CHAPTER IX

THE AUDIENCIA AND THE GOVERNOR: THE AD INTERIM RULE

The most extensive non-judicial activity in which the audiencia

participated at any time was its assumption of the provisional

government of the colony during vacancies in the governorship. Aside

from the ten different occasions on which this was done, the audiencia

very frequently assumed control of the government when the exigencies

of defense and foreign conquest rendered necessary the temporary

absence of the governor. This was true at irregular intervals during

the administrations of Governors Pedro Bravo de Acuña (1602-1606),

Juan de Silva (1609-1616), Juan Niño de Tavora (1626-1632), Sebastián

Hurtado de Corcuera (1635-1644) and Diego Fajardo (1644-1653). The

administrations of these several governors were characterized by

extensive military operations, largely in a foreign field, and the

audiencia not only took over governmental affairs but it assumed

the obligations of defense during their absence. On such occasions,

of course, the tribunal retained its exercise of judicial functions.

Since the audiencias in Perú and New Spain assumed the government

much earlier than did the audiencia in the Philippines, and as the

laws authorizing the rule of the audiencia were promulgated first to

meet conditions in those viceroyalties, it seems advisable to inquire

into the circumstances surrounding the establishment and development

of this practice there. Having done this, we shall proceed to a study

of the ad interim rule of the Audiencia of Manila, noting particularly

the causes of the success or failure of its administration and the

effect of this practice upon the subsequent relations of the audiencia

and the governor.

The first law in the Recopilación authorizing the assumption of the

government by an audiencia was promulgated as early as March 19,

1550. This law provided that in case of a vacancy in the office of

Viceroy of Perú, the audiencia there should succeed to the governments

of Perú, Charcas, Quito and Tierra Firme, and that the three last-named

subordinate audiencias should obey the mandates of the Audiencia

of Lima until a permanent successor to the viceroy was named. [579]

This law was proclaimed again on November 20, 1606.

Even before the promulgation of the above law the audiencias of Lima

and Mexico had assumed control of the government in their respective

viceroyalties. Shortly after the death of Francisco Pizarro, the

conqueror, an audiencia was sent to Perú, arriving at Lima in January,

1544, in company with Blasco Núñez Vela, the first viceroy. The

rigidity and thoroughness with which this new executive enforced the

New Laws which were entrusted to him met with the opposition of the

residents of the colony, and the audiencia accordingly removed him

from his position as viceroy and suspended the operation of the code

referred to, assuming charge of affairs itself. [580] Its rule was

brief, however, for on October 28, 1544, it invited Gonzalo Pizarro,

the brother of the conqueror, into the city and turned the government

over to him, proclaiming him Governor and Captain-General of Perú.

During the period from 1544 to 1551, until the arrival in Perú of

Viceroy Mendoza, the audiencia exercised control of governmental

affairs. It made and unmade captains-general and viceroys, irrespective

of royal appointments. It suspended the New Laws of 1542 and its

commands were obeyed. From 1550 to 1551 it governed alone. In these

incidents we note that the audiencia actually assumed the government

ad interim prior to the time of the promulgation of the law of March

19, 1550, exercising administrative as well as judicial powers,

thirty-five years before the Audiencia of Manila was created. "To

it (the audiencia) were confided in the beginning and later in

the absence of the viceroy," writes Moses, "all matters with which

governmental authority might properly deal." [581] He further states

that "the audiencia in its executive capacity, failed to justify the

expectations of the king, and a new order of things was introduced

by the appointment of a viceroy" (Mendoza, April 17, 1535) for New

Spain. [582]

These powers were not only exercised by the Audiencia of Lima, but

also by a second tribunal which was created in 1549 at Santa Fé de

Bogotá. The latter body was endowed permanently with both judicial

and administrative powers, appealing important cases to the superior

government at Lima. This audiencia had the status of a presidency. Its

president was often captain-general, visitador, and senior magistrate,

and in exercising the functions of these various offices he was in

all respects the most powerful official in New Granada, always being

able to enforce his will over the other magistrates. At times this

official acted with entire independence of the Viceroy of Perú. [583]

The exercise of military functions by this president and audiencia

is especially to be noticed in the part they played in putting down

the Pijáo Indian revolt in 1565. [584] On the whole, however, judging

by the strife prevailing in the colony, the various struggles between

the oidores and the president, and between the audiencia or president

and the archbishop, the government could never have been considered

successful. The official corruption which became apparent as a result

of the pesquisas and residencias held during the rule of the Audiencia

of Santa Fé could scarcely have encouraged the home government to

entrust that tribunal with the administration of affairs in the future.

The defects referred to above in connection with the government

of the Audiencia of Santa Fé did not deter the Spanish crown from

founding the Audiencia of Charcas in 1559. This tribunal, "like

the audiencias established elsewhere, exercised not only judicial,

but also administrative powers." [585] It had jurisdiction over

the neighboring city of Potosí. Again we may note the case of the

Audiencia of Santiago de Chile, which was established on August 27,

1565. Its members arrived in 1567 and the audiencia was installed at

Concepción "as the supreme court of the colony, and, at the same time,

in accordance with the royal decree, it became the administrative

head of the government. In this latter capacity it undertook to

reorganize the military forces." Later, in 1568, Melchoir Bravo de

Saravia assumed the office and functions of the governorship of Chile

(1568-1575) and the audiencia became a judicial tribunal, without

other attributes. [586]

We may gather from these various citations taken from the early

history of the audiencias of South America that these tribunals not

only exercised the authority of governing ad interim, but that they

had permanent governmental and administrative powers as well. It

would seem, as Professor Moses has suggested, that the original

purpose of the Spanish government had been to entrust the executive

and administrative functions in the dependencies to the audiencia, and

that the endowment of the viceroys and captains-general with extensive

executive powers was an expedient to which Spain was obliged to turn

after the breakdown of the audiencia as an administrative agency. The

main fact to be emphasized in this connection is that during the

period of the promulgation of the laws which we are now studying,

the minor audiencias were exercising regular governmental powers.

The Audiencia of Mexico, which was created in 1527 to check the

excesses of Hernán Cortés, had participated in governmental affairs

even before the events described above. This tribunal, which was

composed of four magistrates, with the notorious Guzmán as president,

conducted the residencias of Cortés and his followers, and after

obtaining control of the government, administered affairs to suit

its own convenience. [587] It was at this time, and as a result of

these abuses, Bancroft tells us, that the Spanish government decided

to establish a viceroyalty in New Spain, with a semiregal court and

regal pretensions. A new tribunal was left in charge of governmental

affairs while this reform was being inaugurated. This second audiencia

governed with great satisfaction, correcting the abuses of its

predecessor and devoting itself to various improvements. [588]

Although the audiencia of 1528-1535 exercised the administrative

functions above mentioned, Bancroft brings forth no evidence in

support of the theory that it was ever the royal intention to entrust

the institution of the audiencia permanently with administrative

authority. He states that as early as 1530, three years after the

establishment of the first tribunal in Mexico, the sovereigns had

already decided to establish a viceroyalty. Although the audiencia

was entrusted with the government for a few years, the above facts

would seem to indicate that this was only a temporary arrangement. The

audiencia's chief attributes were judicial, and we have repeatedly

noted that the principal object of its establishment, aside from

the administration of justice, was to check the abuses of the

captain-general.

Cortés retained his rank as captain-general after the audiencia

was established. The conqueror was in reality reduced to a secondary

position, and he was compelled repeatedly to acknowledge the supremacy

of the audiencia. His commission was recognized by the tribunal on its

arrival, but soon after its establishment the oidores exhibited a royal

order requiring that "Cortés, in all his operations, should consult

the president and oidores and act only on their approval." [589]

Even in his field, as commander of the military forces, Cortés was

subordinated to the tribunal, and the audiencia and the conqueror

quarrelled bitterly over practically all matters which presented

themselves for solution. The audiencia had been created to meet

extraordinary and unusual conditions. It was the business of the

tribunal to correct the abuses which had previously been inflicted

on the colony by Cortés, and it did so. On the arrival of Mendoza in

1535, however, the audiencia surrendered the control of administrative

affairs, and it did not assume them again, except in the regular way

in conjunction with the viceroy, until it next served to administer

the ad interim government. [590]

The first legal provision for the succession of the audiencia

in Mexico, according to Bancroft, was contained in the royal

instructions to Visitor Valderrama, who arrived in Mexico in

1563. These instructions, says Bancroft, provided that in the event

of the death or inability of the viceroy to discharge his duties, the

audiencia should rule temporarily. [591] This was indeed timely, in

view of the death of Viceroy Velasco on July 31, 1564. The audiencia,

which was legally authorized to take charge of the government,

was under investigation when the death of the viceroy occurred,

and the tribunal was dominated during the first half of its rule by

the visitor, who, Bancroft tells us, was virtually viceroy. [592]

Valderrama dismissed two of the oidores, and sent them to Spain. The

audiencia was even less able to administer justice during the early

part of its ad interim government than it had been when the viceroy

was alive. After the departure of the visitor, however, the audiencia

inaugurated a season of proscription and reprisal which bade fair

to include every opponent of the oidores in the colony. Matters had

reached a very unsatisfactory state, indeed, when the new viceroy,

the Marqués de Falcés, arrived at Mexico on October 14, 1566. [593]

In view of the fact that the next important law dealing with

the question of the succession was not promulgated until 1600,

a continuance of this survey of affairs in New Spain will not be

necessary. The audiencia there did not again assume the government

until 1612, and then only for a very short period. We have already

noticed the conditions under which the Audiencia of Mexico was

created, and the various occasions on which it assumed charge

of the government. Though entrusted with the government upon its

establishment, the example set by three years of its unsatisfactory

rule convinced the Spanish monarch of the unwisdom of entrusting such

governmental authority to the audiencia permanently. Therefore, a

viceroy was sent out in 1535, and it was not until 1563 that the first

law was promulgated which provided for the temporary government by

the audiencia when there was a vacancy in the office of viceroy. This

was thirteen years after such a law had been promulgated for Perú,

and fourteen years after an audiencia had been created, with all the

functions of government, at Santa Fé de Bogotá.

The cédula of February 12, 1569, following in sequence that of March

5, 1550, provided that the faculty of filling vacancies among the

oficiales reales, in case of death or removal from office, should

rest with the viceroy, president, or the audiencia, if the latter

body were governing. [594] This, of course, was a recognition of the

principle of the assumption of the government by the audiencia. This

law was not confined in its application to any particular territory,

but was general in its scope and applicable wherever an audiencia

existed. It was later confirmed by the cédula of August 24, 1619. [595]

The next law dealing with the subject of succession was promulgated on

January 3, 1600. It applied especially to New Spain, and it provided

that in case of a vacancy in the office of viceroy, either by death or

by promotion, the audiencia should assume charge of the government of

the provinces there, and it should execute the duties which ordinarily

devolved upon the viceroy, performing them "as he could, would and

ought to do." It furthermore ordered the subordinate Audiencia of

Guadalajara, under such circumstances, to obey and fulfill the orders

which the Audiencia of Mexico might give or send, in the same manner

as it would do, were those orders issued by the viceroy. [596] Under

a separate title on this same date the assumption of the government

of the minor dependencies of Perú and New Spain by the respective

audiencias was authorized in case of the illness or absence of the

viceroy. In other words, this law authorized in New Spain the same

procedure in case of the death or absence of the viceroy as had

already prevailed in South America for half a century.

The above laws form a precedent for the subsequent authorization of

the Audiencia of Manila to assume charge of the government on the

death of the governor. This authorization was given on April 12,

1664, but the Audiencia of Manila, like those of Mexico and Lima,

had already assumed the functions of the executive on four earlier

occasions, and the king, in the cédula of 1664, merely recognized,

with some qualifications, a practice which had been followed in the

Philippines for half a century. A cédula dated as early as September

13, 1608, had authorized the nomination in advance by the Viceroy of

New Spain of a resident of the Islands to assume the governorship on

the death of the regular governor. [597] The intention of this law

seems to have been to guard against the ills incident to a vacancy

in the governorship by an arrangement whereby some person should be

appointed in advance and thus be ready to assume the command without

delay. Whatever the royal intentions may have been, this law was never

effective in bringing about the benefits for which it was designed. In

fact, this particular provision met with general dissatisfaction

in the Philippines, and the audiencia, acting in accordance with

the custom observed in other parts of Spain's dominions, continued

to govern on the demise of the governor, ruling two or three years

on some occasions, until the arrival of a temporary governor, sent

from New Spain. So flagrantly was the prescribed method of procedure

violated in the Philippines that in 1630, Visitor Francisco de Rojas

y Ornate reminded the Council of the Indies of the existing law (that

of 1608) and recommended that henceforth on the death of a governor

the audiencia should have nothing to do with administration, but that

one of three persons secretly designated by the viceroy should take

over the government at once, thus eliminating all possibility of the

interference of the tribunal. [598]

The irregularities and inconveniences arising from the inefficacy

of the law of 1608 led to the promulgation of the cédulas of January

30, 1635, and of April 2, 1664, and to the enactment of the consulta

of September 9, 1669. These regulations applied exclusively to the

Philippines, and they legalized the intervention of the audiencia

in governmental affairs on the death of the governor. The first of

these admitted the right of the audiencia to administer political

affairs, but ordered that military defense should be in the hands

of a person appointed in advance by the Viceroy of New Spain. The

cédula of April 2, 1664, ordered that the audiencia should serve

temporarily during vacancies in the governorship until the temporary

appointee of the viceroy should arrive. This law further prescribed

that the audiencia should assume charge of political affairs while the

senior magistrate should take over the military command. He was to see

that the forces and defenses of the Islands were adequately kept up,

and that the soldiers were disciplined; he was authorized to command

them in case of insurrection or invasion. The consulta of September

9, 1669, above referred to, re-enacted the cédula of April 2, 1664,

but in addition it specifically ordered that the viceroy should not

designate a temporary governor until news of the death of the regular

incumbent was received, and then that no resident or native of the

Philippines should be appointed. [599]

The Council of the Indies, by the law of September 29, 1623, had

already sought to guard against any undue assumption of power on

the part of the audiencia by ordering that when the viceroy was

absent from the capital city, but within his own district, he should

still retain his status as governor, and neither the audiencia nor

any of the oidores should interfere in governmental affairs. [600]

This law was not applicable to the Philippines alone, but it was of

general validity, throughout Spain's dominions. The control of the

audiencia in governmental affairs was only to become effective when

the governor was absent from the colony, or incapacitated through

sickness or death. Otherwise the governor's sphere of authority was

to be recognized by the tribunal.

A variety of laws exist in the Recopilación prescribing the duties and

conduct of the audiencia when it had charge of governmental affairs,

and defining the relationship which should exist between the oidores

under such conditions. The magistrates were ordered to proceed

harmoniously and moderately both in the execution of governmental

affairs and in the administration of justice, not erring either on the

side of excessive severity, or of undue moderation. They were to devote

special attention to the increase and care of the royal revenue during

these times. [601] The right to grant encomiendas, essentially the

function of the governing authority, was conceded to the audiencia

when it acted in the capacity of governor. All such concessions

ultimately had to be confirmed by the king. On these occasions,

also, the audiencia filled vacancies and made appointments. However,

the oidores were warned against discharging officials and vacating

offices in order to fill them with their dependents and friends. [602]

All appointments made by the audiencia were to become void after the

arrival of a regular governor, unless they had subsequently received

the royal confirmation. When a vacancy arose, it was the duty of the

senior magistrate to propose a candidate, but the actual filling

of the place was to be effected by the acuerdo vote of the entire

audiencia. [603]

The laws provided that the audiencia, as a body, should exercise

two distinct types or classes of powers when in charge of the

government. These were designated as governmental and military. The

exercise of these functions was assigned respectively to the audiencia

as a body, and to the senior magistrate, individually. While an

effort was made to insure the fair and equal participation of all

in government in case of a vacancy, the senior magistrate assumed

the position and honors of the executive, though not granted all the

governor's powers. [604] In the functions and duties of administration

all the magistrates were to participate. As noted above, each

was to have a share in the exercise of the appointing power, the

administration of colonial finances, participation in the acuerdo,

and in every other function except defense, which was entrusted to the

senior oidor. In this capacity, the oidor was always the most prominent

figure in the government. Among those who distinguished themselves

through the exercise of this power were Rojas, Morga, Alcaraz, Bónifaz,

Coloma, Montemayor, and above all, Anda. Although these men were

assisted and supported by their colleagues of the audiencia, and the

parts played by the latter were not without importance, the periods

of rule of the audiencia are always identified with the names of the

senior oidores, while those of the ordinary magistrates are forgotten.

A complete understanding of the governmental functions and authority of

the audiencia, and the relation of the latter to the other departments

of government under these conditions may best be obtained by a review

of the circumstances and conditions of the audiencia's rule during

vacancies in the Philippines. The first occasion which in any way

approached the temporary rule of an audiencia in the Philippines was

in 1593, after the murder of Governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas. Pedro

de Rojas, who had been a magistrate of the audiencia when it was

suppressed in 1589, was at that time sole judge, with the additional

rank of lieutenant-governor and asesor, standing next to the governor

in authority. [605] After the death of Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas,

Rojas had occupied the governor's chair less than a year when he was

succeeded by the deceased governor's son, Luís Pérez Dasmariñas,

who became governor on the authority of a royal order found among

the papers of his father, whereby he was given the power to name

his successor. [606] His tenure seems to have been only temporary,

however, for as soon as news reached the court of the death of the

elder Dasmariñas, Francisco Tello de Guzmán was appointed permanent

governor and an audiencia was sent to the Islands, arriving at Manila

in 1596. [607] Meanwhile Rojas was succeeded as lieutenant-governor and

asesor by Antonio de Morga. According to Montero y Vidal, Dasmariñas

turned over the government to Morga in 1595, but it is more probable

that Morga assumed the temporary governorship when Dasmariñas was

in Cambodia and elsewhere fighting against the Dutch. In fact,

this conclusion is confirmed by Zúñiga. [608] At any rate, Morga

administered both governmental and military affairs on several

occasions when the various governors were absent from the Islands,

engaged in expeditions of conquest.

On the suppression of the audiencia in 1589, the administration of

justice remained entirely in the hands of the lieutenant-governor

and asesor. This position was first occupied by Rojas, and later by

Morga, who succeeded to the same judicial duties and enjoyed the same

prerogatives as had formerly belonged to the audiencia. In the absence

of the tribunal, therefore, they assumed functions which elsewhere

were carried out by the audiencia on the death of the governor or

viceroy, partly because they had taken the place of the audiencia, and

partly because they were lieutenants-governor. After the audiencia was

re-established in 1598, Morga continued in charge of military affairs

when the governor was absent or dead, while the audiencia administered

the government, not by virtue of any laws relating especially to the

Philippines, but seemingly because this was the general practice in

all of Spain's colonies. Morga's defense of Manila against the Dutch

in 1600 has been referred to in an earlier chapter.

Not only did the audiencia do much in defense against outside enemies

at this time, but it carried on offensive operations against them

in the Moluccas after the deaths of Governors Tello and Acuña. The

Japanese who were residing in the city also caused trouble, and the

audiencia was under the necessity of taking repressive measures against

them. [609] In 1606, while Governor Acuña was absent from the colony,

the fortification of Cavite, the equipment of a fleet and the defense

of the city were undertaken and carried out successfully by Oidor

Almansa. [610] Then on the death of Governor Acuña the audiencia

succeeded to the government and it managed affairs from June 24,

1606, to June 15, 1608, with Almansa in charge of military affairs.

The various governmental matters with which the audiencia concerned

itself during this period are shown in a memorial which it sent

to the king on July 6, 1606. After reporting the death of Governor

Acuña, and its succession to the government, the audiencia took up

questions of finance and commerce. It stated that the money in the

treasury was insufficient for the necessary expenses of the colony,

owing to the extraordinary outlays which had been necessary to defray

the costs of the wars and expeditions which had been undertaken

at this time. The audiencia suggested that the galleon returns be

increased from 500,000 to 1,000,000 pesos a year. It was pointed out

in this connection that the total cost of transporting goods from

Manila to Acapulco, including freight and duty, aggregated thirty

per cent of their value, leaving to the merchants a profit of only

350,000 pesos. The oidores admitted that this arrangement might have

been ample and satisfactory when the colony was small or when there

was peace, but at that time, when the inhabitants of the colony

had been forced to expend so much of their revenue for defense, a

larger return was necessary. [611] Further recommendations were made

regarding commerce and the management of the galleons. It was said

that their great size encouraged smuggling; in order to avoid this,

and at the same time to contribute to the revenues of the colony,

it was urged that the ships should carry cargo to the limit of their

capacity, instead of being restricted to an insufficient amount. Large

reductions of salaries of ships' officers, soldiers, and sailors were

urged. The oidores did not think it advisable to forbid the crews and

officers of the galleons to trade, however, since their interest in

the cargo would encourage them to be obedient and loyal. [612] The

audiencia concluded its memorial with an appeal for the reform of the

freight and customs charges on the galleon. The abolition of all fixed

duties was recommended; instead, it was suggested that these duties

be graduated to meet the regular expenses of the colony as they were

incurred year by year. This recommendation was made on the basis of

the theory that duties should not be levied for the benefit of the

king's exchequer, but only for the support and maintenance of the

merchants and inhabitants of the colony. [613] This memorial would

seem to indicate that the audiencia, when acting in the capacity

of governor, exercised considerable authority and assumed entire

responsibility for the commercial and financial affairs of the colony.

Zúñiga, after describing the success of Oidor Almansa in putting down

an insurrection of the Japanese, characterized the administration of

affairs by the audiencia during this period as follows:

The Royal Audience conducted themselves with great approbation in

the civil administration, until the year 1608, when Don Rodrigo

Vivero of Laredo, who was named by the Viceroy as Governor ad

interim, arrived at Manila, and having had great experience in

the management of the Indians in New Spain, he availed himself

of it on this occasion, giving instructions to that effect to

the chief judges, and other ministers of justice. He governed

with much satisfaction for one year, when he delivered up the

insignia of his office, and returned to Mexico. [614]

Vivero arrived in the colony on June 15, 1608. Vivero was the first

of the military governors appointed from New Spain. Under this and

succeeding arrangements, these governors exercised absolute control

of military affairs, while the audiencia concerned itself solely

with matters of government, the senior magistrate, of course, not

participating in military affairs.

Vivero was relieved in 1609 by Governor Juan de Silva, who had

a permanent appointment and served for seven years. Silva's

administration was characterized by his military exploits, chief

among which was his defense of the colony against the attacks of the

Dutch pirate, Wittert, and subsequently of Spielberg. These frequent

expeditions gave the audiencia many opportunities to assume charge of

affairs, and after Silva's death in the Moluccas the tribunal ruled

from April 19, 1616, to June 8, 1619. During a part of this time

Andrés de Alcaraz, the senior magistrate, exercised the duties of

captain-general, successfully defending the city against the Dutch. On

September 30, 1617, the office of military governor devolved on

Gerónimo de Silva, who was especially designated for the post by the

royal order of March 20, 1616. [615] He was not an oidor, however,

but had served as governor of Ternate, having recently returned from

the Moluccas. [616]

While the post of captain-general devolved upon Silva, the audiencia

retained control of administrative affairs in the colony until Alonso

Fajardo y Tenza, the next royal appointee, arrived on June 8, 1618,

to enter upon the duties of governor and captain-general. As we have

already seen, Alcaraz was relieved of his military responsibilities on

September 30, 1617, and was at once obliged to submit to residencia. In

this trial he was compelled to answer for his failure to warn the

Chinese traders, who usually approached the Islands at that time of

the year, of the presence of the Dutch. As a result of his oversight

in this matter, a large quantity of merchandise, including provisions

for the city, had fallen into the hands of the enemy. He was also held

accountable for the disaster which had occurred to a portion of the

Spanish fleet in the battle of Playa Honda through the appointment of

the son of one of the oidores to its command. [617] Alcaraz, senior

oidor, who was legally responsible for defense, was compelled to

answer for the failure of this inefficient commander. The choice of

a relative of one of the oidores was a violation of the laws of the

Indies. [618] Although Oidor Alcaraz seems to have acquitted himself

well of his duties as commander of the military forces, seven galleons

were lost in an expedition to the Moluccas during the rule of the

audiencia, and considerable difficulty was experienced in fixing

responsibility for this disaster. Alcaraz claimed that Silva was

answerable; the latter maintained that the audiencia was to blame,

and the audiencia disclaimed responsibility because, it alleged,

"the audiencia was entrusted with government and not war." In an

investigation ultimately made in 1625, Silva was deprived of his

office and was prevented from leaving the Islands.

Governor Fajardo has left us a number of comments and criticisms of

the work of the audiencia as governor. His observations are timely and

appropriate, since the tribunal had been in charge of the government

for two years preceding his rule, and he was brought intimately in

touch with the deeds and mistakes of the previous administration. [619]

Fajardo's comments relate to the abuse of the appointing power by the

audiencia, and the failure of that body to provide adequately for the

defense of the colony. In support of the former charge, Fajardo said

that the magistrates had appointed several officials for life, which

was forbidden by the laws, since the audiencia was only permitted

to fill offices for the period of its rule. [620] The audiencia had

also infringed upon the prerogatives of the governor by the permanent

bestowal of encomiendas. Fajardo stated that when he arrived in the

Islands he found all the offices and encomiendas filled with friends

and dependents of the oidores. Thus as a direct consequence the success

of his administration was impaired by the presence of officials who

regarded him, their chief, with hostility. He cited an instance in

which similar infringements upon the rights of the viceroy by the

Audiencia of Mexico had been nullified by the royal veto, and he urged

that some definite cédula or law should be promulgated relative to

these matters in the Philippines. [621]

The difficulty of fixing responsibility for the loss of the galleons

in the expedition to the Moluccas led Fajardo to criticise the

practice of allowing the audiencia to assume control of affairs

during vacancies. He regarded it as a cumbrous proceeding which could

only result in chaotic and incompetent government. No better results

could be expected when a body of magistrates and lawyers undertook

to rule an isolated colony, and especially when one of them assumed

responsibility for military affairs, which could not be successfully

carried out by any but a military man. He emphasized the necessity of

locating responsibility for every department of government in a central

authority. He recommended the designation of "two military men of such

standing and ability that, when the governor and captain-general is

absent, they might succeed to those duties." [622] He considered it

advisable that during vacancies, as well as when the regular governor

was present, authority should rest with one person and not be scattered

or divided among a number of magistrates.

Gerónimo de Silva had been given a commission from the viceroy to

assume the post of captain-general, and upon the demise of Fajardo in

1624, he took charge of military affairs, while the audiencia retained

the government. Silva's responsibility for the loss of the ships in

1617, already referred to, as well as for other disasters in 1624,

caused him to be removed from the command and confined in Fort Santiago

where he remained until released by the new temporary governor,

Fernando de Silva, who arrived in 1625. The latter commanded the

military forces, while the audiencia administered the government. [623]

Of far-reaching importance was the action of the audiencia in 1624, in

nullifying the action taken by the former governor, Alonso Fajardo,

relative to the construction of a seminary for Japanese priests

and students. This edifice had been partially constructed when the

audiencia took over the government. It is interesting to note that

the oidores, although not collectively responsible for the defense

of the colony, took a stand on this occasion in a matter which had

to do with the common security. The objections of the oidores were

significant. The location of the seminary within three hundred feet

of the wall was thought to be unwise in view of the danger of a

Japanese revolt. The Japanese emperor had signified his disapproval

of Christianity on many occasions by banishing and torturing numerous

friars who had gone to Japan from the Islands. He had forbidden the

worship and propagation of Christianity in his empire. There were at

that time rumors of an impending conquest of China and the Philippines

by the Japanese, consequently the audiencia did not wish to invite

the emperor's wrath upon the colony by attempting to proselyte

his subjects. The audiencia thought best to stop this before the

displeasure and enmity of the Japanese were incurred. Fear of the

loss of trade with China, dread of an alliance of the Japanese with

the Dutch, making probable a concerted attack on the Philippines,

and the danger of an outbreak of the Japanese already within the

colony in conjunction with an attack by those without, were all

considerations which induced the audiencia to take responsibility

upon itself in this matter. [624]

The official correspondence of the governor following immediately

upon the administration of an audiencia is always valuable as showing

the state of affairs under the preceding rule. That of Fernando de

Silva coincides closely with the correspondence of Governor Fajardo

in charging the audiencia with many misdeeds, chief among which were

the abuse of the appointing power and the concession of encomiendas

without authorization. Silva, on his accession to the governorship,

also found the finances of the colony in a bad condition, great waste

having been incurred in their administration. There had been neither

peace nor order; the oidores had quarreled among themselves, and

residents were leaving the city as a consequence of this turmoil. The

oidores had, without cause, dismissed all the officials appointed by

Fajardo, filling their places with their friends. [625] The following

account of the excesses of the audiencia was given by Silva:

Under pretext of the arrest and removal of Don Geronimo de Silva,

Licentiate Legaspi, ... exercised the office of captain-general,

carrying the staff of office and making them lower the banners

to him, and address him as "your Lordship," and his wife as

"my lady." He immediately appointed his elder son to the post of

sargento-mayor of this camp, and his younger son to a company,

while another company was assigned to a relative of Auditor Matias

Flores y Cassila (also an oidor). Others were assigned to brothers

of the said Don Matias, the fiscal, and other auditors, except

Don Albaro (Messa y Lugo), who refused to have anything given to

his household. Upon seeing the illegality of these appointments,

I issued an act declaring them vacant and restoring those posts

to those who had held them before. [626]

That the king had not entirely lost confidence in the audiencia,

notwithstanding the above complaints, is attested by the instruction

issued by the Council of the Indies to Francisco de Rojas y Ornate,

royal visitor to the Philippines. [627] This communication, which was

dated August 17, 1628, approved the stand which the audiencia had taken

in insisting that all money obtained from Chinese trading-licenses

should be put into the royal treasury and accounted for by the

oficiales reales before it was spent. It appears that the governor

had hitherto used this money as an extra fund upon which to draw for

the expenses of the colony. The king also approved the attitude of

the audiencia in denying to persons in New Spain the right of using

the Manila galleon for the shipment of their goods, and in refusing to

allow money sent by them to the Islands to be invested in the Chinese

trade. Silva contended that the audiencia had no right to intervene

in either of the above matters, but in this Silva was not sustained,

Rojas y Ornate being instructed to see that Governor Tavora respected

the action of the audiencia in the two particulars referred to. [628]

The audiencia assumed management of political affairs in 1632, on

the death of Governor Juan Niño de Tavora, but neither the audiencia

as a body, nor the senior oidor personally were entrusted with the

military command. This responsibility devolved on Lorenzo de Olazo,

the maestre de campo, who had been designated by the viceroy of New

Spain to assume temporary charge of military affairs. He was succeeded

the following year by Juan Cerezo de Salamanca, who had been sent from

Mexico by the viceroy as soon as the death of Tavora was announced in

that city. Cerezo served ad interim for three years, and during his

administration the audiencia acted solely as a judicial body, not

attempting to interfere in governmental or military affairs. [629]

It was under the rule of this governor that important expeditions

were undertaken against the Moros in the South, and the first fort

and settlement were made at Zamboanga.

It is to be especially noted that in the appointment of Olazo and

Cerezo in 1632 and 1633 respectively, the senior oidor was deprived

of the control of military affairs. This had been done also in

1617 and in 1624 when Gerónimo de Silva, governor of Ternate, had

taken charge of military affairs during vacancies in the regular

governorship. Temporary appointments had been made on two different

occasions by the Marqués de Cerralbo, Viceroy of New Spain, once in

the sending of Fernando de Silva after the death of Governor Fajardo,

and on this occasion, when Cerezo de Salamanca took the place of

Governor Juan Niño de Tavora, after the audiencia had governed

a year. Experience had shown that the assumption of the military

command by the senior oidor was not productive of the most satisfactory

results. It was not to be expected, of course, that a magistrate would

administer military affairs with the skill of a captain-general, and

we have seen that various governors recommended that the practice

should no longer be continued. So it came about that the law of

1608 was revived, and the viceroy appointed a temporary governor to

assume control of military affairs, the audiencia being restricted

to judicial and administrative functions. In 1633, on the accession

of Cerezo de Salamanca, the audiencia was deprived of the right of

intervention in the last mentioned activity, and was confined to its

judicial duties alone. This was confirmed by the cédula of January

30, 1635, which relieved the Audiencia of Manila of all jurisdiction

over military affairs during vacancies, ordering that they were to

be administered by a temporary appointee of the viceroy. [630]

Nevertheless, considerable opposition to this method of filling

vacancies in the governorship had developed within the colony. This

is shown in various protests which came from the Islands from time

to time. These are set forth with great clarity in the correspondence

of the governors. Corcuera, in a letter written to Philip IV on June

30, 1636, stated that these temporary governors had allowed persons

in Mexico to make large fortunes out of the Philippine trade, and

that the governors had devoted most of their time when in Manila to

serving as agents of the residents of Mexico. Corcuera, however,

seemed to regard the audiencia as incapable of government, for he

claimed that in the brief term of a year in which the tribunal had

ruled, three years prior to his accession, it had run the colony into

debt from 80,000 to 100,000 pesos. He charged the oidores with the

same dishonest practice as had been alleged against Governor Fajardo,

namely, that they had issued due-bills in payment of debts and had

bought them up later at less than their face value, realizing the

full amount on them upon their presentation to the treasury later. He

stated that these warrants were not only bought by the oidores, but

by practically all the officials of the government. During Cerezo's

term a sum in excess of 100,000 pesos was said to have been paid out

to officials as usury. [631]

Corcuera presented a scheme of reform designed to remedy the evils

resulting from the succession either of the audiencia or of an

irresponsible military commander to the ad interim governorship. He

recommended that the regularly appointed governor should be assisted

by five commissioners, who should be military men, holding the

respective commands of Fort Santiago, Cavite, the Port of Manila,

Formosa, and the Parián. These were to be eligible in the order named

in case of a vacancy. This plan, like so many of the schemes of the

soldier governors, only took cognizance of the military side of the

governor's office. The marked tendency of these commanders was to

continually underestimate the administrative and political phases

of their positions. The plan of Corcuera was not adopted, however,

and the viceroy continued to appoint temporary governors to succeed

the audiencia when it assumed the government ad interim.

Governor Diego Fajardo, on July 10, 1651, wrote a letter to the

king protesting against the policy of appointment which was then in

force. He said:

I should be unfaithful to Your Majesty if I did not advise you

of the inconveniences arising from the appointment of governors

by the Viceroy of New Spain; the practice of sending money from

Mexico for investment in this colony has continued and increased,

to the exclusion and deprivation of the merchants of these

Islands.... Investments have been made by the viceroys through

the agency of others. [632]

Fajardo urged that the audiencia should be permitted to retain the

government as it had done formerly. He showed the advantages accruing

to the colony from a continuity of policy which would result from the

rule of the oidores. He showed that the incursions of the viceroys

and residents of Mexico upon the galleon trade would more likely be

checked by the oidores than by any other agency, adding moreover that

this particular matter should be attended to at once since the life and

prosperity of the colony depended on the control of the Acapulco and

Chinese commerce by the merchants of Manila. [633] A similar argument

was presented by Governor Manrique de Lara in a letter written July 19,

1654. This governor urged that a commission of magistrates, familiar

with the needs of the colony through experience and long residence, was

better fitted to rule for the common good than a stranger, appointed

by a distant viceroy, coming to the Islands as most of the temporary

governors had done, with the sole purpose of exploitation. [634]

Probably the sentiments of the residents and officials of the

Philippines were best and most effectively expressed on this subject in

the letter written by the audiencia to the king on July 19, 1654. [635]

The audiencia, on this occasion, described the inconveniences

resulting from the appointment of a resident of the Islands by the

Viceroy of New Spain. It was alleged that these appointees, being

already established in the Islands as merchants, officials, lawyers,

and even as soldiers, spent all their time in the service of their

own special interests. The commercial abuses of these appointees were

said to be notorious. The presence of so many relatives, friends, and

business connections made it impossible for these temporary rulers to

officiate properly as presidents of the audiencia, or to administer

the affairs of the government with diligence and impartiality.

As a result of the general dissatisfaction in the colony, which was

reflected in the above letters, and in compliance with the repeated

requests previously made for reform, the law of April 2, 1664, was

proclaimed, and followed by the consulta of September 9, 1669, which

has been already referred to. These laws still recognized the right of

the Viceroy of New Spain to appoint governors temporarily, but these

were no longer to be designated in advance from the residents of the

Islands. While the senior magistrate was to have charge of military

affairs, he was to seek the advice of such military officials as

were stationed in the colony, "exercising very particular care and

vigilance in all that pertains to military affairs, endeavoring to

keep the presidios well stocked and provided with all the defenses

necessary for whatever occasion may arise." This, then, was a return

to the practice which had prevailed prior to September 13, 1608,

when the Viceroy of New Spain was first authorized to appoint a

temporary governor in advance of the death of the incumbent. Although

the audiencia assumed the government with partial legal justification

from 1593 onward, the period from 1664 to 1719 may rightly be said

to constitute the era of the audiencia's authorized rule.

An occasion for the exercise of the new law occurred in 1668,

when Governor Diego de Salcedo was arrested and imprisoned by the

commissary of the Inquisition. In accordance with the law of April

2, 1664, just referred to, the audiencia was entitled to assume the

government until the arrival of the provisional governor from New

Spain. A dispute arose between the two most eligible oidores, Francisco

de Coloma and Francisco Montemayor y Mansilla, for the honors of the

military command. Coloma had been commissioned as magistrate of the

Audiencia of Manila before Montemayor, who maintained his claim to the

headship of military affairs on the grounds that he had arrived in

the Philippines earlier than Coloma. [636] These two officials were

unable to agree as to their respective rights, and Juan Manuel de la

Peña Bónifaz, junior magistrate of the audiencia, took advantage of

the discord to further his own interests. Put forward by the commissary

of the Inquisition and by the ecclesiastical element of the colony as

arbiter in the contention between his two colleagues, he solidified

his own power until he was able to usurp the entire government. He

issued orders to the soldiers, compromised with Coloma, exiled

Montemayor, enacted financial and governmental measures, appointed

his friends to office, and in general acted the part of a dictator,

combining in his own person all the functions of the military,

judicial and executive departments. [637] The audiencia, of course,

was entirely suppressed. Certain ecclesiastical authorities state

that he governed with greater consideration and fairness than many

of his predecessors, and that his rule was more just than that of

the audiencia had been. [638] The spirit of his administration was

particularly favorable to the churchmen, by whose favor he gained

office, and by whose aid he was able to retain his position. His

successor, Manuel de León, was appointed regular governor as soon as

news of the arrest of Salcedo reached Spain. Bónifaz was apprehended

and sentenced to pay the customary penalty for treason, but death

intervened and defrauded the king's justice. It may be considered, in

a sense, that Bónifaz conferred a service upon the colony by forcibly

putting an end to the disputes which had been prevalent between the

rival oidores whose claims could not have been settled for three

years at least--the time necessary for the Council of the Indies to

transmit to the distant colony a ruling on the points at issue.

The audiencia next took over the government in April, 1679, on the

death of Governor León, and it retained control of affairs until the

arrival of Governor Juan de Vargas Hurtado in September, 1678. The

rule of the tribunal on this occasion was without sensational

features. Oidor Francisco de Coloma, in whose favor the Council of

the Indies had declared in the dispute described above, assumed charge

of military affairs, serving as captain-general until his death. His

seniority was acknowledged by Montemayor, who was called back from

exile to a place in the audiencia. [639]

The inefficiency of the audiencia as a governing agency as shown

in the episode just described was surpassed by the state of utter

impotency to which the tribunal was reduced during the Pardo

controversy in 1684. Though at first successful in exiling the

archbishop, the audiencia and Governor Vargas were later completely

undone by the intriguing of the new governor, Curuzaelegui, with

the prelate to discredit the previous administration. The struggle

ended in the restoration of the prelate, the residencia of Vargas

and the appointment of a new tribunal which was calculated to be more

subservient to the commands of the new governor and the prelate. This

audiencia assumed the government after the death of Curuzaelegui on

April 17, 1689, with Alonzo de Ávila as chief executive. [640]

The events of the Pardo controversy prepared the way for a period of

rule by an audiencia in which the entire government was dominated

by the ecclesiastics. Archbishop Pardo and his successors were

the real governors and the victory of the church over the various

officials of civil administration lowered the moral tone of the entire

government. Corruption flourished and the vigor of the administration

decayed. [641] It is clear that the depravity of the civil government

proceeded largely from the weakness of the audiencia and its submission

to the governor. The latter was under orders from no less an authority

than the king, himself, to put an end to the disputes between church

and state in the colony and to bring about peace; it also happened

that the situation in the colony at that time caused the governor to

lean towards the side of Pardo and his supporters. The audiencia was

entirely disregarded both by Governor Curuzaelegui and by the court,

which may be attributed in some measure to that policy of the Spanish

government previously alluded to--that of sacrificing principle in

order to preserve harmony. There is no doubt but that the weakness

and inefficiency of the audiencia during these two controversies

contributed largely to the subsequent decision of the court to deprive

the audiencia of the right of governing ad interim.

The last occasion on which the audiencia regularly assumed the

government of the Islands, and one which demonstrated still more

conclusively the inefficiency of the audiencia as governor, occurred

in 1715, after the death of Governor Lizarraga. His rule had been

uncommonly quiet and peaceful, and the period of extortion and strife

which succeeded it furnished a marked contrast to that governor's

administration. The audiencia ruled from February 4, 1715, to August

9, 1717, with Oidor José Torralba as senior magistrate. The reports

sent by Torralba to the court during the two years of his service

as military commander show that the audiencia as a body played a

very small part in the government. This was again the rule of a

dictator. We have seen in a former chapter that Torralba was held

accountable in his residencia for a deficit of 700,000 pesos which

developed during this period; [642] it is difficult to understand

how this could have been possible had the senior magistrate concerned

himself solely with military affairs. Concepción states that Torralba,

inflated by his position, and ambitious of getting absolute control

of the government, drove from office the oidores who dared to oppose

him. [643] He refused to honor the royal cédula of April 15, 1713,

which ordered the reinstatement of Oidor Pavón to his place as senior

oidor since the fulfillment of this order would have deprived Torralba

of his command.

Torralba reported great progress in the repair and restoration of

royal and municipal warehouses, hospitals, convents, and churches

during his administration. The wall of Manila was re-built and new

bronze guns were cast and placed thereon. As acting captain-general,

Torralba inspected Fort Santiago, and, "noting grave needs both

in construction and in the morale of troops," made the necessary

repairs, reforms and corrections. [644] He concerned himself also

with the promotion and appointment of military officials. These

latter acts were vigorously resisted by the maestre de campo, and by

other military officials, as encroachments on their authority. They

ultimately sought to bring about the nullification of all Torralba's

"unjustifiable acts of interference within the military sphere." [645]

Whether animated by a sincere desire to see the natives justly treated,

or rather by his natural dislike of the friars, Torralba intervened

on various occasions for the protection of the Indians against the

encroachments and abuses of the churchmen on the encomiendas and

in the native towns. These acts were carried out in the name of the

audiencia, and in accordance with the law, ultimately meeting with

the approval of the Council of the Indies. [646]

A great deal of dissatisfaction, both at the court and in the colony,

had resulted from the audiencia's assumption of the government at

various times since 1664. We have already noted that the restoration

of this authority to the audiencia was attended by the disgraceful

quarrel between Coloma and Montemayor and the usurpation of Bónifaz in

1668. The Pardo controversy did not produce a favorable impression of

the activities of the audiencia. Torralba's dictatorship in the name

of the audiencia from 1715 to 1717, conspicuous for the huge deficit

in which it culminated, demonstrated the unfitness of the audiencia

to be entrusted with the rule of the Islands.

Indeed, it may be said that the various experiments made by the

monarchs during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries for

the purpose of perfecting a system whereby the governorship could

be satisfactorily filled ad interim had failed to demonstrate or

develop any authority capable of maintaining harmony or decent

government. Co-operation among the authorities of the colony was

practically unknown. The royal disapproval was passed upon practically

all the official acts of these interim administrations. The thirst

for personal glory, and the desire for private gain invariably

induced some official who was stronger than his contemporaries to

assume control of affairs; thus the government of the colony was made

repeatedly to subserve personal ends, and civil and political life

was characterized by its strife and discord. The probabilities that

the temporary administration of the audiencia would not be entirely

successful had been recognized from the beginning, and in order to

guard against its misrule the king had authorized the appointment of

a temporary governor by the Viceroy of New Spain. It was unavoidable,

however, that the audiencia should govern until the arrival of this

official. For a time the alternative was tried of allowing the maestre

de campo to assume the military command, but this resulted in such an

incompetent rule that the former prerogatives of the audiencia were

restored. Whether the audiencia was capable of governing successfully

or not, it certainly had the power to make or mar the government of

any other person or authority, whether he was regularly appointed by

the king, or chosen temporarily by the viceroy.

The church, as represented by a succession of triumphant archbishops,

had exercised the preponderance of power and authority throughout the

forty years of strife, ending with the death of Governor Bustamante. We

need not be concerned here with the various struggles and disagreements

with governors and audiencias, but the fact remains that the church

was the only institution existing during this period which was able to

present a solid and united front to its enemies, or which manifested

any symptoms of power, unity or royal approbation. The culmination

of ecclesiastical power was virtually reached on October 11, 1719,

when Governor Bustamante was murdered by emissaries of the church

and Fray Francisco de la Cuesta, Archbishop of Manila, assumed the

vacant governorship.

Zúñiga, the Dominican historian, says that the archbishop declined the

governorship on this occasion, but was subsequently prevailed upon

to accept it. [647] It is certain that the tribunal was in no state

or condition to take charge of affairs; its administration had been

discredited by the murder of its protector, its senior magistrate had

been proved an embezzler in his residencia, and the remaining members

of the tribunal were not qualified to remain in office. Oidores

Villa and Pavón, removed by Torralba and Bustamante, were restored

by the archbishop, and were content to recognize him as president

of the audiencia. Each of them had his own claims to the position of

acting-governor and had Cuesta not occupied the governorship with their

consent, these oidores would either have been languishing in banishment

as punishment for having resisted the prelate, or they would have

been struggling for the honors of a position occupied by a pretended

mediator, as on former occasions. So there can be no doubt that it

was best for all concerned that the church was powerful at this time;

the colony had had enough of strife and murder and there was urgent

need of some authority with sufficient power to bring about peace. It

is sufficient to say that the audiencia renounced its claims to the

government, and, according to Zúñiga, who devotes an unusual amount

of space to this important epoch in the ecclesiastical history of the

Islands, the people were very content with the archbishop's rule after

the injustice and oppression of Bustamante. [648] It may be noted that

the archbishop exercised complete authority over the audiencia, even

to the extent of restoring oidores who had been unlawfully dismissed,

and of acting as an intermediary between magistrates. He was master

of the situation and his interim rule was preferred by the sovereign

and by the people to that of the audiencia.

The royal order of September 8, 1720, legalizing the government of

the prelates, applied not only to the administration of Cuesta, but it

established a precedent for the temporary rule of four prelates. [649]

In compliance with this decree, three sealed envelopes (pliegos de

providencia) were sent to the audiencia to be placed unopened in

the archives of that tribunal, and the seals were to be broken only

on the death of the governor. These envelopes were accompanied by an

order from the king, directing that the person mentioned in the first

envelope should be recognized as temporary governor. In case of his

absence or incapacity to serve, the second envelope was to be opened

and the directions contained therein were to be followed, and if

these could not be complied with, the third envelope was to be opened.

No further necessity for the observance of this law of succession

arose until after the death of Governor Gaspar de la Torre, when,

on August 15, 1745, the first envelope was opened in the presence of

the audiencia. The post of archbishop being vacant at this time it

became necessary to follow the directions prescribed by the second

envelope. It was found that Fray Juan de Arrechedera, Bishop of

Nueva Segovia, had been designated as the governor's successor. The

audiencia relinquished the control of affairs into his hands and he

governed for a period of five years.

It would seem that the ecclesiastical calling of this governor in no

way incapacitated or hindered him in the execution of his duties. His

administration was characterized especially by various measures taken

for the defense and fortification of the Islands. He suppressed several

insurrections in Ilocos and Cagayán, dispatching military forces under

the command of alcaldes mayores against the revolting natives. He

repelled several Moro raids and made treaties of peace with the Sultan

of Sulu. [650] There is no evidence of discord between the governor and

the audiencia during this period. Although Archbishop Trinidad arrived

and took possession of his see on August 27, 1747, he made no attempt

to take charge of political affairs. [651] He permitted Arrechedera

to continue as governor for three years, handing over to him

a royal mandate, for the absolute expulsion of the Chinese

[which was never] ... carried into execution, the interest of

the Governor being too deeply involved in the suspension of it,

the Chinese paying him a contribution for his forbearance. The

Archbishop found that Arrechedera was strongly attached to this

nation, and he became so far a convert to his sentiments on this

subject that he did not put the royal order in force.... This

seems to have been the only error committed by this illustrious

prelate during the time he held the government. In all other

respects his conduct reflected the highest honour on him. [652]

The third time the government was taken over by a prelate was in 1759

on the death of Governor Arandía. On this occasion it became necessary

to open the third pliego de providencia. The metropolitan see of Manila

and the diocese of Nueva Segovia being vacant, Bishop Espeleta of Cebú

was the senior prelate of the Islands. Shortly after the accession

of Espeleta, Manuel Rojo, the new archbishop, arrived, commanding

Espeleta to vacate the governorship at once. Rojo refused, citing the

precedent established by Bishop Arrechedera. Espeleta appealed to the

audiencia for support, but the oidores were unable to agree on the

question, two of them, Calderón and Galbán supporting Rojo, and the

other two remaining in favor of the retention of the governorship by

Espeleta. The question was left to the fiscal, Francisco Leandro de

Viana, who advised that the matter should be carried to the Council

of the Indies for final settlement. [653] It transpired, therefore,

that Espeleta retained the governorship from 1759 until 1761, and he

did very effective work in repelling the raids of the Moros, who had

been ravaging the provinces with impunity for some time.

The prosecution of Dr. Santiago Orendaín occupied a large share of

Espeleta's attention during his administration. This controversy

should be noted here because it illustrates the relations between

the audiencia and an ecclesiastical governor. Orendaín had been

the advisor (asesor) of Governor Arandía, and was held responsible

for the repressive measures taken against the church during the

administration of the latter. The rule of an unscrupulous prelate

presented an excellent opportunity for revenge and Orendaín's

prosecution was unanimously demanded by the ecclesiastical element of

the colony. The magistrates also welcomed the opportunity to retaliate

upon a hitherto successful, but unpopular, rival. The fiscal brought

action against Orendaín, who sought refuge in an Augustinian convent,

whereupon the civil authorities forced an entrance into the asylum,

seizing Orendaín and imprisoning him in Fort Santiago. The provisor

of the ecclesiastical court excommunicated Magistrate Villacorta,

who had exculpated Orendaín in his trial, but the ban was disregarded

by the audiencia. A division over the question arose in the tribunal,

and matters were assuming a threatening aspect, when the authorized

appointment of Governor Rojo arrived. Espeleta gave up his office,

and the first act of the new governor was to restore Orendaín to full

favor as his counsellor. The affair of Dr. Orendaín illustrates a phase

of Spanish colonial administration which is too characteristic to be

left unnoticed here. Aside from the influence which Orendaín exercised

over Governor Arandía, his persecution shows the measure of personal

rancour which even a prelate might put into his administration,

spending practically two years in the pursuit of revenge. In this he

was supported by the audiencia. In this affair neither the church nor

the audiencia were animated so much by motives of right and justice

as they were influenced by personal feelings.

The rule of Archbishop Rojo from 1761 to 1764 was a notable one

in the history of the Philippines. The principal event during

his administration was the capture of Manila by the British. This

furnished the occasion for the resistance of Oidor Simón de Anda y

Salazar, in the name of the audiencia, both to the English and to

the archbishop who had ordered his surrender. These events show

the complete incapacity of an ecclesiastical governor of Rojo's

type and personality to fulfill the military requirements of his

position. In the operations of Anda we note how a man of decisive

action, energy, courage, and loyalty was able to force the issue and

deprive the archbishop-governor of the executive functions which

he had assumed legally, but which he was unable to dispense. This

episode illustrates, furthermore, the general disregard of the laws

which placed the governorship in the hands of a man who was unfit

for its exercise, showing again that in the selection of a person to

carry out the duties of governor the military side of the situation

could not be disregarded.

Anda, at the time of the accession of Rojo, was a junior magistrate

in the audiencia, having arrived in Manila on July 21, 1761. [654]

The British squadron entered Manila Bay on September 22, 1762. The

British subsequently attacked the city, the fall of which seemed

imminent on account of the neglectful state into which the defense had

fallen. [655] The proposition was made to the archbishop-governor by

Fiscal Francisco Leandro de Viana and the audiencia that Oidor Anda

should be dispatched to the provinces with the title of Governor

and Captain-general of the Islands for the purpose of maintaining

and defending them under the sovereignty of the Spanish monarch,

[656] and "in order that he might keep the natives quiet in their

Christian instruction and in their obedience to the king." [657] The

archbishop refused to accede to this proposition on the grounds that

"neither he nor the Audiencia had any authority to create a governor

and captain-general, which was the proper privilege of his Majesty;

and that it was enough to give him the title of visitor of the land

... and ... of lieutenant of the captain-general." [658] This was done,

therefore, and Anda left on the night of October 3, 1762, with these

titles and powers.

It is important to note that Anda was not given the title of governor

and captain-general, but that as oidor he was commissioned visitador

de tierras and teniente de gobernador y capitán general. [659] The

authority to designate oidores as visitors of the provinces was

a function regularly exercised by the president of the audiencia

and authorized by the laws of the Indies. [660] It appears from the

above that Anda was sent to the provinces to defend them against the

English. This was the main object as stated in the original proposition

of the audiencia. Zúñiga states the purpose of the departure of Anda to

have been "to maintain the islands in obedience to the King of Spain,"

[661] and this is corroborated by the testimonies of Anda, [662]

Viana [663] and of Rojo, [664] himself. In view of these facts, Rojo's

failure to co-operate with Anda, his proneness to listen to those who

counseled surrender, his complete reversal of tactics in repeatedly

summoning Anda to abdicate, and his willingness even to betray Anda

into the hands of the British are almost inexplicable. [665]

Anda organized a provisional government in his capacity as

lieutenant-governor. He disregarded the repeated summons of the

archbishop to return to the city and surrender to the British. In

a letter to the archbishop, dated October 21, 1762, Anda justified

his position and made clear that he was not acting on the basis

of any delegation of power as captain-general, which authority,

he acknowledged, still rested with Rojo. He stated that he had been

appointed visitor-general of the provinces "with the real mission

of protecting them if the English captured Manila;" in case this

happened he was to solicit the aid of prelates, religious and alcaldes

mayores in defending the Islands. He complained that Rojo had already

"endeavored to influence the prelates, religious and natives to

submit to the British." [666] He urged that Rojo should desist from

his opposition to his efforts, pointing out the great desirability

of their co-operation.

When Anda became convinced of the infirmity of Rojo and the uselessness

of further attempts at co-operation with him he completely changed

his attitude towards his own position and towards the question of the

defense and government of the Islands. While he had hitherto recognized

Rojo as governor and captain-general, he now assumed the position that

the archbishop was a prisoner in the city and he therefore refused to

recognize the orders of the latter. Anda issued a call to all loyal

inhabitants to defend the honor of Spain. He ordered the alcaldes

mayores to pay no heed to the dispatches and commands issued by the

archbishop or the British in the city. He set himself up as governor

and captain-general of the Islands, subsequently moving his capital

to Bacolor, Pampanga. He obtained possession of the funds of the

royal treasury, which had been sent to the province of Laguna when

the English had appeared, and he turned a deaf ear to the demands of

the archbishop that the money should be returned to the city in order

that it might be applied on the payment of the four million-peso war

indemnity imposed by the victorious British. Anda enlisted a military

force aggregating eight thousand men, and he successfully prevented

the enemy from doing more than capture Cavite, Pásig, and a few other

places of minor importance. Notwithstanding the demands of the British,

who had placed a price of four thousand pesos on his head, and the

entreaties of the archbishop, Anda resisted until he was assured that

peace was definitely arranged between Spain and Great Britain. [667]

The justification which Anda offered for his conduct was as follows:

the regular governor and the audiencia (excepting himself) were

prisoners in the city of Manila; their positions and places

were therefore vacant, and Anda, as the sole oidor who was not

incapacitated, should accordingly succeed and had succeeded to the

management of political affairs and defense. He was both audiencia

and governor. In support of his contention that he himself was the

legally constituted audiencia, he cited the law promulgated by Philip

III on August 14, 1620, declaring that "in some of the audiencias

of the Indies it has happened, and it might happen still that the

oidores being absent and ... only one remaining, ... in such cases the

audiencia is to be conserved and continued with only one oidor." [668]

Anda had been a legally appointed oidor on special delegation to

the provinces when the city fell into the hands of the British;

the governor and the remaining oidores had become prisoners and

were civilly dead; being the only magistrate of the audiencia yet on

duty, he was at once audiencia and governor. He stated that he would

surrender his office to the archbishop and audiencia when both had

regained their liberty, but he warned the archbishop that if he went

to the extreme of surrendering the Islands, he (Anda) "would in no

wise obey so unjust and absurd a treaty," and furthermore stated that

if the British wished to rule the country, they would have to conquer

it first. He expressed the conviction that neither the archbishop nor

any other authority except the king had the power to surrender the

Islands. [669] In these arguments and sentiments Anda was supported

by the fiscal, Francisco Leandro de Viana, and by Oidores Galbán and

Villacorta, who subsequently escaped from the city and joined him in

the provinces, aiding him in his resistance to the invaders.

Although the British had agreed in their terms of capitulation that

the audiencia should continue in the exercise of its normal powers

in Manila, [670] that tribunal and the archbishop were virtually

prisoners; the idea of their recognition therefore appears almost

an absurdity. The oidores acted as members of the council of

war which considered the proposition made by the British for the

surrender of the city, but if we may trust the testimony of Viana,

the archbishop, influenced by his favorites, Monroy and Orendaín,

forced the magistrates to sign the articles of capitulation. Viana

says that in the various matters which came up for solution after the

city had surrendered, the oidores were formally consulted, but the

archbishop followed his own counsel, or that of his favorites. [671]

The position of Rojo after the escape of the fiscal and the oidores

was an exceedingly unpleasant one. The English commander complained

that the prelate and the audiencia had failed to keep the agreement

which had been made between them; in escaping, the fiscal and the

oidores had violated their oaths; the indemnity had not been paid;

the provinces had not surrendered and Anda was still continuing his

resistance. The sack of the city was threatened. These conditions made

Rojo redouble his efforts to betray Anda and to get possession of

the treasure which had come on the patache, "Filipino". The British

offered remission of tribute to all natives then in insurrection who

would surrender. Anda was charged with responsibility for the danger

with which the city was threatened. He was said to have prevented

the fulfillment of the treaty between Rojo and the British. To this

Anda replied that he had not been a party to the treaty. The state

of perpetual worry in which Rojo was kept brought about his death

on January 30, 1764. Even before this he had practically lost his

status as governor and the British were treating with Anda for the

surrender of the Islands. [672] This continued until the legitimacy

of the position of Anda was recognized by Governor Torre. [673]

A statement of the above facts aids in clarifying our view of

Anda's position. It certainly can be said that there was neither an

audiencia nor a governor with sovereign powers in Manila; this lack

furnished a reasonable basis for Anda's claims. However clearly it was

established that a vacancy existed in the governorship, his position

would have been sufficiently tenable had it been based solely on the

grounds that the archbishop had delegated him as lieutenant of the

captain-general, with military powers. The archbishop-governor had

granted him that title and those powers for the very purpose for which

he had utilized them, namely, for the defense of the Islands against

the British. In view of the support which was extended to Anda in his

contention that he was governor and captain-general as long as the

archbishop and the regularly constituted audiencia were prisoners,

it is not easy to understand why it was necessary for him to justify

himself by advancing the claim, first, that he was the audiencia,

and, second, that he was the governor because he had the authority

of the audiencia. The only accountable reason for this was probably

the necessity of nullifying the commands of the archbishop which

were being issued from the captured city. He may have felt that such

measures were imperative in order to gain and retain the respect of

the natives and provincial officials who were not under his immediate

influence and who were consequently more independent and inclined to

be insurrectionary and riotous. Yet, it is hardly possible that the

legal arguments advanced in support of his claims were understood by

this class.

It does not appear, moreover, that Anda was entirely justified in his

argument by the laws. No doubt he was right in regarding himself as

the audiencia, on the basis of the laws cited by him. However, the

law did not at that time authorize the succession of the audiencia

to a vacancy in the governorship. The cédulas of September 8, 1720,

and of August 15, 1731, were still in force in the Philippines, and

by virtue of these and by the special cédula promulgated in 1761 in

favor of Rojo, an ecclesiastic was authorized to act as governor

in case of a vacancy. According to law and precedent, the post

vacated by the archbishop-governor should have been filled by the

bishop of Nueva Segovia, and by the bishop of Cebú, respectively. It

is true that neither of these ecclesiastics put forth any effort

to maintain their legal rights, probably for the reason that they

realized their incapacity to organize and conduct the defense of the

Islands as well as Anda had done. The audiencia had not succeeded to

the government since 1715; it had been forbidden to do so in 1720 and

subsequently. It is therefore difficult to understand how Anda could

have seriously advanced the claim that in his capacity as sole oidor

he should succeed to the government.

Aside from the opposition of the archbishop, there does not seem to

have been any great difference of opinion on the question of whether

Anda could rightfully claim the prerogatives of the audiencia and

governorship at the same time. Rojo paid no attention to the legal

arguments advanced by Anda, but contended that both the governor and

the audiencia were still in full possession of their powers and in

complete enjoyment of their liberties within the city. No comment

is to be found on Anda's contention in the royal dispatches which

were sent in answer to his reports. It is important to note, however,

that after the death of the archbishop, and after the restoration of

peace, the fiscal was of the opinion that the government should go

to Fray Ustáriz, bishop of Nueva Segovia. [674] In this opinion he

was seconded by Oidor Galbán.

It would seem that Anda was supported in his resistance to Archbishop

Rojo and the British largely on grounds of expediency. This is

clearly brought out in a letter which Fiscal Viana wrote to the king

on October 30, 1762, stating his opinion that:

Since the Audiencia and governor are unable to exercise their

duties, Anda, as the only active and unembarrassed minister who is

able to retain his place under the authority of Your Majesty, has

declared himself governor, royal audiencia and captain-general. It

is evident that, being a prisoner, the archbishop cannot be

governor and captain-general, and it is equally certain that

the government and office of captain-general falls back on the

audiencia and the oldest oidor. [675]

This argument savors of expediency and sound practicability rather

than of interest in the legal quibble. Had Viana been convinced of

the legality of Anda's claims he would not subsequently have supported

Ustáriz. Viana contended that neither the archbishop nor the audiencia

enjoyed sovereign powers when they were prisoners. Anda, on the other

hand, was in such a position that he could utilize his legal powers;

he used them to good advantage and effectively, therefore he was

entitled to recognition.

Aside from the question of legality, it is important to note that Anda

was the only person who was able to exercise sovereign powers during

this time. It is certain, moreover, that he prevented the Islands

from falling into the hands of the British and that he maintained the

continuity of the sovereignty of Spain in the Islands from 1762 to

1764. During his rule in the provinces he exercised practically all

the functions of a normal government. Aside from the management of

military affairs he administered the finances and levied tribute. As

noted above, he contrived to obtain possession of the royal treasure

which had been sent to Laguna; he was consequently better equipped

financially than he would have been otherwise, and better than his

rivals in the city. His finances were also augmented by the favorable

circumstance of his capture of the "Filipino" which was returning

from Acapulco with the proceeds of the sale of her former cargo. [676]

Other functions of a semi-military and governmental character were

exercised by Anda in his capacity as acting governor. In some of these

matters he was assisted by the fiscal and audiencia in the latter part

of his administration. He regulated the prices of provisions in order

to prevent them from attaining prohibitive proportions. He did all that

he could to further and encourage interprovincial trade. He issued

orders in regulation of wages. In order to discourage drunkenness

he forbade the sale of nipa wine except in small quantities. He

discouraged the importation of wine from Laguna. He took measures

to prevent the Chinese from counterfeiting or chipping coins, and

he declared what should be legal tender. He forbade the shipment of

provisions to the beleaguered city and refused to permit the natives

under his jurisdiction to shelter or otherwise assist an Englishman. He

prevented secular priests from communicating with the archbishop. In

order to encourage service in the army he exempted natives from the

polo, or labor tax, and he also made certain exceptions to the general

rule for the payment of tribute to offset the decree of the British

who had offered wholesale exemption from the payment of tribute

in order to attract the natives. Anda issued very severe orders to

prevent looting and extortion on the part of his soldiers. Because of

the alliance between the Chinese and the British, Anda was obliged

to take repressive measures against the former. He forbade games of

dice, cock-fighting and card-playing so as to raise the morale of

the natives, to prevent thefts and to encourage law and order. He

prescribed the death penalty for theft. Anda's rule was little less

than a dictatorship, with all the powers of government centered in

himself and in his immediate advisors. [677]

It has already been pointed out that when Anda's resistance gave

certain assurances of success, the fiscal, Viana, and the oidores,

Galbán and Villacorta, escaped to his capital, attached themselves to

his cause and assumed a share in his government. Anda was willing

to recognize them as magistrates of the audiencia, and as such

they officiated. Villacorta made some trouble for Anda, however,

by claiming the right to act as governor on the ground that he was

Anda's senior in the audiencia. This was generally recognized, but

Anda refused to accede to his demands, and the matter was dropped

for a time. [678] Anda found that his colleagues, Viana and Galbán,

were of the opinion that Bishop Ustáriz was legally entitled to the

office of governor, but there was some doubt in their minds whether

he should be invited at that time to act as governor. Anda consulted

the Bishop of Camarines and that prelate expressed his willingness

to submit to the decision of the audiencia. The Augustinians and

Dominicans were of the same opinion, but the Jesuits and Franciscans

told him, that in the then (sic) situation of the islands he alone

could preserve the public tranquillity, and on that account he

ought to retain the supreme authority. This diversity of opinion

was not very gratifying to Señor Anda, and although the troops

were in his favour, he was by no means desirous of having recourse

to violence. [679]

Shortly after the death of Archbishop Rojo, Anda received dispatches

informing him that peace had been restored between Spain and England;

[680] at the same time the British received orders to evacuate the

city. Now that Anda's presence in the field as military commander was

no longer absolutely required, a three-cornered fight arose among the

supporters of Villacorta, Ustáriz and Anda. Each of these contenders

was able to advance a reasonable claim. Villacorta was certainly

the senior magistrate, and thus he had a better right legally to the

office than Anda. Ustáriz was bishop of Nueva Segovia and as such, was

entitled to the governorship according to the most recent law. "Anda

had in his favor the circumstance of having defended the islands,

and of having prevented the English from advancing to the northern

provinces; and, above all, he commanded the troops, who were attached

to him, and this served to check the pretensions of the others." [681]

The arrival of the interim governor, Francisco Xavier de la Torre,

put an end to these disputes. He had been dispatched to the Islands

by the Viceroy of New Spain with the title of teniente del rey

(king's lieutenant), and in accordance with his instructions he

assumed the temporary government on March 17, 1764, which he retained

until the arrival of Governor Raón in July, 1765. Anda's residencia

was taken by his successor, and it was found that the finances of

the colony had been faithfully and honestly administered during his

administration. He was able to account for all of the money taken

from the "Filipino", turning over two million pesos of these funds

to the new governor, accounting for the balance. Anda was recalled

to Spain, where he was presented at court, receiving the personal

thanks of the sovereign. [682]

Torre's accession to the governorship marks the discontinuance in

the Philippines of the practice of allowing the archbishop to take

charge of the government during vacancies. On no subsequent occasion

in the history of the Islands did an ecclesiastic take over the rule

of the Islands. [683] It would seem that this plan of succession was

abandoned quite generally throughout Spain's dominions, though there

is no instance in which the rule of a prelate ever resulted quite

so disastrously as in the Philippines from 1762 to 1764. Torre's

accession marks the return to the practice introduced in 1608 and

followed from time to time throughout the history of the Islands.

The audiencia, as a tribunal, concerned itself no further with

the temporary government of the Islands. On September 30, 1762, a

new cédula authorized the appointment of a teniente del rey by the

viceroy of New Spain, and the succession of this official was ordered

in case of a vacancy. This law was repromulgated on two subsequent

occasions, the first time on November 23, 1774, and again on July 2,

1779. [684] The plan of succession which it authorized was followed

quite generally in the subsequent history of the Islands, until the

separation of New Spain in 1821 rendered impossible the appointment of

a teniente by the viceroy. Anda's government was the last occasion on

which the audiencia, in reality or in theory, ever attempted to rule

by its own right, except by association with the teniente del rey,

with whom it acted in the usual advisory capacity, as authorized in

the above-mentioned laws.

By the Royal Instruction of Regents of 1776, the regent was authorized

to act as president of the audiencia during the absence of the

governor, and in case there were no regent, the senior magistrate of

the audiencia was to take his place. [685] This law was confirmed

by the cédula of August 2, 1789, which ordered that viceroys and

presidents, on going outside of their capitals, "should assign to

the regents the faculties for the dispatch of the most important

and immediate affairs." [686] A subsequent law, dated July 30, 1779,

stated that "these important and immediate affairs" did not include

"the duties and functions of the captain-general." Again, the royal

order of October 23, 1806, [687] commanded that the audiencia should

in no case take control of the government when there was a vacancy,

but that the name of the temporary governor should be contained in

an envelope which was to be opened on the death of the governor, or

on his absence from the district. In case provision had not been made

in this way, it was ordered that the government should be taken over

by the ranking military officer of the colony, if he were higher than

the grade of colonel; if not, the regent or decano should be temporary

president, governor and captain-general, without ceding the exercise

of any of the functions of this office to the audiencia. [688] This

law was suspended by the royal order of July 12, 1812, and by the

decree of November 2, 1834, which ordered that the segundo cabo, or

lieutenant-commander of the king's forces should succeed the governor

and captain-general. [689] It is important to note that these laws

were applicable throughout the Spanish colonial empire. Subsequent

vacancies in the Philippines were filled by military men, and the

audiencia refrained from interference with the government.

Considering the question in its broadest phases, it cannot be said that

the audiencia administered the ad interim rule with a great degree of

success. This method of filling vacancies in the governorship failed

for a number of reasons. Owing to the divided composition of the

tribunal, the rivalry and personal jealousy of the magistrates and

the perpetual quarrels and struggles which arose as a consequence,

the periods of its rule became wild scrambles for power in which

the strongest survived and reaped all the benefits of office. By

their example, the oidores stimulated others to wrong-doing, and in

their efforts to secure advantages for themselves they oppressed the

residents, Spanish and native, with the burden of their misrule. They

did not scruple to indulge in dishonest practices whenever occasion

offered; indeed, they went out of their way to seek such opportunities.

Perhaps the gravest defect of the rule of the audiencia lay in

its failure as an executive, owing to the divided character of

its composition. There was much jealousy, but neither unity nor

centralized responsibility. In their governmental capacity the oidores

frequently enacted measures and made recommendations of a statesmanlike

character, although they did not always succeed in enforcing them. The

magistrates were neither experienced legislators nor trained soldiers,

and the latter defect seems to have been a cause of considerable

dissatisfaction, especially among the military classes. These were

naturally jealous of an assumption of military power by lawyers, whose

commands they refused to obey. Nevertheless it must be conceded that

such individual oidores as Morga, Alcaraz, Almansa and Anda acquitted

themselves of their military duties with great credit when called upon.

The reform which gave the government to the churchmen was designed to

obviate the defects expressed above. It was believed that a prelate

would not be open to so many ventures of a questionable and mainly

commercial character. Moreover, the archbishops in Mexico and elsewhere

had fulfilled the duties of the executive on former occasions with

a fair degree of success. The church was the most powerful, highly

centralized and unified institution in the Philippines at the time

when both the audiencia and the governorship were weakest. The

ecclesiastical authority had repeatedly triumphed over the civil

government, and the former gave promise of being able to control

matters more effectively in the future than the audiencia had done in

the past. The rule of the churchmen did not remedy matters, however,

except that it produced harmony through the exercise of force. During

the rule of the archbishops, with the exception of that of Rojo, the

audiencia was so completely dominated by the ecclesiastical power that

the tribunal could scarcely be considered a factor in the government.

There were various defects in the rule of the ecclesiastics. Of these,

perhaps the most prominent was their failure to meet the military

requirements of the position. Because of the natural incongruity

existing between ecclesiastical and military duties, they were

obliged to delegate the command of the troops to military leaders,

who thus exercised an influence never realized by them during the

rule of the audiencia. Archbishop Rojo was unwilling to trust the

problem of defense to any other person, though unable to cope with

the situation himself. Hence Anda forced his way to the front because

he was fitted to command and Rojo was not. As administrators and

executives the prelates were as efficient as any others, but they were

never able to reconcile successfully the opposition of the civil,

political, and commercial elements, who were displeased with the

rule of an ecclesiastic. Surprising as it may seem, the government

of a prelate was usually most unsatisfactory to the churchmen and

religious authorities. If the prelate-governor were a friar, his rule

was resented by the members of all the rival orders. If he were a

secular priest, he was opposed by the friars of all the orders.

The failure of Rojo was enough to condemn the practice of permitting

ecclesiastics to assume the government, but aside from that, there was

a more significant and fundamental reason. The increasing political

authority of the church at that time, both in the colonies and in the

mother country, its widespread and almost irresistible dominance over

temporal affairs, demanded a radical change of policy whereby this

dangerous ecclesiastical power could be checked. The rule of Anda,

though technically based on that law which gave the succession to

the tribunal, was not a typical instance of the government of the

audiencia, nor did that period present all the features of such

a rule. The influence of the audiencia as a body was practically

nil. Anda governed because he was a strong man, not because he was

sole oidor or because he was lieutenant-governor. His government was

virtually a dictatorship, based on military power, but, nevertheless,

just and benevolent. His extra-judicial actions met with the king's

approval, because they were efficient.

History will show that the Audiencia of Manila assumed temporary

charge of the government because the distance and isolation of the

colony rendered such a course necessary and because it was thought

that the audiencia was best fitted to assume control. The government

by the audiencia in the Philippines was not an isolated incident,

but was typical of the entire Spanish colonial empire. Owing to the

conditions which we have noted, and judged by the standards which

constitute good government, the rule of the audiencia was neither

successful nor satisfactory. Its most far-reaching defect, as far as

the relations of the audiencia and the governor were concerned, lay

in the wholesale exercise of administrative and military functions by

the magistrates of the audiencia. This impaired the quality of their

services as impartial magistrates and contributed in most cases to an

insatiable thirst for power. The magistrates were loath to surrender

the exercise of these governmental activities on the accession of

the succeeding governor, the audiencia displaying a marked tendency

to continue in the exercise of administrative control. This, then,

was a decided cause of strife and dissension between the audiencia

and the governor.