OF THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE[2]
When people declare, as all are ready to do, that the Bible is the Word
of God teaching men true blessedness and the way of salvation, they
evidently do not mean what they say; for the masses take no pains at all
to live according to Scripture, and we see most people endeavoring to
hawk about their own commentaries as the word of God, and giving their
best efforts, under the guise of religion, to compelling others to think
as they do: we generally see, I say, theologians anxious to learn how to
wring their inventions and sayings out of the sacred text, and to
fortify them with Divine authority. Such persons never display less
scruple and more zeal than when they are interpreting Scripture or the
mind of the Holy Ghost; if we ever see them perturbed, it is not that
they fear to attribute some error to the Holy Spirit, and to stray from
the right path, but that they are afraid to be convicted of error by
others, and thus to overthrow and bring into contempt their own
authority. But if men really believe what they verbally testify of
Scripture, they would adopt quite a different plan of life: their minds
would not be agitated by so many contentions, nor so many hatreds, and
they would cease to be excited by such a blind and rash passion for
interpreting the sacred writings, and excogitating novelties in
religion. On the contrary, they would not dare to adopt, as the teaching
of Scripture, anything which they could not plainly deduce therefrom:
lastly, these sacrilegious persons who have dared, in several passages,
to interpolate the Bible, would have shrunk from so great a crime, and
would have stayed their sacrilegious hands.
Ambition and unscrupulousness have waxed so powerful, that religion is
thought to consist, not so much in respecting the writings of the Holy
Ghost, as in defending human commentaries, so that religion is no longer
identified with charity, but with spreading discord and propagating
insensate hatred disguised under the name of zeal for the Lord, and
eager ardor.
To these evils we must add superstition, which teaches men to despise
reason and Nature, and only to admire and venerate that which is
repugnant to both: whence it is not wonderful that for the sake of
increasing the admiration and veneration felt for Scripture, men strive
to explain it so as to make it appear to contradict, as far as possible,
both one and the other: thus they dream that most profound mysteries lie
hid in the Bible, and weary themselves out in the investigation of these
absurdities, to the neglect of what is useful. Every result of their
diseased imagination they attribute to the Holy Ghost, and strive to
defend with the utmost zeal and passion; for it is an observed fact that
men employ their reason to defend conclusions arrived at by reason, but
conclusions arrived at by the passions are defended by the passions.
If we would separate ourselves from the crowd and escape from
theological prejudices, instead of rashly accepting human commentaries
for Divine documents, we must consider the true method of interpreting
Scripture and dwell upon it at some length: for if we remain in
ignorance of this we cannot know, certainly, what the Bible and the Holy
Spirit wish to teach.
I may sum up the matter by saying that the method of interpreting
Scripture does not widely differ from the method of interpreting
Nature--in fact, it is almost the same. For as the interpretation of
Nature consists in the examination of the history of Nature, and
therefrom deducing definitions of natural phenomena on certain fixed
axioms, so Scriptural interpretation proceeds by the examination of
Scripture, and inferring the intention of its authors as a legitimate
conclusion from its fundamental principles. By working in this manner
every one will always advance without danger of error--that is, if they
admit no principles for interpreting Scripture, and discussing its
contents save such as they find in Scripture itself--and will be able
with equal security to discuss what surpasses our understanding, and
what is known by the natural light of reason.
In order to make clear that such a method is not only correct, but is
also the only one advisable, and that it agrees with that employed in
interpreting Nature, I must remark that Scripture very often treats of
matters which cannot be deduced from principles known to reason: for it
is chiefly made up of narratives and revelation: the narratives
generally contain miracles--that is, [as we shall show in a later
chapter], relations of extraordinary natural occurrences adapted to the
opinions and judgment of the historians who recorded them: the
revelations also were adapted to the opinions of the prophets and in
themselves surpassed human comprehension. Therefore the knowledge of all
these--that is, of nearly the whole contents of Scripture, must be
sought from Scripture alone, even as the knowledge of nature is sought
from nature. As for the moral doctrines which are also contained in the
Bible, they may be demonstrated from received axioms, but we cannot
prove in the same manner that Scripture intended to teach them, this can
only be learned from Scripture itself.
If we would bear unprejudiced witness to the Divine origin of Scripture,
we must prove solely on its own authority that it teaches true moral
doctrines, for by such means alone can its Divine origin be
demonstrated: we have shown that the certitude of the prophets depended
chiefly on their having minds turned towards what is just and good,
therefore we ought to have proof of their possessing this quality before
we repose faith in them. From miracles God's divinity cannot be proved
[as I shall show], for miracles could be wrought by false prophets.
Wherefore the Divine origin of Scripture must consist solely in its
teaching true virtue. But we must come to our conclusion simply on
Scriptural grounds, for if we were unable to do so we could not, unless
strongly prejudiced, accept the Bible and bear witness to its Divine
origin.
Our knowledge of Scripture must then be looked for in Scripture only.
Lastly, Scripture does not give us definitions of things any more than
nature does: therefore, such definitions must be sought in the latter
case from the diverse workings of nature; in the former case, from the
various narratives about the given subject which occur in the Bible.
The universal rule, then, in interpreting Scripture is to accept nothing
as an authoritative Scriptural statement which we do not perceive very
clearly when we examine it in the light of its history. What I mean by
its history, and what should be the chief points elucidated, I will now
explain.
The history of a Scriptural statement comprises--
I. The nature and properties of the language in which the books of the
Bible were written, and in which their authors were accustomed to speak.
We shall thus be able to investigate every expression by comparison with
common conversational usages.
Now all the writers both of the Old Testament and the New were Hebrews:
therefore, a knowledge of the Hebrew language is before all things
necessary, not only for the comprehension of the Old Testament, which
was written in that tongue, but also of the New: for although the latter
was published in other languages, yet its characteristics are Hebrew.
II. An analysis of each book and arrangement of its contents under
heads; so that we may have at hand the various texts which treat of a
given subject. Lastly, a note of all the passages which are ambiguous or
obscure, or which seem mutually contradictory.
I call passages clear or obscure according as their meaning is inferred
easily or with difficulty in relation to the context, not according as
their truth is perceived easily or the reverse by reason. We are at
work not on the truth of passages, but solely on their meaning. We must
take especial care, when we are in search of the meaning of a text, not
to be led away by our reason in so far as it is founded on principles of
natural knowledge (to say nothing of prejudices): in order not to
confound the meaning of a passage with its truth, we must examine it
solely by means of the signification of the words, or by a reason
acknowledging no foundation but Scripture.
I will illustrate my meaning by an example. The words of Moses, "God is
a fire" and "God is jealous," are perfectly clear so long as we regard
merely the signification of the words, and I therefore reckon them among
the clear passages, though in relation to reason and truth they are most
obscure: still, although the literal meaning is repugnant to the natural
light of reason, nevertheless, if it cannot be clearly overruled on
grounds and principles derived from its Scriptural "history," it, that
is, the literal meaning, must be the one retained: and contrariwise if
these passages literally interpreted are found to clash with principles
derived from Scripture, though such literal interpretation were in
absolute harmony with reason, they must be interpreted in a different
manner, _i.e._, metaphorically.
If we would know whether Moses believed God to be a fire or not, we must
on no account decide the question on grounds of the reasonableness or
the reverse of such an opinion, but must judge solely by the other
opinions of Moses which are on record.
In the present instance, as Moses says in several other passages that
God has no likeness to any visible thing, whether in heaven or in earth,
or in the water, either all such passages must be taken metaphorically,
or else the one before us must be so explained. However, as we should
depart as little as possible from the literal sense, we must first ask
whether this text, God is a fire, admits of any but the literal
meaning--that is, whether the word fire ever means anything besides
ordinary natural fire. If no such second meaning can be found, the text
must be taken literally, however repugnant to reason it may be: and all
the other passages, though in complete accordance with reason, must be
brought into harmony with it. If the verbal expressions would not admit
of being thus harmonized, we should have to set them down as
irreconcilable, and suspend our judgment concerning them. However, as we
find the name fire applied to anger and jealousy (see Job xxxi. 12) we
can thus easily reconcile the words of Moses, and legitimately conclude
that the two propositions God is a fire, and God is jealous, are in
meaning identical.
Further, as Moses clearly teaches that God is jealous, and nowhere
states that God is without passions or emotions, we must evidently infer
that Moses held this doctrine himself, or at any rate, that he wished to
teach it, nor must we refrain because such a belief seems contrary to
reason: for as we have shown, we cannot wrest the meaning of texts to
suit the dictates of our reason, or our preconceived opinions. The whole
knowledge of the Bible must be sought solely from itself.
III. Lastly, such a history should relate the environment of all the
prophetic books extant; that is, the life, the conduct, and the studies
of the author of each book, who he was, what was the occasion, and the
epoch of his writing, whom did he write for, and in what language.
Further, it should inquire into the fate of each book: how it was first
received, into whose hands it fell, how many different versions there
were of it, by whose advice was it received into the Bible, and, lastly,
how all the books now universally accepted as sacred, were united into a
single whole.
All such information should, as I have said, be contained in the
"history" of Scripture. For, in order to know what statements are set
forth as laws, and what as moral precepts, it is important to be
acquainted with the life, the conduct, and the pursuits of their author:
moreover, it becomes easier to explain a man's writings in proportion as
we have more intimate knowledge of his genius and temperament.
Further, that we may not confound precepts which are eternal with those
which served only a temporary purpose, or were only meant for a few, we
should know what was the occasion, the time, the age, in which each book
was written, and to what nation it was addressed.
Lastly, we should have knowledge on the other points I have mentioned,
in order to be sure, in addition to the authenticity of the work, that
it has not been tampered with by sacrilegious hands, or whether errors
can have crept in, and, if so, whether they have been corrected by men
sufficiently skilled and worthy of credence. All these things should be
known, that we may not be led away by blind impulse to accept whatever
is thrust on our notice, instead of only that which is sure and
indisputable.
Now, when we are in possession of this history of Scripture, and have
finally decided that we assert nothing as prophetic doctrine which does
not directly follow from such history, or which is not clearly deducible
from it, then, I say, it will be time to gird ourselves for the task of
investigating the mind of the prophets and of the Holy Spirit. But in
this further arguing, also, we shall require a method very like that
employed in interpreting Nature from her history. As in the examination
of natural phenomena we try first to investigate what is most universal
and common to all Nature--such, for instance, as motion and rest, and
their laws and rules, which Nature always observes, and through which
she continually works--and then we proceed to what is less universal;
so, too, in the history of Scripture, we seek first for that which is
most universal, and serves for the basis and foundation of all
Scripture, a doctrine, in fact, that is commended by all the prophets as
eternal and most profitable to all men. For example, that God is one,
and that He is omnipotent, and He alone should be worshiped, that He has
a care for all men, and that He especially loves those who adore Him and
love their neighbor as themselves, etc. These and similar doctrines, I
repeat, Scripture everywhere so clearly and expressly teaches, that no
one was ever in doubt of its meaning concerning them.
The nature of God, His manner of regarding and providing for things, and
similar doctrines, Scripture nowhere teaches professedly, and as eternal
doctrine; on the contrary, we have shown that the prophets themselves
did not agree on the subject; therefore, we must not lay down any
doctrine as Scriptural on such subjects, though it may appear perfectly
clear on rational grounds.
From a proper knowledge of this universal doctrine of Scripture, we must
then proceed to other doctrines less universal, but which, nevertheless,
have regard to the general conduct of life, and flow from the universal
doctrine like rivulets from a source: such are all particular external
manifestations of true virtue, which need a given occasion for their
exercise; whatever is obscure or ambiguous on such points in Scripture
must be explained and defined by its universal doctrine; with regard to
contradictory instances, we must observe the occasion and the time in
which they were written. For instance, when Christ says, "Blessed are
they that mourn, for they shall be comforted," we do not know, from the
actual passage, what sort of mourners are meant; as, however, Christ
afterwards teaches that we should have care for nothing, save only for
the kingdom of God and His righteousness, which is commended as the
highest good (see Matt. vi. 33), it follows that by mourners He only
meant those who mourn for the kingdom of God and righteousness neglected
by man: for this would be the only cause of mourning to those who love
nothing but the Divine kingdom and justice, and who evidently despise
the gifts of fortune. So, too, when Christ says: "But if a man strike
you on the right cheek, turn to him the left also," and the words which
follow.
If He had given such a command, as a lawgiver, to judges, He would
thereby have abrogated the law of Moses, but this He expressly says He
did not do (Matt. v. 17). Wherefore we must consider who was the
speaker, what was the occasion, and to whom were the words addressed.
Now Christ said that He did not ordain laws as a legislator, but
inculcated precepts as a teacher: inasmuch as He did not aim at
correcting outward actions so much as the frame of mind. Further, these
words were spoken to men who were oppressed, who lived in a corrupt
commonwealth on the brink of ruin, where justice was utterly neglected.
The very doctrine inculcated here by Christ just before the destruction
of the city was also taught by Jeremiah before the first destruction of
Jerusalem, that is, in similar circumstances, as we see from
Lamentations iii. 25-30.
Now as such teaching was only set forth by the prophets in times of
oppression, and was even then never laid down as a law; and as, on the
other hand, Moses (who did not write in times of oppression, but--mark
this--strove to found a well-ordered commonwealth), while condemning
envy and hatred of one's neighbor, yet ordained that an eye should be
given for an eye, it follows most clearly from these purely Scriptural
grounds that this precept of Christ and Jeremiah concerning submission
to injuries was only valid in places where justice is neglected, and in
a time of oppression, but does not hold good in a well-ordered state.
In a well-ordered state where justice is administered every one is
bound, if he would be accounted just, to demand penalties before the
judge (see Lev. v. 1), not for the sake of vengeance (Lev. xix. 17, 18),
but in order to defend justice and his country's laws, and to prevent
the wicked rejoicing in their wickedness. All this is plainly in
accordance with reason. I might cite many other examples in the same
manner, but I think the foregoing are sufficient to explain my meaning
and the utility of this method, and this is all my present purpose.
Hitherto we have only shown how to investigate those passages of
Scripture which treat of practical conduct, and which, therefore, are
more easily examined, for on such subjects there was never really any
controversy among the writers of the Bible.
The purely speculative passages cannot be so easily traced to their real
meaning: the way becomes narrower, for as the prophets differed in
matters speculative among themselves, and the narratives are in great
measure adapted to the prejudices of each age, we must not, on any
account, infer the intention of one prophet from clearer passages in the
writings of another; nor must we so explain his meaning, unless it is
perfectly plain that the two prophets were at one in the matter.
How we are to arrive at the intention of the prophets in such cases I
will briefly explain. Here, too, we must begin from the most universal
proposition, inquiring first from the most clear Scriptural statements
what is the nature of prophecy or revelation, and wherein does it
consist; then we must proceed to miracles, and so on to whatever is most
general till we come to the opinions of a particular prophet, and, at
last, to the meaning of a particular revelation, prophecy, history, or
miracle. We have already pointed out that great caution is necessary not
to confound the mind of a prophet or historian with the mind of the Holy
Spirit and the truth of the matter; therefore I need not dwell further
on the subject. I would, however, here remark concerning the meaning of
revelation, that the present method only teaches us what the prophets
really saw or heard, not what they desired to signify or represent by
symbols. The latter may be guessed at but cannot be inferred with
certainty from Scriptural premises.
We have thus shown the plan for interpreting Scripture, and have, at the
same time, demonstrated that it is the one and surest way of
investigating its true meaning. I am willing indeed to admit that those
persons (if any such there be) would be more absolutely certainly right,
who have received either a trustworthy tradition or an assurance from
the prophets themselves, such as is claimed by the Pharisees; or who
have a pontiff gifted with infallibility in the interpretation of
Scripture, such as the Roman Catholics boast. But as we can never be
perfectly sure, either of such a tradition or of the authority of the
pontiff, we cannot found any certain conclusion on either: the one is
denied by the oldest sect of Christians, the other by the oldest sect of
Jews. Indeed, if we consider the series of years (to mention no other
point) accepted by the Pharisees from their Rabbis, during which time
they say they have handed down the tradition from Moses, we shall find
that it is not correct, as I show elsewhere. Therefore such a tradition
should be received with extreme suspicion; and although, according to
our method, we are bound to consider as uncorrupted the tradition of the
Jews, namely, the meaning of the Hebrew words which we received from
them, we may accept the latter while retaining our doubts about the
former.
No one has ever been able to change the meaning of a word in ordinary
use, though many have changed the meaning of a particular sentence. Such
a proceeding would be most difficult; for whoever attempted to change
the meaning of a word, would be compelled, at the same time, to explain
all the authors who employed it, each according to his temperament and
intention, or else, with consummate cunning, to falsify them.
Further, the masses and the learned alike preserve language, but it is
only the learned who preserve the meaning of particular sentences and
books: thus, we may easily imagine that the learned having a very rare
book in their power, might change or corrupt the meaning of a sentence
in it, but they could not alter the signification of the words;
moreover, if anyone wanted to change the meaning of a common word he
would not be able to keep up the change among posterity, or in common
parlance or writing.
For these and such-like reasons we may readily conclude that it would
never enter into the mind of anyone to corrupt a language, though the
intention of a writer may often have been falsified by changing his
phrases or interpreting them amiss. As then our method (based on the
principle that the knowledge of Scripture must be sought from itself
alone) is the sole true one, we must evidently renounce any knowledge
which it cannot furnish for the complete understanding of Scripture....
If we read a book which contains incredible or impossible narratives, or
is written in a very obscure style, and if we know nothing of its
author, nor of the time or occasion of its being written, we shall
vainly endeavor to gain any certain knowledge of its true meaning. For
being in ignorance on these points we cannot possibly know the aim or
intended aim of the author; if we are fully informed, we so order our
thoughts as not to be in any way prejudiced either in ascribing to the
author or him for whom the author wrote either more or less than his
meaning, and we only take into consideration what the author may have
had in his mind, or what the time and occasion demanded. I think this
must be tolerably evident to all.
It often happens that in different books we read histories in themselves
similar, but which we judge very differently, according to the opinions
we have formed of the authors. I remember once to have read in some book
that a man named Orlando Furioso used to drive a kind of winged monster
through the air, fly over any countries he liked, kill unaided vast
numbers of men and giants, and such like fancies, which from the point
of view of reason are obviously absurd. A very similar story I read in
Ovid of Perseus, and also in the books of Judges and Kings of Samson,
who alone and unarmed killed thousands of men, and of Elijah, who flew
through the air, and at last went up to heaven in a chariot of fire,
with horses of fire. All these stories are obviously alike, but we judge
them very differently. The first only sought to amuse, the second had a
political object, the third a religious object. We gather this simply
from the opinions we had previously formed of the authors. Thus it is
evidently necessary to know something of the authors of writings which
are obscure or unintelligible, if we would interpret their meaning; and
for the same reason, in order to choose the proper reading from among a
great variety, we ought to have information as to the versions in which
the differences are found, and as to the possibility of other readings
having been discovered by persons of greater authority....
... The difficulties in this method of interpreting Scripture from its
own history, I conceive to be so great that I do not hesitate to say
that the true meaning of Scripture is in many places inexplicable, or at
best mere subject for guess work; but I must again point out, on the
other hand, that such difficulties only arise when we endeavor to follow
the meaning of a prophet in matters which cannot be perceived, but only
imagined, not in things, whereof the understanding can give a clear and
distinct idea, and which are conceivable through themselves: matters
which by their nature are easily perceived cannot be expressed so
obscurely as to be unintelligible; as the proverb says, "a word is
enough to the wise." Euclid, who only wrote of matters very simple and
easily understood, can easily be comprehended by any one in any
language; we can follow his intention perfectly, and be certain of his
true meaning, without having a thorough knowledge of the language in
which he wrote; in fact, a quite rudimentary acquaintance is sufficient.
We need make no researches concerning the life, the pursuits, or the
habits of the author; nor need we inquire in what language, nor when he
wrote, nor the vicissitudes of his book, nor its various readings, nor
how, nor by whose advice it has been received.
What we here say of Euclid might equally be said of any book which
treats of things by their nature perceptible: thus we conclude that we
can easily follow the intention of Scripture in moral questions, from
the history we possess of it, and we can be sure of its true meaning.
The precepts of true piety are expressed in very ordinary language, and
are equally simple and easily understood. Further, as true salvation and
blessedness consist in a true assent of the soul--and we truly assent
only to what we clearly understand--it is most plain that we can follow
with certainty the intention of Scripture in matters relating to
salvation and necessary to blessedness; therefore, we need not be much
troubled about what remains: such matters, inasmuch as we generally
cannot grasp them with our reason and understanding, are more curious
than profitable.
I think I have now set forth the true method of Scriptural
interpretation, and have sufficiently explained my own opinion thereon.
Besides, I do not doubt that every one will see that such a method only
requires the aid of natural reason. The nature and efficacy of the
natural reason consists in deducing and proving the unknown from the
known, or in carrying premises to their legitimate conclusions; and
these are the very processes which our method desiderates. Though we
must admit that it does not suffice to explain everything in the Bible,
such imperfection does not spring from its own nature, but from the
fact that the path which it teaches us, as the true one, has never been
tended or trodden by men, and has thus, by the lapse of time, become
very difficult, and almost impassable, as, indeed, I have shown in the
difficulties I draw attention to.
There only remains to examine the opinions of those who differ from me.
The first which comes under our notice is, that the light of nature has
no power to interpret Scripture, but that a supernatural faculty is
required for the task. What is meant by this supernatural faculty I will
leave to its propounders to explain. Personally, I can only suppose that
they have adopted a very obscure way of stating their complete
uncertainty about the true meaning of Scripture. If we look at their
interpretations, they contain nothing supernatural, at least nothing but
the merest conjectures.
Let them be placed side by side with the interpretations of those who
frankly confess that they have no faculty beyond their natural ones; we
shall see that the two are just alike--both human, both long pondered
over, both laboriously invented. To say that the natural reason is
insufficient for such results is plainly untrue, firstly, for the
reasons above stated, namely, that the difficulty of interpreting
Scripture arises from no defect in human reason, but simply from the
carelessness (not to say malice) of men who neglected the history of the
Bible while there were still materials for inquiry; secondly, from the
fact (admitted, I think, by all) that the supernatural faculty is a
Divine gift granted only to the faithful. But the prophets and apostles
did not preach to the faithful only, but chiefly to the unfaithful and
wicked. Such persons, therefore, were able to understand the intention
of the prophets and apostles, otherwise the prophets and apostles would
have seemed to be preaching to little boys and infants, not to men
endowed with reason. Moses, too, would have given his laws in vain, if
they could only be comprehended by the faithful, who need no law.
Indeed, those who demand supernatural faculties for comprehending the
meaning of the prophets and apostles seem truly lacking in natural
faculties, so that we should hardly suppose such persons the possessors
of a Divine supernatural gift.
The opinion of Maimonides was widely different. He asserted that each
passage in Scripture admits of various, nay, contrary meanings; but that
we could never be certain of any particular one till we knew that the
passage, as we interpreted it, contained nothing contrary or repugnant
to reason. If the literal meaning clashes with reason, though the
passage seems in itself perfectly clear, it must be interpreted in some
metaphorical sense. This doctrine he lays down very plainly in Chap.
xxv. part ii. of his book _More Nebuchim_ for he says: "Know that we
shrink not from affirming that the world hath existed from eternity,
because of what Scripture saith concerning the world's creation. For the
texts which teach that the world was created are not more in number than
those which teach that God hath a body; neither are the approaches in
this matter of the world's creation closed, or even made hard to us: so
that we should not be able to explain what is written, as we did when we
showed that God hath no body, nay, peradventure, we could explain and
make fast the doctrine of the world's eternity more easily than we did
away with the doctrines that God hath a beatified body. Yet two things
hinder me from doing as I have said, and believing that the world is
eternal. As it hath been clearly shown that God hath not a body, we must
perforce explain all those passages whereof the literal sense agreeth
not with the demonstration, for sure it is that they can be so
explained. But the eternity of the world hath not been so demonstrated,
therefore it is not necessary to do violence to Scripture in support of
some common opinion, whereof we might, at the bidding of reason, embrace
the contrary."
Such are the words of Maimonides, and they are evidently sufficient to
establish our point: for if he had been convinced by reason that the
world is eternal, he would not have hesitated to twist and explain away
the words of Scripture till he made them appear to teach this doctrine.
He would have felt quite sure that Scripture, though everywhere plainly
denying the eternity of the world, really intends to teach it. So that,
however clear the meaning of Scripture may be, he would not feel certain
of having grasped it, so long as he remained doubtful of the truth of
what was written. For we are in doubt whether a thing is in conformity
with reason, or contrary thereto, so long as we are uncertain of its
truth, and, consequently, we cannot be sure whether the literal meaning
of a passage be true or false.
If such a theory as this were sound, I would certainly grant that some
faculty beyond the natural reason is required for interpreting
Scripture. For nearly all things that we find in Scripture cannot be
inferred from known principles of the natural reason, and therefore, we
should be unable to come to any conclusion about their truth, or about
the real meaning and intention of Scripture, but should stand in need of
some further assistance.
Further, the truth of this theory would involve that the masses, having
generally no comprehension of, nor leisure for, detailed proofs, would
be reduced to receiving all their knowledge of Scripture on the
authority and testimony of philosophers, and consequently, would be
compelled to suppose that the interpretations given by philosophers were
infallible.
Truly this would be a new form of ecclesiastical authority, and a new
sort of priests or pontiffs, more likely to excite men's ridicule than
their veneration. Certainly our method demands a knowledge of Hebrew for
which the masses have no leisure; but no such objection as the foregoing
can be brought against us. For the ordinary Jews or Gentiles, to whom
the prophets and apostles preached and wrote, understood the language,
and consequently, the intention of the prophet or apostle addressing
them; but they did not grasp the intrinsic reason of what was preached,
which, according to Maimonides, would be necessary for an understanding
of it.
There is nothing, then, in our method which renders it necessary that
the masses should follow the testimony of commentators, for I point to a
set of unlearned people who understood the language of the prophets and
apostles; whereas Maimonides could not point to any such who could
arrive at the prophetic or apostolic meaning through their knowledge of
the causes of things.
As to the multitude of our own time [we shall show] that whatsoever is
necessary to salvation, though its reasons may be unknown, can easily be
understood in any language, because it is thoroughly ordinary and usual;
it is in such understanding as this that the masses acquiesce, not in
the testimony of commentators; with regard to other questions, the
ignorant and the learned fare alike.
But let us return to the opinion of Maimonides, and examine it more
closely. In the first place, he supposes that the prophets were in
entire agreement one with another, and that they were consummate
philosophers and theologians; for he would have them to have based their
conclusions on the absolute truth. Further, he supposes that the sense
of Scripture cannot be made plain from Scripture itself, for the truth
of things is not made plain therein (in that it does not prove anything,
nor teach the matters of which it speaks through their definitions and
first causes), therefore, according to Maimonides, the true sense of
Scripture cannot be made plain from itself, and must not be there
sought.
The falsity of such a doctrine is shown in this very chapter, for we
have shown both by reason and examples that the meaning of Scripture is
only made plain through Scripture itself, and even in questions
deducible from ordinary knowledge should be looked for from no other
source.
Lastly, such a theory supposes that we may explain the words of
Scripture according to our preconceived opinions, twisting them about,
and reversing or completely changing the literal sense, however plain it
may be. Such license is utterly opposed to the teaching of this and the
[succeeding] chapters, and moreover, will be evident to every one as
rash and excessive.
But if we grant all this license, what can it effect after all?
Absolutely nothing. Those things which cannot be demonstrated, and which
make up the greater part of Scripture, cannot be examined by reason, and
cannot therefore be explained or interpreted by this rule; whereas, on
the contrary, by following our own method, we can explain many questions
of this nature, and discuss them on a sure basis, as we have already
shown, by reason and example. Those matters which are by their nature
comprehensible we can easily explain, as has been pointed out, simply by
means of the context.
Therefore, the method of Maimonides is clearly useless: to which we may
add, that it does away with all the certainty which the masses acquire
by candid reading, or which is gained by any other persons in any other
way. In conclusion, then, we dismiss Maimonides' theory as harmful,
useless, and absurd.
As to the tradition of the Pharisees, we have already shown[3] that it
is not consistent, while the authority of the popes of Rome stands in
need of more credible evidence; the latter, indeed, I reject simply on
this ground, for if the popes could point out to us the meaning of
Scripture as surely as did the high priests of the Jews, I should not be
deterred by the fact that there have been heretic and impious Roman
pontiffs; for among the Hebrew high-priests of old there were also
heretics and impious men who gained the high-priesthood by improper
means, but who, nevertheless, had Scriptural sanction for their supreme
power of interpreting the law. (See Deut. xvii. 11, 12, and xxxviii. 10,
also Malachi ii. 8).
However, as the popes can show no such sanction, their authority remains
open to very grave doubt, nor should any one be deceived by the example
of the Jewish high-priests and think that the Catholic religion also
stands in need of a pontiff; he should bear in mind that the laws of
Moses being also the ordinary laws of the country, necessarily required
some public authority to insure their observance; for, if everyone were
free to interpret the laws of his country as he pleased, no state could
stand, but would for that very reason be dissolved at once, and public
rights would become private rights.
With religion the case is widely different. Inasmuch as it consists not
so much in outward actions as in simplicity and truth of character, it
stands outside the sphere of law and public authority. Simplicity and
truth of character are not produced by the constraint of laws, nor by
the authority of the state, no one the whole world over can be forced or
legislated into a state of blessedness; the means required for such a
consummation are faithful and brotherly admonition, sound education, and
above all, free use of the individual judgment.
Therefore, as the supreme right of free thinking, even on religion, is
in every man's power, and as it is inconceivable that such power could
be alienated, it is also in every man's power to wield the supreme right
and authority of free judgment in this behalf, and to explain and
interpret religion for himself. The only reason for vesting the supreme
authority in the interpretation of law, and judgment on public affairs
in the hands of the magistrates, is that it concerns questions of public
right. Similarly the supreme authority in explaining religion, and in
passing judgment thereon, is lodged with the individual because it
concerns questions of individual right. So far, then, from the authority
of the Hebrew high-priests telling in confirmation of the authority of
the Roman pontiffs to interpret religion, it would rather tend to
establish individual freedom of judgment. Thus in this way, also, we
have shown that our method of interpreting Scripture is the best. For as
the highest power of Scriptural interpretation belongs to every man, the
rule for such interpretation should be nothing but the natural light of
reason which is common to all--not any supernatural light nor any
external authority; moreover, such a rule ought not to be so difficult
that it can only be applied by very skillful philosophers, but should be
adapted to the natural and ordinary faculties and capacity of mankind.
And such I have shown our method to be, for such difficulties as it has
arise from men's carelessness, and are no part of its nature.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. vii, same title.
[3] The detailed discussion of this point has been omitted.--ED.