_Corsica reunited with France--Critical situation of Buonaparte
in Italy at this period--The Austrian General Alvinzi placed at
the head of a new Army--Various Contests, attended with no
decisive result--Want of Concert among the Austrian
Generals--French Army begin to murmur--First Battle of
Arcola--Napoleon in personal danger--No decisive result--Second
Battle of Arcola--The French victorious--Fresh want of concert
among the Austrian Generals--General Views of Military and
Political Affairs, after the conclusion of the fourth Italian
Campaign--Austria commences a fifth Campaign--but has not
profited by experience--Battle of Rivoli, and Victory of the
French--Further successful at La Favorita--French regain their
lost ground in Italy--Surrender of Mantua--Instances of
Napoleon's Generosity._
[Sidenote: CORSICA REUNITED WITH FRANCE.]
About this period the reunion of Corsica with France took place.
Buonaparte contributed to this change in the political relations of his
native country indirectly, in part by the high pride which his
countrymen must have originally taken in his splendid career; and he did
so more immediately, by seizing the town and port of Leghorn, and
assisting those Corsicans, who had been exiled by the English party, to
return to their native island.[194] He intimated the event to the
Directory, and stated that he had appointed Gentili, the principal
partisan of the French, to govern the island provisionally; and that the
Commissioner Salicetti was to set sail for the purpose of making other
necessary arrangements.[195] The communication is coldly made, nor does
Buonaparte's love of his birth-place induce him to expatiate upon its
importance, although the Directory afterwards made the acquisition of
that island a great theme of exultation. But his destinies had called
him to too high an elevation to permit his distinguishing the obscure
islet which he had arisen from originally. He was like the young lion,
who, while he is scattering the herds and destroying the hunters, thinks
little of the forest-cave in which he first saw the light.[196]
Indeed, Buonaparte's situation, however brilliant, was at the same time
critical, and required his undivided thoughts. Mantua still held out,
and was likely to do so. Wurmser had caused about three-fourths of the
horses belonging to his cavalry to be killed and salted for the use of
the garrison, and thus made a large addition, such as it was, to the
provisions of the place. His character for courage and determination was
completely established; and being now engaged in defending a fortress by
ordinary rules of art, which he perfectly understood, he was in no
danger of being over-reached and out-manœuvred by the new system of
tactics, which occasioned his misfortunes in the open field.
[Sidenote: ALVINZI.]
While, therefore, the last pledge of Austria's dominions in Italy was
confided to such safe custody, the Emperor and his ministers were
eagerly engaged in making a new effort to recover their Italian
territories. The defeat of Jourdan, and the retreat of Moreau before the
Archduke Charles, had given the Imperialists some breathing time, and
enabled them, by extensive levies in the warlike province of Illyria, as
well as draughts from the army of the Rhine, to take the field with a
new army, for the recovery of the Italian provinces, and the relief of
Mantua. By orders of the Aulic Council, two armies were assembled on the
Italian frontier; one at Friuli, which was partly composed of that
portion of the army of Wurmser, which, cut off from their main body at
the battle of Bassano, had effected, under Quasdonowich, a retreat in
that direction; the other was to be formed on the Tyrol. They were to
operate in conjunction, and both were placed under the command of
Marshal Alvinzi,[197] an officer of high reputation, which was then
thought merited.
Thus, for the fourth time, Buonaparte was to contest the same objects on
the same ground, with new forces belonging to the same enemy. He had,
indeed, himself, received from France, reinforcements to the number of
twelve battalions, from those troops which had been formerly employed in
La Vendée. The army, in general, since victory had placed the resources
of the rich country which they occupied at the command of their leader,
had been well supplied with clothes, food, and provisions, and were
devotedly attached to the chief who had conducted them from starving on
the barren Alps into this land of plenty, and had directed their
military efforts with such skill, that they could scarce ever be said to
have failed of success in whatever they undertook under his direction.
Napoleon had also on his side the good wishes, if not of the Italians in
general, of a considerable party, especially in Lombardy, and friends
and enemies were alike impressed with belief in his predestined success.
During the former attempts of Wurmser, a contrary opinion had prevailed,
and the news that the Austrians were in motion, had given birth to
insurrections against the French in many places, and to the publication
of sentiments unfavourable to them almost every where. But now, when all
predicted the certain success of Napoleon, the friends of Austria
remained quiet, and the numerous party who desire in such cases to keep
on the winning side, added weight to the actual friends of France, by
expressing their opinions in her favour. It seems, however, that
Victory, as if displeased that mortals should presume to calculate the
motives of so fickle a deity, was, on this occasion, disposed to be more
coy than formerly even to her greatest favourite, and to oblige him to
toil harder than he had done even when the odds were more against
him.[198]
Davidowich commanded the body of the Austrians which was in the Tyrol,
and which included the fine militia of that martial province. There was
little difficulty in prevailing on them to advance into Italy, convinced
as they were that there was small security for their national
independence while the French remained in possession of Lombardy.
Buonaparte, on the other hand, had placed Vaubois in the passes upon the
river Lavisa, above Trent, to cover that new possession of the French
Republic, and check the advance of Davidowich. It was the plan of
Alvinzi to descend from Friuli, and approach Vicenza, to which place he
expected Davidowich might penetrate by a corresponding movement down the
Adige. Having thus brought his united army into activity, his design was
to advance on Mantua, the constant object of bloody contention. He
commenced his march in the beginning of October, 1796.
As soon as Buonaparte heard that Alvinzi was in motion, he sent orders
to Vaubois to attack Davidowich, and to Massena to advance to Bassano
upon the Brenta, and make head against the Austrian commander-in-chief.
Both measures failed in effect.
[Sidenote: Nov. 5.]
Vaubois indeed made his attack, but so unsuccessfully, that after two
days' fighting he was compelled to retreat before the Austrians, to
evacuate the city of Trent, and to retreat upon Calliano, already
mentioned as a very strong position, in the previous account of the
battle of Roveredo. A great part of his opponents being Tyrolese, and
admirably calculated for mountain warfare, they forced Vaubois from a
situation which was almost impregnable; and their army, descending the
Adige upon the right bank, appeared to manœuvre with the purpose of
marching on Montebaldo and Rivoli, and thus opening the communication
with Alvinzi.
On the other hand, though Massena had sustained no loss, for he avoided
an engagement, the approach of Alvinzi, with a superior army, compelled
him to evacuate Bassano, and to leave the enemy in undisputed possession
of the valley of the Brenta. Buonaparte, therefore, himself saw the
necessity of advancing with Augereau's division, determined to give
battle to Alvinzi, and force him back on the Piave before the arrival of
Davidowich. But he experienced unusual resistance; and it is amid
complaints of the weather, of misadventures and miscarriages of
different sorts, that he faintly claims the name of a victory for his
first encounter with Alvinzi. It is clear that he had made a desperate
attempt to drive the Austrian general from Bassano--that he had not
succeeded; but, on the contrary, was under the necessity of retreating
to Vicenza. It is further manifest, that Buonaparte was sensible this
retreat did not accord well with his claim of victory; and he says, with
a consciousness which is amusing, that the inhabitants of Vicenza were
surprised to see the French army retire through their town, as they had
been witnesses of their victory on the preceding day.[199] No doubt
there was room for astonishment if the Vicenzans had been as completely
convinced of the fact as Buonaparte represents them. The truth was,
Buonaparte was sensible that Vaubois, being in complete retreat, was
exposed to be cut off unless he was supported, and he hasted to prevent
so great a loss, by meeting and reinforcing him. His own retrograde
movement, however, which extended as far as Verona, left the whole
country betwixt the Brenta and Adige open to the Austrians; nor does
there occur to those who read the account of the campaign, any good
reason why Davidowich and Alvinzi, having no body of French to interrupt
their communication, should not instantly have adjusted their operations
on a common basis.[200] But it was the bane of the Austrian tactics,
through the whole war, to neglect that connexion and co-operation
betwixt their separate divisions, which is essential to secure the
general result of a campaign. Above all, as Buonaparte himself remarked
of them, their leaders were not sufficiently acquainted with the value
of time in military movements.
Napoleon having retreated to Verona, where he could at pleasure assume
the offensive by means of the bridge, or place the Adige between himself
and the enemy, visited, in the first place, the positions of Rivoli and
Corona, where were stationed the troops which had been defeated by
Davidowich.
[Sidenote: MURMURS OF THE TROOPS.]
They appeared before him with dejected countenances, and Napoleon
upbraided them with their indifferent behaviour. "You have displeased
me," he said;--"You have shown neither discipline, nor constancy, nor
bravery. You have suffered yourselves to be driven from positions where
a handful of brave men might have arrested the progress of a large army.
You are no longer French soldiers.--Let it be written on their
colours--'They are not of the Army of Italy.'" Tears, and groans of
sorrow and shame, answered this harangue--the rules of discipline could
not stifle their sense of mortification, and several of the grenadiers,
who had deserved and wore marks of distinction, called out from the
ranks--"General, we have been misrepresented--Place us in the advance,
and you may then judge whether we do not belong to the army of Italy."
Buonaparte having produced the necessary effect, spoke to them in a more
conciliatory tone; and the regiments who had undergone so severe a
rebuke, redeemed their character in the subsequent part of the
campaign.[201]
While Napoleon was indefatigable in concentrating his troops on the
right bank of the Adige, and inspiring them with his own spirit of
enterprise, Alvinzi had taken his position on the left bank, nearly
opposite to Verona. His army occupied a range of heights called
Caldiero, on the left of which, and somewhat in the rear, is the little
village of Arcola, situated among marshes, which extend around the foot
of that eminence. Here the Austrian general had stationed himself, with
a view, it may be supposed, to wait until Davidowich and his division
should descend the right bank of the Adige, disquiet the French leader's
position on that river, and give Alvinzi himself the opportunity of
forcing a passage.
Buonaparte, with his usual rapidity of resolution, resolved to drive the
Austrian from his position on Caldiero, before the arrival of
Davidowich. But neither on this occasion was fortune propitious to
him.[202] A strong French division, under Massena, attacked the heights
amid a storm of rain; but their most strenuous exertions proved
completely unsuccessful, and left to the general only his usual mode of
concealing a check, by railing at the elements.[203]
The situation of the French became critical, and, what was worse, the
soldiers perceived it; and complained that they had to sustain the whole
burden of the war, had to encounter army after army, and must succumb at
last under the renewed and unwearied efforts of Austria. Buonaparte
parried these natural feelings as well as he could,[204] promising that
their conquest of Italy should be speedily sealed by the defeat of this
Alvinzi; and he applied his whole genius to discover the means of
bringing the war to an effective struggle, in which he confided that,
in spite of numbers, his own talents, and the enterprising character of
an army so often victorious, might assure him a favourable result. But
it was no easy way to discover a mode of attacking, with even plausible
hopes of success. If he advanced northward on the right bank to seek out
and destroy Davidowich, he must weaken his line on the Adige, by the
troops withdrawn to effect that purpose; and during his absence, Alvinzi
would probably force the passage of the river at some point, and thus
have it in his power to relieve Mantua. The heights of Caldiero,
occupied by the Austrian main body, and lying in his front, had, by dire
experiment, been proved impregnable.
In these doubtful circumstances the bold scheme occurred to the French
general, that the position of Caldiero, though it could not be stormed,
might be turned, and that by possessing himself of the village of
Arcola, which lies to the left, and in the rear of Caldiero, the
Austrians might be compelled to fight to disadvantage. But the idea of
attacking Arcola was one which would scarce have occurred to any general
save Buonaparte.
Arcola is situated upon a small stream called the Alpon, which, as
already hinted, finds its way into the Adige, through a wilderness of
marshes, intersected with ditches, and traversed by dikes in various
directions. In case of an unsuccessful attack, the assailants were like
to be totally cut off in the swamps. Then to debouche from Verona, and
move in the direction of Arcola, would have put Alvinzi and his whole
army on their guard. Secrecy and celerity are the soul of enterprise.
All these difficulties gave way before Napoleon's genius.
Verona, it must be remembered, is on the left bank of the Adige--on the
same with the point which was the object of Buonaparte's attack. At
nightfall, the whole forces at Verona were under arms; and leaving
fifteen hundred men under Kilmaine to defend the place from any assault,
with strict orders to secure the gates, and prevent all communication of
his nocturnal expedition to the enemy, Buonaparte commenced his march at
first to the rear, in the direction of Peschiera; which seemed to imply
that his resolution was at length taken to resign the hopes of gaining
Mantua, and perhaps to abandon Italy. The silence with which the march
was conducted, the absence of all the usual rumours which used in the
French army to precede a battle, and the discouraging situation of
affairs, appeared to presage the same issue. But after the troops had
marched a little way in this direction, the heads of columns were
wheeled to the left, out of the line of retreat, and descended the Adige
as far as Ronco, which they reached before day. Here a bridge had been
prepared, by which they passed over the river, and were placed on the
same bank with Arcola, the object of their attack, and lower than the
heights of Caldiero.
[Sidenote: FIRST BATTLE OF ARCOLA.]
[Sidenote: Nov. 15.]
There were three causeways by which the marsh of Arcola is
traversed--each was occupied by a French column. The central column
moved on the causeway which led to the village so named. The dikes and
causeways were not defended, but Arcola and its bridge were protected by
two battalions of Croats with two pieces of cannon, which were placed in
a position to enfilade the causeway. These received the French column
with so heavy a fire on its flank, that it fell back in disorder.
Augereau rushed forward upon the bridge with his chosen grenadiers; but
enveloped as they were in a destructive fire, they were driven back on
the main body.
Alvinzi, who conceived it only an affair of light troops, sent, however,
forces into the marsh by means of the dikes which traversed them, to
drive out the French. These were checked by finding that they were to
oppose strong columns of infantry, yet the battle continued with
unabated vigour. It was essential to Buonaparte's plan that Arcola
should be carried; but the fire continued tremendous. At length, to
animate his soldiers to a final exertion, he caught a stand of colours,
rushed on the bridge, and planted them there with his own hand. A fresh
body of Austrians arrived at that moment, and the fire on flank blazed
more destructively than ever. The rear of the French column fell back;
the leading files, finding themselves unsupported, gave way; but, still
careful of their general, bore him back in their arms through the dead
and dying, the fire and the smoke. In the confusion he was at length
pushed into the marsh. The Austrians were already betwixt him and his
own troops, and he must have perished or been taken, had not the
grenadiers perceived his danger. The cry instantly arose,
"Forward--forward--save the general!" Their love to Buonaparte's person
did more than even his commands and example had been able to
accomplish.[205] They returned to the charge, and at length pushed the
Austrians out of the village; but not till the appearance of a French
corps under General Guieux had turned the position, and he had thrown
himself in the rear of it. These succours had passed at the ferry of
Alborado, and the French remained in possession of the long-contested
village. It was at the moment a place of the greatest importance; for
the possession of it would have enabled Buonaparte, had the Austrians
remained in their position, to operate on their communications with the
Brenta, interpose between Alvinzi and his reserves, and destroy his park
of artillery. But the risk was avoided by the timely caution of the
Austrian field-marshal.[206]
Alvinzi was no sooner aware that a great division of the French army was
in his rear than, without allowing them time for farther operations, he
instantly broke up his position on Caldiero, and evacuated these heights
by a steady and orderly retreat. Buonaparte had the mortification to see
the Austrians effect this manœuvre by crossing a bridge in their rear
over the Alpon, and which could he have occupied, as was his purpose, he
might have rendered their retreat impossible, or at least disastrous. As
matters stood, however, the village of Arcola came to lose its
consequence as a position, since, after Alvinzi's retreat, it was no
longer in the rear, but in the front of the enemy.
Buonaparte remembered he had enemies on the right as well as the left of
the Adige; and that Davidowich might be once more routing Vaubois, while
he was too far advanced to afford him assistance. He therefore evacuated
Arcola, and the village of Porcil, situated near it, and retreating to
Ronco, recrossed the river, leaving only two demi-brigades in advance
upon the left bank.
The first battle of Arcola, famous for the obstinacy with which it was
disputed, and the number of brave officers and men who fell, was thus
attended with no decisive result. But it had checked the inclination of
Alvinzi to advance on Verona--it had delayed all communication betwixt
his army and that of the Tyrol--above all, it had renewed the Austrians'
apprehensions of the skill of Buonaparte and the bravery of his troops,
and restored to the French soldiery the usual confidence of their
national character.
[Sidenote: Nov. 16.]
Buonaparte remained stationary at Ronco until next morning at five
o'clock, by which time he received intelligence that Davidowich had lain
quiet in his former position; that he had no cause to be alarmed for
Vaubois' safety, and might therefore operate in security against
Alvinzi. This was rendered the more easy, (16th November,) as the
Austrian general, not aware of Buonaparte's having halted his army at
Ronco, imagined he was on his march to concentrate his forces nearer
Mantua, and hastened therefore to overwhelm the rear-guard, whom he
expected to find at the ferry. Buonaparte spared them the trouble of a
close advance to the Adige. He again crossed to the left side, and again
advanced his columns upon the dikes and causeways which traversed the
marshes of Arcola. On such ground, where it was impossible to assign to
the columns more breadth than the causeways could accommodate, the
victorious soldiers of France had great advantage over the recent levies
of Austria; for though the latter might be superior in number on the
whole, success must in such a case depend on the personal superiority of
the front or leading files only. The French, therefore, had the first
advantage, and drove back the Austrians upon the village of Arcola; but
here, as on the former day, Alvinzi constituted his principal point of
defence, and maintained it with the utmost obstinacy.
After having repeatedly failed when attacking in front a post so
difficult of approach, Napoleon endeavoured to turn the position by
crossing the little river Alpon, near its union with the Adige. He
attempted to effect a passage by means of fascines, but unsuccessfully;
and the night approached without any thing effectual being decided. Both
parties drew off, the French to Ronco, where they recrossed the Adige;
the Austrians to a position behind the well-contested village of Arcola.
The battle of the 16th November was thus far favourable to the French,
that they had driven back the Austrians, and made many prisoners in the
commencement of the day; but they had also lost many men; and Napoleon,
if he had gained ground in the day, was fain to return to his position
at night, lest Davidowich, by the defeat of Vaubois, might either
relieve Mantua, or move on Verona. The 17th was to be a day more
decisive.
[Sidenote: SECOND BATTLE OF ARCOLA.]
[Sidenote: Nov. 17.]
The field of battle, and the preliminary manœuvres, were much the
same as on the preceding day; but those of the French were nearly
disconcerted by the sinking of one of the boats which constituted their
bridge over the Adige. The Austrians instantly advanced on the
demi-brigade which had been stationed on the left bank to defend the
bridge. But the French having repaired the damage, advanced in their
turn, and compelled the Austrians to retreat upon the marsh. Massena
directed his attack on Porcil--General Robert pressed forward on Arcola.
But it was at the point where he wished to cross the Alpon that
Buonaparte chiefly desired to attain a decided superiority; and in order
to win it, he added stratagem to audacity. Observing one of his columns
repulsed, and retreating along the causeway, he placed the 32d regiment
in ambuscade in a thicket of willows which bordered the rivulet, and
saluting the pursuing enemy with a close, heavy, and unexpected fire,
instantly rushed to close with the bayonet, and attacking the flank of a
column of nearly three thousand Croats, forced them into the marsh,
where most of them perished.
It was now that, after a calculation of the losses sustained by the
enemy, Napoleon conceived their numerical superiority so far diminished,
and their spirit so much broken, that he need no longer confine his
operations to the dikes, but meet his enemy on the firm plain which
extended beyond the Alpon. He passed the brook by means of a temporary
bridge which had been prepared during night, and the battle raged as
fiercely on the dry level, as it had done on the dikes and amongst the
marshes.
The Austrians fought with resolution, the rather that their left, though
stationed on dry ground, was secured by a marsh which Buonaparte had no
means of turning. But though this was the case, Napoleon contrived to
gain his point by impressing on the enemy an idea that he had actually
accomplished that which he had no means of doing. This he effected by
sending a daring officer, with about thirty of the guides, (his own
body-guards they may be called,) with four trumpets; and directing these
determined cavaliers to charge, and the trumpets to sound, as if a
large body of horse had crossed the marsh. Augereau attacked the
Austrian left at the same moment; and a fresh body of troops advancing
from Legnago, compelled them to retreat, but not to fly.
Alvinzi was now compelled to give way, and commence his retreat on
Montebello. He disposed seven thousand men in echelon to cover this
movement, which was accomplished without very much loss; but his ranks
had been much thinned by the slaughter of the three battles of Arcola.
Eight thousand men has been stated as the amount of his losses.[207] The
French who made so many and so sanguinary assaults upon the villages,
must also have suffered a great deal. Buonaparte acknowledges this in
energetic terms. "Never," he writes to Carnot, "was field of battle so
disputed. I have almost no generals remaining--I can assure you that the
victory could not have been gained at a cheaper expense. The enemy were
numerous, and desperately resolute."[208] The truth is, that
Buonaparte's mode of striking terror by these bloody and desperate
charges in front upon strong positions, was a blemish in his system.
They cost many men, and were not uniformly successful. That of Arcola
was found a vain waste of blood, till science was employed instead of
main force, when the position was turned by Guieux on the first day; and
on the third, by the troops who crossed the Alpon.
The tardy conduct of Davidowich, during these three undecided days of
slaughterous struggle, is worthy of notice and censure. It would appear
that from the 10th November that general had it in his power to attack
the division which he had hitherto driven before him, and that he had
delayed doing so till the 16th; and on the 18th, just the day after
Alvinzi had made his retreat, he approached Verona on the right bank.
Had these movements taken place before Alvinzi's defeat, or even during
any of the three days preceding, when the French were engaged before
Arcola, the consequences must have been very serious. Finding, however,
that Alvinzi had retreated, Davidowich followed the same course, and
withdrew into the mountains, not much annoyed by the French, who
respected the character of his army, which had been repeatedly
victorious, and felt the weakness incident to their own late
losses.[209]
Another incidental circumstance tends equally strongly to mark the want
of concert and communication among the Austrian generals. Wurmser, who
had remained quiet in Mantua during all the time when Alvinzi and
Davidowich were in the neighbourhood, made a vigorous sally on the 23d
November; when his doing so was of little consequence, since he could
not be supported.
Thus ended the fourth campaign undertaken for the Austrian possessions
in Italy. The consequences were not so decidedly in Buonaparte's favour
as those of the three former. Mantua, it is true, had received no
relief; and so far the principal object of the Austrians had miscarried.
But Wurmser was of a temper to continue the defence till the last
moment, and had already provided for a longer defence than the French
counted upon, by curtailing the rations of the garrison. The armies of
Friuli and the Tyrol had also, since the last campaign, retained
possession of Bassano and Trent, and removed the French from the
mountains through which access is gained to the Austrian hereditary
dominions. Neither had Alvinzi suffered any such heavy defeat as his
predecessors Beaulieu or Wurmser; while Davidowich, on the contrary, was
uniformly successful, had he known how to avail himself of his
victories. Still the Austrians were not likely, till reinforced again,
to interrupt Buonaparte's quiet possession of Lombardy.
During two months following the battle of Arcola and the retreat of the
Austrians, the war which had been so vigorously maintained in Italy
experienced a short suspension, and the attention of Buonaparte was
turned towards civil matters--the arrangement of the French interests
with the various powers of Italy, and with the congress of Lombardy, as
well as the erection of the districts of Bologna, Ferrara, Reggio, and
Modena, into what was called the Transpadane Republic. These we shall
notice elsewhere, as it is not advisable to interrupt the course of our
military annals, until we have recounted the last struggle of the
Austrians for the relief of Mantua.
[Sidenote: FRENCH AND AUSTRIAN ARMIES.]
It must be in the first place observed, that whether from jealousy or
from want of means, supplies and recruits were very slowly transmitted
from France to their Italian army. About seven thousand men, who were
actually sent to join Buonaparte, scarcely repaired the losses which he
had sustained in the late bloody campaigns.[210] At the same time the
treaty with the Pope being broken off, the supreme pontiff threatened to
march a considerable army towards Lombardy. Buonaparte endeavoured to
supply the want of reinforcements by raising a defensive legion among
the Lombards, to which he united many Poles. This body was not fit to be
brought into line against the Austrians, but was more than sufficient to
hold at bay the troops of the papal see, who have never enjoyed of late
years a high degree of military reputation.
Meantime Austria, who seemed to cling to Italy with the tenacity of a
dying grasp, again, and now for the fifth time, recruited her armies on
the frontier, and placing Alvinzi once more at the head of sixty
thousand men, commanded him to resume the offensive against the French
in Italy.[211] The spirit of the country had been roused instead of
discouraged by the late defeats. The volunteer corps, consisting of
persons of respectability and consideration, took the field, for the
redemption, if their blood could purchase it, of the national honour.
Vienna furnished four battalions, which were presented by the Empress
with a banner, that she had wrought for them with her own hands. The
Tyrolese also thronged once more to their sovereign's standard,
undismayed by a proclamation made by Buonaparte after the retreat from
Arcola, and which paid homage, though a painful one, to these brave
marksmen. "Whatever Tyrolese," said this atrocious document, "is taken
with arms in his hand, shall be put to instant death." Alvinzi sent
abroad a counter proclamation, "that for every Tyrolese put to death as
threatened, he would hang up a French officer." Buonaparte again
replied, "that if the Austrian general should use the retaliation he
threatened, he would execute in his turn officer for officer out of his
prisoners, commencing with Alvinzi's own nephew, who was in his power."
A little calmness on either side brought them to reflect on the cruelty
of aggravating the laws of war, which are already too severe; so that
the system of military execution was renounced on both sides.
[Sidenote: AUSTRIAN PLAN OF OPERATIONS.]
But notwithstanding this display of zeal and loyalty on the part of the
Austrian nation, its councils do not appear to have derived wisdom from
experience. The losses sustained by Wurmser and by Alvinzi, proceeded in
a great measure from the radical error of having divided their forces,
and commenced the campaign on a double line of operation, which could
not, or at least were not made to, correspond and communicate with each
other. Yet they commenced this campaign on the same unhappy principles.
One army descending from the Tyrol upon Montebaldo, the other was to
march down by the Brenta on the Paduan territory, and then to operate on
the lower Adige, the line of which, of course, they were expected to
force, for the purpose of relieving Mantua. The Aulic Council ordered
that these two armies were to direct their course so as to meet, if
possible, upon the beleaguered fortress. Should they succeed in raising
the siege, there was little doubt that the French must be driven out of
Italy; but even were the scheme only partially successful, still it
might allow Wurmser with his cavalry to escape from that besieged city,
and retreat into the Romagna, where it was designed that he should, with
the assistance of his staff and officers, organize and assume the
command of the papal army. In the meantime, an intelligent agent was
sent to communicate, if possible, with Wurmser.[212]
This man fell into the hands of the besiegers. It was in vain that he
swallowed his despatches, which were inclosed in a ball of wax; means
were found to make the stomach render up its trust, and the document
which the wax enclosed was found to be a letter, signed by the Emperor's
own hand, directing Wurmser to enter into no capitulation, but to hold
out as long as possible in expectation of relief, and if compelled to
leave Mantua, to accept of no conditions, but to cut his way into the
Romagna, and take upon himself the command of the papal army. Thus
Buonaparte became acquainted with the storm which was approaching, and
which was not long of breaking.[213]
Alvinzi, who commanded the principal army, advanced from Bassano to
Roveredo upon the Adige. Provera, distinguished for his gallant defence
of Cossaria, during the action of Millesimo,[214] commanded the
divisions which were to act upon the lower Adige. He marched as far as
Bevi l'Acqua, while his advanced guard, under Prince Hohenzollern,
compelled a body of French to cross to the right bank of the Adige.
[Sidenote: Jan. 12.]
Buonaparte, uncertain which of these attacks he was to consider as the
main one, concentrated his army at Verona, which had been so important a
place during all these campaigns as a central point, from which he might
at pleasure march either up the Adige against Alvinzi, or descend the
river to resist the attempts of Provera. He trusted that Joubert, whom
he had placed in defence of La Corona, a little town which had been
strongly fortified for the purpose, might be able to make a good
temporary defence. He despatched troops for Joubert's support to Castel
Nuovo, but hesitated to direct his principal force in that direction
until ten in the evening of 13th January, when he received information
that Joubert had been attacked at La Corona by an immense body, which he
had resisted with difficulty during the day, and was now about to
retreat, in order to secure the important eminence at Rivoli, which was
the key of his whole position.[215]
Judging from this account, that the principal danger occurred on the
upper part of the Adige, Buonaparte left only Augereau's division to
dispute with Provera the passage of that river on the lower part of its
course. He was especially desirous to secure the elevated and commanding
position of Rivoli, before the enemy had time to receive his cavalry and
cannon, as he hoped to bring on an engagement ere he was united with
those important parts of his army. By forced marches Napoleon arrived at
Rivoli at two in the morning of the 14th, and from that elevated
situation, by the assistance of a clear moonlight, he was able to
discover, that the bivouac of the enemy was divided into five distinct
and separate bodies, from which he inferred that their attack the next
day would be made in the same number of columns.[216]
The distance at which the bivouacs were stationed from the position of
Joubert, made it evident to Napoleon that they did not mean to make
their attack before ten in the morning, meaning probably to wait for
their infantry and artillery. Joubert was at this time in the act of
evacuating the position which he only occupied by a rear-guard.
Buonaparte commanded him instantly to counter-march and resume
possession of the important eminence of Rivoli.
[Sidenote: BATTLE OF RIVOLI.]
[Sidenote: Jan. 14.]
A few Croats had already advanced so near the French line as to discover
that Joubert's light troops had abandoned the chapel of Saint Marc, of
which they took possession. It was retaken by the French, and the
struggle to recover and maintain it brought on a severe action, first
with the regiment to which the detachment of Croats belonged, and
afterwards with the whole Austrian column which lay nearest to that
point, and which was commanded by Ocskay. The latter was repulsed, but
the column of Kobler pressed forward to support them, and having gained
the summit, attacked two regiments of the French who were stationed
there, each protected by a battery of cannon. Notwithstanding this
advantage, one of the regiments gave way, and Buonaparte himself
galloped to bring up reinforcements. The nearest French were those of
Massena's division, which, tired with the preceding night's march, had
lain down to take some rest. They started up, however, at the command of
Napoleon, and suddenly arriving on the field, in half an hour the column
of Kobler was beaten and driven back. That of Liptay advanced in turn;
and Quasdonowich, observing that Joubert, in prosecuting his success
over the division of Ocskay, had pushed forward and abandoned the chapel
of Saint Marc, detached three battalions to ascend the hill, and occupy
that post. While the Austrians scaled, on one side, the hill on which
the chapel is situated, three battalions of French infantry, who had
been countermarched by Joubert to prevent Quasdonowich's purpose,
struggled up the steep ascent on another point. The activity of the
French brought them first to the summit, and having then the advantage
of the ground, it was no difficult matter for them to force the
advancing Austrians headlong down the hill which they were endeavouring
to climb. Meantime, the French batteries thundered on the broken columns
of the enemy--their cavalry made repeated charges, and the whole
Austrians who had been engaged fell into inextricable disorder. The
columns which had advanced were irretrievably defeated; those who
remained were in such a condition, that to attack would have been
madness.
Amid this confusion, the division of Lusignan, which was the most remote
of the Austrian columns, being intrusted with the charge of the
artillery and baggage of the army, had, after depositing these according
to order, mounted the heights of Rivoli, and assumed a position in rear
of the French. Had this column attained the same ground while the
engagement continued in front, there can be no doubt that it would have
been decisive against Napoleon. Even as it was, their appearance in the
rear would have startled troops, however brave, who had less confidence
in their general; but those of Buonaparte only exclaimed, "There arrive
farther supplies to our market," in full reliance that their commander
could not be out-manœuvred. The Austrian division, on the other hand,
arriving after the battle was lost, being without artillery or cavalry,
and having been obliged to leave a proportion of their numbers to keep a
check upon a French brigade, felt that, instead of being in a position
to cut off the French, by attacking their rear while their front was
engaged, they themselves were cut off by the intervention of the
victorious French betwixt them and their defeated army. Lusignan's
division was placed under a heavy fire of the artillery in reserve, and
was soon obliged to lay down its arms. So critical are the events of
war, that a military movement, which, executed at one particular period
of time, would have ensured victory, is not unlikely, from the loss of a
brief interval, to occasion only more general calamity.[217] The
Austrians, on this, as on some other occasions, verified too much
Napoleon's allegation, that they did not sufficiently consider the value
of time in military affairs.
The field of Rivoli was one of the most desperate that Buonaparte ever
won, and was gained entirely by superior military skill, and not by the
overbearing system of mere force of numbers, to which he has been
accused of being partial.[218] He himself had his horses repeatedly
wounded in the course of the action, and exerted to the utmost his
personal influence to bring up the troops into action where their
presence was most required.[219]
Alvinzi's error, which was a very gross one, consisted in supposing that
no more than Joubert's inconsiderable force was stationed at Rivoli,
and in preparing, therefore, to destroy him at his leisure; when his
acquaintance with the French celerity of movement[220] ought to have
prepared him for the possibility of Buonaparte's night march, by which,
bringing up the chosen strength of his army into the position where the
enemy only expected to find a feeble force, he was enabled to resist and
defeat a much superior army, brought to the field upon different points,
without any just calculation on the means of resistance which were to be
opposed; without the necessary assistance of cavalry and artillery; and,
above all, without a preconcerted plan of co-operation and mutual
support. The excellence of Napoleon's manœuvres was well supported by
the devotion of his generals, and the courage of his soldiers. Massena,
in particular, so well seconded his general, that afterwards, when
Napoleon, as Emperor, conferred on him the title of Duke, he assigned
him his designation from the battle of Rivoli.[221]
Almost before this important and decisive victory was absolutely gained,
news arrived[222] which required the presence of Buonaparte elsewhere.
On the very same day of the battle, Provera, whom we left manœuvring
on the Lower Adige, threw a bridge of pontoons over that river, where
the French were not prepared to oppose his passage, and pushed forward
to Mantua, the relief of which fortress he had by stratagem nearly
achieved. A regiment of his cavalry, wearing white cloaks, and
resembling, in that particular, the first regiment of French hussars,
presented themselves before the suburb of Saint George, then only
covered by a mere line of circumvallation. The barricades were about to
be opened without suspicion, when it occurred to a sagacious old French
sergeant, who was beyond the walls gathering wood, that the dress of
this regiment of white cloaks was fresher than that of the French corps,
called Bertini's, for whom they were mistaken. He communicated his
suspicions to a drummer who was near him; they gained the suburb, and
cried to arms, and the guns of the defences were opened on the hostile
cavalry, whom they were about to have admitted in the guise of
friends.[223]
[Sidenote: Jan. 16]
About the time that this incident took place, Buonaparte himself arrived
at Roverbella, within twelve miles of Mantua, to which he had marched
with incredible despatch from the field of battle at Rivoli, leaving to
Massena, Murat, and Joubert, the task of completing his victory, by the
close pursuit of Alvinzi and his scattered forces.
[Sidenote: BATTLE OF LA FAVORITA.]
In the meanwhile, Provera communicated with the garrison of Mantua
across the lake, and concerted the measures for its relief with Wurmser.
On the 16th of January, being the morning after the battle of Rivoli,
and the unsuccessful attempt to surprise the suburb of Saint George, the
garrison of Mantua sallied from the place in strength, and took post at
the causeway of La Favorita, being the only one which is defended by an
enclosed citadel or independent fortress. Napoleon, returning at the
head of his victorious forces, surrounded and attacked with fury the
troops of Provera, while the blockading army compelled the garrison, at
the bayonet's point, to re-enter the besieged city of Mantua. Provera,
who had in vain, though with much decision and gallantry, attempted the
relief of Mantua, which his Imperial master had so much at heart, was
compelled to lay down his arms with a division of about five thousand
men, whom he had still united under his person. The detached corps which
he had left to protect his bridge, and other passes in his rear,
sustained a similar fate. Thus one division of the army, which had
commenced the campaign of January only on the 7th of that month, were
the prisoners of the destined conqueror before ten days had elapsed. The
larger army, commanded by Alvinzi, had no better fortune. They were
closely pursued from the bloody field of Rivoli, and never were
permitted to draw breath or to recover their disorder. Large bodies were
intercepted and compelled to surrender, a practice now so frequent among
the Austrian troops, that it ceased to be shameful.[224]
Nevertheless, one example is so peculiar as to deserve commemoration, as
a striking instance of the utter consternation and dispersion of the
Austrians after this dreadful defeat, and of the confident and audacious
promptitude which the French officers derived from their unvaried
success. René, a young officer, was in possession of the village called
Garda, on the lake of the same name, and, in visiting his advanced
posts, he perceived some Austrians approaching, whom he caused his
escort to surround and make prisoners. Advancing to the front to
reconnoitre, he found himself close to the head of an imperial column of
eighteen hundred men, which a turning in the road had concealed till he
was within twenty yards of them. "Down with your arms!" said the
Austrian commandant; to which René answered with the most ready
boldness,--"Do _you_ lay down your arms! I have destroyed your advanced
guard, as witness these prisoners--ground your arms or no quarter." And
the French soldiers, catching the hint of their leader, joined in the
cry of "Ground your arms." The Austrian officer hesitated, and proposed
to enter into capitulation; the Frenchman would admit of no terms but
instant and immediate surrender. The dispirited imperialist yielded up
his sword, and commanded his soldiers to imitate his example. But the
Austrian soldiers began to suspect the truth; they became refractory,
and refused to obey their leader, whom René addressed with the utmost
apparent composure. "You are an officer, sir, and a man of honour--you
know the rules of war--you have surrendered--you are therefore my
prisoner, but I rely on your parole. Here, I return your sword--compel
your men to submission, otherwise I direct against you the division of
six thousand men who are under my command." The Austrian was utterly
confounded, betwixt the appeal to his honour and the threat of a charge
from six thousand men. He assured René he might rely on his punctilious
compliance with the parole he had given him; and speaking in German to
his soldiers, persuaded them to lay down their arms, a submission which
he had soon afterwards the satisfaction to see had been made to
one-twelfth part of their number.
Amid such extraordinary success, the ground which the French had lost in
Italy was speedily resumed. Trent and Bassano were again occupied by the
French. They regained all the positions and strongholds which they had
possessed on the frontiers of Italy before Alvinzi's first descent, and
might perhaps have penetrated deeper into the mountainous frontier of
Germany but for the snow which choked up the passes.[225]
One crowning consequence of the victories of Rivoli and of La Favorita,
was the surrender of Mantua itself, that prize which had cost so much
blood, and had been defended with such obstinacy.
[Sidenote: SURRENDER OF MANTUA.]
[Sidenote: Feb. 2.]
For several days after the decisive actions which left him without a
shadow of hope of relief, Wurmser continued the defence of the place in
a sullen yet honourable despair, natural to the feelings of a gallant
veteran, who, to the last, hesitated between the desire to resist, and
the sense that, his means of subsistence being almost totally expended,
resistance was absolutely hopeless. At length he sent his aide-de-camp,
Klenau, (afterwards a name of celebrity,) to the headquarters of
Serrurier, who commanded the blockade, to treat of a surrender. Klenau
used the customary language on such occasions. He expatiated on the
means which he said Mantua still possessed of holding out, but said,
that as Wurmser doubted whether the place could be relieved in time, he
would regulate his conduct as to immediate submission, or farther
defence, according to the conditions of surrender to which the French
generals were willing to admit him.
A French officer of distinction was present, muffled in his cloak, and
remaining apart from the two officers, but within hearing of what had
passed. When their discussion was finished, this unknown person stepped
forward, and taking a pen wrote down the conditions of surrender to
which Wurmser was to be admitted--conditions more honourable and
favourable by far than what his extremity could have exacted. "These,"
said the unknown officer to Klenau, "are the terms which Wurmser may
accept at present, and which will be equally tendered to him at any
period when he finds farther resistance impossible. We are aware he is
too much a man of honour to give up the fortress and city, so long and
honourably defended, while the means of resistance remain in his power.
If he delays accepting the conditions for a week, for a month, for two
months, they shall be equally his when he chooses to accept them.
Tomorrow I pass the Po, and march upon Rome." Klenau, perceiving that he
spoke to the French commander-in-chief, frankly admitted that the
garrison could not longer delay surrender, having scarce three days'
provisions unconsumed.[226]
This trait of generosity towards a gallant but unfortunate enemy, was
highly favourable to Buonaparte. The taste which dictated the
stage-effect of the cloak may indeed be questioned; but the real current
of his feeling towards the venerable object of his respect, and at the
same time compassion, is ascertained otherwise. He wrote to the
Directory on the subject, that he had afforded to Wurmser such
conditions of surrender as became the generosity of the French nation
towards an enemy, who, having lost his army by misfortune, was so little
desirous to secure his personal safety, that he threw himself into
Mantua, cutting his way through the blockading army; thus voluntarily
undertaking the privations of a siege, which his gallantry protracted
until almost the last morsel of provisions was exhausted.[227]
But the young victor paid still a more delicate and noble-minded
compliment, in declining to be personally present when the veteran
Wurmser had the mortification to surrender his sword, with his garrison
of twenty thousand men, ten thousand of whom were fit for service. This
self-denial did Napoleon as much credit nearly as his victory, and must
not be omitted in a narrative, which, often called to stigmatize his
ambition and its consequences, should not be the less ready to observe
marks of dignified and honourable feeling. The history of this
remarkable man more frequently reminds us of the romantic and improbable
victories imputed to the heroes of the romantic ages, than of the spirit
of chivalry attributed to them; but in this instance Napoleon's conduct
towards Wurmser may be justly compared to that of the Black Prince to
his royal prisoner, King John of France.
Serrurier, who had conducted the leaguer, had the honour to receive the
surrender of Wurmser, after the siege of Mantua had continued for six
months, during which the garrison is said by Napoleon to have lost
twenty-seven thousand men by disease, and in the various numerous and
bloody sallies which took place. This decisive event put an end to the
war in Italy. The contest with Austria was hereafter to be waged on the
hereditary dominions of that haughty power.
The French, possessed of this grand object of their wishes, were not
long in displaying their national characteristics. Their military and
prescient sagacity was evinced in employing one of the most celebrated
of their engineers, to improve and bring nearly to perfection the
defence of a city which may be termed the citadel of Italy. They set
afoot, besides, civic feasts and ceremonies, and among others, one in
honour of Virgil, who, being the panegyrist of an emperor, was
indifferently selected as the presiding genius of an infant republic.
Their cupidity was evinced by their artists' exercising their ingenuity
in devising means to cut from the wall and carry off the fresco
paintings, by Titian, of the wars between the Gods and the Giants, at
all risks of destroying what could never be replaced. Luckily, the
attempt was found totally unadvisable.
FOOTNOTES:
[193] Moniteur, No. 13, October 4.
[194] Jomini, tom. ix., p. 153; Thibaudeau, tom. ii., p. 32;
Montgaillard, tom. iv., p. 468.
[195] "Gentili and all the refugees landed in October, 1796, in spite of
the English cruisers. The republicans took possession of Bastia and of
all the fortresses. The English hastily embarked. The King of England
wore the Corsican crown only two years. This whim cost the British
treasury five millions sterling. John Bull's riches could not have been
worse employed."--NAPOLEON, _Montholon_, tom. iii., p. 58.
[196] It is fair to add, however, that Buonaparte in his Memoirs, while
at St. Helena, gives a sketch of the geographical description and
history of Corsica, and suggests several plans for the civilisation of
his countrymen,--one of which, the depriving them of the arms which they
constantly wear, might be prudent were it practicable, but certainly
would be highly unpalatable. There occurs an odd observation, "that the
Crown of Corsica must, on the temporary annexation of the island to
Great Britain, have been surprised at finding itself appertaining to the
successor of Fingal." Not more, we should think, than the diadem of
France, and the iron crown of Italy, may have marvelled at meeting on
the brow of a Corsican soldier of fortune.--S.
[197] Alvinzi was, at this time, seventy years of age. He died in 1810.
[198] Montholon, tom. iii., p. 345; Thibaudeau, tom. ii., p. 82.
[199] Montholon, tom. iii., p. 345; Thibaudeau, tom. ii., p. 109.
[200] Jomini, tom. ix., p. 165.
[201] Montholon, tom. iii., p. 349.
[202] Jomini, tom. ix., p. 170; Thibaudeau, tom. ii., p. 112.
[203] "The rain fell in torrents; the ground was so completely soaked,
that the French artillery could make no movement, whilst that of the
Austrians, being in position, and advantageously placed, produced its
full effect."--MONTHOLON, tom. iii., p. 352.
[204] "We have but one more effort to make, and Italy is our own. The
enemy is, no doubt, more numerous than we are, but half his troops are
recruits; when he is beaten, Mantua must fall, and we shall remain
masters of all. From the smiling flowery bivouacs of Italy, you cannot
return to the Alpine snows. Succours are on the road; only beat Alvinzi,
and I will answer for your future welfare."--MONTHOLON, tom. iii., p.
355.
[205] "This was the day of military devotedness. Lannes, who had been
wounded at Governolo, had hastened from Milan; he was still suffering;
he threw himself between the enemy and Napoleon, and received three
wounds. Muiron, Napoleon's aide-de-camp, was killed in covering his
general with his own body. Heroic and affecting death!"--NAPOLEON,
_Memoirs_, tom. iii., p. 362.
[206] Jomini, tom. ix., p. 180; Thibaudeau, tom. ii., p. 117.
[207] Jomini, tom. ix., p. 101. Napoleon estimates the loss of Alvinzi,
in the three days' engagements, at 18,000 men including 6000 prisoners.
Montholon, tom. iii., p. 370.
[208] Letter to the Directory, 19th November.
[209] "The French army re-entered Verona in triumph by the Venice gate,
three days after having quitted that city almost clandestinely by the
Milan gate. It would be difficult to conceive the astonishment and
enthusiasm of the inhabitants."--MONTHOLON, tom. iii., p. 370.
[210] "You announce the arrival of 10,000 men from the Army of the
Ocean, and a like number from that of the Rhine; but they have not
arrived, and should they not come speedily, you will sacrifice an army
ardently devoted to the Constitution."--BUONAPARTE to the Directory,
28th December.
[211] "The Austrian army amounted to from 65,000 to 70,000 fighting men,
and 6000 Tyrolese, besides 24,000 men of the garrison of
Mantua."--MONTHOLON, tom. iii., p. 404.
"After the battle of Arcola, the active French army amounted to 36,380
while 10,230 formed the blockade of Mantua."--JOMINI, tom. ix., p. 262.
[212] Montholon, tom. iii., p. 405; Jomini, tom. ix., p. 263.
[213] Montholon, tom. iii., p. 406.
[214] See _ante_, p. 54.
[215] Jomini, tom. ix., p. 268.
[216] Montholon, tom. iii., p. 410.
[217] It is represented in some military accounts, that the division
which appeared in the rear of the French belonged to the army of
Provera, and had been detached by him on crossing the Adige, as
mentioned below. But Napoleon's Saint Helena manuscripts prove the
contrary. Provera only crossed on the 14th January, and it was on the
morning of the same day that Napoleon had seen the five divisions of
Alvinzi, that of Lusignan which afterwards appeared in the rear of his
army being one, lying around Joubert's position of Rivoli.--S.--See
Montholon, tom. iii., p. 415, and Jomini, tom. ix., p. 284.
[218] Jomini, tom. ix., pp. 275, 287; Montholon, tom. iii., p. 408.
[219] "This day the general-in-chief was several times surrounded by the
enemy; he had several horses killed."--MONTHOLON, tom. iii., p. 415.
[220] "The Roman legions are reported to have marched twenty-four miles
a-day; but our brigades, though fighting at intervals, march
thirty."--BUONAPARTE to the Directory.
[221] "It was after the battle of Rivoli, that Massena received from
Buonaparte and the army the title of 'enfant chéri de la victoire,'"
&c.--THIBAUDEAU, tom. ii., p. 195.
[222] "At two o'clock in the afternoon, in the midst of the battle of
Rivoli."--MONTHOLON, tom. iii., p. 416.
[223] Montholon, tom. iii., p. 416.
[224] Montholon, tom. iii., p. 417; Jomini, tom. ix., p. 293.
[225] "The trophies acquired in the course of January were 25,000
prisoners, twenty-four colours and standards, and sixty pieces of
cannon; on the whole, the enemy's loss was at least 35,000 men.
Bessières carried the colours to Paris. The prisoners were so numerous
that they created some difficulty."--MONTHOLON, tom. iii., p. 419.
[226] Montholon, tom. iii., p. 420.
[227] Buonaparte to the Directory, 15 Pluviose, 3d February.