Finally, on June 23, 1863, Rosecrans left Murfreesboro, moving against
Bragg at Tullahoma. By exercising very clever strategy in the form of a
series of flanking movements, the Confederates were forced to give up
one stronghold after another. The Confederates finally crossed the
Tennessee River at Bridgeport and Caperton’s Ferry, Alabama, and moved
directly into Chattanooga. The first arrival at Chattanooga was at the
same hour that General Pickett made his famous charge at Gettysburg,
namely near high noon on July 3rd. By this time the Union army had
advanced to the western base of the Cumberland Mountain. The right of
their line was at Winchester; the left at McMinnville. Rosecrans, with
his headquarters at Winchester, was making preparations for another
campaign for occupying Chattanooga. At this time Chattanooga was of
utmost importance to both armies, and no doubt the largest prize from a
military standpoint which the Army of the Cumberland ever contended for.
The Confederates had destroyed the bridge across the Tennessee River at
Bridgeport to delay the pursuit of the Union Army. The Union army
consisted of three regular Army Corps; the 14th, commanded by Maj.-Gen.
George H. Thomas; the 20th, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Alexander McCook, and
the 21st, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden. The Cavalry Corps
was commanded by Brig.-Gen. Robert Mitchell; the Reserve Corps was
commanded by Maj.-Gen. Gordon Granger. The disposition of the Union
forces was as follows:
Thomas was posted at Decherd; McCook at McMinnville, and Crittenden at
Winchester. Again Rosecrans was urged to renew hostilities against
Bragg. The Cumberland, Raccoon and Lookout Mountain ranges and the
Tennessee River were some of the giant obstacles between Rosecrans and
Chattanooga. To cross these required a maximum of time and supplies as
it was quite a task. There were railroads to repair; the river bridge to
be rebuilt. All of this required time and labor. It was humanly
impossible for Rosecrans to begin a forward movement at this time. By
extending every effort possible, it was July 25th before the railroads
were repaired. Another weighty consideration of Rosecrans was the
necessary forage for the animals. Having knowledge that corn would not
be ripe in east Tennessee and northern Alabama before the middle of
August, Rosecrans insisted on waiting until that time before he launched
another campaign. Officials of the War Department were eager for action
on the part of Rosecrans.
On August 4th, Gen. Halleck sent a message to Rosecrans which said:
“Your forces must move forward without delay. You will daily report the
movement of each corps till you cross the Tennessee River.” Since
Rosecrans was not ready for the movement, he replied: “Your dispatch
ordering me to move forward without delay, reporting the movements of
each corps till I cross the Tennessee River received. As I have
determined to cross the river as soon as practicable, and have been
making all preparations and getting such information as may enable me to
do so without being driven back, like Hooker, I wish to know if your
order is intended to take away my discretion as to the time and manner
of moving my troops.” To this message Gen. Halleck replied: “The orders
for the advance of your army, and that it be reported daily are
peremptory.” This latter message did not set well with Rosecrans. He
prepared his reply and after conferring with his corps commanders and
receiving their assurance that they would support him, he sent the
following message: Gen. Halleck: “My arrangements for beginning a
continuous movement will be completed and the execution begun Monday
next. We have information to show that crossing the Tennessee River
between Bridgeport and Chattanooga is impracticable, but not enough to
show whether we had better cross above Chattanooga and strike Cleveland,
or below Bridgeport and strike in their rear. The preliminary movement
of troops for the two cases are quite different. It is necessary to have
our means of crossing the river completed and our supplies provided to
cross 60 miles of mountains and sustain ourselves during the operations
of crossing and fighting, before we move. To obey your order literally
would be to push our troops into the mountains on narrow and difficult
roads, destitute of pasture and forage; and short of water where they
would not be able to maneuver as exigencies demand, and would certainly
cause ultimate delay and probable disaster. If, therefore, the movement
which I propose can not be regarded as obedience to your order, I
respectfully request a modification of it or to be relieved from the
command.”
Gen. Halleck wired him as follows: “I have communicated to you the
wishes of the Government in plain and unequivocal terms. The objective
has been stated, and you have been directed to lose no time in
reaching it. The means you are to employ and the roads you are to
follow are left to your own discretion. If you wish to promptly carry
out the wishes of the Government you will not stop to discuss mere
details. In such matters I do not interfere.”
Rosecrans replied the same day. His message read: “Your dispatch
received. I can only repeat the assurance given before the issuance of
the order. This army shall move with all dispatch compatible with the
successful execution of our work. We are pressing everything to bring
up forage for our animals. The present rolling stock of the road will
barely suffice to keep us day by day here, but I have bought 50 more
freight cars, which are arriving. Will advise you daily.” There was no
further interference from Washington.
[Illustration: Park Headquarters, Chickamauga Battlefield]
[Illustration: Snodgrass House, Chickamauga Battlefield]