_Proceedings of Buonaparte in order to consolidate his
power--His great success--Causes that led to it--Cambacérès and
Le Brun chosen Second and Third Consuls--Talleyrand appointed
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Fouché Minister of
Police--Their Characters--Other Ministers nominated--Various
Changes made, in order to mark the Commencement of a new
Era--Napoleon addresses a Letter personally to the King of
England--Answered by Lord Grenville--Negotiation for Peace that
followed, speedily broken off--Campaigns in Italy, and on the
Rhine--Successes of Moreau--Censured by Napoleon for
Over-caution--The Charge considered--The Chief Consul resolves
to bring back, in Person, Victory to the French Standards in
Italy--His Measures for that purpose._
The structure of government which Buonaparte had selected out of the
broken outlines of the plan of Siêyes, being not only monarchical but
despotic, it remained that its offices should be filled with persons
favourable to the new order of things; and to this the attention of
Buonaparte was especially turned. In order to secure the selection of
the official individuals to himself, he eluded entirely the principle by
which Siêyes had proposed to elaborate his national representatives out
of the various signed lists of eligibility, to be made up by the three
classes into which his hierarchy divided the French people. Without
waiting for these lists of eligible persons, or taking any other rule
but his own pleasure, and that of his counsellors, the two new consuls,
Buonaparte named sixty senators; the senators named a hundred tribunes,
and three hundred legislators; and thus the whole bodies of the State
were filled up, by a choice emanating from the executive government,
instead of being vested, more or less directly, in the people.
In availing himself of the privileges which he had usurped, the first
consul, as we must now call him, showed a moderation as artful as it was
conciliatory. His object was to avoid the odium of appearing to hold his
rank by his military character only. He desired, on the contrary, to
assemble round him a party, in which the predominant character of
individuals, whatever it had hitherto been, was to be merged in that of
the new system; as the statuary throws into the furnace broken fragments
of bronze of every various description, without regarding their
immediate appearance or form, his purpose being to unite them by fusion,
and bestow upon the mass the new shape which his art destines it to
represent.
With these views, Napoleon said to Siêyes, who reprobated the admission
of Fouché into office and power, "we are creating a new era. Of the
past, we must forget the bad, and only remember the good. Time, habits
of business, and experience, have formed many able men, and modified
many characters."[510] These words may be regarded as the key-note of
his whole system. Buonaparte did not care what men had been formerly, so
that they were now disposed to become that which was suitable for his
interest, and for which he was willing to reward them liberally. The
former conduct of persons of talent, whether in politics or morality,
was of no consequence, providing they were willing, now, faithfully to
further and adhere to the new order of things. This prospect of immunity
for the past, and reward for the future, was singularly well calculated
to act upon the public mind, desirous as it was of repose, and upon that
of individuals, agitated by so many hopes and fears as the Revolution
had set afloat. The consular government seemed a general place of refuge
and sanctuary to persons of all various opinions, and in all various
predicaments. It was only required of them, in return for the safety
which it afforded, that they should pay homage to the presiding deity.
So artfully was the system of Buonaparte contrived, that each of the
numerous classes of Frenchmen found something in it congenial to his
habits, his feelings, or his circumstances, providing only he was
willing to sacrifice to it the essential part of his political
principles. To the Royalist, it restored monarchical forms, a court, and
a sovereign--but he must acknowledge that sovereign in Buonaparte. To
the churchman, it opened the gates of the temples, removed the tyranny
of the persecuting philosophers--promised in course of time a national
church--but by the altar must be placed the image of Buonaparte. The
Jacobin, dyed double red in murder and massacre, was welcome to safety
and security from the aristocratic vengeance which he had so lately
dreaded. The regicide was guaranteed against the return of the
Bourbons--they who had profited by the Revolution as purchasers of
national domains, were ensured against their being resumed. But it was
under the implied condition, that not a word was to be mentioned by
those ci-devant democrats, of liberty or equality: the principles for
which forfeitures had been made, and revolutionary tribunals erected,
were henceforth never to be named. To all these parties, as to others,
Buonaparte held out the same hopes under the same conditions--"All these
things will I give you, if you will kneel down and worship me." Shortly
afterwards, he was enabled to place before those to whom the choice was
submitted, the original temptation in its full extent--a display of the
kingdoms of the earth, over which he offered to extend the empire of
France, providing always he was himself acknowledged as the object of
general obedience, and almost adoration.
The system of Buonaparte, as it combined great art with an apparent
generosity and liberality, proved eminently successful among the people
of France, when subjected to the semblance of a popular vote. The
national spirit was exhausted by the changes and the sufferings, the
wars and the crimes, of so many years; and in France, as in all other
countries, parties, exhausted by the exertions and vicissitudes of civil
war, are in the very situation where military tyranny becomes the next
crisis. The rich favoured Buonaparte for the sake of protection,--the
poor for that of relief,--the emigrants, in many cases, because they
desired to return to France,--the men of the Revolution, because they
were afraid of being banished from it;--the sanguine and courageous
crowded round his standard in hope of victory,--the timid cowered behind
it in the desire of safety. Add to these the vast multitude who follow
the opinions of others, and take the road which lies most obvious, and
is most trodden, and it is no wonder that the 18th Brumaire, and its
consequences, received the general sanction of the people. The
constitution of the year Eight, or Consular Government, was approved by
the suffrages of nearly four millions of citizens,[511]--a more general
approbation than any preceding system had been received with. The vote
was doubtless a farce in itself, considering how many constitutions had
been adopted and sworn to within so short a space; but still the numbers
who expressed assent, more than doubling those votes which were obtained
by the constitution of 1792 and of the year Three, indicate the superior
popularity of Buonaparte's system.
To the four millions who expressly declared their adherence to the new
Consular constitution, must be added the many hundreds of thousands and
millions more, who were either totally indifferent upon the form of
government, providing they enjoyed peace and protection under it, or
who, though abstractedly preferring other rulers, were practically
disposed to submit to the party in possession of the power.
Such and so extended being the principles on which Buonaparte selected
the members of his government, he manifested, in choosing individuals,
that wonderful penetration, by which, more perhaps than any man who ever
lived, he was enabled at once to discover the person most capable of
serving him, and the means of securing his attachment. Former crimes or
errors made no cause of exclusion; and in several cases the alliance
between the first consul and his ministers might have been compared to
the marriages between the settlers on the Spanish mainland, and the
unhappy females, the refuse of great cities, sent out to recruit the
colony.--"I ask thee not," said the bucanier to the wife he had selected
from the cargo of vice, "what has been thy former conduct; but,
henceforth, see thou continue faithful to me, or this," striking his
hand on his musket, "shall punish thy want of fidelity."
[Sidenote: CAMBACÉRÈS--LEBRUN--TALLEYRAND.]
For second and third consuls, Buonaparte chose Cambacérès,[512] a
lawyer, and a member of the moderate party, with Lebrun,[513] who had
formerly co-operated with the Chancellor Maupeou. The former was
employed by the chief consul as his organ of communication with the
Revolutionists, while Lebrun rendered him the same service with the
Royal party; and although, as Madame de Staël observes, they preached
very different sermons on the same texts,[514] yet they were both
eminently successful in detaching from their original factions many of
either class, and uniting them with this third, or government party,
which was thus composed of deserters from both. The last soon became so
numerous, that Buonaparte was enabled to dispense with the _bascule_, or
trimming system, by which alone his predecessors, the directors, had
been enabled to support their power.
In the ministry, Buonaparte acted upon the same principle, selecting and
making his own the men whose talents were most distinguished, without
reference to their former conduct. Two were particularly distinguished,
as men of the most eminent talents, and extensive experience. These were
Talleyrand and Fouché. The former, noble by birth, and Bishop of Autun,
notwithstanding his high rank in church and state, had been deeply
engaged in the Revolution. He had been placed on the list of emigrants,
from which his name was erased on the establishment of the Directorial
government, under which he became minister of foreign affairs. He
resigned that office in the summer preceding 18th Brumaire; and
Buonaparte, finding him at variance with the Directory, readily passed
over some personal grounds of complaint which he had against him, and
enlisted in his service a supple and dexterous politician, and an
experienced minister; fond, it is said, of pleasure, not insensible to
views of self-interest, nor too closely fettered by principle, but
perhaps unequalled in ingenuity. Talleyrand was replaced in the
situation of minister for foreign affairs, after a short interval,
assigned for the purpose of suffering the public to forget his prominent
share in the scandalous treaty with the American commissioners, and
continued for a long tract of time one of the closest sharers of
Buonaparte's councils.[515]
If the character of Talleyrand bore no strong traces of public virtue or
inflexible morality, that of Fouché was marked with still darker
shades. He had been dipt in some of the worst transactions of the Reign
of Terror, and his name is found among the agents of the dreadful crimes
of that unhappy period. In the days of the Directory, he is stated to
have profited by the universal peculation which was then practised, and
to have amassed large sums by shares in contracts and brokerage in the
public funds. To atone for the imperfections of a character stained with
perfidy, venality, and indifference to human suffering, Fouché brought
to Buonaparte's service a devotion, never like to fail the first consul
unless his fortunes should happen to change; and a perfect experience
with all the weapons of revolutionary war, and knowledge of those who
were best able to wield them. He had managed under Barras's
administration the department of police; and, in the course of his
agency, had become better acquainted perhaps than any man in France with
all the various parties in that distracted country, the points which
they were desirous of reaching, the modes by which they hoped to attain
them, the character of their individual leaders, and the means to gain
them over or to intimidate them. Formidable by his extensive knowledge
of the revolutionary springs, and the address with which he could either
put them into motion, or prevent them from operating, Fouché, in the
latter part of his life, displayed a species of wisdom which came in
place of morality and benevolence.
Loving wealth and power, he was neither a man of ardent passions, nor of
a vengeful disposition; and though there was no scruple in his nature to
withhold him from becoming an agent in the great crimes which state
policy, under an arbitrary government, must often require, yet he had a
prudential and constitutional aversion to unnecessary evil, and was
always wont to characterise his own principle of action, by saying, that
he did as little harm as he possibly could. In his mysterious and
terrible office of head of the police, he had often means of granting
favours, or interposing lenity in behalf of individuals, of which he
gained the full credit, while the harsh measures of which he was the
agent, were set down to the necessity of his situation. By adhering to
these principles of moderation, he established for himself at length a
character totally inconsistent with that belonging to a member of the
revolutionary committee, and resembling rather that of a timid but
well-disposed servant, who, in executing his master's commands, is
desirous to mitigate as much as possible their effect on individuals. It
is, upon the whole, no wonder, that although Siêyes objected to Fouché,
from his want of principle, and Talleyrand was averse to him from
jealousy, interference, and personal enmity, Napoleon chose,
nevertheless, to retain in the confidential situation of minister of
police, the person by whom that formidable office had been first placed
on an effectual footing.[516]
Of the other ministers, it is not necessary to speak in detail.
Cambacérès retained the situation of minister of justice,[517] for which
he was well qualified; and the celebrated mathematician, Laplace, was
preferred to that of the Interior, for which he was not, according to
Buonaparte's report, qualified at all.[518] Berthier, as we have already
seen, filled the war department, and shortly afterwards Carnot; and
Gaudin administered the finances with credit to himself. Forfait, a
naval architect of eminence,[519] replaced Bourdon in the helpless and
hopeless department of the French Admiralty.
A new constitution having been thus formed, and the various branches of
duty distributed with much address among those best capable of
discharging them, other changes were at the same time made, which were
designed to mark that a new era was commenced, in which all former
prejudices were to be abandoned and done away.
[Sidenote: VARIOUS CHANGES.]
We have noticed that one of the first acts of the Provisional Government
had been to new-modify the national oath, and generalize its terms, so
that they should be no longer confined to the constitution of the year
Three, but should apply to that which was about to be framed, or to any
other which might be produced by the same authority.[520] Two subsequent
alterations in the constitution, which passed without much notice, so
much was the revolutionary or republican spirit abated, tended to show
that farther changes were impending, and that the Consular Republic was
speedily to adopt the name, as it already had the essence, of a
monarchy. It was scarcely three months since the President of the
Directory had said to the people, on the anniversary of the taking of
the Bastile,--"Royalty shall never raise its head again. We shall no
more behold individuals boasting a title from Heaven, to oppress the
earth with more ease and security, and who considered France as their
private patrimony, Frenchmen as their subjects, and the laws as the
expression of their good-will and pleasure." Yet now, in contradiction
to this sounding declamation, the national oath, expressing hatred to
royalty, was annulled, under the pretext that the Republic, being
universally acknowledged, had no occasion for the guard of such
disclamations.
In like manner, the public observance of the day on which Louis XVI. had
suffered decapitation, was formally abolished. Buonaparte, declining to
pass a judgment on the action as just, politic, or useful, pronounced
that, in any event, it could only be regarded as a national calamity,
and was therefore in a moral, as well as a political sense, an unfit
epoch for festive celebration. An expression of the first consul to
Siêyes was also current at the same time, which, although Buonaparte may
not have used it, has been generally supposed to express his sentiments.
Siêyes had spoken of Louis under the established phrase of the Tyrant.
"He was no tyrant," Buonaparte replied; "had he been such, I should have
been a subaltern officer of artillery, and you, Monsieur l'Abbé, would
have been still saying mass."[521]
A third sign of approaching change, or rather of the approaching return
to the ancient system of government under a different chief, was the
removal of the first consul from the apartments in the Luxembourg
palace, occupied by the directors, to the royal residence of the
Tuileries. Madame de Staël beheld the entrance of this fortunate soldier
into the princely residence of the Bourbons. He was already surrounded
by a vassal crowd, eager to pay him the homage which the inhabitants of
those splendid halls had so long claimed as their due, that it seemed to
be consistent with the place, and to become the right of this new
inhabitant. The doors were thrown open with a bustle and violence,
expressive of the importance of the occasion. But the hero of the scene,
in ascending the magnificent staircase, up which a throng of courtiers
followed him, seemed totally indifferent to all around, his features
bearing only a general expression of indifference to events, and
contempt for mankind.[522]
The first measures of Buonaparte's new government, and the expectation
attached to his name, had already gone some length in restoring domestic
quiet; but he was well aware that much more must be done to render that
quiet permanent; that the external relations of France with Europe must
be attended to without delay; and that the French expected from him
either the conclusion of an honourable peace, or the restoration of
victory to their national banners. It was necessary, too, that advances
towards peace should in the first place be made, in order, if they were
unsuccessful, that a national spirit should be excited, which might
reconcile the French to the renewal of the war with fresh energy.
[Sidenote: LETTER TO THE KING OF ENGLAND.]
Hitherto, in diplomacy, it had been usual to sound the way for opening
treaties of peace by obscure and almost unaccredited agents, in order
that the party willing to make propositions might not subject themselves
to a haughty and insulting answer, or have their desire of peace
interpreted as a confession of weakness. Buonaparte went into the
opposite extreme, and addressed the King of England in a personal
epistle. This Letter,[523] like that to the Archduke Charles, during the
campaign of 1797, intimates Buonaparte's affectation of superiority to
the usual forms of diplomacy, and his pretence to a character determined
to emancipate itself from rules only designed for mere ordinary men. But
the manner of the address was in bad taste, and ill calculated to obtain
credit for his being sincere in the proposal of peace. He was bound to
know so much of the constitutional authority of the monarch whom he
addressed, as to be aware that George III. would not, and could not,
contract any treaty personally, but must act by the advice of those
ministers whose responsibility was his guarantee to the nation at large.
The terms of the letter set forth, as usual, the blessings of peace, and
urged the propriety of its being restored; propositions which could not
admit of dispute in the abstract, but which admit much discussion when
coupled with unreasonable or inadmissible conditions.
The answer transmitted by Lord Grenville, in the forms of diplomacy, to
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dwelt on the aggressions of France,
declared that the restoration of the Bourbons would have been the best
security for their sincerity, but disavowed all right to dictate to
France in her internal concerns. Some advances were made to a pacific
treaty; and it is probable that England might at that period have
obtained the same or better terms than she afterwards got by the treaty
of Amiens. It may be added, that the moderate principles expressed by
the consular government, might, in the infancy of his power, and in a
moment of considerable doubt, have induced Buonaparte to make
sacrifices, to which, triumphant and established, he would not
condescend. But the possession of Egypt, which Buonaparte must have
insisted on, were it only for his own reputation, was likely to be an
insuperable difficulty. The conjuncture also appeared to the English
ministers propitious for carrying on the war. Italy had been recovered,
and the Austrian army, to the number of 140,000, were menacing Savoy,
and mustering on the Rhine. Buonaparte, in the check received before
Acre, had been found not absolutely invincible. The exploits of Suwarrow
over the French were recent, and had been decisive. The state of the
interior of France was well known; and it was conceived, that though
this successful general had climbed into the seat of supreme power which
he found unoccupied, yet that two strong parties, of which the Royalists
objected to his person, the Republicans to his form of government, could
not fail, the one or other, to deprive him of his influence.
The treaty was finally broken off, on the score that there was great
reason to doubt Buonaparte's sincerity; and supposing that were granted,
there was at least equal room to doubt the stability of a power so
hastily acknowledged, and seeming to contain in itself the principles of
decay. There may be a difference of opinion in regard to Buonaparte's
sincerity in the negotiation, but there can be none as to the reality of
his joy at its being defeated. The voice which summoned him to war was
that which sounded sweetest in his ears, since it was always followed by
exertion and by victory. He had been personally offended, too, by the
allusion to the legitimate rights of the Bourbons, and indulged his
resentment by pasquinades in the Moniteur. A supposed letter from the
last descendant of the Stuart family appeared there, congratulating the
King of Britain on his acceding to the doctrine of legitimacy, and
summoning him to make good his principles, by an abdication of his crown
in favour of the lineal heir.[524]
[Sidenote: EXTERNAL SITUATION OF FRANCE.]
The external situation of France had, as we before remarked, been
considerably improved by the consequences of the battle of Zurich, and
the victories of Moreau. But the Republic derived yet greater advantages
from the breach between the Emperors of Austria and Russia. Paul,
naturally of an uncertain temper, and offended by the management of the
last campaign, in which Korsakow had been defeated, and Suwarrow
checked, in consequence of their being unsupported by the Austrian army,
had withdrawn his troops, so distinguished for their own bravery as well
as for the talents of their leader, from the seat of war. But the
Austrians, possessing a firmness of character undismayed by defeat, and
encouraged by the late success of their arms under the veteran Melas,
had made such gigantic exertions as to counterbalance the loss of their
Russian confederates.[525]
Their principal force was in Italy, and it was on the Italian frontier
that they meditated a grand effort, by which, supported by the British
fleet, they proposed to reduce Genoa, and penetrate across the Var into
Provence, where existed a strong body of Royalists ready to take arms,
under the command of General Willot, an emigrant officer. It was said
the celebrated Pichegru, who, escaped from Guiana, had taken refuge in
England, was also with his army, and was proposed as a chief leader of
the expected insurrection.
To execute this plan, Melas was placed at the head of an army of 140,000
men. This army was quartered for the winter in the plains of Piedmont,
and waited but the approach of spring to commence operations.
Opposed to them, and occupying the country betwixt Genoa and the Var,
lay a French army of 40,000 men; the relics of those who had been
repeatedly defeated in Italy by Suwarrow. They were quartered in a poor
country, and the English squadron, which blockaded the coast, was
vigilant in preventing any supplies from being sent to them. Distress
was therefore considerable, and the troops were in proportion dispirited
and disorganized. Whole corps abandoned their position, contrary to
orders; and, with drums beating, and colours flying, returned into
France. A proclamation from Napoleon was almost alone sufficient to
remedy these disorders. He called on the soldiers, and particularly
those corps who had formerly distinguished themselves under his command
in his Italian campaigns, to remember the confidence he had once placed
in them.[526] The scattered troops returned to their duty, as war-horses
when dispersed are said to rally and form ranks at the mere sound of the
trumpet. Massena, an officer eminent for his acquaintance with the mode
of carrying on war in a mountainous country, full of passes and strong
positions, was intrusted with the command of the Italian army, which
Buonaparte[527] resolved to support in person with the army of reserve.
The French army upon the Rhine possessed as great a superiority over the
Austrians, as Melas, on the Italian frontier, enjoyed over Massena.
Moreau was placed in the command of a large army, augmented by a strong
detachment from that of General Brune, now no longer necessary for the
protection of Holland, and by the army of Helvetia, which, after the
defeat of Korsakow, was not farther required for the defence of
Switzerland. In bestowing this great charge on Moreau, the first consul
showed himself superior to the jealousy which might have dissuaded
meaner minds from intrusting a rival, whose military skill was often
compared with his own, with such an opportunity of distinguishing
himself.[528] But Buonaparte, in this and other cases, preferred the
employing and profiting by the public service of men of talents, and
especially men of military eminence, to any risk which he could run from
their rivalry. He had the just confidence in his own powers, never to
doubt his supremacy, and trusted to the influence of discipline, and the
love of their profession, which induces generals to accept of command
even under the administrations of which they disapprove. In this manner
he rendered dependant upon himself even those officers, who, averse to
the consular form of government, inclined to republican principles. Such
were Massena, Brune, Jourdan, Lecourbe, and Championnet. He took care,
at the same time, by changing the commands intrusted to them, to break
off all combinations or connexions which they might have formed for a
new alteration of the government.
General Moreau was much superior in numbers to Kray, the Austrian who
commanded on the Rhine, and received orders to resume the offensive. He
was cautious in his tactics, though a most excellent officer, and was
startled at the plan sent him by Buonaparte, which directed him to cross
the Rhine at Schaffhausen, and, marching on Ulm with his whole force,
place himself in the rear of the greater part of the Austrian army. This
was one of those schemes, fraught with great victories or great
reverses, which Buonaparte delighted to form, and which often requiring
much sacrifice of men, occasioned his being called by those who loved
him not, a general at the rate of ten thousand men per day. Such
enterprises resemble desperate passes in fencing, and must be executed
with the same decisive resolution with which they are formed. Few even
of Buonaparte's best generals could be trusted with the execution of his
master-strokes in tactics, unless under his own immediate
superintendence.
Moreau invaded Germany on a more modified plan; and a series of marches,
counter-marches, and desperate battles ensued, in which General Kray,
admirably supported by the Archduke Ferdinand, made a gallant defence
against superior numbers.
[Sidenote: SUCCESSES OF MOREAU.]
In Buonaparte's account of this campaign,[529] he blames Moreau for
hesitation and timidity in following up the advantages which he
obtained.[530] Yet to a less severe, perhaps to a more impartial judge,
Moreau's success might seem satisfactory, since, crossing the Rhine in
the end of April, he had his headquarters at Augsburg upon the 15th
July, ready either to co-operate with the Italian army, or to march into
the heart of the Austrian territory. Nor can it be denied that, during
this whole campaign, Moreau kept in view, as a principal object, the
protecting the operations of Buonaparte in Italy, and saving that chief,
in his dauntless and desperate invasion of the Milanese territory, from
the danger which might have ensued, had Kray found an opportunity of
opening a communication with the Austrian army in Italy, and despatching
troops to its support.
It may be remarked of these two great generals, that, as enterprise was
the characteristic of Buonaparte's movements, prudence was that of
Moreau's; and it is not unusual, even when there occur no other motives
for rivals undervaluing each other, that the enterprising judge the
prudent to be timid, and the prudent account the enterprising rash.
[Sidenote: 15th July.]
It is not ours to decide upon professional questions between men of such
superior talents; and, having barely alluded to the topic, we leave
Moreau at Augsburg, where he finally concluded an armistice[531] with
General Kray, as a consequence of that which Buonaparte had established
in Italy after the battle of Marengo. Thus much, therefore, is due in
justice to Moreau. His campaign was, on the whole, crowned in its
results with distinguished success.[532] And when it is considered, that
he was to manœuvre both with reference to the safety of the first
consul's operations and his own, it may be doubted whether Buonaparte
would, at the time, have thanked him for venturing on more hazardous
measures; the result of which might have been either to obtain more
brilliant victory for the army of the Rhine, in the event of success, or
should they have miscarried, to have ensured the ruin of the army of
Italy, as well as of that commanded by Moreau himself. There must have
been a wide difference between the part which Moreau ought to act as
subsidiary to Buonaparte, (to whom it will presently be seen he
despatched a reinforcement of from fifteen to twenty thousand men,) and
that which Buonaparte, in obedience to his daring genius, might have
himself thought it right to perform. The commander-in-chief may venture
much on his own responsibility, which must not be hazarded by a
subordinate general, whose motions ought to be regulated upon the
general plan of the campaign.
We return to the operations of Napoleon during one of the most important
campaigns of his life, and in which he added--if that were still
possible--to the high military reputation he had acquired.
[Sidenote: PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.]
In committing the charge of the campaign upon the Rhine to Moreau, the
first consul had reserved for himself the task of bringing back victory
to the French standards, on the fields in which he won his earliest
laurels. His plan of victory again included a passage of the Alps, as
boldly and unexpectedly as in 1795, but in a different direction. That
earlier period had this resemblance to the present, that, on both
occasions, the Austrians menaced Genoa; but in 1800, it was only from
the Italian frontier and the Col di Tende, whereas, in 1795, the enemy
were in possession of the mountains of Savoy, above Genoa. Switzerland,
too, formerly neutral, and allowing no passage for armies, was now as
open to the march of French troops as any of their own provinces, and of
this Buonaparte determined to avail himself. He was aware of the
Austrian plan of taking Genoa and entering Provence; and he formed the
daring resolution to put himself at the head of the army of reserve,
surmount the line of the Alps, even where they are most difficult of
access, and, descending into Italy, place himself in the rear of the
Austrian army, interrupt their communications, carry off their
magazines, parks, and hospitals, coop them up betwixt his own army and
that of Massena, which was in their front, and compel them to battle, in
a situation where defeat must be destruction. But to accomplish this
daring movement, it was necessary to march a whole army over the highest
chain of mountains in Europe, by roads which afford but a dangerous
passage to the solitary traveller, and through passes where one man can
do more to defend, than ten to force their way. Artillery was to be
carried through sheep-paths and over precipices impracticable to
wheel-carriages; ammunition and baggage were to be transported at the
same disadvantages; and provisions were to be conveyed through a country
poor in itself, and inhabited by a nation which had every cause to be
hostile to France, and might therefore be expected prompt to avail
themselves of any opportunity which should occur of revenging themselves
for her late aggressions.[533]
The strictest secrecy was necessary, to procure even the opportunity of
attempting this audacious plan of operations; and to ensure this
secrecy, Buonaparte had recourse to a singular mode of deceiving the
enemy. It was made as public as possible, by orders, decrees,
proclamations, and the like, that the first consul was to place himself
at the head of the army of reserve, and that it was to assemble at
Dijon. Accordingly, a numerous staff was sent, and much apparent bustle
took place in assembling there six or seven thousand men with great pomp
and fracas. These, as the spies of Austria truly reported to their
employers, were either conscripts, or veterans unfit for service; and
caricatures were published of the first consul reviewing troops composed
of children and disabled soldiers, which was ironically termed his army
of reserve.[534] When an army so composed was reviewed by the first
consul himself with great ceremony, it impressed a general belief that
Buonaparte was only endeavouring, by making a show of force, to divert
the Austrians from their design upon Genoa, and thus his real purpose
was effectually concealed. Bulletins, too, were privately circulated by
the agents of police, as if scattered by the Royalists, in which
specious arguments were used to prove that the French army of reserve
neither did, nor could exist--and these also were designed to withdraw
attention from the various points on which it was at the very moment
collecting.[535]
The pacification of the west of France had placed many good troops at
Buonaparte's disposal, which had previously been engaged against the
Chouans; the quiet state of Paris permitted several regiments to be
detached from the capital. New levies were made with the utmost
celerity; and the divisions of the army of reserve were organized
separately, and at different places of rendezvous, but ready to form a
junction when they should receive the signal for commencing operations.
FOOTNOTES:
[510] Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 118.
[511] Out of 3,012,569 votes, 1562 rejected the new constitution;
3,011,007 accepted it.--See THIBAUDEAU, tom. i., p. 117.
[512] "Cambacérès was of an honourable family in Languedoc; he was fifty
years old; he had been a member of the Convention, and had conducted
himself with moderation: he was generally esteemed, and had a just claim
to the reputation which he enjoyed of being one of the ablest lawyers of
the republic."--NAPOLEON, _Gourgaud_, tom. i., p. 153.
[513] "Lebrun was sixty years of age, and came from Normandy. He was one
of the best writers in France, a man of inflexible integrity; and he
approved of the changes of the Revolution only in consideration of the
advantages which resulted from them to the mass of the people, for his
own family were all of the class of peasantry."--_Ibid._, p. 153.
[514] Consid. sur la Rév. Française, tom. ii., p. 255.
[515] Thibaudeau, tom. i., p. 115; Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 115.
[516] Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 116.
[517] "When Cambacérès afterwards vacated the office, Buonaparte
appointed M. d'Abrial, who died in 1828, a peer of France. On remitting
the folio to the new minister, the First Consul addressed him thus: 'M.
d'Abrial, I know you not, but am informed you are the most upright man
in the magistracy; it is on that account I name you minister of
justice.'"--BOURRIENNE, tom. ii., p. 118.
[518] "Laplace, a geometrician of the first rank, soon proved himself
below mediocrity as a minister. On his very first essay, the consuls
found that they had been mistaken; not a question did Laplace seize in
its true point of view: he sought for subtleties in every thing; had
none but problematical ideas, and carried the doctrine of infinite
littleness into the business of administration."--NAPOLEON, _Gourgaud_,
tom. i., p. 116.
[519] "Forfait, a native of Normandy, had the reputation of being a
naval architect of first-rate talent, but he was a mere projector, and
did not answer the expectations formed of him."--NAPOLEON, _Gourgaud_,
tom. i., p. 115.
[520] _Moniteur_, 31st Dec. 1799.
[521] Las Cases, tom. iv., p. 337.
[522] "The choice of this residence was a stroke of policy. It was there
that the King of France was accustomed to be seen; circumstances
connected with that monarchy were there presented to every eye; and the
very influence of the walls on the minds of spectators was, if we may
say so, sufficient for the restoration of regal power."--MAD. DE STAËL,
tom. ii., p. 256.
[523]
"French Republic--Sovereignty of the People--Liberty--Equality.
"Buonaparte, First Consul of the Republic, to his Majesty the King of
Great Britain and Ireland.
"Paris, 5th Nivose, 8th year of the Republic,
(25th Dec. 1799.)
"Called by the wishes of the French nation to occupy the first
magistracy of the Republic, I think it proper, on entering into office,
to make a direct communication of it to your Majesty. The war, which for
eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the world, must it be
eternal? Are there no means of coming to an understanding? How can the
two most enlightened nations of Europe, powerful and strong beyond what
their safety and independence require, sacrifice to ideas of vain
greatness the benefits of commerce, internal prosperity, and the
happiness of families? How is it that they do not feel that peace is the
first necessity as well as the first glory? These sentiments cannot be
foreign to the heart of your Majesty, who reign over a free nation, and
with the sole view of rendering it happy. Your Majesty will only see, in
this overture, my sincere desire to contribute efficaciously, for the
second time, to a general pacification, by a proceeding prompt, entirely
confidential, and disengaged from those forms which, necessary perhaps
to disguise the dependence of weak States, prove only in the case of the
strong the mutual desire of deceiving each other. France and England, by
the abuse of their strength, may still, for a long time, for the
misfortune of all nations, retard the period of their being exhausted.
But I will venture to say, the fate of all civilized nations is attached
to the termination of a war which involves the whole world.
"BUONAPARTE."
[524] See _Moniteur_, 23 Pluviose, 10th February 1800; and Thibaudeau,
tom. i., p. 194.
[525] Thibaudeau, tom. i., p. 182; Jomini, tom. xiii., p. 16, 24.
[526] These disorders gave rise to many general orders from Napoleon; in
one of them he said--"The first quality of a soldier is patient
endurance of fatigue and privation; valour is but a secondary virtue.
Several corps have quitted their positions; they have been deaf to the
voice of their officers. Are, then, the heroes of Castiglione, of
Rivoli, of Neumark no more? _They_ would rather have perished than have
deserted their colours. Soldiers, do you complain that your rations have
not been regularly distributed? What would you have done, if, like the
fourth and twenty second light demi-brigades, you had found yourselves
in the midst of the desert, without bread or water, subsisting on horses
and camels? _Victory will give us bread_, said they; and you--you desert
your colours! Soldiers of Italy, a new general commands you; he was
always in the foremost ranks, in the moments of your brightest glory;
place your confidence in him; he will bring back victory to your
colours."--GOURGAUD, tom. i., p. 160.
[527] In a proclamation issued to the armies, he said--"Soldiers! it is
no longer the frontiers that you are called on to defend, the countries
of your enemies are to be invaded. At a fit season I will be in the
midst of you, and Europe shall be made to remember that you belong to a
valiant race."--GOURGAUD, tom. i., p. 162.
[528] Jomini, tom. xiii., p. 35, 43; Thibaudeau, tom. i., p. 182-6:
Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 163.
[529] Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 167.
[530] "Moreau did not know the value of _time_; he always passed the day
after a battle in total indecision."--NAPOLEON, _Gourgaud_, tom. i., p.
174.
[531] For the terms of the armistice, see Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 185.
[532] Jomini, tom. xiii., p. 355, 369; Thibaudeau, tom. i., p. 342.
[533] Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 261.
[534] "Europe was full of caricatures. One of them represented a boy of
twelve years of age, and an invalid with a wooden leg; underneath which
was written 'Buonaparte's army of reserve.'"--NAPOLEON, _Gourgaud_, tom.
i., p. 262.
[535] Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 263.