vice of Nature,
for she is always the same and everywhere one. Her virtue is the same,
and her power of acting; that is to say, her laws and rules, according
to which all things are and are changed from form to form, are
everywhere and always the same; so that there must also be one and the
same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, that
is to say, by the universal laws and rules of Nature. The emotions,
therefore, of hatred, anger, envy, considered in themselves, follow from
the same necessity and virtue of Nature as other individual things; they
have therefore certain causes through which they are to be understood,
and certain properties which are just as worthy of being known as the
properties of any other thing in the contemplation alone of which we
delight. I shall, therefore, pursue the same method in considering the
nature and strength of the emotions and the power of the mind over them
which I pursued in our previous discussion of God and the mind, and I
shall consider human actions and appetites just as if I were considering
lines, planes or bodies.
_Definitions_
I.--I call that an adequate cause whose effect can be clearly and
distinctly perceived by means of the cause. I call that an inadequate or
partial cause whose effect cannot be understood by means of the cause
alone.
II.--I say that we act when anything is done, either within us or
without us, of which we are the adequate cause, that is to say (by the
preceding Definition), when from our nature anything follows, either
within us or without us, which by that nature alone can be clearly and
distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we suffer when
anything is done within us, or when anything follows from our nature, of
which we are not the cause excepting partially.
III.--By emotion I understand the modifications of the body, by which
the power of acting of the body itself is increased, diminished, helped,
or hindered, together with the ideas of these modifications.
If, therefore, we can be the adequate cause of any of these
modifications, I understand the emotion to be an action, otherwise it is
a passion.
_Postulates_
1.--The human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of
acting is increased or diminished, and also in other ways which make its
power of acting neither greater nor less.
2.--The human body is capable of suffering many changes, and,
nevertheless, can retain the impressions or traces of objects, and
consequently the same images of things.
_The Two States of Mind: Active and Passive_
In every human mind some ideas are adequate, and others mutilated and
confused. But the ideas which in any mind are adequate are adequate in
God in so far as He forms the essence of that mind, while those again
which are inadequate in the mind are also adequate in God, not in so far
as He contains the essence of that mind only, but in so far as He
contains the ideas of other things at the same time in Himself. Again,
from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow, of which God is
the adequate cause, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He
is considered as affected with the given idea. But of that effect of
which God is the cause, in so far as He is affected by an idea which is
adequate in any mind, that same mind is the adequate cause. Our mind,
therefore, in so far as it has adequate ideas, necessarily at times
acts. Again, if there be anything which necessarily follows from an idea
which is adequate in God, not in so far as He contains within Himself
the mind of one man only, but also, together with this, the ideas[26]
of other things, then the mind of that man is not the adequate cause of
that thing, but is only its partial cause, and therefore, in so far as
the mind has inadequate ideas, it necessarily at times suffers.
_The Basic Endeavor of All Things_
Individual things are modes by which the attributes of God are expressed
in a certain and determinate manner; that is to say, they are things
which express in a certain and determinate manner the power of God, by
which He is and acts. A thing, too, has nothing in itself through which
it can be destroyed, or which can negate its existence,[27] but, on the
contrary, it is opposed to everything which could negate its existence.
Therefore, in so far as it can and is in itself, it endeavors to
persevere in its own being.
_The Three Primary Emotions_
I
_Desire_
The essence of the mind is composed of adequate and inadequate ideas (as
we have shown), and therefore both in so far as it has the former and in
so far as it has the latter, it endeavors to persevere in its being,
and endeavors to persevere in it for an indefinite time. But since the
mind, through the ideas of the modifications of the body, is necessarily
conscious of itself, it is therefore conscious of its effort.
This effort, when it is related to the mind alone, is called _will_, but
when it is related at the same time both to the mind and the body, is
called _appetite_, which is therefore nothing but the very essence of
man, from the nature of which necessarily follow those things which
promote his preservation, and thus he is determined to do those things.
Hence there is no difference between appetite and desire, unless in this
particular, that desire is generally related to men in so far as they
are conscious of their appetites, and it may therefore be defined as
appetite of which we are conscious. From what has been said it is plain,
therefore, that we neither strive for, wish, seek, nor desire anything
because we think it to be good, but, on the contrary, we adjudge a thing
to be good because we strive for, wish, seek, or desire it.
II
_Joy and Sorrow_
If anything increases, diminishes, helps, or limits our body's power of
action, the idea of that thing increases, diminishes, helps, or limits
our mind's power of thought.
We thus see that the mind can suffer great changes, and can pass now to
a greater and now to a lesser perfection; these passions explaining to
us the emotions of joy and sorrow. By _joy_, therefore, in what
follows, I shall understand the passion by which the mind passes to a
greater perfection; by _sorrow_, on the other hand, the passion by which
it passes to a less perfection. The emotion of joy, related at the same
time both to the mind and the body, I call _pleasurable excitement_
(_titillatio_) or _cheerfulness_; that of sorrow I call _pain_ or
_melancholy_. It is, however, to be observed that pleasurable excitement
and pain are related to a man when one of his parts is affected more
than the others; cheerfulness and melancholy, on the other hand, when
all parts are equally affected. What the nature of desire is I have
explained; and besides these three--joy, sorrow, and desire--I know of
no other primary emotion, the others springing from these.
_Definitions of the Principal Emotions_
I.--_Desire_ is the essence itself of man in so far as it is conceived
as determined to any action by any one of his modifications.
_Explanation._--We have said above, that desire is appetite which is
self-conscious, and that appetite is the essence itself of man in so far
as it is determined to such acts as contribute to his preservation. But
I have taken care to remark that in truth I cannot recognize any
difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a man be
conscious of his appetite or not, it remains one and the same appetite,
and so, lest I might appear to be guilty of tautology, I have not
explained desire by appetite, but have tried to give such a definition
of desire as would include all the efforts of human nature to which we
give the name of appetite, desire, will, or impulse. For I might have
said that desire is the essence itself of man in so far as it is
considered as determined to any action; but from this definition it
would not follow that the mind could be conscious of its desire or
appetite, and therefore, in order that I might include the cause of this
consciousness, it was necessary to add the words, _in so far as it is
conceived as determined to any action by any one of his modifications_.
For by a modification of the human essence we understand any
constitution of that essence, whether it be innate, whether it be
conceived through the attribute of thought alone or of extension alone,
or whether it be related to both. By the word "desire," therefore, I
understand all the efforts, impulses, appetites, and volitions of a man,
which vary according to his changing disposition, and not unfrequently
are so opposed to one another that he is drawn hither and thither, and
knows not whither he ought to turn.
II. _Joy_ is man's passage from a less to a greater perfection.
III. _Sorrow_ is man's passage from a greater to a less perfection.
_Explanation._--I say passage, for joy is not perfection itself. If a
man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess
it without the emotion of joy; a truth which will appear the more
clearly from the emotion of sorrow, which is the opposite to joy. For
that sorrow consists in the passage to a less perfection, but not in the
less perfection itself, no one can deny, since in so far as a man shares
any perfection he cannot be sad. Nor can we say that sorrow consists in
the privation of a greater perfection for privation is nothing. But the
emotion of sorrow is a reality, and it therefore must be the reality of
the passage to a lesser perfection, or the reality by which man's power
of acting is diminished or limited. As for the definitions of
cheerfulness, pleasurable excitement, melancholy, and grief, I pass
these by, because they are related rather to the body than to the mind,
and are merely different kinds of joy or of sorrow.
IV. _Astonishment_ is the imagination of an object in which the mind
remains fixed because this particular imagination has no connection with
others.
_Explanation._--That which causes the mind from the contemplation of one
thing immediately to pass to the thought of another is that the images
of these things are connected one with the other, and are so arranged
that the one follows the other; a process which cannot be conceived when
the image of the thing is new, for the mind will be held in the
contemplation of the same object until other causes determine it to
think of other things. The imagination, therefore, considered in itself,
of a new object is of the same character as other imaginations; and for
this reason I do not class astonishment among the emotions, nor do I see
any reason why I should do it, since this abstraction of the mind arises
from no positive cause by which it is abstracted from other things, but
merely from the absence of any cause by which from the contemplation of
one thing the mind is determined to think other things. I acknowledge,
therefore, only three primitive or primary emotions, those of joy,
sorrow, and desire; and the only reason which has induced me to speak
of astonishment is, that it has been the custom to give other names to
certain emotions derived from the three primitives whenever these
emotions are related to objects at which we are astonished. This same
reason also induces me to add the definition of contempt.
V. _Contempt_ is the imagination of an object which so little touches
the mind that the mind is moved by the presence of the object to imagine
those qualities which are not in it rather than those which are in it.
The definitions of veneration and scorn I pass by here, because they
give a name, so far as I know, to none of the emotions.
VI. _Love_ is joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause.
_Explanation._--This definition explains with sufficient clearness the
essence of love; that which is given by some authors, who define love to
be the will of the lover to unite himself to the beloved object,
expresses not the essence of love but one of its properties. In as much
as these authors have not seen with sufficient clearness what is the
essence of love, they could not have a distinct conception of its
properties, and consequently their definition has by everybody been
thought very obscure. I must observe, however, when I say that it is a
property in a lover to will a union with the beloved object, that I do
not understand by will a consent or deliberation or a free decree of the
mind (for that this is a fiction we have demonstrated above), nor even a
desire of the lover to unite himself with the beloved object when it is
absent, nor a desire to continue in its presence when it is present, for
love can be conceived without either one or the other of these desires;
but by will I understand the satisfaction that the beloved object
produces in the lover by its presence, by virtue of which the joy of the
lover is strengthened, or at any rate supported.
VII. _Hatred_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of an external cause.
_Explanation._--What is to be observed here will easily be seen from
what has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition.
VIII. _Inclination_ (_propensio_) is a joy with the accompanying idea of
some object as being accidentally the cause of joy.
IX. _Aversion_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of some object which
is accidentally the cause of the sorrow.
X. _Devotion_ is love towards an object which astonishes us.
_Explanation._--Astonishment arises from the novelty of the object. If,
therefore, it should happen that we often imagine the object at which we
are astonished, we shall cease to be astonished at it, and hence we see
that the emotion of devotion easily degenerates into simple love.
XI. _Derision_ is joy arising from the imagination that something we
despise is present in an object we hate.
_Explanation._--In so far as we despise a thing we hate do we deny its
existence, and so far do we rejoice. But inasmuch as we suppose that a
man hates what he ridicules, it follows that this joy is not solid.
XII. _Hope_ is a joy not constant, arising from the idea of something
future or past, about the issue of which we sometimes doubt.
XIII. _Fear_ is a sorrow not constant, arising from the idea of
something future or past, about the issue of which we sometimes doubt.
_Explanation._--From these definitions it follows that there is no hope
without fear nor fear without hope, for the person who wavers in hope
and doubts concerning the issue of anything is supposed to imagine
something which may exclude its existence, and so far, therefore, to be
sad, and consequently while he wavers in hope, to fear lest his wishes
should not be accomplished. So also the person who fears, that is to
say, who doubts whether what he hates will not come to pass, imagines
something which excludes the existence of what he hates, and therefore
is rejoiced, and consequently so far hopes that it will not happen.
XIV. _Confidence_ is joy arising from the idea of a past or future
object from which cause for doubting is removed.
XV. _Despair_ is sorrow arising from the idea of a past or future object
from which cause for doubting is removed.
_Explanation._--Confidence, therefore, springs from hope and despair
from fear, whenever the reason for doubting the issue is taken away; a
case which occurs either because we imagine a thing past or future to be
present and contemplate it as present, or because we imagine other
things which exclude the existence of those which made us to doubt.
For although we can never be sure about the issue of individual objects,
it may nevertheless happen that we do not doubt it. For elsewhere we
have shown that it is one thing not to doubt and another to possess
certitude, and so it may happen that from the image of an object either
past or future we are affected with the same emotion of joy or sorrow as
that by which we should be affected from the image of an object present.
XVI. _Gladness_ (_gaudium_) is a joy with the accompanying idea of
something past, which, unhoped for, has happened.
XVII. _Remorse_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of something past,
which, unhoped for, has happened.
XVIII. _Commiseration_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of evil
which has happened to some one whom we imagine like ourselves.
_Explanation._--Between commiseration and compassion there seems to be
no difference, excepting perhaps that commiseration refers rather to an
individual emotion and compassion to it as a habit.
XIX. _Favor_ is love towards those who have benefited others.
XX. _Indignation_ is hatred towards those who have injured others.
_Explanation._--I am aware that these names in common bear a different
meaning. But my object is not to explain the meaning of words but the
nature of things, and to indicate them by words whose customary meaning
shall not be altogether opposed to the meaning which I desire to bestow
upon them. I consider it sufficient to have said this once for all.
XXI. _Over-estimation_ consists in thinking too highly of another person
in consequence of our love for him.
XXII. _Contempt_ consists in thinking too little of another person in
consequence of our hatred for him.
_Explanation._--Over-estimation and contempt are therefore respectively
effects or properties of love or hatred, and so over-estimation may be
defined as love in so far as it affects a man so that he thinks too much
of the beloved object; and, on the contrary, contempt may be defined as
hatred in so far as it affects a man so that he thinks too little of the
object he hates.
XXIII. _Envy_ is hatred in so far as it affects a man so that he is sad
at the good fortune of another person and is glad when any evil happens
to him.
_Explanation._--To envy is generally opposed compassion
(_misericordia_), which may therefore be defined as follows,
notwithstanding the usual signification of the word:--
XXIV. _Compassion_ is love in so far as it affects a man so that he is
glad at the prosperity of another person and is sad when any evil
happens to him.
I pass now to consider other emotions which are attended by the idea of
something within us as the cause.
XXV. _Self-satisfaction_ is the joy which is produced by contemplating
ourselves and our own power of action.
XXVI. _Humility_ is the sorrow which is produced by contemplating our
impotence or helplessness.
Self-satisfaction is opposed to humility in so far as we understand by
the former the joy which arises from contemplating our power of action,
but in so far as we understand by it joy attended with the idea of
something done, which we believe has been done by a free decree of our
mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we may thus define:--
XXVII. _Repentance_ is sorrow accompanied with the idea of something
done which we believe has been done by a free decree of our mind.
It is not to be wondered at that sorrow should always follow all those
actions which are from _custom_ called wicked, and that joy should
follow those which are called good. But that this is chiefly the effect
of education will be evident from what we have before said. Parents, by
reprobating what are called bad actions, and frequently blaming their
children whenever they commit them, while they persuade them to what are
called good actions, and praise their children when they perform them,
have caused the emotions of sorrow to connect themselves with the
former, and those of joy with the latter. Experience proves this, for
custom and religion are not the same everywhere; but, on the contrary,
things which are sacred to some are profane to others, and what are
honorable with some are disgraceful with others. Education alone,
therefore, will determine whether a man will repent of any deed or boast
of it.
XXVIII. _Pride_ is thinking too much of ourselves, through self-love.
_Explanation._--Pride differs, therefore, from over-estimation, inasmuch
as the latter is related to an external object, but pride to the man
himself who thinks of himself too highly. As over-estimation, therefore,
is an effect or property of love, so pride is an effect or property of
self-love, and it may therefore be defined as love of ourselves or
self-satisfaction, in so far as it affects us so that we think too
highly of ourselves.
To this emotion a contrary does not exist, for no one, through hatred of
himself, thinks too little of himself; indeed, we may say that no one
thinks too little of himself, in so far as he imagines himself unable to
do this or that thing. For whatever he imagines that he cannot do, that
thing he necessarily imagines, and by his imagination is so disposed
that he is actually incapable of doing what he imagines he cannot do. So
long, therefore, as he imagines himself unable to do this or that thing,
so long is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long it is
impossible for him to do it. If, however, we pay attention to what
depends upon opinion alone, we shall be able to conceive it possible for
a man to think too little of himself, for it may happen that while he
sorrowfully contemplates his own weakness he will imagine himself
despised by everybody, although nothing could be further from their
thoughts than to despise him. A man may also think too little of himself
if in the present he denies something of himself in relation to a future
time of which he is not sure; for example, when he denies that he can
conceive of nothing with certitude, and that he can desire and do
nothing which is not wicked and base. We may also say that a man thinks
too little of himself when we see that, from an excess of fear or shame,
he does not dare to do what others who are his equals dare to do. This
emotion, to which I will give the name of despondency, may therefore be
opposed to pride; for as self-satisfaction springs from pride, so
despondency springs from humility, and it may therefore be defined thus:
XXIX. _Despondency_ is thinking too little of ourselves through sorrow.
_Explanation._--We are, nevertheless, often in the habit of opposing
humility to pride, but only when we attend to their effects rather than
to their nature. For we are accustomed to call a man proud who boasts
too much, who talks about nothing but his own virtues and other people's
vices, who wishes to be preferred to everybody else, and who marches
along with that stateliness and pomp which belong to others whose
position is far above his. On the other hand, we call a man humble who
often blushes, who confesses his own faults and talks about the virtues
of others, who yields to every one, who walks with bended head, and who
neglects to adorn himself. These emotions, humility and despondency, are
very rare, for human nature, considered in itself, struggles against
them as much as it can, and hence those who have the most credit for
being abject and humble are generally the most ambitious and envious.
XXX. Self-exaltation is joy with the accompanying idea of some action we
have done, which we imagine people praise.
XXXI. _Shame_ is sorrow, with the accompanying idea of some action which
we imagine people blame.
_Explanation._--A difference, however, is here to be observed between
shame and modesty. Shame is sorrow which follows a deed of which we are
ashamed. Modesty is the dread or fear of shame, which keeps a man from
committing any disgraceful act. To modesty is usually opposed impudence,
which indeed is not an emotion, as I shall show in the proper place; but
the names of emotions, as I have already said, are matters rather of
custom than indications of the nature of the emotions. I have thus
discharged the task which I set myself of explaining the emotions of
joy and sorrow. I will advance now to those which I ascribe to desire.
XXXII. _Regret_ is the desire or longing to possess something, the
emotion being strengthened by the memory of the object itself, and at
the same time being restrained by the memory of other things which
exclude the existence of the desired object.
_Explanation._--Whenever we recollect a thing, as we have often said, we
are thereby necessarily disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion
as if it were present before us. But this disposition or effort, while
we are awake, is generally restrained by the images of things which
exclude the existence of the thing which we recollect. Whenever,
therefore, we recollect a thing which affects us with any kind of joy,
we thereby endeavor to contemplate it with the same emotion of joy as if
it were present,--an attempt which is, however, immediately restrained
by the memory of that which excludes the existence of the thing. Regret,
therefore, is really a sorrow which is opposed to the joy which arises
from the absence of what we hate. But because the name _regret_ seems to
connect this emotion with desire, I therefore ascribe it to desire.
XXXIII. _Emulation_ is the desire which is begotten in us of a thing
because we imagine that other persons have the same desire.
_Explanation._--He who seeks flight because others seek it, he who fears
because he sees others fear, or even he who withdraws his hand and moves
his body as if his hand were burning because he sees that another person
has burnt his hand, such as these, I say, although they may indeed
imitate the emotion of another, are not said to emulate it; not because
we have recognized one cause for emulation and another for imitation,
but because it has been the custom to call that man only emulous who
imitates what we think noble, useful, or pleasant.
XXXIV. _Thankfulness_ or _gratitude_ is the desire or endeavor of love
with which we strive to do good to others who, from a similar emotion of
love, have done good to us.
XXXV. _Benevolence_ is the desire to do good to those whom we pity.
XXXVI. _Anger_ is the desire by which we are impelled, through hatred,
to injure those whom we hate.
XXXVII. _Vengeance_ is the desire which, springing from mutual hatred,
urges us to injure those who, from a similar emotion, have injured us.
XXXVIII. _Cruelty_ or _ferocity_ is the desire by which a man is
impelled to injure any one whom we love or pity.
_Explanation._--To cruelty is opposed mercy, which is not a passion, but
a power of the mind by which a man restrains anger and vengeance.
XXXIX. _Fear_ is the desire of avoiding the greater of two dreaded evils
by the less.
XL. _Audacity_ is the desire by which we are impelled to do something
which is accompanied with a danger which our equals fear to meet.
XLI. A person is said to be _pusillanimous_ whose desire is restrained
by the fear of a danger which his equals dare to meet.
_Explanation._--Pusillanimity, therefore, is nothing but the dread of
some evil which most persons do not usually fear, and therefore I do not
ascribe it to the emotions of desire. I wished, notwithstanding, to
explain it here, because in so far as we attend to desire, pusillanimity
is the true opposite of the emotion of audacity.
XLII. _Consternation_ is affirmed of the man whose desire of avoiding
evil is restrained by astonishment at the evil which he fears.
_Explanation._--Consternation is therefore a kind of pusillanimity. But
because consternation springs from a double fear, it may be more aptly
defined as that dread which holds a man stupefied or vacillating, so
that he cannot remove an evil. I say _stupefied_, in so far as we
understand his desire of removing the evil to be restrained by his
astonishment. I say also _vacillating_, in so far as we conceive the
same desire to be restrained by the fear of another evil which equally
tortures him, so that he does not know which of the two evils to avoid.
XLIII. _Courtesy_ or _moderation_ is the desire of doing those things
which please men and omitting those which displease them.
XLIV. _Ambition_ is the immoderate desire of glory.
_Explanation._--Ambition is a desire which increases and strengthens all
the emotions, and that is the reason why it can hardly be kept under
control. For so long as a man is possessed by any desire, he is
necessarily at the same time possessed by this. _Every noble man_, says
Cicero, _is led by glory, and even the philosophers who write books
about despising glory place their names on the title-page_.
XLV. _Luxuriousness_ is the immoderate desire or love of good living.
XLVI. _Drunkenness_ is the immoderate desire and love of drinking.
XLVII. _Avarice_ is the immoderate desire and love of riches.
XLVIII. _Lust_ is the immoderate desire and love of sexual intercourse.
_Explanation._--This desire of sexual intercourse is usually called
lust, whether it be held within bounds or not. I may add that the five
last-mentioned emotions have no contraries, for moderation is a kind of
ambition, and I have already observed that temperance, sobriety, and
chastity show a power and not a passion of the mind. Even supposing that
an avaricious, ambitious, or timid man refrains from an excess of
eating, drinking, or sexual intercourse, avarice, ambition, and fear are
not therefore the opposites of voluptuousness, drunkenness, or lust. For
the avaricious man generally desires to swallow as much meat and drink
as he can, provided only it belong to another person. The ambitious man,
too, if he hopes he can keep it a secret, will restrain himself in
nothing, and if he lives amongst drunkards and libertines, will be more
inclined to their vices just because he is ambitious. The timid man,
too, does what he does not will; and although, in order to avoid death,
he may throw his riches into the sea, he remains avaricious; nor does
the lascivious man cease to be lascivious because he is sorry that he
cannot gratify his desire. Absolutely, therefore, these emotions have
reference not so much to the acts themselves of eating and drinking as
to the appetite and love itself. Consequently nothing can be opposed to
these emotions but nobility of soul and strength of mind, as we shall
see afterwards.
The definitions of jealousy and the other vacillations of the mind I
pass over in silence, both because they are compounded of the emotions
which we have already defined, and also because many of them have no
names,--a fact which shows that, for the purposes of life, it is
sufficient to know these combinations generally. Moreover, it follows
from the definitions of the emotions which we have explained that, they
all arise from desire, joy, or sorrow, or rather that there are none but
these three, which pass under names varying as their relations and
external signs vary. If, therefore, we attend to these primitive
emotions and to what has been said above about the nature of the mind,
we shall be able here to define the emotions in so far as they are
related to the mind alone.
_General definition of the emotions._--Emotion, which is called _animi
pathema_, is a confused idea by which the mind affirms of its body, or
any part of it, a greater or less power of existence than before; and
this increase of power being given, the mind itself is determined to one
particular thought rather than to another.
_Explanation._--I say, in the first place, that an emotion or passion of
the mind _is a confused idea_. For we have shown that the mind suffers
only in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas. I say again, _by
which the mind affirms of its body, or any part of it, a greater or less
power of existence than before_. For all ideas which we possess of
bodies indicate the actual constitution of our body rather than the
nature of the external body; but this idea, which constitutes the form
of an emotion, must indicate or express the constitution of the body, or
of some part of it; which constitution the body or any part of it
possesses from the fact that its power of action or force of existence
is increased or diminished, helped or limited. But it is to be observed,
that when I say _a greater or less power of existence than before_, I do
not mean that the mind compares the present with the past constitution
of the body, but that the idea which constitutes the form of emotion
affirms something of the body which actually involves more or less
reality than before. Moreover, since the essence of the mind consists in
its affirmation of the actual existence of its body, and since we
understand by perfection the essence itself of the thing, it follows
that the mind passes to a greater or less perfection when it is able to
affirm of its body, or some part of it, something which involves a
greater or less reality than before. When, therefore, I have said that
the mind's power of thought is increased or diminished, I have wished to
be understood as meaning nothing else than that the mind has formed an
idea of its body, or some part of its body, which expresses more or less
reality than it had hitherto affirmed of the body. For the value of
ideas and the actual power of thought are measured by the value of the
object. Finally, I added, _which being given, the mind itself is
determined to one particular thought rather than to another_, that I
might also express the nature of desire in addition to that of joy and
sorrow, which is explained by the first part of the definition.
I have now, I think, explained the principal emotions and vacillations
of the mind which are compounded of the three primary emotions, desire,
joy, and sorrow, and have set them forth through their first causes.
From what has been said it is plain that we are disturbed by external
causes in a number of ways, and that, like the waves of the sea agitated
by contrary winds, we fluctuate in our ignorance of our future and
destiny. I have said, however, that I have only explained the principal
mental complications, and not all which may exist. For by the same
method which we have pursued above it would be easy to show that love
unites itself to repentance, scorn, shame, etc.; but I think it has
already been made clear to all that the emotions can be combined in so
many ways, and that so many variations can arise, that no limits can be
assigned to their number. It is sufficient for my purpose to have
enumerated only those which are of consequence; the rest, of which I
have taken no notice, being more curious than important.
There is one constantly recurring characteristic of love which I have
yet to notice, and that is, that while we are enjoying the thing which
we desired, the body acquires from that fruition a new disposition by
which it is otherwise determined, and the images of other things are
excited in it, and the mind begins to imagine and to desire other
things. For example, when we imagine anything which usually delights our
taste, we desire to enjoy it by eating it. But whilst we enjoy it the
stomach becomes full, and the constitution of the body becomes altered.
If, therefore, the body being now otherwise disposed, the image of the
food, in consequence of its being present, and therefore also the
effort or desire to eat it, become more intense, then this new
disposition of the body will oppose this effort or desire, and
consequently the presence of the food which we desired will become
hateful to us, and this hatefulness is what we call loathing or disgust.
As for the external modifications of the body which are observed in the
emotions, such as trembling, paleness, sobbing, laughter, and the like,
I have neglected to notice them, because they belong to the body alone
without any relationship to the mind.
FOOTNOTES:
[26] Hence it follows that the mind is subject to passions in proportion
to the number of inadequate ideas which it has, and that it acts in
proportion to the number of adequate ideas which it has.
[27] This proposition is self-evident, for the definition of any given
thing affirms and does not deny the existence of the thing; that is to
say, it posits the essence of the thing and does not negate it. So long,
therefore, as we attend only to the thing itself, and not to external
causes, we shall discover nothing in it which can destroy it.