OF THE DIVINE NATURE
_Definitions_
I. By cause of itself, I understand that, whose essence involves
existence; or that, whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing.
II. That thing is called finite in its own kind (_in suo genere_) which
can be limited by another thing of the same nature. For example, a body
is called finite, because we always conceive another which is greater.
So a thought is limited by another thought; but a body is not limited by
a thought, nor a thought by a body.
III. By substance, I understand that which is in itself and is conceived
through itself; in other words, that, the conception of which does not
need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed.
IV. By attribute, I understand that which the intellect perceives of
substance, as constituting its essence.
V. By mode, I understand the affections of substance, or that which is
in another thing through which also it is conceived.
VI. By God, I understand Being absolutely infinite, that is to say,
substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses
eternal and infinite essence.
_Explanation._--I say absolutely infinite but not infinite in its own
kind (_in suo genere_); for of whatever is infinite only in its own kind
(_in suo genere_), we can deny infinite attributes; but to the essence
of that which is absolutely infinite pertains whatever expresses essence
and involves no negation.
VII. That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its
own nature alone, and is determined to action by itself alone. That
thing, on the other hand, is called necessary, or rather compelled,
which by another is determined to existence and action in a fixed and
prescribed manner.
VIII. By eternity, I understand existence itself, so far as it is
conceived necessarily to follow from the definition alone of the eternal
thing.
_Explanation._--For such existence, like the essence of the thing, is
conceived as an eternal truth. It cannot therefore be explained by
duration of time, even if the duration be conceived without beginning or
end.
_Axioms_
I. Everything which is, is either in itself or in another.
II. That which cannot be conceived through another must be conceived
through itself.
III. From a given determinate cause an effect necessarily follows; and,
on the other hand, if no determinate cause be given, it is impossible
that an effect can follow.
IV. The knowledge (cognitio) of an effect depends upon and involves the
knowledge of the cause.
V. Those things which have nothing mutually in common with one another
cannot through one another be mutually understood, that is to say, the
conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other.
VI. A true idea must agree with that of which it is the idea (_cum suo
ideato_).
VII. The essence of that thing which can be conceived as not existing
does not involve existence.
_The Essence of God_
God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which
expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.
[This can be proved in the following manner]:
For the existence or non-existence of everything there must be a reason
or cause. For example, if a triangle exists, there must be a reason or
cause why it exists; and if it does not exist, there must be a reason or
cause which hinders its existence or which negates it. But this reason
or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing or lie
outside it. For example, the nature of the thing itself shows the reason
why a square circle does not exist, the reason being that a square
circle involves a contradiction. And the reason, on the other hand, why
substance exists follows from its nature alone, which involves
existence. But the reason why a circle or triangle exists or does not
exist is not drawn from their nature, but from the order of corporeal
nature generally; for from that it must follow either that a triangle
necessarily exists, or that it is impossible for it to exist. But this
is self-evident. Therefore it follows that if there be no cause nor
reason which hinders a thing from existing, it exists necessarily. If
therefore there be no reason nor cause which hinders God from existing,
or which negates His existence, we must conclude absolutely that He
necessarily exists. But if there be such a reason or cause, it must be
either in the nature itself of God or must lie outside it, that is to
say, in another substance of another nature. For if the reason lay in a
substance of the same nature, the existence of God would be by this very
fact admitted. But substance possessing another nature could have
nothing in common with God, and therefore could not give Him existence
nor negate it. Since, therefore, the reason or cause which could negate
the divine existence cannot be outside the divine nature, it will
necessarily, supposing that the divine nature does not exist, be in His
nature itself, which would therefore involve a contradiction. But to
affirm this of the Being absolutely infinite and consummately perfect is
absurd. Therefore neither in God nor outside God is there any cause or
reason which can negate His existence, and therefore God necessarily
exists....
_The Corporeality of God_
There are those who imagine God to be like a man, composed of body and
soul and subject to passions; but it is clear enough from what has
already been demonstrated how far off men who believe this are from the
true knowledge of God. But these I dismiss, for all men who have in any
way looked into the divine nature deny that God is corporeal. That He
cannot be so they conclusively prove by showing that by "body" we
understand a certain quantity possessing length, breadth, and depth,
limited by some fixed form; and that to attribute these to God, a being
absolutely infinite, is the greatest absurdity. But yet at the same
time, from other arguments by which they endeavor to confirm their
proof, they clearly show that they remove altogether from the divine
nature substance itself corporeal or extended, affirming that it was
created by God. By what divine power, however, it could have been
created they are altogether ignorant, so that it is clear they do not
understand what they themselves say....
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But I will refute my adversaries' arguments, which, taken altogether,
come to this. First, that corporeal substance, in so far as it is
substance, consists, as they suppose, of parts, and therefore they deny
that it can be infinite, and consequently that it can pertain to God.
This they illustrate by many examples, one or two of which I will
adduce. If corporeal substance, they say, be infinite, let us conceive
it to be divided into two parts; each part, therefore, will be either
finite or infinite. If each part be finite, then the infinite is
composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If each part be infinite,
there is then an infinite twice as great as another infinite, which is
also absurd. Again, if infinite quantity be measured by equal parts of a
foot each, it must contain an infinite number of such parts, and
similarly if it be measured by equal parts of an inch each; and
therefore one infinite number will be twelve times greater than another
infinite number. Lastly, if from one point of any infinite quantity it
be imagined that two lines, AB, AC, which at first are at a certain and
determinate distance from one another, be infinitely extended, it is
plain that the distance between B and C will be continually increased,
and at length from being determinate will be indeterminable. Since
therefore these absurdities follow, as they think, from supposing
quantity to be infinite, they conclude that corporeal substance must be
finite, and consequently cannot pertain to the essence of God. A second
argument is assumed from the absolute perfection of God. For God, they
say, since He is a being absolutely perfect, cannot suffer; but
corporeal substance, since it is divisible, can suffer: it follows,
therefore, that it does not pertain to God's essence.
These are the arguments which I find in authors, by which they endeavor
to show that corporeal substance is unworthy of the divine nature, and
cannot pertain to it.... If any one will rightly consider the matter, he
will see that all these absurdities (supposing that they are all
absurdities, a point which I will now take for granted), from which
these authors attempt to draw the conclusion that substance extended is
finite, do not by any means follow from the supposition that quantity is
infinite, but from the supposition that infinite quantity is measurable,
and that it is made up of finite parts. Therefore, from the absurdities
to which this leads nothing can be concluded, excepting that infinite
quantity is not measurable, and that it cannot be composed of finite
parts. But this is what we [maintain].
... The shaft therefore which is aimed at us turns against those who
cast it. If, therefore, from these absurdities any one should attempt to
conclude that substance extended must be finite, he would, forsooth, be
in the position of the man who supposes a circle to have the properties
of a square, and then concludes that it has no center, such that all the
lines drawn from it to the circumference are equal. For corporeal
substance, which cannot be conceived except as infinite, one and
indivisible, is conceived by those against whom I argue to be composed
of finite parts, and to be multiplex and divisible, in order that they
may prove it finite. Just in the same way others, after they have
imagined a line to consist of points, know how to discover many
arguments, by which they show that a line cannot be divided _ad
infinitum_; and indeed it is not less absurd to suppose that corporeal
substance is composed of bodies or parts than to suppose that a body is
composed of surfaces, surfaces of lines, and that lines, finally, are
composed of points. Every one who knows that clear reason is infallible
ought to admit this, and especially those who deny that a vacuum can
exist. For if corporeal substance could be so divided that its parts
could be really distinct, why could not one part be annihilated, the
rest remaining, as before, connected with one another? And why must all
be so fitted together that there can be no vacuum? For of things which
are really distinct the one from the other, one can be and remain in its
own position without the other. Since therefore it is supposed that
there is no vacuum in Nature (about which I will speak at another time),
but that all the parts must be united, so that no vacuum can exist, it
follows that they cannot be really separated; that is to say, that
corporeal substance, in so far as it is substance, cannot be divided.
If, nevertheless, any one should now ask why there is a natural tendency
to consider quantity as capable of division, I reply that quantity is
conceived by us in two ways: either abstractly or superficially; that is
to say, as we imagine it, or else as substance, in which way it is
conceived by the intellect alone. If, therefore, we regard quantity (as
we do very often and easily) as it exists in the imagination, we find it
to be finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we regard it as
it exists in the intellect, and conceive it in so far as it is
substance, which is very difficult, then, as we have already
sufficiently demonstrated, we find it to be infinite, one, and
indivisible.
This will be plain enough to all who know how to distinguish between the
imagination and the intellect, and more especially if we remember that
matter is everywhere the same, and that, except in so far as we regard
it as affected in different ways, parts are not distinguished in it;
that is to say, they are distinguished with regard to mode, but not with
regard to reality. For example, we conceive water as being divided, in
so far as it is water, and that its parts are separated from one
another; but in so far as it is corporeal substance we cannot thus
conceive it, for as such it is neither separated nor divided. Moreover,
water, in so far as it is water, is originated and destroyed; but in so
far as it is substance, it is neither originated nor destroyed.
By this reasoning I think that I have also answered the second argument,
since that too is based upon the assumption that matter, considered as
substance, is divisible and composed of parts. And even if what I have
urged were not true, I do not know why matter should be unworthy of the
divine nature, since outside God no substance can exist from which the
divine nature could suffer. All things, I say, are in God, and
everything which takes place by the laws alone of the infinite nature of
God, and follows (as I shall presently show) from the necessity of His
essence. Therefore in no way whatever can it be asserted that God
suffers from anything, or that substance extended, even if it be
supposed divisible, is unworthy of the divine nature, provided only it
be allowed that it is eternal and infinite.... Whatever is, is in God,
and nothing can either be or be conceived without God.
_The Properties of God_
I
From the necessity of the divine nature infinite numbers of things in
infinite ways (that is to say, all things which can be conceived by the
infinite intellect) must follow.
This proposition must be plain to every one who considers that from the
given definition of anything a number of properties necessarily
following from it (that is to say, following from the essence of the
thing itself) are inferred by the intellect, and just in proportion as
the definition of the thing expresses a greater reality, that is to say,
just in proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves a
greater reality, will more properties be inferred. But the divine nature
possesses absolutely infinite attributes (Def. 6), each one of which
expresses infinite essence in its own kind (_in suo genere_), and
therefore, from the necessity of the divine nature, infinite numbers of
things in infinite ways (that is to say, all things which can be
conceived by the infinite intellect) must necessarily follow. Hence it
follows that God is the efficient cause of all things which can fall
under the infinite intellect. It follows, secondly, that God is cause
through Himself, and not through that which is contingent (_per
accidens_). It follows, thirdly, that God is absolutely the first cause.
II
We have just shown that from the necessity, or (which is the same thing)
from the laws only of the divine nature, infinite numbers of things
absolutely follow: and we have demonstrated that nothing can be, nor can
be conceived, without God, but that all things are in God. Therefore,
outside Himself, there can be nothing by which He may be determined or
compelled to act; and therefore He acts from the laws of His own nature
only, and is compelled by no one.
Hence it follows, firstly, that there is no cause, either external to
God or within Him, which can excite Him to act except the perfection of
His own nature. It follows, secondly, that God alone is a free cause;
for God alone exists from the necessity alone of His own nature and acts
from the necessity alone of His own nature. Therefore He alone is a free
cause.
There are some who think that God is a free cause because He can, as
they think, bring about that those things which we have said follow from
His nature--that is to say, those things which are in His power--should
not be, or should not be produced by Him. But this is simply saying that
God could bring about that it should not follow from the nature of a
triangle that its three angles should be equal to two right angles, or
that from a given cause an effect should not follow, which is absurd.
But I shall show farther on, without the help of this proposition, that
neither intellect nor will pertain to the nature of God.
I know indeed that there are many who think themselves able to
demonstrate that intellect of the highest order and freedom of will both
pertain to the nature of God, for they say that they know nothing more
perfect which they can attribute to Him than that which is the chief
perfection in ourselves. But although they conceive God as actually
possessing the highest intellect, they nevertheless do not believe that
He can bring about that all those things should exist which are actually
in His intellect, for they think that by such a supposition they would
destroy His power. If He had created, they say, all things which are in
His intellect, He could have created nothing more, and this, they
believe, does not accord with God's omnipotence; so then they prefer to
consider God as indifferent to all things, and creating nothing except
that which He has decreed to create by a certain absolute will. But I
think that I have shown with sufficient clearness that from the supreme
power of God, or from His infinite nature, infinite things in infinite
ways, that is to say, all things, have necessarily flowed, or
continually follow by the same necessity, in the same way as it follows
from the nature of a triangle, from eternity and to eternity, that its
three angles are equal to two right angles. The omnipotence of God has
therefore been actual from eternity, and in the same actuality will
remain to eternity. In this way the omnipotence of God, in my opinion,
is far more firmly established.
My adversaries, indeed (if I may be permitted to speak plainly), seem to
deny the omnipotence of God, inasmuch as they are forced to admit that
He has in His mind an infinite number of things which might be created,
but which, nevertheless, He will never be able to create, for if He were
to create all things which He has in His mind, He would, according to
them, exhaust His omnipotence and make Himself imperfect. Therefore, in
order to make a perfect God, they are compelled to make Him incapable of
doing all those things to which His power extends, and anything more
absurd than this, or more opposed to God's omnipotence, I do not think
can be imagined.
Moreover--to say a word, too, here about the intellect and will which we
commonly attribute to God--if intellect and will pertain to His eternal
essence, these attributes cannot be understood in the sense in which men
generally use them, for the intellect and will which could constitute
His essence would have to differ entirely from our intellect and will,
and could resemble ours in nothing except in name. There could be no
further likeness than that between the celestial constellation of the
Dog and the animal which barks. This I will demonstrate as follows: If
intellect pertains to the divine nature, it cannot, like our intellect,
follow the things which are its object (as many suppose), nor can it be
simultaneous in its nature with them, since God is prior to all things
in causality; but, on the contrary, the truth and formal essence of
things is what it is, because as such it exists objectively in God's
intellect. Therefore the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived
to constitute His essence, is in truth the cause of things, both of
their essence and of their existence,--a truth which seems to have been
understood by those who have maintained that God's intellect, will, and
power are one and the same thing.
Since, therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, both of
their essence and of their existence (as we have already shown), it must
necessarily differ from them with regard both to its essence and
existence; for an effect differs from its cause precisely in that which
it has from its cause. For example, one man is the cause of the
existence but not of the essence of another, for the essence is an
eternal truth; and therefore with regard to essence the two men may
exactly resemble one another, but with regard to existence they must
differ. Consequently if the existence of one should perish, that of the
other will not therefore perish; but if the essence of one could be
destroyed and become false, the essence of the other would be likewise
destroyed. Therefore a thing which is the cause both of the essence and
of the existence of any effect must differ from that effect both with
regard to its essence and with regard to its existence. But the
intellect of God is the cause both of the essence and existence of our
intellect; therefore the intellect of God, so far as it is conceived to
constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both with
regard to its essence and its existence, nor can it coincide with our
intellect in anything except the name, which is what we essayed to
prove. The same demonstration may be applied to the will, as any one may
easily see for himself.
III
All things which are, are in God and must be conceived through Him and
therefore He is the cause of the things which are in Himself. Moreover,
outside God there can be no substance, that is to say (Def. 3), outside
Him nothing can exist which is in itself. God, therefore, is the
immanent, but not the transitive cause of all things.
_The Necessity of All Things_
In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things are determined
from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a certain
manner.... That which has not been thus determined by God cannot
determine itself to action. A thing which has been determined by God to
any action cannot render itself indeterminate.
... All things have necessarily followed from the given nature of God
and from the necessity of His nature have been determined to existence
and action in a certain manner. If therefore things could have been of
another nature, or could have been determined in another manner to
action, so that the order of nature would have been different, the
nature of God might then be different to that which it now is, and hence
that different nature would necessarily exist, and there might
consequently be two or more Gods, which is absurd. Therefore things
could be produced by God in no other manner and in no other order than
that in which they have been produced.
Since I have thus shown, with greater clearness, than that of noonday
light, that in things there is absolutely nothing by virtue of which
they can be called contingent, I wish now to explain in a few words what
is to be understood by _contingent_, but, firstly, what is to be
understood by _necessary_ and _impossible_.
A thing is called necessary either in reference to its essence or its
cause. For the existence of a thing necessarily follows either from the
essence and definition of the thing itself, or from a given efficient
cause. In the same way a thing is said to be impossible either because
the essence of the thing itself or its definition involves a
contradiction, or because no external cause exists determinate to the
production of such a thing. But a thing cannot be called contingent
unless with reference to a deficiency in our knowledge. For if we do not
know that the essence of a thing involves a contradiction, or if we
actually know that it involves no contradiction, and nevertheless we can
affirm nothing with certainty about its existence because the order of
causes is concealed from us, that thing can never appear to us either as
necessary or impossible, and therefore we call it either contingent or
possible.
From what has gone before it clearly follows that things have been
produced by God in the highest degree of perfection, since they have
necessarily followed from the existence of a most perfect nature. Nor
does this doctrine accuse God of any imperfection, but, on the contrary,
His perfection has compelled us to affirm it. Indeed, from its contrary
would clearly follow, as I have shown above, that God is not absolutely
perfect, since, if things had been produced in any other fashion,
another nature would have had to be assigned to Him, different from that
which the consideration of the most perfect Being compels us to assign
to Him. I do not doubt that many will reject this opinion as ridiculous,
nor will they care to apply themselves to its consideration, and this
from no other reason than that they have been in the habit of assigning
to God another liberty widely different from that absolute will which
(Def. 7) we have taught. On the other hand, I do not doubt, if they were
willing to study the matter and properly to consider the series of our
demonstrations, that they would altogether reject this liberty which
they now assign to God, not only as of no value, but as a great obstacle
to knowledge. Neither is there any need that I should here repeat those
things which are said [above][12].
But for the sake of those who differ from me, I will here show that
although it be granted that will pertains to God's essence, it follows
nevertheless from His perfection that things could be created in no
other mode or order by Him. This it will be easy to show if we first
consider that which my opponents themselves admit, that it depends upon
the decree and will of God alone that each thing should be what it is,
for otherwise God would not be the cause of all things. It is also
admitted that all God's decrees were decreed by God Himself from all
eternity, for otherwise imperfection and inconstancy would be proved
against Him. But since in eternity there is no _when_ nor _before_ nor
_after_, it follows from the perfection of God alone that He neither can
decree nor could ever have decreed anything else than that which He has
decreed; that is to say, God has not existed before His decrees, and can
never exist without them. But it is said that although it be supposed
that God had made the nature of things different from that which it is,
or that from eternity He had decreed something else about Nature and her
order, it would not thence follow that any imperfection exists in God.
But if this be said, it must at the same time be allowed that God can
change His decrees. For if God had decreed something about Nature and
her order other than that which He has decreed--that is to say, if He
had willed and conceived something else about Nature--He would
necessarily have had an intellect and a will different from those which
He now has. And if it be allowed to assign to God another intellect and
another will without any change of His essence and of His perfection,
what is the reason why He cannot now change His decrees about creation
and nevertheless remain equally perfect? For His intellect and will
regarding created things and their order remain the same in relationship
to His essence and perfection in whatever manner His intellect and will
are conceived.
Moreover, all the philosophers whom I have seen admit that there is no
such thing as an intellect existing potentially in God, but only an
intellect existing actually. But since His intellect and His will are
not distinguishable from His essence, as all admit, it follows from this
also that if God had had another intellect actually and another will,
His essence would have been necessarily different, and hence, as I
showed at the beginning, if things had been produced by God in a manner
different from that in which they now exist, God's intellect and will,
that is to say, His essence (as has been granted), must have been
different, which is absurd.
Since, therefore, things could have been produced by God in no other
manner or order, this being a truth which follows from His absolute
perfection, there is no sound reasoning which can persuade us to believe
that God was unwilling to create all things which are in His intellect
with the same perfection as that in which they exist in His intellect.
But we shall be told that there is no perfection nor imperfection in
things, but that that which is in them by reason of which they are
perfect or imperfect and are said to be good or evil depends upon the
will of God alone, and therefore if God had willed He could have
effected that that which is now perfection should have been the extreme
of imperfection, and _vice versa_. But what else would this be than
openly to affirm that God, who necessarily understands what He wills, is
able by His will to understand things in a manner different from that in
which He understands them, which, as I have just shown, is a great
absurdity? I can therefore turn the argument on my opponents in this
way. All things depend upon the power of God. In order that things may
be differently constituted, it would be necessary that God's will should
be differently constituted; but God's will cannot be other than it is as
we have lately most clearly deduced from His perfection. Things
therefore cannot be differently constituted.
I confess that this opinion, which subjects all things to a certain
indifferent God's will, and affirms that all things depend upon God's
good pleasure, is at a less distance from the truth than the opinion of
those who affirm that God does everything for the sake of the Good. For
these seem to place something outside of God which is independent of
Him, to which He looks while He is at work as to a model, or at which He
aims as if at a certain mark. This is indeed nothing else than to
subject God to fate, the most absurd thing which can be affirmed of Him
whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of
all things as well as of their existence. Therefore it is not worth
while that I should waste time in refuting this absurdity.
Before I go any farther, I wish here to explain or rather to recall to
recollection, what we mean by _natura naturans_ and what by _natura
naturata_. For, from what has gone before, I think it is plain that by
_natura naturans_ we are to understand that which is in itself and is
conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance which express
eternal and infinite essence, that is to say, God in so far as He is
considered as a free cause. But by _natura naturata_ I understand
everything which follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of
any one of God's attributes, that is to say, all the modes of God's
attributes in so far as they are considered as things which are in God,
and which without God can neither be nor can be conceived.
... Individual things are nothing but affections or modes of God's
attributes, expressing those attributes in a certain and determinate
manner.
_General Conclusions_
I have now explained the nature of God and its properties. I have shown
that He necessarily exists; that He is one God; that from the necessity
alone of His own nature He is and acts; that He is, and in what way He
is, the free cause of all things; that all things are in Him, and so
depend upon Him that without Him they can neither be nor can be
conceived; and, finally, that all things have been predetermined by Him,
not indeed from freedom of will or from absolute good pleasure, but from
His absolute nature or infinite power.
Moreover, wherever an opportunity was afforded, I have endeavored to
remove prejudices which might hinder the perception of the truth of what
I have demonstrated; but because not a few still remain which have been
and are now sufficient to prove a very great hindrance to the
comprehension of the connection of things in the manner in which I have
explained it, I have thought it worth while to call them up to be
examined by reason. But all these prejudices which I here undertake to
point out depend upon this solely: that it is commonly supposed that all
things in Nature, like men, work to some end; and indeed it is thought
to be certain that God Himself directs all things to some sure end, for
it is said that God has made all things for man, and man that he may
worship God.
This, therefore, I will first investigate by inquiring, firstly, why so
many rest in this prejudice, and why all are so naturally inclined to
embrace it? I shall then show its falsity, and, finally, the manner in
which there have arisen from it prejudices concerning _good_ and _evil_,
_merit_ and _sin_, _praise_ and _blame_, _order_ and _disorder_,
_beauty_ and _deformity_, and so forth. This, however, is not the place
to deduce these things from the nature of the human mind. It will be
sufficient if I here take as an axiom that which no one ought to
dispute, namely, that man is born ignorant of the causes of things, and
that he has a desire, of which he is conscious, to seek that which is
profitable to him. From this it follows, firstly, that he thinks himself
free because he is conscious of his wishes and appetites, whilst at the
same time he is ignorant of the causes by which he is led to wish and
desire, not dreaming what they are; and, secondly, it follows that man
does everything for an end, namely, for that which is profitable to him,
which is what he seeks. Hence it happens that he attempts to discover
merely the final causes of that which has happened; and when he has
heard them he is satisfied, because there is no longer any cause for
further uncertainty. But if he cannot hear from another what these final
causes are, nothing remains but to turn to himself and reflect upon the
ends which usually determine him to the like actions, and thus by his
own mind he necessarily judges that of another.
Moreover, since he discovers, both within and without himself a
multitude of means which contribute not a little to the attainment of
what is profitable to himself--for example, the eyes, which are useful
for seeing, the teeth for mastication, plants and animals for
nourishment, the sun for giving light, the sea for feeding fish,
etc.--it comes to pass that all natural objects are considered as means
for obtaining what is profitable. These too being evidently discovered
and not created by man, hence he has a cause for believing that some
other person exists, who has prepared them for man's use. For having
considered them as means it was impossible to believe that they had
created themselves, and so he was obliged to infer from the means which
he was in the habit of providing for himself that some ruler or rulers
of Nature exist, endowed with human liberty, who have taken care of all
things for him, and have made all things for his use. Since he never
heard anything about the mind of these rulers, he was compelled to judge
of it from his own, and hence he affirmed that the gods direct
everything for his advantage, in order that he may be bound to them and
hold them in the highest honor. This is the reason why each man has
devised for himself, out of his own brain, a different mode of
worshiping God, so that God might love him above others, and direct all
Nature to the service of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice.
Thus has this prejudice been turned into a superstition and has driven
deep roots into the mind--a prejudice which was the reason why every one
has so eagerly tried to discover and explain the final causes of things.
The attempt, however, to show that Nature does nothing in vain (that is
to say, nothing which is not profitable to man), seems to end in showing
that Nature, the gods, and man are alike mad.
Do but see, I pray, to what all this has led. Amidst so much in Nature
that is beneficial, not a few things must have been observed which are
injurious, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, and it was affirmed
that these things happened either because the gods were angry because of
wrongs which had been inflicted on them by man, or because of sins
committed in the method of worshiping them; and although experience
daily contradicted this, and showed by an infinity of examples that both
the beneficial and the injurious were indiscriminately bestowed on the
pious and the impious, the inveterate prejudices on this point have not
therefore been abandoned. For it was much easier for a man to place
these things aside with others of the use of which he was ignorant, and
thus retain his present and inborn state of ignorance, than to destroy
the whole superstructure and think out a new one. Hence it was looked
upon as indisputable that the judgments of the gods far surpass our
comprehension; and this opinion alone would have been sufficient to keep
the human race in darkness to all eternity, if mathematics, which does
not deal with ends, but with the essences and properties of forms, had
not placed before us another rule of truth. In addition to mathematics,
other causes also might be assigned, which it is superfluous here to
enumerate, tending to make men reflect upon these universal prejudices,
and leading them to a true knowledge of things.
I have thus sufficiently explained what I promised in the first place to
explain. There will now be no need of many words to show that Nature has
set no end before herself, and that all final causes are nothing but
human fictions. For I believe that this is sufficiently evident both
from the foundations and causes of this prejudice, as well as from all
those propositions in which I have shown that all things are begotten by
a certain eternal necessity of Nature and in absolute perfection. Thus
much, nevertheless, I will add, that this doctrine concerning an end
altogether overturns nature. For that which is in truth the cause it
considers as the effect, and _vice versa_. Again, that which is first in
Nature it puts last; and, finally, that which is supreme and most
perfect it makes the most imperfect. For, passing by the first two
assertions as self-evident, it is plain that that effect is the most
perfect which is immediately produced by God, and in proportion as
intermediate causes are necessary for the production of a thing is it
imperfect. But if things which are immediately produced by God were made
in order that He might obtain the end He had in view, then the last
things for the sake of which the first exist, must be the most perfect
of all.
Again, this doctrine does away with God's perfection. For if God works
to obtain an end, He necessarily seeks something of which he stands in
need. And although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between
the end of want and the end of assimilation (_finem indigentiae et finem
assimilationis_), they confess that God has done all things for His own
sake, and not for the sake of the things to be created, because before
the creation they can assign nothing excepting God for the sake of which
God could do anything; and therefore they are necessarily compelled to
admit that God stood in need of and desired those things for which He
determined to prepare means. This is self-evident. Nor is it here to be
overlooked that the adherents of this doctrine, who have found a
pleasure in displaying their ingenuity in assigning the ends of things,
have introduced a new species of argument, not the _reductio ad
impossible_, but the _reductio ad ignorantiam_, to prove their position,
which shows that it had no other method of defense left.
For, by way of example, if a stone had fallen from some roof on
somebody's head and killed him, they will demonstrate in this manner
that the stone has fallen in order to kill the man. For if it did not
fall for that purpose by the will of God, how could so many
circumstances concur through chance (and a number often simultaneously
do concur)? You will answer, perhaps, that the event happened because
the wind blew and the man was passing that way. But, they will urge, why
did the wind blow at that time, and why did the man pass that way
precisely at the same moment? If you again reply that the wind rose then
because the sea on the preceding day began to be stormy, the weather
hitherto having been calm, and that the man had been invited by a
friend, they will urge again--because there is no end of
questioning--But why was the sea agitated? why was the man invited at
that time? And so they will not cease from asking the causes of causes,
until at last you fly to the will of God, the refuge for ignorance.
So, also, when they behold the structure of the human body, they are
amazed; and because they are ignorant of the causes of such art, they
conclude that the body was made not by mechanical but by a supernatural
or divine art, and has been formed in such a way so that the one part
may not injure the other. Hence it happens that the man who endeavors to
find out the true causes of miracles, and who desires as a wise man to
understand Nature, and not to gape at it like a fool, is generally
considered and proclaimed to be a heretic and impious by those whom the
vulgar worship as the interpreters both of Nature and the gods. For
these know that if ignorance be removed, amazed stupidity, the sole
ground on which they rely in arguing or in defending their authority, is
taken away also. But these things I leave and pass on to that which I
determined to do in the third place.
After man has persuaded himself that all things which exist are made for
him, he must in everything adjudge that to be of the greatest importance
which is most useful to him, and he must esteem that to be of surpassing
worth by which he is most beneficially affected. In this way he is
compelled to form those notions by which he explains Nature; such, for
instance, as _good_, _evil_, _order_, _confusion_, _heat_, _cold_,
_beauty_, and _deformity_, etc.; and because he supposes himself to be
free, notions like those of _praise_ and _blame_, _sin_ and _merit_,
have arisen. These latter I shall hereafter explain when I have treated
of human nature; the former I will here briefly unfold.
It is to be observed that man has given the name _good_ to everything
which leads to health and the worship of God; on the contrary,
everything which does not lead thereto he calls _evil_. But because
those who do not understand Nature affirm nothing about things
themselves, but only imagine them, and take the imagination to be
understanding, they therefore, ignorant of things and their nature,
firmly believe an _order_ to be in things; for when things are so placed
that if they are represented to us through the senses, we can easily
imagine them, and consequently easily remember them, we call them well
arranged; but if they are not placed so that we can imagine and remember
them, we call them badly arranged or _confused_. Moreover, since those
things are more especially pleasing to us which we can easily imagine,
men therefore prefer order to confusion, as if order were something in
Nature apart from our own imagination; and they say that God has created
everything in order, and in this manner they ignorantly attribute
imagination to God, unless they mean perhaps that God, out of
consideration for the human imagination, has disposed things in the
manner in which they can most easily be imagined. No hesitation either
seems to be caused by the fact that an infinite number of things are
discovered which far surpass our imagination, and very many which
confound it through its weakness. But enough of this.
The other notions which I have mentioned are nothing but modes in which
the imagination is affected in different ways, and nevertheless they are
regarded by the ignorant as being specially attributes of things,
because, as we have remarked, men consider all things as made for
themselves, and call the nature of a thing good, evil, sound, putrid, or
corrupt, just as they are affected by it. For example, if the motion by
which the nerves are affected by means of objects represented to the eye
conduces to well-being, the objects by which it is caused are called
_beautiful_; while those exciting a contrary motion are called
_deformed_. Those things, too, which stimulate the senses through the
nostrils are called sweet-smelling or stinking; those which act through
the taste are called sweet or bitter, full-flavored or insipid; those
which act through the touch, hard or soft, heavy or light; those,
lastly, which act through the ears are said to make a noise, sound, or
harmony, the last having caused men to lose their senses to such a
degree that they have believed that God even is delighted with it.
Indeed, philosophers may be found who have persuaded themselves that the
celestial motions beget a harmony.
All these things sufficiently show that every one judges things by the
constitution of his brain, or rather accepts the affections of his
imagination in the place of things.[13] It is not, therefore, to be
wondered at, as we may observe in passing, that all those controversies
which we see have arisen amongst men, so that at last skepticism has
been the result. For although human bodies agree in many things, they
differ in more, and therefore that which to one person is good will
appear to another evil, that which to one is well arranged to another is
confused, that which pleases one will displease another, and so on in
other cases which I pass by both because we cannot notice them at length
here, and because they are within the experience of every one. For every
one has heard the expressions: So many heads, so many ways of thinking;
Every one is satisfied with his own way of thinking; Differences of
brains are not less common than differences of taste;--all which maxims
show that men decide upon matters according to the constitution of their
brains, and imagine rather than understand things.
If men understood things, they would, as mathematics prove, at least be
all alike convinced if they were not all alike attracted. We see,
therefore, that all those methods by which the common people are in the
habit of explaining Nature are only different sorts of imaginations, and
do not reveal the nature of anything in itself, but only the
constitution of the imagination; and because they have names as if they
were entities existing apart from the imagination, I call them entities
not of the reason but of the imagination. All argument therefore, urged
against us based upon such notions can be easily refuted.
Many people, for instance, are accustomed to argue thus:--If all things
have followed from the necessity of the most perfect nature of God, how
is it that so many imperfections have arisen in Nature--corruption, for
instance, of things till they stink; deformity, exciting disgust;
confusion, evil, crime, etc.? But, as I have just observed, all this is
easily answered. For the perfection of things is to be judged by their
nature and power alone; nor are they more or less perfect because they
delight or offend the human senses, or because they are beneficial or
prejudicial to human nature. But to those who ask why God has not
created all men in such a manner that they might be controlled by the
dictates of reason alone, I give but this answer: Because to Him
material was not wanting for the creation of everything, from the
highest down to the very lowest grade of perfection; or, to speak more
properly, because the laws of His nature were so ample that they
sufficed for the production of everything which can be conceived by an
infinite intellect, as I have demonstrated.
These are the prejudices which I undertook to notice here. If any others
of a similar character remain, they can easily be rectified with a
little thought by any one.
FOOTNOTES:
[12] Pp. 132-135.
[13] Beauty, my dear Sir, is not so much a quality of the object beheld,
as an effect in him who beholds it. If our sight were longer or shorter,
or, if our constitution were different, what now appears beautiful to us
would seem misshapen and what we now think misshapen we should regard as
beautiful. The most beautiful hand seen through the microscope will
appear horrible. Some things are beautiful at a distance, but ugly near;
thus things regarded in themselves, and in relation to God, are neither
ugly nor beautiful. Therefore, he who says that God has created the
world so that it might be beautiful is bound to adopt one of the two
alternatives: either that God created the world for the sake of men's
pleasure and eyesight, or else that He created men's pleasure and
eyesight for the sake of the world. _From a letter to Hugo Boxel_
(1674).
SECOND PART
ON MAN
_The more things the mind knows, the better it understands its own
powers and the order of Nature. The better it understands its own
powers, so much the more easily can it direct itself and propose rules
to itself. The better, also, it understands the order of Nature, the
more easily can it restrain itself from what is useless._
SPINOZA.