PARIS, September, 1805.
MY LORD:--Three months before Brune set out on his embassy to
Constantinople, Talleyrand and Fouche were collecting together all the
desperadoes of our Revolution, and all the Italian, Corsican, Greek, and
Arabian renegadoes and vagabonds in our country, to form him a set of
attendants agreeable to the real object of his mission.
You know too much of our national character and of my own veracity to
think it improbable, when I assure you that most of our great men in
place are as vain as presumptuous, and that sometimes vanity and
presumption get the better of their discretion and prudence. What I am
going to tell you I did not hear myself, but it was reported to me by a
female friend, as estimable for her virtues as admired for her
accomplishments. She is often honoured with invitations to Talleyrand’s
familiar parties, composed chiefly of persons whose fortunes are as
independent as their principles, who, though not approving the
Revolution, neither joined its opposers nor opposed its adherents,
preferring tranquillity and obscurity to agitation and celebrity. Their
number is not much above half a dozen, and the Minister calls them the
only honest people in France with whom he thinks himself safe.
When it was reported here that two hundred persons of Brune’s suite had
embarked at Marseilles and eighty-four at Genoa, and when it was besides
known that nearly fifty individuals accompanied him in his outset, this
unusual occurrence caused much conversation and many speculations in all
our coteries and fashionable circles. About that time my friend dined
with Talleyrand, and, by chance, also mentioned this grand embassy,
observing, at the same time, that it was too much honour done to the
Ottoman Porte, and too much money thrown away upon splendour, to honour
such an imbecile and tottering Government.
“How people talk,” interrupted Talleyrand, “about what they do not
comprehend. Generous as Bonaparte is, he does not throw away his
expenses; perhaps within twelve months all these renegadoes or
adventurers, whom you all consider as valets of Brune, will be
three-tailed Pachas or Beys, leading friends of liberty, who shall have
gloriously broken their fetters as slaves of a Selim to become the
subjects of a Napoleon. The Eastern Empire has, indeed, long expired,
but it may suddenly be revived.”
“Austria and Russia,” replied my friend, “would never suffer it, and
England would sooner ruin her navy and exhaust her Treasury than permit
such a revolution.”
“So they have tried to do,” retorted Talleyrand, “to bring about a
counter revolution in France. But though only a moment is requisite to
erect the standard of revolt, ages often are necessary to conquer and
seize it. Turkey has long been ripe for a revolution. It wanted only
chiefs and directors. In time of war, ten thousand Frenchmen landed in
the Dardanelles would be masters of Constantinople, and perhaps of the
Empire. In time of peace, four hundred bold and well-informed men may
produce the same effect. Besides, with some temporary cession of a
couple of provinces to each of the Imperial Courts, and with the
temporary present of an island to Great Britain, everything may be
settled ‘pro tempore’, and a Joseph Bonaparte be permitted to reign at
Constantinople, as a Napoleon does at Paris.”
That the Minister made use of this language I can take upon me to affirm;
but whether purposely or unintentionally, whether to give a high opinion
of his plans or to impose upon his company, I will not and cannot assert.
On the subject of this numerous suite of Brune, Markof is said to have
obtained several conferences with Talleyrand and several audiences of
Bonaparte, in which representations, as just as energetic, were made,
which, however, did not alter the intent of our Government or increase
the favour of the Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. Cloud. But it
proved that our schemes of subversion are suspected, and that our agents
of overthrow would be watched and their manoeuvres inspected.
Count Italinski, the Russian Ambassador to the Ottoman Porte, is one of
those noblemen who unite rank and fortune, talents and modesty, honour
and patriotism, wealth and liberality. His personal character and his
individual virtues made him, therefore, more esteemed and revered by the
members of the Divan, than the high station he occupied, and the powerful
Prince he represented, made him feared or respected. His warnings had
created prejudices against Brune which he found difficult to remove. To
revenge himself in his old way, our Ambassador inserted several
paragraphs in the Moniteur and in our other papers, in which Count
Italinski was libelled, and his transactions or views calumniated.
After his first audience with the Grand Seignior, Brune complained
bitterly, of not having learned the Turkish language, and of being under
the necessity, therefore, of using interpreters, to whom he ascribed the
renewed obstacles he encountered in every step he took, while his hotel
was continually surrounded with spies, and the persons of his suite
followed everywhere like criminals when they went out. Even the valuable
presents he carried with him, amounting in value to twenty-four millions
of livres--were but indifferently received, the acceptors, seeming to
suspect the object and the honesty of the donor.
In proportion as our politics became embroiled with those of Russia, the
post of Brune became of more importance; but the obstacles thrown in his
way augmented daily, and he was forced to avow that Russia and England
had greater influence and more credit than the French Republic and its
chief. When Bonaparte was proclaimed an Emperor of the French, Brune
expected that his acknowledgment as such at Constantinople would be a
mere matter of course and announced officially on the day he presented a
copy of his new credentials. Here again he was disappointed, and
therefore demanded his recall from a place where there was no
probability, under the present circumstances, of either exciting the
subjects to revolt, of deluding the Prince into submission, or seducing
Ministers who, in pocketing his bribes, forgot for what they were given.
It was then that Bonaparte sent Joubert with a letter in his own
handwriting, to be delivered into the hands of the Grand Seignior
himself. This Joubert is a foundling, and, was from his youth destined
and educated to be one of the secret agents of our secret diplomacy. You
already, perhaps, have heard that our Government selects yearly a number
of young foundlings or orphans, whom it causes to be brought up in
foreign countries at its expense, so as to learn the language as natives
of the nation, where, when grown up, they are chiefly to be employed.
Joubert had been educated under the inspection of our consuls at Smyrna,
and, when he assumes the dress of a Turk, from his accent and manners
even the Mussulmans mistake him for one of their own creed and of their
country. He was introduced to Bonaparte in 1797, and accompanied him to
Egypt, where his services were of the greatest utility to the army. He
is now a kind of undersecretary in the office of our secret diplomacy,
and a member of the Legion of Honour. Should ever Joseph Bonaparte be an
Emperor or Sultan of the East, Joubert will certainly be his Grand
Vizier. There is another Joubert (with whom you must not confound him),
who was; also a kind of Dragoman at Constantinople some years ago, and
who is still somewhere on a secret mission in the East Indies.
Joubert’s arrival at Constantinople excited both curiosity among the
people and suspicion among the Ministry. There is no example in the
Ottoman history of a chief of a Christian nation having written to the
Sultan by a private messenger, or of His Highness having condescended to
receive the letter from the bearer, or to converse with him. The Grand
Vizier demanded a copy of Bonaparte’s letter, before an audience could be
granted. This was refused by Joubert; and as Brune threatened to quit
the capital of Turkey if any longer delay were experienced, the letter
was delivered in a garden near Constantinople, where the Sultan met
Bonaparte’s agent, as if by chance, who, it seems, lost all courage and
presence of mind, and did not utter four words, to which no answer was
given.
This impertinent intrigue, and this novel diplomacy, therefore, totally
miscarried, to the great shame and greater disappointment of the schemers
and contrivers. I must, however, do Talleyrand the justice to say that
he never approved of it, and even foretold the issue to his intimate
friends. It was entirely the whim and invention of Bonaparte himself,
upon a suggestion of Brune, who was far from being so well acquainted
with the spirit and policy of the Divan as he had been with the genius
and plots of Jacobinism. Not rebuked, however, Joubert was ordered away
a second time with a second letter, and, after an absence of four months,
returned again as he went, less satisfied with the second than with his
first journey.
In these trips to Turkey, he had always for travelling companions some of
our emissaries to Austria, Hungary, and in particular to Servia, where
the insurgents were assisted by our councils, and even guided by some of
our officers. The principal aide-de-camp of Czerni George, the Servian
chieftain, is one Saint Martin, formerly a captain in our artillery,
afterwards an officer of engineers in the Russian service, and finally a
volunteer in the army of Conde. He and three other officers of artillery
were, under fictitious names, sent by our Government, during the spring
of last year, to the camp of the insurgents. They pretended to be of the
Grecian religion, and formerly Russian officers, and were immediately
employed. Saint Martin has gained great influence over Czerni George,
and directs both his political councils and military operations. Besides
the individuals left behind by Joubert; it is said that upwards of one
hundred persons of Brune’s suite have been ordered for the same
destination. You see how great the activity of our Government is, and
that nothing is thought unworthy of its vigilance or its machinations. In
the staff of Paswan Oglou, six of my countrymen have been serving ever
since 1796, always in the pay of our Government.
It was much against the inclination and interest of our Emperor that his
Ambassador at Constantinople should leave the field of battle there to
the representatives of Russia, Austria, and England. But his dignity was
at stake. After many threats to deprive the Sultan of the honour of his
presence, and even after setting out once for some leagues on his return,
Brune, observing that these marches and countermarches excited more mirth
than terror, at last fixed a day, when, finally, either Bonaparte must be
acknowledged by the Divan as an Emperor of the French, or his departure
would take place. On that day he, indeed, began his retreat, but, under
different pretexts, be again stopped, sent couriers to his secretaries,
waited for their return, and sent new couriers again,--but all in vain,
the Divan continued refractory.
At his first audience after his return, the reception Bonaparte gave him
was not very cordial. He demanded active employment, in case of a
continental war, either in Italy or in Germany, but received neither.
When our army of England was already on its march towards the Rhine, and
Bonaparte returned here, Brune was ordered to take command on the coast,
and to organize there an army of observation, destined to succour Holland
in case of an invasion, or to invade England should a favourable occasion
present itself. The fact is, he was charged to intrigue rather than to
fight; and were Napoleon able to force upon Austria another Peace of
Luneville, Brune would probably be the plenipotentiary that would ask
your acceptance of another Peace of Amiens. It is here a general belief
that his present command signifies another pacific overture from
Bonaparte before your Parliament meets, or, at least, before the New
Year. Remember that our hero is more to be dreaded as a Philip than as
an Alexander.
General Brune has bought landed property for nine millions of livres--and
has, in different funds, placed ready money to the same amount. His own
and his wife’s diamonds are valued by him at three millions; and when he
has any parties to dinner, he exhibits them with great complaisance as
presents forced upon him during his campaign in Switzerland and Holland,
for the protection he gave the inhabitants. He is now so vain of his
wealth and proud of his rank, that he not only disregards all former
acquaintances, but denies his own brothers and sisters,--telling them
frankly that the Fieldmarshal Brune can have no shoemaker for a brother,
nor a sister married to a chandler; that he knows of no parents, and of
no relatives, being the maker of his own fortune, and of what he is; that
his children will look no further back for ancestry than their father.
One of his first cousins, a postilion, who insisted, rather obstinately,
on his family alliance, was recommended by Brune to his friend Fouche,
who sent him on a voyage of discovery to Cayenne, from which he probably
will not return very soon.