_The Alps--Feelings and Views of Buonaparte on being appointed
to the Command of the Army of Italy--General Account of his new
Principles of Warfare--Mountainous Countries peculiarly
favourable to them--Retrospect of Military Proceedings since
October 1795--Hostility of the French Government to the
Pope--Massacre of the French Envoy Basseville, at Rome--Austrian
Army under Beaulieu--Napoleon's Plan for entering Italy--Battle
of Montenotte, and Buonaparte's first Victory--Again defeats the
Austrians at Millesimo--and again under Colli--Takes possession
of Cherasco--King of Sardinia requests an Armistice, which leads
to a Peace, concluded on very severe Terms--Close of the
Piedmontese Campaign--Napoleon's Character at this period._
Napoleon has himself observed, that no country in the world is more
distinctly marked out by its natural boundaries than Italy.[84] The Alps
seem a barrier erected by Nature herself, on which she has inscribed in
gigantic characters, "Here let ambition be staid." Yet this tremendous
circumvallation of mountains, as it could not prevent the ancient Romans
from breaking out to desolate the world, so it has been in like manner
found, ever since the days of Hannibal, unequal to protect Italy herself
from invasion. The French nation, in the times of which we treat, spoke
indeed of the Alps as a natural boundary, so far as to authorise them to
claim all which lay on the western side of these mountains, as naturally
pertaining to their dominions; but they never deigned to respect them as
such, when the question respected their invading, on their own part, the
territories of other states, which lay on or beyond the formidable
frontier. They assumed the law of natural limits as an unchallengeable
rule when it made in favour of France, but never allowed it to be quoted
against her interest.
[Sidenote: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.]
During the Revolutionary War, the general fortune of battle had varied
from time to time in the neighbourhood of these mighty boundaries. The
King of Sardinia[85] possessed almost all the fortresses which command
the passes on these mountains, and had therefore been said to wear the
keys of the Alps at his girdle. He had indeed lost his Dukedom of Savoy,
and the County of Nice, in the late campaigns; but he still maintained a
very considerable army, and was supported by his powerful ally the
Emperor of Austria, always vigilant regarding that rich and beautiful
portion of his dominions which lies in the north of Italy. The frontiers
of Piedmont were therefore covered by a strong Austro-Sardinian army,
opposed to the French, of which Napoleon had been just named
commander-in-chief. A strong Neapolitan force[86] was also to be added,
so that in general numbers their opponents were much superior to the
French; but a great part of this force was cooped up in garrisons which
could not be abandoned.
It may be imagined with what delight the general, scarce aged
twenty-six, advanced to an independent field of glory and conquest,
confident in his own powers, and in the perfect knowledge of the
country, which he had acquired when by his scientific plans of the
campaign, he had enabled General Dumerbion to drive the Austrians back,
and obtain possession of the Col di Tende, Saorgio, and the gorges of
the higher Alps.[87] Buonaparte's achievements had hitherto been under
the auspices of others. He made the dispositions before Toulon, but it
was Dugommier who had the credit of taking the place. Dumerbion, as we
have just said, obtained the merit of the advantages in Piedmont. Even
in the civil turmoil of the 13th Vendemaire, his actual services had
been overshadowed by the official dignity of Barras as commander-in-chief.
But if he reaped honour in Italy, the success would be exclusively his
own; and that proud heart must have throbbed to meet danger upon such
terms; that keen spirit have toiled to discover the means of success.
For victory he relied chiefly upon a system of tactics hitherto
unpractised in war, or at least upon any considerable or uniform scale.
It may not be unnecessary to pause, to take a general view of the
principles which he now called into action.
Nations in the savage state, being constantly engaged in war, always
form for themselves some peculiar mode of fighting, suited to the
country they inhabit, and to the mode in which they are armed. The
North-American Indian becomes formidable as a rifleman or sharpshooter,
lays ambuscades in his pathless forests, and practises all the arts of
irregular war. The Arab, or Scythian, manœuvres his clouds of
cavalry, so as to envelope and destroy his enemy in his deserts by
sudden onsets, rapid retreats, and unexpected rallies; desolating the
country around, cutting off his antagonist's supplies, and practising,
in short, the species of war proper to a people superior in light
cavalry.
The first stage of civilisation is less favourable to success in war. As
a nation advances in the peaceful arts, and the character of the soldier
begins to be less familiarly united with that of the citizen, this
system of natural tactics falls out of practice; and when foreign
invasion, or civil broils, call the inhabitants to arms, they have no
idea save that of finding out the enemy, rushing upon him, and
committing the event to superior strength, bravery, or numbers. An
example may be seen in the great Civil War of England, where men fought
on both sides, in almost every county of the kingdom, without any
combination, or exact idea of uniting in mutual support, or
manœuvring so as to form their insulated bands into an army of
preponderating force. At least, what was attempted for that purpose must
have been on the rudest plan possible, where, even in actual fight, that
part of an army which obtained any advantage, pursued it as far as they
could, instead of using their success for the support of their
companions; so that the main body was often defeated when a victorious
wing was in pursuit of those whom their first onset had broken.
But--as war becomes a profession, and a subject of deep study--it is
gradually discovered, that the principles of tactics depend upon
mathematical and arithmetical science; and that the commander will be
victorious who can assemble the greatest number of forces upon the same
point at the same moment, notwithstanding an inferiority of numbers to
the enemy when the general force is computed on both sides. No man ever
possessed in a greater degree than Buonaparte, the power of calculation
and combination necessary for directing such decisive manœuvres. It
constituted, indeed, his _secret_--as it was for some time called--and
that secret consisted in an imagination fertile in expedients which
would never have occurred to others; clearness and precision in forming
his plans; a mode of directing with certainty the separate moving
columns which were to execute them, by arranging so, that each division
should arrive on the destined position at the exact time when their
service was necessary; and above all, in the knowledge which enabled
such a master-spirit to choose the most fitting subordinate implements,
to attach them to his person, and, by explaining to them so much of his
plan as it was necessary each should execute, to secure the exertion of
their utmost ability in carrying it into effect.
Thus, not only were his manœuvres, however daring, executed with a
precision which warlike operations had not attained before his time; but
they were also performed with a celerity which gave them almost always
the effect of surprise. Napoleon was like lightning in the eyes of his
enemies; and when repeated experience had taught them to expect this
portentous rapidity of movement, it sometimes induced his opponents to
wait, in a dubious and hesitating posture, for attacks, which, with less
apprehension of their antagonist, they would have thought it more
prudent to frustrate and to anticipate.
Great sacrifices were necessary to enable the French troops to move with
that degree of celerity which Buonaparte's combinations required. He
made no allowance for impediments or unexpected obstacles; the time
which he had calculated for execution of manœuvres prescribed, was on
no account to be exceeded--every sacrifice was to be made of baggage,
stragglers, even artillery, rather than the column should arrive too
late at the point of its destination. Hence, all that had hitherto been
considered as essential not only to the health, but to the very
existence of an army, was in a great measure dispensed with in the
French service; and, for the first time, troops were seen to take the
field without tents, without camp-equipage, without magazines of
provisions, without military hospitals;--the soldiers eating as they
could, sleeping where they could, dying where they could; but still
advancing, still combating, and still victorious.
It is true that the abandonment of every object, save success in the
field, augmented frightfully all the usual horrors of war. The soldier,
with arms in his hands, and wanting bread, became a marauder in
self-defence; and, in supplying his wants by rapine, did mischief to the
inhabitants, in a degree infinitely beyond the benefit he himself
received; for it may be said of military requisition, as truly as of
despotism, that it resembles the proceedings of a savage, who cuts down
a tree to come at the fruit. Still, though purchased at a high rate,
that advantage was gained by this rapid system of tactics, which in a
slower progress, during which the soldier was regularly maintained, and
kept under the restraint of discipline, might have been rendered
doubtful. It wasted the army through disease, fatigue, and all the
consequences of want and toil; but still the victory was attained, and
that was enough to make the survivors forget their hardships, and to
draw forth new recruits to replace the fallen. Patient of labours, light
of heart and temper, and elated by success beyond all painful
recollections, the French soldiers were the very men calculated to
execute this desperate species of service under a chief, who, their
sagacity soon discovered, was sure to lead to victory all those who
could sustain the hardships by which it was to be won.
[Sidenote: SYSTEM OF TACTICS.]
The character of the mountainous countries, among which he was, for the
first time, to exercise his system, was highly favourable to
Buonaparte's views. Presenting many lines and defensible positions, it
induced the Austrian generals to become stationary, and occupy a
considerable extent of ground, according to their old system of tactics.
But though abounding in such positions as might at first sight seem
absolutely impregnable, and were too often trusted to as such, the
mountains also exhibited to the sagacious eye of a great captain,
gorges, defiles, and difficult and unsuspected points of access, by
which he could turn the positions that appeared in front so formidable;
and, by threatening them on the flank and on the rear, compel the enemy
to a battle at disadvantage, or to a retreat with loss.
The forces which Buonaparte had under his command were between fifty and
sixty thousand good troops, having, many of them, been brought from the
Spanish campaign, in consequence of the peace with that country; but
very indifferently provided with clothing, and suffering from the
hardships they had endured in those mountainous, barren, and cold
regions.[88] The cavalry, in particular, were in very poor order; but
the nature of their new field of action not admitting of their being
much employed, rendered this of less consequence. The misery of the
French army, until these Alpine campaigns were victoriously closed by
the armistice of Cherasco, could, according to Buonaparte's
authority,[89] scarce bear description. The officers for several years
had received no more than eight livres a-month (twenty pence sterling
a-week) in name of pay, and staff-officers had not amongst them a single
horse. Berthier preserved, as a curiosity, an order of the day, dated
Albenga, directing an advance of four Louis d'or to every general of
division, to enable them to enter on the campaign.[90] Among the
generals to whom this paltry supply was rendered acceptable by their
wants, were, or might have been, many whose names became afterwards the
praise and dread of war.[91] Augereau, Massena,[92] Serrurier, Joubert,
Lasnes, and Murat, all generals of the first consideration, served under
Buonaparte in his first Italian campaign.
The position of the French army had repeatedly varied since October
1795, after the skirmish at Cairo. At that time the extreme left of the
line, which extended from south to north, rested upon the Col
d'Argentine, and communicated with the higher Alps--the centre was on
the Col di Tende and Mount Bertrand--the left occupied the heights of
Saint Bertrand, Saint Jacques, and other ridges running in the same
direction, which terminated on the Mediterranean shore, near Finale.
The Austrians, strongly reinforced, attacked this line, and carried the
heights of Mont Saint Jacques; and Kellermann, after a vain attempt to
regain that point of his position, retreated to the line of defence more
westward, which rests on Borghetto. Kellermann, an active and good
brigade officer, but without sufficient talent to act as
commander-in-chief, was superseded, and Scherer was placed in command of
the army of Italy. He risked a battle with the Austrians near Loana, in
which the talents of Massena and Augereau were conspicuous; and by the
victory which ensued, the French regained the line of Saint Jacques and
Finale, which Kellermann had been forced to abandon; so that in a
general point of view, the relative position of the two opposed armies
was not very different from that in which they had been left by
Buonaparte.[93]
[Sidenote: THE POPE.]
But though Scherer had been thus far victorious, he was not the person
to whom the Directory desired to intrust the daring plan of assuming the
offensive on a grand scale upon the Alpine frontier, and, by carrying
their arms into Italy, compelling the Austrians to defend themselves in
that quarter, and to diminish the gigantic efforts which that power had
hitherto continued with varied success, but unabated vigour, upon the
Rhine. The rulers of France had a farther object in this bold scheme.
They desired to intimidate, or annihilate and dethrone the Pope. He was
odious to them as head of the Church, because the attachment of the
French clergy to the Roman See, and the points of conscience which
rested upon that dependence, had occasioned the recusancy of the
priests, especially of those who were most esteemed by the people, to
take the constitutional oath. To the Pope, and his claims of supremacy,
were therefore laid the charge of the great civil war in La Vendée, and
the general disaffection of the Catholics in the south of France.
But this was not the only cause of the animosity entertained by the
Directory against the head of the Catholic Church. They had, three years
before, sustained an actual injury from the See of Rome, which was yet
unavenged. The people of Rome were extremely provoked that the French
residing there, and particularly the young artists, had displayed the
three-coloured cockade, and were proposing to exhibit the scutcheon
containing the emblems of the Republic, over the door of the French
consul. The Pope, through his minister, had intimated his desire that
this should not be attempted, as he had not acknowledged the Republic as
a legitimate government. The French, however, pursued their purpose; and
the consequence was, that a popular commotion arose, which the papal
troops did not greatly exert themselves to suppress. The carriage of the
French envoy, or chargé des affaires, named Basseville, was attacked in
the streets, and chased home; his house was broken into by the mob, and
he himself, unarmed and unresisting, was cruelly assassinated. The
French Government considered this very naturally as a gross insult, and
were the more desirous of avenging it, that by doing so they would
approach nearer to the dignified conduct of the Roman Republic, which,
in good or evil, seems always to have been their model. The affair
happened in 1793, but was not forgotten in 1796.[94]
The original idea entertained by the French Government for prosecuting
their resentment, had been by a proposed landing at Civita Vecchia with
an army of ten thousand men, marching to Rome, and exacting from the
pontiff complete atonement for the murder of Basseville. But as the
English fleet rode unopposed in the Mediterranean, it became a matter of
very doubtful success to transport such a body of troops to Civita
Vecchia by sea, not to mention the chance that, even if safely landed,
they would have found themselves in the centre of Italy, cut off from
supplies and succours, assaulted on all hands, and most probably
blockaded by the British fleet. Buonaparte, who was consulted,
recommended that the north of Italy should be first conquered, in order
that Rome might be with safety approached and chastised; and this
scheme, though in appearance scarce a less bold measure, was a much
safer one than the Directory had at first inclined to, since Buonaparte
would only approach Rome in the event of his being able to preserve his
communications with Lombardy and Tuscany, which he must conquer in the
first place.[95]
The plan of crossing the Alps and marching into Italy, suited in every
respect the ambitious and self-confident character of the general to
whom it was now intrusted. It gave him a separate and independent
authority, and the power of acting on his own judgment and
responsibility; for his countryman Salicetti, the deputy who accompanied
him as a commissioner of the Government, was not probably much disposed
to intrude his opinions. He had been Buonaparte's patron, and was still
his friend.[96] The young general's mind was made up to the alternative
of conquest or ruin, as may be judged from his words to a friend at
taking leave of him. "In three months," he said, "I will be either at
Milan or at Paris;" intimating at once his desperate resolution to
succeed, and his sense that the disappointment of all his prospects must
be the consequence of a failure.
On the 27th of March Buonaparte reached Nice. The picture of the army
which General Scherer[97] laid before him, was even worse than he had
formed any idea of. The supply of bread was very uncertain;
distributions of meat had long ceased; and for means of conveyance there
were only mules, and not above five hundred of these could be reckoned
upon.
The headquarters had never been removed from Nice, since the
commencement of the war: they were instantly ordered to be transferred
to Albenga. On the march thither, along the rugged and precipitous shore
of the Mediterranean, the staff, broken with the rear and baggage of the
army, were exposed to the cannonade of Nelson's squadron; but the young
commander-in-chief would not allow the columns to halt, for the purpose
either of avoiding or of returning it.[98] On the 3d of April, the army
reached port Maunie, near Oneglia, and on the 4th arrived at Albenga;
where, with the view of animating his followers to ambitious hopes, he
addressed the army of Italy to the following purpose:--"Soldiers, you
are hungry and naked.--The Republic owes you much, but she has not the
means to acquit herself of her debts. The patience with which you
support your hardships among these barren rocks is admirable, but it
cannot procure you glory. I am come to lead you into the most fertile
plains that the sun beholds--Rich provinces, opulent towns, all shall be
at your disposal--Soldiers, with such a prospect before you, can you
fail in courage and constancy?" This was showing the deer to the hound
when the leash is about to be slipped.
The Austro-Sardinian army, to which Buonaparte was opposed, was
commanded by Beaulieu, an Austrian general of great experience and some
talent, but no less than seventy-five years old; accustomed all his life
to the ancient rules of tactics, and unlikely to suspect, anticipate, or
frustrate, those plans, formed by a genius so fertile as that of
Napoleon.
Buonaparte's plan for entering Italy differed from that of former
conquerors and invaders, who had approached that fine country by
penetrating or surmounting at some point or other her Alpine barriers.
This inventive warrior resolved to attain the same object, by turning
round the southern extremity of the Alpine range, keeping as close as
possible to the shores of the Mediterranean, and passing through the
Genoese territory by the narrow pass called the Boccheta leading around
the extremity of the mountains, and betwixt these and the sea. Thus he
proposed to penetrate into Italy, by the lowest level which the surface
of the country presented, which must be of course where the range of the
Alps unites with that of the Apennines. The point of junction where
these two immense ranges of mountains touch upon each other, is at the
heights of Mount Saint Jacques, above Genoa, where the Alps, running
north-westward, ascend to Mont Blanc, their highest peak, and the
Apennines, running to the south-east, gradually elevate themselves to
Monte Velino, the tallest mountain of the range.
To attain his object of turning the Alps in the manner proposed, it was
necessary that Buonaparte should totally change the situation of his
army; those occupying a defensive line, running north and south, being
to assume an offensive position, extending east and west. Speaking of an
army as of a battalion, he was to form into column upon the right of the
line which he had hitherto occupied. This was an extremely delicate
operation, to be undertaken in presence of an active enemy, his superior
in numbers; nor was he permitted to execute it uninterrupted.
No sooner did Beaulieu learn that the French general was concentrating
his forces, and about to change his position, than he hastened to
preserve Genoa, without possession of which, or at least of the adjacent
territory, Buonaparte's scheme of advance could scarce have been
accomplished. The Austrian divided his army into three bodies. Colli, at
the head of a Sardinian division, he stationed on the extreme right at
Ceva; his centre division, under D'Argenteau, having its head at
Sasiello, had directions to march on a mountain called Montenotte, with
two villages of the same name, near to which was a strong position at a
place called Montelegino, which the French had occupied in order to
cover their flank during their march towards the east. At the head of
his left wing, Beaulieu himself moved from Novi upon Voltri, a small
town within ten miles of Genoa, for the protection of that ancient city,
whose independence and neutrality were like to be held in little
reverence. Thus it appears, that while the French were endeavouring to
penetrate into Italy by an advance from Sardinia by the way of Genoa,
their line of march was threatened by three armies of Austro-Sardinians,
descending from the skirts of the Alps, and menacing to attack their
flank. But though a skilful disposition, Beaulieu's had, from the very
mountainous character of the country, the great disadvantage of wanting
connexion between the three separate divisions; neither, if needful,
could they be easily united on any point desired, while the lower line,
on which the French moved, permitted constant communication and
co-operation.
[Sidenote: BATTLE OF MONTENOTTE.]
On the 10th of April, D'Argenteau, with the central division of the
Austro-Sardinian army, marched on Montenotte, while Beaulieu on the left
attacked the van of the French army, which had come as far as Voltri.
General Cervoni, commanding the French division which sustained the
attack of Beaulieu, was compelled to fall back on the main body of his
countrymen; and had the assault of D'Argenteau been equally animated, or
equally successful, the fame of Buonaparte might have been stifled in
the birth. But Colonel Rampon, a French officer, who commanded the
redoubts near Montelegino, stopped the progress of D'Argenteau by the
most determined resistance. At the head of not more than fifteen hundred
men, whom he inspired with his own courage, and caused to swear either
to maintain their post or die there,[99] he continued to defend the
redoubts, during the whole of the 11th, until D'Argenteau, whose conduct
was afterwards greatly blamed for not making more determined efforts to
carry them, drew off his forces for the evening, intending to renew the
attack next morning.
But, on the morning of the 12th, the Austrian general found himself
surrounded with enemies. Cervoni, who retreated before Beaulieu, had
united himself with La Harpe, and both advancing northward during the
night of the 11th, established themselves in the rear of the redoubts of
Montelegino, which Rampon had so gallantly defended. This was not all.
The divisions of Augereau and Massena had marched, by different routes,
on the flank and on the rear of D'Argenteau's column; so that next
morning, instead of renewing his attack on the redoubts, the Austrian
general was obliged to extricate himself by a disastrous retreat,
leaving behind him colours and cannon, a thousand slain, and two
thousand prisoners.[100]
Such was the battle of Montenotte, the first of Buonaparte's victories;
eminently displaying that truth and mathematical certainty of
combination,[101] which enabled him on many more memorable occasions,
even when his forces were inferior in numbers, and apparently disunited
in position, suddenly to concentrate them and defeat his enemy, by
overpowering him on the very point where he thought himself strongest.
He had accumulated a superior force on the Austrian centre, and
destroyed it, while Colli, on the right, and Beaulieu himself, on the
left, each at the head of numerous forces, did not even hear of the
action till it was fought and won.[102]
In consequence of the success at Montenotte, and the close pursuit of
the defeated Austrians, the French obtained possession of Cairo, which
placed them on that side of the Alps which slopes towards Lombardy, and
where the streams from these mountains run to join the Po.
Beaulieu had advanced to Voltri, while the French withdrew to unite
themselves in the attack upon D'Argenteau. He had now to retreat
northward with all haste to Dego, in the valley of the river Bormida, in
order to resume communication with the right wing of his army,
consisting chiefly of Sardinians, from which he was now nearly separated
by the defeat of the centre. General Colli, by a corresponding movement
on the right, occupied Millesimo, a small town about nine miles from
Dego, with which he resumed and maintained communication by a brigade
stationed on the heights of Biastro. From the strength of this position,
though his forces were scarce sufficiently concentrated, Beaulieu hoped
to maintain his ground till he should receive supplies from Lombardy,
and recover the consequences of the defeat at Montenotte. But the
antagonist whom he had in front had no purpose of permitting him such
respite.
[Sidenote: BATTLE OF MILLESIMO.]
Determined upon a general attack on all points of the Austrian position,
the French army advanced in three bodies upon a space of four leagues in
extent. Augereau, at the head of the division which had not fought at
Montenotte, advanced on the left against Millesimo; the centre, under
Massena, directed themselves upon Dego, by the vale of the Bormida; the
right wing, commanded by La Harpe, proceeded by the heights of Cairo,
for the purpose of turning Beaulieu's left flank. Augereau, whose
division had not engaged at the battle of Montenotte, was the first who
came in contact with the enemy. He attacked General Colli on the 13th
April. His troops, emulous of the honour acquired by their companions,
behaved with great bravery, rushed upon the outposts of the Sardinian
army at Millesimo, forced, and retained possession of the gorge by which
it was defended, and thus separated from the Sardinian army a body of
about two thousand men, under the Austrian General Provera, who occupied
a detached eminence called Cossaria, which covered the extreme left of
General Colli's position. But the Austrian showed the most obstinate
courage. Although surrounded by the enemy, he threw himself into the
ruinous castle of Cossaria, which crowned the eminence, and showed a
disposition to maintain the place to the last; the rather that, as he
could see from the turrets of his stronghold the Sardinian troops, from
whom he had been separated, preparing to fight on the ensuing day, he
might reasonably hope to be disengaged.[103]
Buonaparte in person came up; and seeing the necessity of dislodging the
enemy from this strong post, ordered three successive attacks to be made
on the castle. Joubert, at the head of one of the attacking columns, had
actually, with six or seven others, made his way into the outworks, when
he was struck down by a wound in the head. General Banel, and
Adjutant-general Quénin fell, each at the head of the column which he
commanded; and Buonaparte was compelled to leave the obstinate Provera
in possession of the castle for the night. The morning of the 14th
brought a different scene. Contenting himself with blockading the castle
of Cossaria, Buonaparte now gave battle to General Colli, who made every
effort to relieve it. These attempts were all in vain. He was defeated
and cut off from Beaulieu; he retired as well as he could upon Ceva,
leaving to his fate the brave General Provera, who was compelled to
surrender at discretion.
[Sidenote: ACTION OF DEGO.]
On the same day, Massena, with the centre, attacked the heights of
Biastro, being the point of communication betwixt Beaulieu and Colli,
while La Harpe, having crossed the Bormida, where the stream came up to
the soldiers' middle, attacked in front and in flank the village of
Dego, where the Austrian commander-in-chief was stationed. The first
attack was completely successful,--the heights of Biastro were carried,
and the Piedmontese routed. The assault of Dego was not less so,
although after a harder struggle. Beaulieu was compelled to retreat, and
was entirely separated from the Sardinians, who had hitherto acted in
combination with him. The defenders of Italy now retreated in different
directions, Colli moving westward towards Ceva, while Beaulieu, closely
pursued through a difficult country, retired upon D'Aqui.[104]
Even the morning after the victory, it was nearly wrested out of the
hands of the conquerors. A fresh division of Austrians, who had
evacuated Voltri later than the others, and were approaching to form a
junction with their general, found the enemy in possession of Beaulieu's
position. They arrived at Dego like men who had been led astray, and
were no doubt surprised at finding it in the hands of the French. Yet
they did not hesitate to assume the offensive, and by a brisk attack
drove out the enemy, and replaced the Austrian eagles in the village.
Great alarm was occasioned by this sudden apparition; for no one among
the French could conceive the meaning of an alarm beginning on the
opposite quarter to that on which the enemy had retreated, and without
its being announced from the outposts towards D'Aqui.
Buonaparte hastily marched on the village. The Austrians repelled two
attacks; at the third, General Lanusse, afterwards killed in Egypt, put
his hat upon the point of his sword, and advancing to the charge,
penetrated into the place. Lannes also, afterwards Duke of Montebello,
distinguished himself on the same occasion by courage and military
skill, and was recommended by Buonaparte to the Directory for promotion.
In this battle of Dego, more commonly called of Millesimo, the
Austro-Sardinian army lost five or six thousand men, thirty pieces of
cannon, with a great quantity of baggage. Besides, the Austrians were
divided from the Sardinians; and the two generals began to show, not
only that their forces were disunited, but that they themselves were
acting upon separate motives; the Sardinians desiring to protect Turin,
whereas the movements of Beaulieu seemed still directed to prevent the
French from entering the Milanese territory.[105]
Leaving a sufficient force on the Bormida to keep in check Beaulieu,
Buonaparte now turned his strength against Colli, who, overpowered, and
without hopes of succour, abandoned his line of defence near Ceva, and
retreated to the line of the Tanaro.
Napoleon, in the meantime, fixed his head-quarters at Ceva, and enjoyed
from the heights of Montezemoto, the splendid view of the fertile fields
of Piedmont stretching in boundless perspective beneath his feet,
watered by the Po, the Tanaro, and a thousand other streams which
descend from the Alps. Before the eyes of the delighted army of victors
lay this rich expanse like a promised land; behind them was the
wilderness they had passed;--not indeed, a desert of barren sand,
similar to that in which the Israelites wandered, but a huge tract of
rocks and inaccessible mountains, crested with ice and snow, seeming by
nature designed as the barrier and rampart of the blessed regions which
stretched eastward beneath them. We can sympathize with the
self-congratulation of the general who had surmounted such tremendous
obstacles in a way so unusual. He said to the officers around him, as
they gazed upon this magnificent scene, "Hannibal took the Alps by
storm. We have succeeded as well by taming their flank."[106]
The dispirited army of Colli was attacked at Mondovi during his retreat,
by two corps of Buonaparte's army, from two different points, commanded
by Massena and Serrurier. The last general, the Sardinian repulsed with
loss; but when he found Massena, in the meantime, was turning the left
of his line, and that he was thus pressed on both flanks, his situation
became almost desperate.[107] The cavalry of the Piedmontese made an
effort to renew the combat. For a time they overpowered and drove back
those of the French; and General Stengel, who commanded the latter, was
slain in attempting to get them into order.[108] But the desperate
valour of Murat, unrivalled perhaps in the heady charge of cavalry
combat, renewed the fortune of the field; and the horse, as well as the
infantry of Colli's army, were compelled to a disastrous retreat. The
defeat was decisive; and the Sardinians, after the loss of the best of
their troops, their cannon, baggage, and appointments, and being now
totally divided from their Austrian allies, and liable to be overpowered
by the united forces of the French army, had no longer hopes of
effectually covering Turin. Buonaparte, pursuing his victory, took
possession of Cherasco, within ten leagues of the Piedmontese
capital.[109]
Thus Fortune, in the course of a campaign of scarce a month, placed her
favourite in full possession of the desired road to Italy by command of
the mountain-passes, which had been invaded and conquered with so much
military skill. He had gained three battles over forces far superior to
his own; inflicted on the enemy a loss of twenty-five thousand men in
killed, wounded, and prisoners; taken eighty pieces of cannon, and
twenty-one stand of colours;[110] reduced to inaction the Austrian army;
almost annihilated that of Sardinia; and stood in full communication
with France upon the eastern side of the Alps, with Italy lying open
before him, as if to invite his invasion. But it was not even with such
laurels, and with facilities which now presented themselves for the
accomplishment of new and more important victories upon a larger scale,
and with more magnificent results, that the career of Buonaparte's
earliest campaign was to be closed. The head of the royal house of
Savoy, if not one of the most powerful, still one of the most
distinguished in Europe, was to have the melancholy experience, that he
had encountered with the Man of Destiny, as he was afterwards proudly
called, who, for a time, had power, in the emphatic phrase of Scripture,
"to bind kings with chains, and nobles with fetters of iron."
The shattered relics of the Sardinian army had fallen back, or rather
fled, to within two leagues of Turin, without hope of being again able
to make an effectual stand. The Sovereign of Sardinia, Savoy, and
Piedmont, had no means of preserving his capital, nay, his existence on
the continent, excepting by an almost total submission to the will of
the victor. Let it be remembered, that Victor Amadeus the Third was the
descendant of a race of heroes, who, from the peculiar situation of
their territories, as constituting a neutral ground of great strength
betwixt France and the Italian possessions of Austria, had often been
called on to play a part in the general affairs of Europe, of importance
far superior to that which their condition as a second-rate power could
otherwise have demanded. In general, they had compensated their
inferiority of force by an ability and gallantry which did them the
highest credit, both as generals and as politicians; and now Piedmont
was at the feet, in her turn, of an enemy weaker in numbers than her
own. Besides the reflections on the past fame of his country, the
present humiliating situation of the King was rendered more mortifying
by the state of his family connexions. Victor Amadeus was the
father-in-law of Monsieur (Louis XVIII.,) and of the Comte d'Artois,
(afterwards Charles X.) He had received his sons-in-law at his court at
Turin, had afforded them an opportunity of assembling around them their
forces, consisting of the emigrant noblesse, and had strained all the
power he possessed, and in many instances successfully, to withstand
both the artifices and the arms of the French Republicans. And now, so
born, so connected, and with such principles, he was condemned to sue
for peace, on any terms which might be dictated, from a General of
France, aged twenty-six years, who, a few months before, was desirous of
an appointment in the artillery service of the Grand Signior.
[Sidenote: ARMISTICE OF CHERASCO.]
Under these afflicting circumstances, a suspension of hostilities was
requested by the King of Sardinia; and, on the 24th April, conferences
were held at Carru, the headquarters of the French, but an armistice
could only be purchased by placing two of the King's strongest
fortresses--Coni and Tortona, in the hands of the French, and thus
acknowledging that he surrendered at discretion. The armistice was
agreed on [April 28] at Cherasco, but commissioners were sent by the
King to Paris, to arrange with the Directory the final terms of peace.
These were such as victors give to the vanquished.
Besides the fortresses already surrendered, the King of Sardinia was to
place in the hands of the French five others of the first importance.
The road from France to Italy was to be at all times open to the French
armies; and indeed the King, by surrender of the places mentioned, had
lost the power of interrupting their progress. He was to break off every
species of alliance and connexion with the combined powers at war with
France, and become bound not to entertain at his court, or in his
service, any French emigrants whatever, or any of their connexions; nor
was an exception even made in favour of his own two daughters. In short,
the surrender was absolute.[111] Victor Amadeus exhibited the utmost
reluctance to subscribe this treaty, and did not long survive it.[112]
His son succeeded in name to the kingdom of Piedmont; but the fortresses
and passes, which had rendered him a prince of some importance, were,
excepting Turin, and one or two of minor consequence, all surrendered
into the hands of the French.
Viewing this treaty with Sardinia as the close of the Piedmontese
campaign, we pause to consider the character which Buonaparte displayed
at that period. The talents as a general which he had exhibited were of
the very first order. There was no disconnexion in his objects; they
were all attained by the very means he proposed, and the success was
improved to the utmost. A different conduct usually characterises those
who stumble unexpectedly on victory, either by good fortune or by the
valour of their troops. When the favourable opportunity occurs to such
leaders, they are nearly as much embarrassed by it as by a defeat. But
Buonaparte, who had foreseen the result of each operation by his
sagacity, stood also prepared to make the most of the advantages which
might be derived from it.
His style in addressing the Convention was, at this period, more modest
and simple, and therefore more impressive, than the figurative and
bombastic style which he afterwards used in his bulletins. His
self-opinion, perhaps, was not risen so high as to permit him to use the
sesquipedalian words and violent metaphors, to which he afterwards seems
to have given a preference. We may remark also, that the young victor
was honourably anxious to secure for such officers as distinguished
themselves, the preferment which their services entitled them to.[113]
He urges the promotion of his brethren in arms in almost every one of
his despatches,--a conduct not only just and generous, but also highly
politic. Were his recommendations successful, their general had the
gratitude due for the benefit; were they overlooked, thanks equally
belonged to him for his good wishes, and the resentment for the slight
attached itself to the government, who did not give effect to them.
If Buonaparte spoke simply and modestly on his own achievements, the
bombast which he spared was liberally dealt out to the Convention by an
orator named Daubermesnil, who invokes all bards, from Tyrtæus and
Ossian down to the author of the Marseillois Hymn--all painters, from
Apelles to David--all musicians, from Orpheus to the author of the
_Chant du départ_, to sing, paint, and compose music, upon the
achievements of the General and Army of Italy.[114]
With better taste, a medal of Buonaparte was struck in the character of
the Conqueror of the battle of Montenotte. The face is extremely thin,
with lank hair, a striking contrast to the fleshy square countenance
exhibited on his later coins. On the reverse, Victory, bearing a palm
branch, a wreath of laurel, and a naked sword, is seen flying over the
Alps. This medal we notice as the first of the splendid series which
records the victories and honours of Napoleon, and which was designed by
Denon as a tribute to the genius of his patron.
FOOTNOTES:
[84] Napoleon, Memoirs, tom. iii., p. 91.
[85] Victor Amadeus III. He was born in 1726, and died in 1796.
[86] "The Neapolitan army was 60,000 strong; the cavalry was
excellent."--NAPOLEON, _Memoirs_, tom. iii., p. 134.
[87] Viz. in April, 1794.--See Napoleon, Memoirs, tom. iii., p. 28.
[88] Napoleon states his fighting force, fit for duty, at about 30,000
men.--Montholon, tom. iii., p. 140; Jomini, tom. viii., p. 59, at
42,400.
[89] Las Cases, tom. i., p. 162.
[90] This reminds us of the liberality of the Kings of Brentford to
their Knightsbridge forces--
_First King._ Here, take five guineas to these warlike men.
_Second King._ And here, five more, which makes the sum just ten.
_Herald._ We have not seen so much the Lord knows when!--S.
[91] "The state of the finances was such, that the government, with all
its efforts, could only furnish the chest of the army, at the opening of
the campaign, with 2000 louis in specie, and a million in drafts, part
of which were protested."--NAPOLEON, _Montholon_, tom. iii., p. 140;
Thiers, tom. viii., p. 174.
[92] "An idea of the penury of the army may be collected from the
correspondence of the commander-in-chief, who appears to have once sent
Massena a supply of twenty-four francs to provide for his official
expenses."--JOMINI, tom. viii., p. 96.
[93] Napoleon, Memoirs, tom. iii., p. 54.
[94] "He received a thrust of a bayonet in the abdomen: he was dragged
into the streets, holding his bowels in his hands, and at length left on
a field-bed in a guard-house, where he expired."--MONTHOLON, tom. iii.,
p. 41; Botta, Storia d'Italia, tom. i., p. 271. Basseville, in 1789, was
editor of the _Mercure National_. He published _Elémens de Mythologie_,
&c.
[95] Montholon, tom. iii., p. 43; Thibaudeau, Hist. Gen. de Napoleon,
tom. i., p. 139; Jomini, tom. viii., p. 49.
[96] "Salicetti was never the personal friend of Napoleon, but of his
brother Joseph; with whom, in 1792 and 1793, he had been member for the
department of Corsica."--JOSEPH BUONAPARTE, _Notes sur les Mémoires de
Bourrienne_, tom. i., p. 238.
[97] "I am particularly gratified with my reception by General Scherer;
who, by his honourable deportment and readiness to supply me with all
useful information, has acquired a right to my gratitude. To great
facility in expressing himself, he unites an extent of general and
military knowledge, which may probably induce you to deem his services
useful in some important station."--NAPOLEON _to the Directory, March
30_.
[98] Jomini, tom. viii., p. 62; Thiers, tom. viii., p. 329.
[99] Thiers, tom. viii., p. 178; Lacretelle, tom. xiii., p. 153.
[100] Napoleon, Memoirs, tom. iii., p. 145; Jomini, tom. viii., p. 70;
Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 187.
[101] "Napoleon placed himself on a ridge in the centre of his
divisions, the better to judge of the turn of affairs, and to prescribe
the manœuvres which might become necessary."--JOMINI, tom. viii., p.
72.
[102] Montholon, tom. iii., p. 145; Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 190; Thiers,
tom. viii., p. 178.
[103] Montholon, tom. iii., p. 146; Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 192; Jomini,
tom. viii., p. 76.
[104] Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 193; Montholon, tom. iii., p. 148; Thiers,
tom. viii., p. 181.
[105] Montholon, tom. iii., p. 148; Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 193;
Lacretelle, tom. xiii., p. 59.
[106] "Annabal a forcé les Alpes; nous nous les avons
tournées!"--NAPOLEON, _Montholon_, tom. iii., p. 151.
[107] "The rapidity of Massena's movements was a subject of astonishment
and terror with the Piedmontese, who regarded him as a rebel. He was
born at Nice, but attached himself early in his youth to the French
service. The Revolution found him a sergeant in the Royal Italian
regiment."--LACRETELLE, tom. xiii., p. 161.
[108] "General Stengel, a native of Alsace, was an excellent hussar
officer; he had served under Dumouriez, and in the other campaigns of
the North; he was adroit, intelligent, and active, combining the
qualities of youth with those of maturity, he was the true general for
advanced posts."--NAPOLEON, _Montholon_, tom. iii., p. 152.
[109] Montholon, tom. iii., p. 151; Jomini, tom. viii., p. 93.
[110] Murat was despatched to Paris with them, and the treaty for the
armistice of Cherasco. His arrival, by way of Mount Cenis, with so many
trophies, and the King of Sardinia's submission, caused great joy in the
capital. Junot, who had been despatched after the battle of Millesimo by
the Nice road, arrived later than Murat.
[111] The treaty was concluded at Paris, on the 15th May. For a copy of
it, see _Annual Register_, vol. xxxviii., p. 262.
[112] Victor Amadeus died of apoplexy, in the following October, and was
succeeded by his son, Charles Emanuel.
[113] See Correspondence Inédite, tom. i., p. 85.
[114] See the speech in the _Moniteur_, No. 233, 12th May.