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Gutenberg.
The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898
Explorations by early navigators, descriptions of the islands and
their peoples, their history and records of the catholic missions,
as related in contemporaneous books and manuscripts, showing the
political, economic, commercial and religious conditions of those
islands from their earliest relations with European nations to the
close of the nineteenth century,
Volume XXX, 1640
Edited and annotated by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson
with historical introduction and additional notes by Edward Gaylord
Bourne.
The Arthur H. Clark Company
Cleveland, Ohio
MCMV
CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXX
Preface 9
Commerce between the Philippines and Nueva Espana. Antonio
Alvarez de Abreu; Madrid, 1736. [From his Extracto
historial.] 23
Historia de la provincia del Sancto Rosario de la Orden
de Predicadores (to be continued). Diego Aduarte, O.P.;
Manila, 1640 115
Bibliographical Data 323
ILLUSTRATIONS
Title-page of Extracto historial (Madrid, 1736);
photographic facsimile from copy in library of Harvard
University 21
Map of the eastern islands; photographic facsimile from
Mercator's Atlas minor (Amsterdam, 1633); from copy of
original map in the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris 83
Title-page of Historia de la provincia del Sancto Rosario
... en Philippinas, by Diego Aduarte, O.P. (Manila, 1640);
photographic facsimile from copy in library of Edward
E. Ayer, Chicago 113
Governor Luis Perez Dasmarinas; from painting exhibited at
St. Louis, 1904, in the Philippine exhibit of the Louisiana
Purchase Exposition 227
PREFACE
The present volume contains no record of events in the year 1640;
but its two documents are retrospective from that date. The first,
an historical survey of Philippine commerce with Nueva Espana,
from its beginning until 1640, is taken from the Extracto historial
(Madrid, 1736), a work devoted to that subject and compiled by order
of the Spanish government. The second is Aduarte's noted history of
the Dominican missions in the Philippines; although much of it is
briefly synopsized, its great length permits us only to begin it here,
two more volumes being necessary to complete it.
Valuable information regarding the trade between the Philippines and
Nueva Espana is furnished by the Extracto historial (Madrid, 1736),
from which we take such matter as pertains to that commerce up to
1640. A brief summary of royal ordinances thereon is followed by a
memorial sent (1640) to the royal visitor for Mexico, Juan Palafox
y Mendoza, by Juan Grau y Monfalcon, agent at the Spanish court for
the Philippine Islands. As Palafox is commissioned to investigate
the condition, needs, and commerce of the islands, Grau sends him
this memorial by way of information thereon, and as a brief for the
islands in their controversy over the grievous restrictions placed on
their commerce with Nueva Espana (which is mainly their export thither
of Chinese silk fabrics). Grau's argument is carefully divided and
subdivided; it is not always ingenuous, and sometimes he overshoots
his mark, or uses the same premises for different and at times
incongruous results; but it is on the whole a forcible presentation
of the difficulties and embarrassments under which that commerce is
laboring, and even the colony striving for existence. He constantly
urges the great importance of the Philippines to the Spanish crown,
not only as a center of missionary effort in the Orient, but for
the defense of the Moluccas and the spice trade, the maintenance
of Eastern India, and the diversion from that region and from the
American coasts of the Dutch enemy, on whom the Philippine colony
is a continual and effective check; all these considerations are
discussed at length. He lauds the bravery, loyalty, and piety of the
Spaniards in those islands, and their great services to the crown. He
computes the expenditures necessary to sustain the Philippine colony,
and the revenues which it yields, and shows that its actual expense
is but moderate, and far less than is supposed. From even this should
properly be deducted the expenses of sustaining Moluco, a burden which
falls on the Philippines, although the Spice Islands and their trade
are the property of Portugal; such computation leaves but 26,000
pesos annually as the actual cost of maintaining the Philippines,
Grau proposes two plans for securing this end: one, to pay all the
expenses of the islands directly from the royal treasury; the other, to
grant them a sufficient amount of commerce--the latter being the most
expedient and desirable method. Granting this, it remains to consider
the character, amount, and form of such commerce; Grau expatiates on
the third of these in especial, recounting the annoyances and injuries
inflicted at Acapulco on Philippine merchants and their goods.
Grau notices the accusations that have been made against the Philippine
commerce, of infractions of the ordinances regulating it; while not
denying these, he claims that they are not more extensive or serious
than those that are committed in the India trade, and do not deserve
the severity which has been employed against them. In behalf of the
islands, Grau asks for an increase in the amount of trade permitted to
them; for the restrictions on their commerce have greatly reduced their
wealth, on which heavier burdens are constantly laid by the necessity
of defending themselves from so many and so powerful enemies. The
population of Manila is also much larger than when the trade was
first limited, and needs more for its support; moreover, much of
the amount permitted is granted to convents and other institutions,
and to certain privileged persons, and various deductions are made
from its total, thus diminishing its actual value. Grau argues that
a sufficient increase in the trade of the islands would put a stop
to illegal shipments of goods; and that the exporters cannot make any
reasonable profits unless they are more liberally treated. He suggests
that they be allowed to export goods freely, a limitation being placed
only on the returns of silver therefor; and urges that the products
of the islands be free from all restrictions, and not included in
the amount permitted--which latter should apply only to Chinese
goods--for which he adduces various forcible arguments. Discussing
then the commerce between Nueva Espana and Peru, he shows that the
suspension of this trade during 1635-40 has been very injurious to
the Philippines, for various reasons; it has also hurt both Peru
and Mexico, especially by checking the latter's silk industry, which
found a market in Peru. He defends the Peruvian merchants from the
accusations made against them of transgressing the trade permission
that had been accorded to them, and urges that, for the sake of all
the western colonies, this permission be restored to Peru.
This memorial by Grau is followed by several royal decrees
(dated February 14, 1640) addressed to Palafox; these are mainly
"informatory," and lay before that official the representations
made by the citizens of the islands regarding their distressed
condition--ordering him to investigate the affairs of Philipinas
carefully and thoroughly, and report thereon to the home government. In
later volumes of this series will be presented a considerable part of
the Extracto historial--a work which, as we understand, has not before
been Englished--on account of the importance attached not only to the
book as an official report, but to the commerce of the Philippines
as a factor in the history and development of that Spanish colony in
the Far East.
Aduarte's Historia de la provincia del Sancto Rosario (Manila, 1640)
is here presented for the first time in English dress--partly in
full translation and partly in synopsis, because this work, besides
being voluminous, contains much about Japan and other countries, and
other matter outside our scope. The earlier chapters (i-ix) of book i,
here briefly summarized, describe the foundation of the province and
the voyage of the first Dominican missionaries to Manila; also the
unsuccessful effort at the same time to open a mission in China. In
chapter x is described their entrance into Manila, their affectionate
reception by all, and their establishment there as a religious
community. The new arrivals are initiated into missionary labor at
Bataan, and soon afterward are placed in charge of the Pangasinan
natives, and of the Chinese at Manila. With the aid of Bishop Salazar,
the Dominicans secure a piece of land for their convent and church;
and they receive many gifts and alms from pious citizens. They labor
for the good of the Spanish residents of Manila, and soon effect a
great change in their morals and religious life. They prosper, and are
able to erect a new and handsome stone church and the other buildings
necessary for their establishment; but the noted fire of 1603 destroys
all this great work. It is afterward rebuilt, even more solidly than
before, and all by the alms of the faithful. Chapters xii-xv are
devoted to an account of an image of our Lady of the Rosary possessed
by this Dominican convent, and of the miracles wrought through its
agency. Some of the friars had complained of the severity of their
mode of life and of the rules imposed upon them; but all finally agree
thereto, with great self-forgetfulness and devotion. Aduarte proceeds
to recount the great advantages arising to the province from this
procedure, and the holiness displayed by the Dominican religious in
Luzon--statements confirmed by various letters written to Spain by
trustworthy persons, not only within but without that order.
Chapter xix is devoted to an account of the Dominicans' first
mission-field, that of Bataan, and their labors therein. This field
had been transiently occupied by other missionaries, but was so hard
and barren that none of them had persevered in its cultivation. But
the Dominicans "licked their fingers over the hardships," and devote
themselves most heroically to the care of these poor souls, and to
learning their language--a difficult task for old men. One of them,
Pedro de Bolanos, is overcome by the labors and privations of this
sort of life, and is compelled to return to Manila, where he finally
dies; and the others suffer much from illness. As soon as the fathers
learn the language of those natives, they acquire great influence over
the natives, especially through the confessional. They greatly abate
drunkenness, the worst vice of the Indians, by "sending to Coventry"
every intoxicated person; and they persuade the heathen to abandon
their idols and superstitious practices, and even (perhaps the greatest
triumph of all) to set free many slaves, and restore what they had
taken from others in usury and by other unjust means. All this is
accomplished within one year; and Bataan acquires a wide reputation
for the religious and peaceful life which its natives lead. Various
marvelous works are wrought for the fathers by divine power; "on
the other hand, the devil played some tricks on them." They have to
encounter witches and devils, but the Lord gives them the victory
over these evil beings.
Pangasinan is another mission-field assigned to the Dominicans,
which also had been barren of gospel fruit through the obstinate
hostility of its natives to the Christian faith. At first, they
try to drive away the Dominicans also, but the holy lives of those
fathers work a miracle in their hard hearts, and convert them to the
faith. This is told in a letter from Bishop Benavides to the pope,
written in 1598. He relates their hardships, patience, and devotion,
in the face of the hatred and hostility of the natives--so bitter
that the missionaries are entreated, not only by Spanish officers
but by Bishop Salazar, to leave Pangasinan. But they refuse to go,
and finally their persistent and unwearied kindness to the Indians,
and their consistent Christian characters, soften those hard hearts;
and, after three years of patient waiting, the fathers gather a rich
harvest of souls. Those Indians are excellent Christians, and show most
edifying devotion and piety, a statement thoroughly confirmed by later
reports. The early persecution of the missionaries is explained by the
fact that after their arrival the oracles of the native idols became
silent, and by false accusations which the devil and his emissaries
concoct against the religious. The conversions and pious acts of two
prominent chiefs are related, as well as various miracles which occur
in this mission.
The leading events and persons of the next mission (1588-89)
are described. Amid the greatest difficulties and dangers, those
religious make the perilous voyage to Manila. The first provincial
chapter-meeting is held in that city, on June 12, 1588; on this
occasion the new province is organized, and officers regularly
elected. Some progress is made this year in Pangasinan; but some of
the natives are obstinately hostile, and the missionaries are often
ill-treated, and sometimes in danger of death. Their acts of charity to
the Indians, and especially their success in curing some sick persons,
gradually win the affection of the natives; and the fathers are able
to do much to improve the condition of those people--above all, in
furnishing them hospitals and medical care for the sick, thus saving
many lives.
Soon after reaching the islands the Dominicans also undertake to
minister to the Chinese who come to Manila. In this field, as among
the Indians, they obtain a foothold by their generous and unwearied
care for the sick; and soon they erect a hospital for the care
of poor Chinese sick persons, which rapidly increases in size and
in the aid bestowed upon it, and where nearly all the patients are
converted before they leave it. One of their converts devotes himself
to the service of the hospital for many years, and greatly aids the
fathers in charge of it. New buildings are erected, and the number
of converts is greatly increased. The village of Binondo is enlarged,
and a large and beautiful church is erected, for this Chinese Christian
population. The pious works of several of these converts are related.
The harvest of souls continues to increase, and in 1589 a small
but helpful reenforcement of missionaries arrives at the islands. A
full account is given of their labors in Pangasinan and Bataan, the
marvels wrought for them, the renunciation of idols by the heathen,
the devotion and piety displayed by the converts. Fathers Castro and
Benavides go to China (1590) to attempt the establishment of a mission
there; but their enterprise is a failure, on account of the Chinese
hostility to foreigners. Juan Cobo, acting provincial during Castro's
absence, visits the missions and makes some arrangements for their
more advantageous management. Excellent crops for several years,
and the advice and aid of the missionaries, increase the temporal
prosperity of the Indians; and they become more friendly to the
religious, and more inclined to receive religious instruction.
Gomez Perez Dasmarinas arrives at Manila in 1590, as governor of
the islands. Dissensions soon arise between him and Bishop Salazar,
and the latter departs for Spain (in June, 1591), accompanied
by Benavides. The governor is afterward slain by his own Chinese
oarsmen. In April, 1592, Fray Alonso Ximenes is chosen provincial;
the various missions are apportioned, and certain ordinances for their
conduct and the better government of the province are enacted. Fray
Juan de Castro and Fray Juan Cobo die soon afterward, of whom Aduarte
presents full biographical accounts. A special assembly of the
religious is convened in December, 1594, at which additional rules
for their conduct are adopted. They are also asked to send religious
to Nueva Segovia, for which mission two fathers are allotted. Aduarte
describes that province, and its conquest (1581) by the Spaniards,
to prevent it from becoming a Japanese possession. The Indians of
that province are so warlike that for a long time the Spaniards can
keep but a precarious hold upon it; and the friars find that they
can accomplish nothing there with either Spaniards or Indians. The
Dominicans, therefore, enter (1595) upon a hard and sterile field;
but a considerable reenforcement of missionaries opportunely arrive
to aid them, although many die while en route from Espana. Aduarte
recounts the superstitious beliefs and observances current among the
Cagayan Indians, notions which shape or modify nearly all of their
social customs; they are, from his standpoint, slaves to the devil
in all things. The Dominican missionaries, now eight in number, plan
and begin the spiritual conquest of Cagayan. For nearly a year they
endure, on account of the hostility of the natives, great sufferings
from hunger, exposure, and apparently vain efforts; but gradually
they subdue the natives by their unwearied self-denial, patience,
and love. Their first-fruits consist in eight converted chiefs,
who are baptized at Easter (1597), and these are the beginning of a
rich harvest--at first, mainly of children baptized before they die
from the prevalent epidemic of smallpox. Gradually, they are able to
build churches in the respective villages, and to introduce among
the Indians a civilized and Christian mode of life. At the time of
Aduarte's writing (ca. 1637), those people have become very fond
of their religious, and ask for them to come to teach them--even
changing their own residences, when necessary for their obtaining
religious instruction. The supply of missionaries for that region is
very inadequate, and should be promptly increased.
The Editors
July, 1905.
COMMERCE BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND NUEVA ESPANA
By Antonio Alvarez de Abreu; Madrid, 1736.
Source: Translated from Abreu's Extracto historial (Madrid, 1736),
fol. 1-28; from a copy in the possession of Edward E. Ayer,
Chicago.
Translation: This is made by Emma Helen Blair.
COMMERCE BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND NUEVA ESPANA
[From Extracto historial. [1]]
PERIOD I
Of what has been ordained by royal decrees, now compiled, in regard
to the commerce of Philipinas.
1-15. [This "period" consists of a very brief summary of the laws
regarding the above commerce, issued from 1593 to 1635; this matter,
in fuller form, has been already given in VOLS. XVII of this series,
pp. 27-50, and XXV, pp. 48-73, with which this document should
be read.]
PERIOD II
Of the debates on this commerce which occurred in the royal Council
of the Indias up to the year 1640, and the commissions which on that
account were entrusted to Senor Don Juan de Palafox, who, being an
official of the [India] House, went as bishop of Puebla de los Angeles.
Although in the collection of documents which was furnished to us by
the Council, for the compilation of this Extracto, nothing appears
relative to the controversies which occurred during the greater part
of the last century in regard to the commerce of Philipinas, in order
that the long silence on this matter--from the earliest decrees up
to the year 1684, of which an account is given us by the papers in
the Secretary's office (with which "Period III" begins, and which
the Extracto will follow)--may not seem irreparable, it has seemed to
us desirable to form the present "Period" from a printed quarto book
which was placed in the hands of Senor Palafox (who is now in Nueva
Espana) by the deputy of those islands, and has reached us among
other interesting documents. In this book are enumerated, for the
purpose of furnishing information to that prelate--who was charged
by the royal orders to inform [the government] regarding that affair
[of the commerce]--the arguments which during the years 1638-40 were
presented in behalf of the maintenance of the commerce of Philipinas,
and the enlargement of the amount of trade allowed to that colony. We
have not been able by any search to obtain the "Memorial" of one
hundred and thirty-six sections which is said, in this printed book,
to have been presented to the Council on this subject, in behalf of
the city of Manila; but the insertion of the present document will
not be unwelcome--not only because it contains substantially the same
arguments which in following years up to the present time have been
adduced, and which, it may reasonably be believed, those same islands
will reproduce in the future whenever this subject is discussed;
but because at the same time it presents certain information which
is of no little value for better understanding the importance of that
remote domain.
Justification of the maintenance of the Philipinas Islands and their
commerce
To the very illustrious and reverend Senor Don Juan de Palafox y
Mendoza, member of his Majesty's Council, in the royal Council of
the Indias, and bishop of Puebla de los Angeles: by Don Juan Grau y
Monfalcon, procurator-general of the Philipinas Islands, agent for
the principality of Catuluna, and syndic of the city of Barcelona.
Very illustrious and reverend sir:
Although I wrote for the city of Manila, the capital of the Philipinas
islands, a memorial of one hundred and thirty-six sections--at the
examination and discussion of which in the Council your illustrious
Lordship was present--in regard to eighty-five petitions, to which
can be reduced all the more important matters which may be presented
concerning those islands and their trade-route and their maintenance;
and that memorial with its petitions your illustrious Lordship is
carrying with you, as it is printed, so that it seems as if there
were no need of further information--and even these were superfluous
to one who is so well informed on all the matters which he has in his
keeping, and is so quick to understand those which may come before him:
nevertheless, in order that I may to some extent relieve and set free
your illustrious Lordship from the burdens imposed upon your memory,
as I know the number and importance of the commissions that you
must execute and the matters that you must decide in Nueva Espana
(all which will be successfully accomplished, as we are assured by
your wide experience in affairs), I have determined to comprise in
this single treatise the matters which concern the city of Manila,
and which it can present to you. It relates to the four leading
points which were entrusted by his Majesty and the royal Council of
the Indias, by royal decrees, to the judicious decision and accurate
information of your Lordship, as follows:
First, to what extent and in what manner shall the commerce of those
islands be tarried on?
Second, whether it will be expedient to increase and extend the
permission which they at present enjoy, both in the export of
merchandise and in the returns of money.
Third, whether in the amount of merchandise allowed to them shall be
included the products of the islands, or only those of China shall
be understood.
Fourth, whether the commerce which Peru was accustomed to hold with
Nueva Espana shall be resumed, on account of the loss which results
to the Philipinas and Nueva Espana from its suspension.
Point first
As for the first decree, which is so general as to include all, for
treating of the commerce of the islands, which is essential to their
preservation: this point, which in the memorial that I have cited is
argued at length, can be reduced to an argument of three infallible
propositions, of which, when two are proved, the third cannot be
denied; and they are in this form.
The Philipinas Islands are absolutely necessary: first, to increase the
preaching of the gospel; second, to maintain the authority, grandeur,
and reputation of this crown; third, to defend the Moluco Islands and
their trade; fourth, to support Eastern India; fifth, to relieve the
Western Indias from their enemies; sixth, to aid the two crowns of
Castilla and Portugal [2] in breaking down the power of the Dutch;
seventh, to protect for both crowns the commerce of China. In order
to support the islands, the commerce with Nueva Espana is requisite
and necessary; for by no other means can their defense, or means for
supporting it, be provided. It immediately follows that it is also
requisite and necessary to grant this commerce to the islands, or,
by abandoning them, to lose all the advantages which result from
their preservation, as here represented.
The first proposition of this argument consists of eight fundamental
reasons, which are stated therein; but it seems as if they ought
to be proved, in order that their force and cogency may be fully
understood. Accordingly, I will run through them as briefly as
possible.
The first one is the increase of the preaching and promulgation of
the holy gospel. This was the principal object which the Catholic
sovereigns of Castilla had in carrying on the discovery of the Western
Indias, and in colonizing and supporting them--and, consequently,
in doing the same for all the islands adjacent to them, among the
number of which are the Philipinas; and although the richness of
those provinces greatly aided their efforts, this was a secondary
object with the sovereigns, and a fulfilment of what is promised in
the gospel, that we must seek first the kingdom of God, and that all
the rest which the world possesses and esteems shall be gathered and
added to us. Therefore, since their intention was the conversion of
all the infidels who inhabit that opposite hemisphere, He who became
flesh in order to redeem them chose that this undertaking should
gain, as a secondary result, the infinite riches which the Indias
have given and are giving to Espana. Such a reason is not lacking
in the Philipinas Islands. Their first discovery and settlement
were solely for extending the Catholic faith; for then it was not
known that those islands would be rich--as indeed they are not of
themselves--nor that there could be any further result than the
conversion of their natives to the gospel law, and the opening of a
gate by which the preaching of the gospel could be carried to other
provinces and kingdoms of Asia. That enterprise was prosecuted very
successfully, as is publicly known; and it is now very evident that all
those islands are today in the bosom of the Church--for they contain
an archbishopric and three episcopal sees, and very many convents
and hospitals; and there may be seen the Christian religion as pure,
as valued, and as venerated as it is in Espana. And this rouses all
the more admiration because the location of the colony is so remote,
and so surrounded by heathens, Moors, and heretics; and that, in spite
of all, the power and revenues of this crown are able to maintain
it. But for this result, which was the main one, what was the second,
and in what was seen fulfilled the promise of the gospel? It was, that
God has placed in those seas a firm column, on which He could found,
and by which they could support themselves, Eastern India, the Molucas
Islands, their commerce, and that of China; and which shall prove for
the enemies of this crown--heretics, Moors, and heathens--a check
upon their advance, a resistance to their intentions, and a strong
rock on which they shall be broken, or at least their success may
be checked and their machinations prevented. Such are the Philipinas
Islands, and this rank they acquired after the preaching of the gospel
entered them; and it seems as if it were a providence of Heaven to
make them so necessary from the human standpoint, in order that the
divine influences might not be lacking in them. For if sometimes the
attainment of the first result might not be sufficient for maintaining
them (which the piety of the kings of Castilla renders incredible),
that of the second result would suffice, because even the divine needs
to be maintained in the world by human protection. This is an axiom
which, in lands newly converted, is generally accepted in the Indias;
and it has been thoroughly proved by experience that the gospel is more
effective among the barbarians when it is under the royal banners and
standards than when it goes without them. Accordingly, it pleased God
to ordain that these standards should be necessary in the Philipinas,
in order that the preaching of the gospel, which was the motive
for their going thither, might be established in their shelter. It
is therefore established by a well-grounded proposition that, even
if no more is looked for than this aim of converting the heathen,
it is now impossible to give up the preservation of the Philipinas,
as being so important a part of the Catholic church. And if the kings
of Castilla, in order not to permit liberty of conscience in Flandes,
have during more than seventy years maintained in those states
(and, through them, in all Europa) the most tedious and costly war
that any monarchy in the world has waged: how can it be denied that
by abandoning so vast a number of Catholics as there are in those
islands, who have been instructed by the Christian zeal of Spaniards,
there will, if we leave them now, be introduced among them liberty of
conscience? not to mention a mingling of schismatic heretics, Moors,
Jews, and heathens of various sects, as is seen in Bantan (which is
the Oriental Ginebra [i.e., Geneva]), and in all other places where
the Dutch find entrance; and they would soon enter those islands [if
we abandon them]. Even if they caused great expenses to this crown
(which they do not), they ought to be supported and preserved.
The second reason is, that in these islands are involved the authority,
grandeur, and reputation of this crown. [My statement in regard to]
the authority is proved by various methods, which may be found in the
memorial that I have cited--of which I will only notice here the power
which is exercised by the governor who rules the islands in the name
of his Majesty. So great is this that it may be affirmed with truth
that in all his kingdoms and seigniories (although the viceroyalties
are classed as superior to that government) the king does not appoint
to an office of greater authority. If this is not evident, let it
be noticed how many crowned kings render homage to that governor,
and recognize him as their superior; how they respect him and fear
his arms; how they desire his friendship, and, if they violate it,
receive punishment. The king of Ternate died a prisoner in Manila;
and he of Sian made, by force of arms, satisfaction for a reprisal
which he had committed. Those of Siao and Tidore are our subjects, and
that of Camboxa is our ally. The ruler of Great China is our friend,
and the emperor of Japon was such until the Dutch alienated him; and
although the failure of the Japanese trade causes us loss, we have not
feared to declare that ruler our enemy--as are those of Champa, Sian,
and Mindanao; and, more than all, the Dutch, who keep those seas so
infested. And it ought to be considered that the governor of Philipinas
sends ambassadors to all those kings, with gifts to present to them,
and receives those that they send to him in return; he makes peace and
declares war, and does whatever seems to him expedient; and all this on
his own responsibility, without waiting for a decision of the matter
from Espana, because the excessive distance renders him the entire
master in these acts. This is a preeminence of so great authority that
no governor or viceroy in Europe exercises it. The grandeur which this
monarchy preserves in those islands is widely known. In its material
aspect, that domain extends through a circuit of 1,400 leguas, in
which are included the two archipelagos of San Lazaro and Moluco:
the latter composed of five especially important islands, which their
own kings govern, with more than seventy others adjacent; the latter,
of those which are properly called Philipinas, forty in number--some
of them larger than all Espana, some as large as this country, and
others somewhat smaller. This does not mention the islands that are
small and uninhabited, which are without number. Among all these is
[foremost] the island of Luzon, in which is the distinguished and ever
loyal city of Manila, which is the precious stone of this setting,
and which alone is enough to prove the grandeur of Espana--by its
location, its splendor, its buildings, its sky, and its soil. In its
citizens are resplendent the religious faith, the loyalty, and the
courage which gave origin to that colony. Since Manila is, as some
say, the antipodes of Sevilla, it seems as if it tried to imitate
that city in its characteristics, and in being a military center and
an emporium of commerce for that hemisphere. If one considers higher
things, the power of the islands cannot be reduced to the region just
mentioned. Manila may be compared to the city of Goa, the capital
of Eastern India; and it is she who reduces to subjection all the
coasts from the Straits of Sincapura to Japon, and the islands of
the Ladrones and the Papuas; for her fleets sail through all those
seas with the never conquered and always victorious royal standards
of Espana. Her ships are admitted into many maritime kingdoms of Asia,
and into numberless islands adjacent to them; they make voyages so long
that no others equal to these are known. They go to China and Japon,
and by the Southern Sea to Nueva Espana; and by way of the Northern
Sea--coasting all the Oriental kingdoms, emerging [from the China Sea]
through Sincapura, and doubling the great Stormy Cape, that of Buena
Esperanza--they have reached the bar of San Lucar, with these two
voyages making almost the entire circuit of the world. And if commerce
is regarded as the greatest splendor of kingdoms (as it certainly is),
this greatness is not lacking to the Philipinas; for they have so
rich a commerce that, if they could enjoy it free, there is no city
known to the world that would surpass, or even equal, Manila. That
in that colony resides and is preserved the reputation of this crown,
is evident, if it be noted that the maintenance of that reputation by
the arms of Espana in Fuente-Rabia, in Salsas, in Italia, in Flandes,
in Alemania, and in other parts of Europa is not to be wondered at;
for if Espana is the heart which inspires strength in the mystical
body of this monarchy, it is not much that the members which are
nearest and so closely connected should share most effectively in
this influx of energy. And if his Majesty (whom God preserve!) is
the soul or vital breath of this heart, it cannot be denied that
the closer proximity will cause the greater effect. Besides, the
great number of the troops who go out from the adjoining [European]
states prevents the enemy from seizing any one of those states;
but the greatest cause of reputation for this crown is that, at a
distance of three thousand leguas from the royal person and Espana,
three thousand three hundred and thirty-six Spaniards, all of them
occupied in those islands in war and in peace, on sea and on land,
[accomplish what they do]. It is the citizens of Manila who are
the substance of that diamond, where the adjoining states are all
enemies--barbarians, heretics, Moors, and heathens. Those Spaniards
are without hope of succor in emergencies, without safety for the
unfortunate in the retreat, and even without the reward due them
for their achievements; they are always inferior in numbers, and
continually attacked by Dutch, Mindanaos, Japanese, Jaos, and other
peoples. They are always in anxiety about the Chinese, or Sangleys,
who number more than 30,000 in Manila; and about the natives, of
whom there are more than 80,000. In that land of many islands they
maintain fortified posts, and on the sea armed fleets of galleons,
galleys, and champans--one for the defense of Manila, another for
conveying troops and supplies to Terrenate, and another for the fort
on the island of Hermosa. In this last island and in those of Moluco,
our military posts confront the Dutch; our people are continually
fighting on sea and on land, while they wage on the frontier a fierce
war with the most wary people that is known, and with tribes who are
as cruel as they can be. Yet, although their soldiers are so few, they
meet innumerable obligations, acquit themselves of all, and cause the
Spanish name to emerge from all gloriously, and the standards of the
king our lord victoriously. Therefore, it is the Philipinas Islands
that preserve the reputation of this crown with the most valor and
the least reward, with the greatest hazard, and with most glory.
The third fundamental reason is, that the Philipinas defend the
islands of Moluco, and the commerce in the cloves that are obtained
from them. The importance of these islands is everywhere known,
because in all the world there are no other islands nor any other
region in which grows this spice or drug, so highly valued. For
their discovery alone Hernando de Magallanes made, by order of the
emperor Carlos Fifth, that celebrated voyage in which he found the
strait to which he gave his name, and passed through it into the
Southern Sea; and, although he was slain while making his claims, his
ship sailed around the world. The lordship of those islands caused
troublesome hostilities between the Castilians and Portuguese,
which were ended by this crown giving them to that of Portugal,
in fulfilment of a contract; for it seemed (and indeed was evident)
that Castilla would have much difficulty in maintaining them when they
were so separated from all its kingdoms and states, while Portugal,
by possessing Eastern India, was less distant from and could better
support them. The course of time showed that even India was very
remote from them; for when the Dutch power entered the Orient and
established a military post in Bantan [3]--a port nearer to Moluco,
and more advantageously located than was India--it was so obviously
impossible to defend them that in the end they were lost to us,
the enemy getting possession of them all and of their commerce. But
as the Philipinas were by that time quite populous, and so near to
the Molucas that they were superior to Bantan [as a trading post],
the task of restoring the Molucas [to Spanish control] was laid upon
the governor, Don Diego de Acuna--who with his courage and energy,
and the convenience of being so near, regained them and restored them
to this crown. When both Castilla and Portugal recognized the great
expense that India would have to incur in maintaining the Molucas,
and that even with excessive expenditures it would be impossible to
do so, on account of the injury being nearer than the remedy, and the
enemy than the succor, those islands were, by the mutual agreement of
the two crowns, united to the government of the Philipinas as regards
their defense and support. The clove-trade was left to the Portuguese,
because it was so important that, if it were taken from them, India
would perish, or become greatly weakened. It is thus sufficiently
proved that the Philipinas contributed to the restoration of all the
forts in the Orient; and that in their preservation was and still is
involved that of the Molucas, and consequently of all India. Thus
they have been maintained since the year 1603, defending them by
force of arms against the Dutch, who never cease their endeavors to
expel the Castilians from those islands; this has been the cause of
many naval encounters and battles, in which the arms of Espana have
always remained victorious. Nevertheless, since the military force
of Philipinas is small, the territory that they must defend large,
and the aid which is given to them for this purpose very limited,
it has not been possible to prevent the treachery and persistence of
the Dutch from having some effect; nor to put a stop to their sharing
in the clove trade at some forts which they keep in the Molucas,
though at the cost of many men, armed vessels, and expenses. From all
of these islands are produced each year 2,816,000 libras of cloves,
of which the Dutch secure 1,098,000 libras, and the Portuguese and
Castilians 1,718,000--and this latter supply is due to the protection
of the Philipinas; while it is computed that the cloves which the
Dutch carry away amount to three times as much as it will cost them
to be absolute lords of the Molucas, even with the large garrisons and
armed fleets which they keep and maintain for purchasing the spice and
transporting it to Bantan. From this it obviously follows that without
the Philipinas the Molucas would be lost, and their commerce and trade
in cloves would cease--from which would follow two pernicious results,
which would cause the loss of whatever his Majesty possesses in the
Orient. One is, that India would be greatly weakened, for lack of that
commerce; for if that country languishes on account of not having all
of that trade, it may well be understood that she will perish if it be
taken from her. The other is, that the Dutch in that case would have
the entire benefit of the trade, and without much expense; for if
[Holanda] with less than half the trade--and that at the cost of so
many garrisons and fleets--gains such profits that they are enough
to maintain whatever she has in India; if she were to secure all the
cloves and, on account of the less cost, thus gain a profit of more
than a thousand per cent upon her investments, while the gross amount
would be doubled: it is very plain that India would not remain safe,
the Western Indias would be more effectively harassed, the rebel states
in Flandes would be strengthened, the coasts of Espana would experience
their invasions, and everywhere the treasure that could be obtained
from the Molucas alone would cause most injurious effects--as may
be seen, with more detailed arguments, in the memorial that I have
cited in behalf of the Philipinas, to which [colony] we owe the only
compensation [that we receive] for all these losses.
The fourth reason is almost the sequence of what has been said in the
third, although it is more general, since it takes notice that the
Dutch fleets have entered the Orient with so strong a force that they
have often placed India in risk of being lost to us; for if they were
aided by the Moorish and heathen kings and the rulers of Persa and
Mogor [4]--and sometimes the Dutch are leagued with the English, who
also navigate those seas--their invasion would be irresistible. What
has prevented this danger has been the diversion furnished by the
Philipinas--not only by diminishing their trade and profits in Moluco
(as has been seen), in China, and in other regions, but by compelling
them to divide their forces, and to maintain in some places very
large ones. India is divided into two parts--[one], from the Cape
of Buena Esperanza to the Straits of Sincapura; the other, from the
straits to China and Japon. The first is defended by the Portuguese
fleets of India, which seldom go thither through the straits; the
second, by the Castilians of Philipinas, who never come here by way
of the straits. For both these, it is necessary that the Dutch send
thither and maintain squadrons; and therefore it is proved, at this
very beginning, that if the fleets of this crown are deficient in
either of those regions, and the enemy can transfer all of his naval
force to the one that remains [without defense] because there is no
diversion [of his forces] in the other, it will be difficult if not
impossible to defend [the one to which he goes]--an argument which
admits no debate in the naval as well as in the military world. From
this it follows that if now the Philipinas fail us Eastern India
will remain without aid, and consequently in evident danger of being
lost [to us]. This is further confirmed by the fact that, of the two
parts into which India is divided, the enemy expends much more of his
energy in the second than in the first. In the latter he is content
with factories and barter, without keeping any fortified posts; in
the former, he maintains the forts of Malayo, Toloco, Tacubo, Malaca,
Tacome, Marieco, Motir, Nofagia, Tafacen, Tabelole, Bermevelt, Tabori,
Gilolo, Amboino, Lagu, Maruco, Mozovia, Belgio, Bantan, and Hermosa
Island. In these nineteen presidios there were, in the year 1616,
3,000 soldiers; 193 pieces of bronze artillery and 310 of iron, and
300 stone-mortars [pedreros]; and thirty war galleons. And all this
is solely to defend themselves from the Philipinas, and to attack
the islands so that the armed fleets of India shall not sail to that
region--or, if they should go thither, it would be easy to stop them
at the Strait of Sincapura. If then, the Philipinas were unable to
act, and the Dutch should abandon those nineteen forts (which now are
many more), as being no longer necessary to them, they would proceed
to the coasts of India, and their galleons to those seas. If even
when their energies are diverted, their forces divided, and their
gains diminished as they are now, they cause so much anxiety, what
would it be if, with little if any opposition, their forces united,
and their profits increased, they should harass India? It is easy to
see that they would occasion that region the utmost distress, and that
consequently the Philipinas are an absolutely necessary defense for it.
The fifth reason has the same ground as the fourth; for, on account of
the diversion of forces and the expense which the enemy now encounters
in the Orient and in the forts of Moluco, he is compelled to refrain
from annoying the Western Indias, and must devote less attention,
military force, and money to that object. And since what he spends
or fails to gain in India enables the Philipinas to oppose or to
embarrass him, it follows that if he there shall gain more and spend
less, he will here take possession of both [the Indias]. And if the
Indias, even with so effective a diversion [of the enemy's force as
they have now], need the Windward Fleet which is being built there,
and for which a subsidy of 600,000 ducados is granted annually: in
order to dispense with the garrisons, fleets, and expenditures in
India everything would have to be increased, so that in the Indias
more expense would be incurred for their defense than is consumed in
the Philipinas.
The sixth is a reason of honor and profit, for these two admirable
results follow from the victories which the inhabitants of Philipinas
have gained over the Dutch: honor, on account of the glory which the
Catholic arms acquire in those seas, which gains for them the esteem
of the Japanese, Chinese, Sianese, Mindanaos, and innumerable other
peoples, who serve as spectators in the theatre for such exploits;
and profit, since, if the enemy's forces are weakened it follows that,
besides those that he loses in being conquered, he is compelled to
expend still greater ones in order to keep his foothold. This is the
most notable reason for maintaining powerful squadrons on the sea,
in order that if the pirate undertakes to plunder successfully, he
will have to do it with so great a force that either he will abandon
the prize because he cannot hold it, or he will let it alone because
the profits do not make it worth his while. Of the victories which
the Spaniards have gained in those seas there are extant histories
and accounts; and in the large memorial some of these are mentioned.
The seventh is, that [by the islands] are aided the two crowns
of Castilla and Portugal, who are so united and in so fraternal
relations in the Orient, each possessing its share of the two parts
into which that region is, as we have said, divided. If we are to base
our opinion on experience, the facts are evident in the restoration
of Moluco; for in the time of Governor Don Juan de Sylva the forces
of both crowns were joined, and it is regarded as certain that,
if death had not intercepted his designs, he would have driven from
those seas the arms of Holanda and of Inglaterra, and awakened fear
and dread in many kings who were awaiting the result of so powerful
a combination; and, even though success is not always so immediate,
it suffices that it should be possible to make the enemy fear, and to
lead them to believe that what has occurred sometimes may occur often.
The eighth reason is to protect and preserve the commerce of China
for both crowns. For this argument it is taken for granted that this
commerce is one of the most beneficial and lucrative of those in
the entire Orient; and we can say that there is no other in all the
world that equals it. The Oriental traffic of ancient times, which
the Romans so highly valued, originated in China and in the drugs,
fabrics, and curiosities of that country--although, as they were
ignorant of its real origin, they called it the India trade, since
they received it from that country. In the larger memorial I have
already discoursed upon this at length. Now all the nations in those
[Oriental] kingdoms take part in this commerce, but it is conducted
most extensively and steadily by the Portuguese of India and the
Castilians of Manila; we shall soon relate how important it is to the
latter. Of the Portuguese it suffices to say that they possess in China
the city of Macan, and the privilege of entering that of Canton; and
the commerce of these two cities they maintain through the Strait of
Sincapura, though always in danger from the Dutch. But as the profits
are so great, they sail by that route; it adds much to their safety
that they cross through the seas of Philipinas, and that Macan can
find succor in Manila. But if this should be lacking, Macan could not
remain many years without ruin, nor could India enjoy the commerce
with China, which is one of those which most benefit her; and if the
Chinese trade is cut off from India and Manila, the Dutch alone will
be strong enough to carry it on. Although they are at present shut
out from it by the robberies that they have committed on the Sangleys,
they would not find it difficult to bring the latter to friendship with
them; for it is already known that when money is lacking in Philipinas
the Sangleys carry their merchandise to the Dutch. Therefore, on the
preservation of those islands depends that of the Chinese trade.
These eight fundamental reasons are sufficient to prove the importance
and necessity that exist for maintaining, preserving, and favoring
those islands; for if they were lost the resulting damage would be
great and excessive beyond any possible comparison or proportion to
what the islands now cost us. And because there is seen in this an
error of misapprehension, I will make a statement regarding it that
is worthy of much attention and notice. This is, that it costs the
royal exchequer more to support the island of San Martin [5]--which
is of no use, and has no more effect than to remove an obstacle to
the navigation of the Indias, and take away a landing-place from the
pirates (who already have numberless others)--than to maintain the
Philipinas Islands, which have the utility and effectiveness which
I have stated.
For the proof of this, I avail myself of a summary of the
detailed statements in the larger memorial, regarding the cost
of the Philipinas. For the officials of justice, who govern them,
37,077 pesos; for the entire ecclesiastical estate, 37,277 pesos. In
maintaining friendly relations with neighboring kings, 1,500 pesos. In
the administration of the royal exchequer, 11,550 pesos. For the land
forces at Manila, and in the military posts of all the islands, 229,696
pesos. For wars on land, and the forts in Moluco, 97,128 pesos. For
naval war, shipbuilding, and navy-yards, 283,184 pesos. For supplies
and provisions for all the soldiers and seamen, 153,302 pesos. These
sums amount to 850,734 pesos, which is the expenditure made each
year for the islands--not omitting to reckon wages and salaries,
scanty though they be. This, therefore, is all the charge for their
cost which can be made.
On the credit side of the account, the tributes from the crown
encomiendas are worth each year 53,715 pesos; and the two reals which
are paid to the king by each Indian in the private encomiendas amount
to 21,107 pesos. The licenses which are given to the Sangleys come to
112,000 pesos; and the tributes from these Sangleys, to 8,250. The
fifth and the tenth of gold, 750 pesos. The ecclesiastical tithes,
which are collected by the royal exchequer for the support of the
prelates and clergy, 2,750 pesos. The freight charges in his Majesty's
ships, 350 pesos. The court fines, 1,000 pesos. The customs duties,
38,000 pesos. The mesada and half-annats, 6,000. From these ten sources
the income amounts to 243,922 pesos; to this must be added the imposts,
freight dues, and customs duties which are collected in Nueva Espana
on the merchandise that comes from the islands--all which amount to
300,000 pesos, and this is income that results and proceeds from the
islands; accordingly, by a decree of February 19, 1606, it is commanded
that these charges, adding to their amount each year, be remitted to
Manila, and that so much less be sent from the royal exchequer of
Mexico. And if all these goods are sold and traded in Nueva Espana
once, or two or more times, and pay the customary charges of alcabala,
[6] if the rate of two [per cent] which they usually pay was moderated
to 30,000 pesos in the larger memorial, the rate on the said [sales]
will certainly amount to 60,000 pesos. With this, the islands now
have 593,922 pesos to their credit; so that their [actual] expense
cannot be estimated at more than 256,812 pesos--[and that] without
counting the proceeds of the Crusade, those from intestate property,
or the monopoly of playing-cards.
Another item ought to be placed with these, which is the expense for
the islands of Moluco. These were possessions of the crown of Portugal,
which consumed in supporting and defending them great sums of ducados
and many soldiers; but finally it lost them, and the Dutch gained
them. By agreement of the two crowns, Governor Don Pedro de Acuna
regained possession of them (as I have related); and as it was evident
that the crown of Portugal could not defend them on account of the
great expense required therefor, those islands were committed, in the
year 1607, to the governor of Philipinas. In this must be considered
several things. First, that these islands of Moluco do not belong
to those which are called Philipinas, nor are they included in that
group. Second, that at present they are the property of the Portuguese
crown, but are in possession of the Castilian crown for the purpose
of protecting, maintaining, and defending them; on this account, the
commerce in cloves is left to India, as it was before. Third, that
the Philipinas and the citizens of Manila do not obtain or possess
any advantage or benefit from Moluco, or anything else besides the
continual trouble of succoring and provisioning its forts; for the
clove-trade belongs to the Portuguese, and there is no other commerce
in those islands. Fourth, that since the day when the governor of
Philipinas and the crown of Castile took charge of Moluco, the crown
of Portugal has saved more than 400,000 pesos, the cost which it would
have incurred in maintaining Moluco, estimated on the basis of what
it now costs Castilla for that--although Manila, which is the place
where provision is made for those islands, is so near them. Fifth,
that for these reasons it is evident and plain that what is spent for
the islands of Moluco should not be charged to the Philipinas; nor
even should the crown of Castilla pay it, but rather that of Portugal,
which is the proprietary owner of Moluco, and has the benefit of the
clove-trade. Consequently, whatever is received from that trade must
be placed to the credit and acquittance of the Philipinas, against
the amount charged to them. Sixth, and last, notice the [items of]
the annual expenses of the Moluco Islands: for salaries, 97,128 pesos;
provisions, considering the total number of people, will average
30,000 pesos a year; for the ecclesiastical ministrations and the
management of the royal treasury, the expense will reach 4,000 pesos;
and for naval affairs and shipyards, 100,000 pesos--since in order
to send every year the usual supplies, and to furnish extraordinary
aid when occasion demands, the armed ships are necessary which are
always kept at Manila. Thus the cost of the islands of Moluco comes
to more than 230,000 pesos each year; deducting this from the 256,000
which remain charged to the Philipinas, only 26,000 pesos. This is
an amount unworthy of consideration, even if the islands were of no
more use than to augment the grandeur of this crown; but granting
that they possess the advantages that I have mentioned, the loss,
cost, and expense is nothing; and it remains abundantly proved how
necessary, just, expedient, and requisite it is to maintain them.
If the Philipinas are to be maintained, it now remains to ascertain
how and in what manner this shall be done, in order to secure their
preservation, and [at the same time] to avoid any considerable injury
to the royal exchequer and to the other kingdoms of this crown. For
this there are but two methods, and these alone; no other can be found
which is adequate and efficacious. The first one is, the method which
is adopted for the island of San Martin, and for all the military posts
which his Majesty maintains in the Indias and in other regions, and
for his fleets and armies; this is, to furnish from the royal treasury
all that shall be necessary for this purpose. Granting that the islands
cost annually 850,000 pesos and furnish revenues of 244,000 pesos, his
Majesty will have to supply 606,000 pesos. Although this is a great
sum of money, the preservation of those islands is so desirable, and
so much more will have to be lost and spent if the islands are lost,
that, in case there shall be no other way, it will be necessary and
compulsory to accept and carry out the above method--although even that
would not be enough, for the islands now cost 850,000 pesos [only]
because the citizens of Manila give much aid, and render service
with their persons and property. In one year they have thus given
more than 200,000 pesos, as is made evident in the larger memorial,
nos. 59 and 60. Accordingly, this method is exceedingly costly,
and even more so than it would seem, for the reason that I have stated.
There remains, then, the second method, the only one [available];
this consists in granting commerce to those islands, which would
suffice to secure three results. The first of these is, to preserve
the present revenue of 244,000 pesos that they yield; for that sum,
or the greater part of it, is based on the wealth which the islands
obtain from their commerce, and if this fails them they will produce
much less, and therefore much more will have to be supplied [from
without]. The second, to give the royal treasury the benefit of the
606,000 pesos which (or the greater part of that sum) are deficient
for the usual expense account, as has been shown. The third, to
furnish the citizens with means by which they can, in emergencies,
aid the extraordinary expenses--as they always have done, and still
do--by having a commerce to support them; but without this it will be
necessary, as they would lack the means to render such aid, that the
king should bear these expenses. These three results being granted,
the preservation of those islands readily follows.
The question then remains as to the character, amount, and form of
this commerce, which are three principal topics. As for the character
of this commerce, it is noted in the larger memorial (no. 15) that
the islands have a domestic and a foreign commerce. It has been shown
that this is scanty, except what proceeds from Moluco; but that this
might be very rich, since it is the trade in cloves (as may be seen
in nos. 28, 30, 34, and 36 of the said memorial). But, as this trade
is reserved for the Portuguese and prohibited to the Castilians,
it is useless to consider it for this purpose--although it is worth
notice that whatever advantage the crown of Portugal derives from that
trade is due to the Philipinas, and results from their preservation. I
shall soon make some observations on the remaining portion of this
domestic commerce, and what can be obtained from it.
Their foreign commerce is with many regions of the Orient, as is
stated in the said memorial, from no. 20 on; and in no. 37 it is
shown that only the inhabitants of the Philipinas can carry on the
commerce with China, because they have means for this only--exporting
that merchandise to Nueva Espana, and obtaining the returns from
it in silver, with which to maintain it; for they have no other
commodity which the Chinese crave, as is proved in the said memorial,
no. 70. From this the conclusion is drawn that the islands cannot
be preserved without commerce, and that this must necessarily be
conducted with Nueva Espana in Chinese merchandise, and in some of
their own products.
As for the second point, the amount of the commerce, this was formerly
without any limitation; and during the time (which was short) while
that condition lasted the islands acquired what strength and wealth
and grandeur they now possess. After a time certain difficulties
arose--which are discussed in the said memorial, nos. 80, 81, 94, 117,
and 118--all being to the prejudice of Espana's commerce; on account
of these it became expedient to limit the commerce of the islands,
reducing it to a fixed amount of 250,000 pesos' worth of merchandise
and 500,000 pesos in returns. Although the citizens resented this,
and saw that if it were successful they could [only] preserve their
wealth without being able to increase it much, they went on under
this decree from the time when it began to be executed (in 1605)
until 1635--when Don Pedro de Quiroga went [to Mexico], and by his
rigorous measures reduced this permission to terms so restricted that
it was rather taking away the permission entirely than carrying out
its intent. This falling upon the necessity of the islands that the
stated amount of their merchandise be increased, on account of the many
shipwrecks, misfortunes, and expenses which they had experienced--of
which I have made a brief relation in the said memorial, no. 107--to
take away the permission that they had without granting them a more
liberal one, was more than they could endure; it may readily be
seen what results this would cause. And as divine Providence did not
cause these troubles to cease with the death of him who caused them,
it may well be believed that the islands are today in so miserable a
condition that they will either be ruined or can no longer be reached
by the remedy which the kind attention of the council has begun to
furnish them--entrusting its final application to the inquiry to be
made by your illustrious Lordship, who is well informed of the losses,
advantages and disadvantages, and all the circumstances of which
knowledge is necessary for your decision in a matter so serious as
this, on which depends the preservation of the Philipinas and of all
that depends upon them. Their citizens hope that your decision will
be what is expedient and necessary for those vassals, always so loyal,
but always harassed by enemies, and even by friends.
There remains, then, the third point of the three that I have stated;
that is, the form which must be adopted and followed in this commerce
of the islands with Nueva Espana. Don Pedro de Quiroga proceeded
in this matter with measures so rigorous and unusual that he tried
to establish regulations different from those which are respected
and observed in all the ports of Espana, of the Indias, and of
the world. He undertook to open and weigh the bundles and chests,
and to count, weigh, and measure the commodities and wares, without
any preceding denunciation, information, or [even] indication that
these exceeded the registration. He laid an embargo on all, without
there being any guilt on the part of the owners, or prohibition of the
articles; and for only raising this so unjust embargo he extorted from
the commerce 300,000 pesos--excluding from composition 600,000 pesos'
worth besides, which are included in the [right of] composition by
express, clear, and plain provisos [of the ordinances]. He collected
the dues on whatever appraisement of the goods it suited him to make,
although it was evident to him that they were being sold at half
that rate in Acapulco, and even in Mexico. He hindered the return
of the proceeds from the merchandise, which is allowed by the royal
decree; and it cannot be denied that he who carries his goods to sell,
[even though] with permission, may not exact the price that he shall
obtain for them. For granting that permission, he demanded new dues and
imposed new burdens; compelled the shippers to do whatever he wished,
and harassed the mariners on that trade-route until he made them leave
it--when it is known (and the islands are making representations to
that effect) that it is for what is most needed in those islands that
the governors in Manila make concessions to their citizens when the
latter ask for these, in order to constrain them by kindness to what
could not be obtained by severity; and the Council is conferring upon
those citizens privileges and distinctions, in order that many may
be encouraged to become mariners and artillerists. All this was done
by Don Pedro de Quiroga under pretext of serving his Majesty; but it
caused his royal exchequer the great loss which has been experienced
in the failure, for two years, of ships to arrive from Philipinas. By
this has been lost, in dues alone, 660,000 pesos, and as much more
through the suspension of commerce; and still greater were the losses
to the vassals of his Majesty, to say nothing of the danger in which
those islands were left, and to which they are still exposed. To
speak of the plan which should be established in this commerce,
it seems as if it were sufficient to place before your illustrious
Lordship what Don Pedro de Quiroga did, and what resulted from that,
in order to understand that if by his proceedings he destroyed and
ruined the commerce it is not expedient to follow his example. Rather
should be followed those of Sevilla, Cartagena, Portovelo, Vera Cruz,
and the other ports of the Indias and of these kingdoms, in which royal
laws, decrees, and ordinances have ordained what shall be observed in
these matters; and since these regulations are not annulled or broken
in favor of the islands, it will not be just if they are broken or
annulled to the loss or injury of that colony. For neither do those
vassals merit less than this, nor is their commerce of different
character from the other commerce that belongs to this crown.
Although representations have been made, with more exaggeration
and less in accordance [with the facts] than would be desirable,
of serious infractions of law that have been committed in this
commerce--which representations I have answered at length and
in detail in the said memorial, from no. 94 to no. 99--it may be
observed that, if there are any (which, if I do not admit, I do not
deny), they are not of greater extent nor of different character than
those which are every year experienced in the fleets and galleons
on the India trade-route. These infractions consist in shipping more
merchandise than what is registered, and different commodities from
what are declared, and in carrying back more silver than is shown
by the registers; and there are not and cannot be on the ships of
Philipinas other infractions than the shipment of more goods and
the return of more silver than appear on the registers. Let, then,
the remedy be ascertained which is applied at Sevilla, Cadiz, and
San Lucar, at Cartagena, Portovelo, Vera Cruz, and Habana, and let
the same be applied at Manila and Acapulco. [7] Let guards be placed,
and informers allowed, and goods declared--with rewards to encourage,
and punishments to warn; but it would be a chance success to ascertain
in detail what would be shipped at Sevilla and unloaded in the ports
of the Indias. This would be to establish not order but disorder in
that commerce, as I state in the said memorial, no. 95; and soon the
same thing would be noticed in that of the islands.
And although it may be represented that the infractions in the
Philipinas trade, considering their amount, cause more loss than
those in the commerce of Espana, especially in the exportation of the
silver--since that which is brought in the galleons outside of the
kingdom finally comes to Castilla; and that which is carried in the
ships of Philipinas soon finds its way to China, and thus is lost,
and the commerce is taken away from the vassals of this crown--reply
may thus be made. The illegal shipments on the Philipinas route cause
much less loss than do those on the India route, as is incurred when
a galleon laden with silver is lost at sea, as compared with one that
is captured by enemies; in the former case there is only our own loss,
but in the latter is the same loss, and an advantage to our enemies. It
cannot be denied that the silver which goes unregistered in the ships
of Philipinas is lost, but no enemy of this crown benefits thereby;
for that silver comes to a halt in China, from which country it never
emerges--as is stated in the said memorial, no. 72--nor does it work
any harm there, whether it be more or less; for neither do we wage
war with China, nor do the Chinese aid any other nation which wages
war with us. As for the silver which comes [to Espana] unregistered
in the galleons, those who best understand the subject consider
that it would cause less damage if it remained in the Indias (and
even some extend this idea to its being lost in the sea); because,
under the pretext of its coming concealed, it either does not come
into Sevilla, or, if it does come in, soon goes out again. In both
these cases, it remains in the hands of the French, English, Flemish,
and Portuguese, and most of it is anchored in their ships, by which
Inglaterra, Francia, and Holanda are enriched; while that which goes
to Portugal is carried to India, and there it is shared by the Dutch,
Persians, Arabs, Mogous, and other hostile nations, until it reaches
China, which is its center [of equilibrium]. It may be judged, then,
which is the greater injury; and since the loss caused by the illegal
shipments on the vessels of Philipinas is less, let that be done
with those ships that is done with the galleons. But let it not be
proposed that the commerce be taken from them, or its amount limited,
or that unusual methods and severity be employed in dealing with
them, since these are not used in the commerce of the Indias, and,
comparing them together, one is no less necessary than the other.
From these considerations we draw the final conclusion that if the
Philipinas Islands are, as has been proved, absolutely necessary to
this crown on account of the eminent advantages and benefits which
result to it from them, and that, in order to preserve them, there
are but two methods: one, for his Majesty to support them; the other,
to grant them commerce by which they can sustain themselves--the first
costly and difficult, the second easy and obvious--the latter ought
to be accepted and carried out. [This can be done] by giving them
the commerce which they have hitherto enjoyed with Nueva Espana,
to the amount that is expedient, and in the usual manner, without
adding conditions that will diminish or render it difficult; for
that will be to withdraw and consequently to destroy and end it,
and with it those islands, which are so important to this Catholic
monarchy. Your illustrious Lordship will make such report on this
point and argument as [his Majesty's] vassals there expect and desire
from your great ability and zeal.
Point second
As for the permission [to trade] which the islands have enjoyed since
1604--which is to the amount of 250,000 pesos that may be carried
in merchandise, and 500,000 pesos which may be sent back in silver,
on the two ships which are allotted for that trade--the islands
have petitioned his Majesty that he would graciously increase the
250,000 pesos' worth of merchandise to 500,000, and the 500,000
pesos of silver to 800,000; this is referred to the inquiry of
your illustrious Lordship. And although I have in the said memorial
discussed the main arguments for this request, I will, since these
are related to the entire subject of those islands, here reduce them
to six or seven principles.
First: because, as I have stated and proved, this commerce began
in the year 1565, and was carried on without any restriction of its
amount until 1604, when it was limited to the amount above stated. The
islands could endure this limitation because they then possessed three
attributes which they now lack. The first was, that the citizens were
rich and strong through having enjoyed free trade almost forty years;
and therefore they possessed, and have had thus far, the means to bear
expense and losses. But since, from their trade being reduced to so
small an amount, it resulted that their profits were diminished and
their obligations increased; their fortunes have so steadily declined
that, if the trade permitted to them is not increased, they cannot
improve their fortunes, nor even preserve the remnants of these. The
second was, that those islands had few enemies, and were less infested
and harried by them [than now]; for until the year 1600 neither did
the Dutch cause any anxiety in those seas, nor was there any other
nation which visited them with hostile acts or fleets. Since that
year the profits obtained from the cloves, the plunder of the ships
from China, and friendly relations with the Japanese, have all been
such inducements to the Dutch to frequent the seas in that region that
they have kept the [Philipinas] Islands continually in arms, rendering
them an active military frontier. Hardly a year has passed without
a sea-fight; and, moreover, the Dutch have incited the Mindanaos,
the Japanese, and other barbarians also to make war on us. The result
has been that the citizens [of the islands] have spent their fortunes
in serving his Majesty, which they have done with their property and
persons--as is described in the said memorial, nos. 59 and 60. And as
the profits from their commerce have become less, and the expenses for
war greater and more continual, their poverty has become so great that
they are in need of more favor than they have thus far enjoyed; for if
(as has been proved) their commerce only is adequate to support those
islands, and that which they have hitherto carried on is steadily
declining, it must necessarily be increased, in order that they may
not perish and be destroyed. This is confirmed by the third of the
circumstances mentioned above, the excessive and enormous losses
of property which the citizens of Manila have suffered since the
year 1575--which are mentioned, in due order, in the said memorial,
no. 107. Some of these misfortunes occurred before the year 1604,
and, as until then the commerce was free, they had some reparation
for their losses; but those which have occurred since then have had,
on account of the limitation of trade, but little relief and scanty
reparation. The result has been that, although the injurious effects
and great loss have not been noticed every year, they are in the course
of all those years so keenly felt that a special means of restoration
is needed; and there can be no other save that of increasing their
commerce, for their relief must come from the same quarter as that
whence their losses came.
Second: [This relief should be given] because when the permit for
250,000 pesos was granted there were in Manila fewer citizens and
soldiers; and now the number of these and the [size of the] city
have increased, and more aid has become necessary, not only with the
course of the thirty-six years which have elapsed, but because there
is more war. It appears that those who are occupied in his Majesty's
service on pay, including those who have been sent to the islands and
those who are born there, number 3,338 Spaniards, and 2,540 Indians
of various nationalities--not counting the citizens, or the traders,
or other persons who are pursuing various crafts (as is stated in
the said memorial, no. 55)--which is twice the number employed in the
year 1604. And as it is requisite that all participate in the commerce,
and that--although it must be through the medium of the citizens, among
whom the amount allowed is distributed--all persons may have some share
in it, it becomes necessary, since there are twice as many people as
there formerly were, that the amount of trade permitted should also
be doubled; for if this be not done, and that which formerly belonged
to few be shared among many, no one will have enough for his needs.
Third: this argument being sufficient for the increase and enlargement
of the amount permitted, it is asserted that this amount is less than
what was first granted; for, as concerns the distribution (which is
made by toneladas), the governors have introduced the practice of
giving these to hospitals and convents, and often to the mariners and
artillerists, to those who go on expeditions and embassies, and to
other persons. Thus is consumed a large part of this permitted amount,
and consequently of the 500,000 pesos' worth of returns--from which
are deducted the legacies, donations, contributions for charitable
purposes, wages of the seamen and soldiers, wrought silver, and
all the rest that is shipped (as is ordained by the decree of 1606,
cited in the said memorial, no. 90), by which, it is at once evident,
the amount granted by the permission is diminished to just that extent.
Fourth: even if it be granted that some illegalities have been
committed in that trade, these must have been in exporting more
merchandise and bringing back more silver than what the permission
decreed; and the cause must have been the pressing need of the
inhabitants. For since their numbers are greater, and the amount of
trade allowed them is less in quantity, and the share of each one is
less because there are more persons concerned in it, the amount that
some receive will be so little that it will compel them to infringe the
permission, and to export or bring back more than is allotted to them,
in order that they may be able to support themselves and meet their
obligations. These illegal acts will cease when the amount permitted
shall be increased and extended; for, as each person will have a share
sufficient to employ his capital, he will not expose it to risk, or
carry goods without registry. With this, not only will the inhabitants
be enriched, but the illegalities will cease; and, as the royal dues
will increase, his Majesty will not have to supply anything for the
maintenance of the islands, but instead will be much profited by them.
Fifth: because the main reason for having limited this commerce was
the injury which has resulted from it to Sevilla, not only with the
merchandise which it carries to Nueva Espana, but with the silver
which it drains thence--as has been noticed in the said memorial,
nos. 71-79 and 116-119. And although this difficulty is there solved,
and this concession is thus made easier--because when the cause ceases,
the effect ceases also--another argument is here adduced; this is as
follows. The [accusations of] illegal acts in that commerce which are
made public are either true or false; if they are false, our object is
attained. But, if they are true and those things are done, how can it
be said that, in place of the 250,000 pesos [allowed], four millions'
worth of merchandise come to Nueva Espana; and that for the 500,000
pesos of returns they carry ten millions in silver? What difficulty
is there in [allowing that for] the four millions that are shipped,
a half-million should come under registry, and one out of the ten
millions that are returned should go registered, and that on this
million and a half the royal dues be collected, since actually more
than 750,000 pesos are carried each way without paying these? And
even if those illegal acts be checked, and it be granted that for
the 250,000 pesos are shipped 500,000, and for the 500,000 pesos
of returns a million be carried: if the excess [now] goes and comes
without registry, how much more certain is it that the goods will be
registered and the royal dues paid? But this argument is made even
stronger by the great probability that the excess over the amounts
allowed only extends or can extend to the investments of the shippers;
and since these actually are only citizens of Philipinas, the citizens
neither have four millions to export, nor can they get ten millions
in returns; for in this way they would be, in four years, at the
rate of six millions of profits a year, the wealthiest in the world,
while they are at this time the poorest. And if that result is not
evident, how can the cause [assigned] be regarded as infallible? Let
us grant, then, that they will infringe the rule if besides the amount
permitted as much more be carried; and even that is much. But if this
permission were ample enough to include the funds of all those who
lade goods, it is evident that the infractions of law would cease,
and that it would not be possible to have them, or means to commit
them; and this becomes more credible, if the urgency with which this
increase of the permission is requested be noted. And how is it to
be supposed that those who are carrying their goods without registry
(which is more profitable) prefer to carry them registered, except
in order not to exceed the privilege that is given to them? And thus
it is certain that if a more extensive permission be granted to them,
there will not be illegal shipments, nor will the injury [to Spanish
trade] be greater, nor as much as is now assumed.
The sixth and last argument is reduced to what was proved in the
said memorial, nos. 101-106: that the profits of this commerce, on
account of the many burdens imposed upon it, are more limited than
has been understood; and that in order for the exporters to make any
gain, they need more liberal concessions. For [even] if the gain be
thirty to forty per cent, it is consumed in costs and management,
if the amount laden be small; and the increase of the principal must
incur almost the same costs, for they will only be greater in [paying]
the duties. The exporters demand with justice that they be authorized
to ship twice as much merchandise, since the benefit that they will
experience is evident, and no injury will result, as has been proved.
I observe that it would seem a very proper measure to place a limit to
the permission only on the returns in silver, and that the shipment of
merchandise be free, under the direction of the governor. One reason
is, that by this means the amount of merchandise would remain limited;
since it is plain that the citizens will not leave their funds in
Nueva Espana, and that therefore they will not carry back more than
they are entitled to in the returns [for their goods]. The other,
because in this no innovation arises, but it accords with the usage
which has hitherto prevailed, the lading being regulated more by the
burden of the ships, their capacity in toneladas, and the bulk of
the commodities, than by its actual and intrinsic value; and giving
opportunity for the registration of the products of the country itself,
even outside of the permission, as will soon be discussed. And if
no difficulty has been found in this practice, and if the governors
and the viceroys have overlooked this, and if Don Pedro de Quiroga,
with all his severity, never paid any attention to the merchandise
being in excess of the 250,000 pesos that were allowed, unless the
goods were shipped unregistered, or incorrectly appraised: it is
not a new or injurious arrangement that such a method be continued,
and that the limitation of the amount allowed be imposed only on the
silver that is carried as returns.
Point third
In case the amount permitted to the islands is increased to 500,000
pesos, or the limitation be placed only on the returns in silver
(as is asked and argued in the second question), the declaration
of this third topic is not necessary; but if the permission is not
enlarged to that extent, and the quantity of merchandise is limited,
the petition which the city of Manila has made finds place. In regard
to that, moreover, your illustrious Lordship must be informed that
the city declares that the commodities which are peculiar to those
islands ought not to be included in the amount permitted, but that
these should be registered outside of that amount--which should be and
is understood to apply to the merchandise from China, and to no other.
Suppose, then, that besides the commodities of China, there are
sent in the ships of this commerce some which are produced and
manufactured in the Philipinas Islands themselves, and are gathered
by their natives and inhabitants--such as wax, white and yellow;
talingas, [8] table-covers, and lampotes [9] (which are pieces of
cotton canvas); blankets from Ilocos, Moro, and Bombon; and some
civet. Of these products a hundred toneladas are usually shipped,
for, as they are bulky, they occupy more space than they are worth;
but it is actually worthwhile for the citizens to ship these to Nueva
Espana, even though it be to sell them at no more than their cost,
because they have no other market for these goods.
The usage which has hitherto been followed in regard to these goods
is to ship them registered, and value them, and pay the royal dues,
like the rest, without paying any attention to their being included
or not in the 250,000 pesos of the amount permitted, although the
returns for them have always been included in the 500,000 pesos of
money; and in some years when the citizens have not had the cloth
from China to fill up the amount of 250,000 pesos, they have done so
with these goods--not because they supposed that such shipments were
prohibited in other circumstances, but to supply the deficiency with
such goods as they could send.
They ask, then, that to avoid uncertainties declaration be made
that these goods, when satisfactory proof is given that they
are the products of the islands, may be carried to Nueva Espana
without limitation of their quantity, or obligation to include them
in the amount permitted. This [request] is based on the fact that
the prohibition was expressly imposed for the merchandise of China,
which on account of being silk goods injured [the sale of] those which
are shipped from Espana. This is gathered from all the decrees that
have been issued in regard to this matter--all of which distinctly
state the cloth of China as being the goods which damage [the Spanish
commerce]--not that of the islands, which is not of that character.
Another reason is, that no province has ever been forbidden to export
to others its own products, for this would be to close to them the
intercourse with others which is their right by natural law; and even
if its commerce be limited to certain provinces it ought not to be
deprived of trade with all the others, but the exportation which it
finds least inconvenient should be left to it. From Philipinas the
commodities which those islands produce cannot be carried to other
parts of the Orient, which have abundance of the same, and even
better. As the only consumption of these goods is in the Indias, the
citizens had begun to send them to Peru, Tierra Firme, Goathemala,
and Nueva Espana; but of these four trade-routes three are prohibited,
because with these goods are shipped those from China, so only the
trade with Nueva Espana remains to them. It immediately follows that
for this latter trade the transportation of goods must be free.
Another reason: because there is not a province in this [kingdom]
which has not tacit or express permission to export its products
to any place where these may have value and be sold, and with their
proceeds are sent in return other products which are lacking in that
land; for if they could not do this they would be shut in, and not
having communication with adjoining lands, the result would be that
both would perish, or would come to such poverty that they could not
support themselves.
Another reason: because--as is proved in the said memorial, nos. 115,
116, and 117--these commodities from the islands do not interfere with
those that are shipped from Espana, because they are so different in
quality. If the people have the former, they consume them; if not,
they cannot supply the lack with the goods from these kingdoms,
for these are of much value, and those from the islands are worth
but little. Nor does it follow that the poor Indian or negro who
buys a vara of canvas from the islands for a real and a half will,
if he cannot obtain it, buy the same goods from Ruan for six or eight
reals; since it is more probable that he will dispense with the goods,
even if he go without a shirt, than possible that he can buy it when
he has not enough money to pay for it.
Another reason: because permission is not asked to carry back the
returns for these goods in silver, since their proceeds, as being of
small value, will be part of the returns allowed for the merchandise
of China; and because, in case there is not room for these proceeds,
the inhabitants of the islands will sooner cease to ship cloth from
China, which costs them their wealth, than cloth of their own country,
since they possess it for the gathering, or their Indians pay tributes
in it. And for these and other reasons which might be presented,
and which will be very evident to your illustrious Lordship in Nueva
Espana as soon as you undertake and investigate the matter, may be
inferred the just cause, the readiness, and the need with which the
Philipinas ask for the above declaration.
Point fourth
Although the commerce from Peru to Nueva Espana does not apparently
concern Manila, and accordingly it will be deemed that Manila is
not interested in the question whether the suspension laid thereon
be continued or removed: proof will first be adduced of the injury
which the Philipinas Islands experience from that suspension, and then
will be presented some arguments, from the many which exist, for the
granting of the permission which was formerly current in that commerce.
It is taken for granted (as is mentioned in the said memorial, no. 80)
that at the beginning the commerce of the islands and of Nueva Espana
was free to Peru and to all its ports and provinces, in which two
kinds of merchandise were trafficked--that from China, and that from
Nueva Espana. The commerce in the goods from China was prohibited, and
consequently that in the commodities of Nueva Espana has been checked;
because, as it was decreed that no ships should go, neither commerce
could be carried on. A definite form and limitations were imposed upon
the commerce in Chinese goods to Nueva Espana; but the provinces of
that country and of Peru remonstrated against the complete interdiction
of the commerce that they had carried on together--representing that,
even if the trade in Chinese goods were taken away from them, as
being foreign, that in their own products ought not to be forbidden to
them. The reasons for this petition being considered just and proper,
permission was granted for one ship each year, which should sail from
the port of Callao de Lima, and go to that of Acapulco; and this ship
was allowed to carry goods to the amount of 200,000 ducados in silver,
which should return to Peru invested in the products and commodities
peculiar to Nueva Espana--whether in agriculture, stock-raising, or
manufactures--and in no others, even if they were the exports of these
kingdoms; while the prohibition of Chinese cloth remained in force,
under greater and more severe penalties. The trade thus permitted,
continued uninterruptedly from 1604 until, on account of certain
malicious reports, and less attention being paid to that trade than
should have been, it was suspended for a period of five years by
a royal decree of November 23, 1634. This decree is, for greater
clearness, copied here exactly; it is as follows:
"The King. To Marques de Cerralvo, my kinsman, member of my Council of
War, and my viceroy, governor, and captain-general of the provinces of
Nueva Espana. For just causes and considerations which have influenced
me thereto, and because I have understood that this measure is
expedient for my service, I have decided that, for a period of five
years, the ship for which permission was granted to the provinces of
Peru to go every year with two hundred thousand ducados for their trade
shall not go to those provinces [of Nueva Espana]. For the execution
of this decree I have sent to the Conde de Chinchon, the viceroy of
those provinces, the orders proper for this, of which I have thought
it best to inform you so that, having understood this matter, you
will on your side aid, in what concerns you. I charge you to do so,
in fulfilment of the aforesaid command, exercising special and vigilant
care that there shall be no infraction of the law, so far as concerns
that country; and that no merchandise from China shall be carried from
Nueva Espana to Peru, which is the principal object aimed at. For
it is certain that, if in this matter proper care and vigilance be
not exercised, whatever is gained by watchfulness and precaution on
one road will be diverted by another. At every opportunity that may
present itself you shall, without omitting anything, always advise me,
with especial care and entire secrecy, how this measure is received by
the merchants and trading people of that country; and what advantages
or disadvantages result from its execution, in order that, knowing
this, I may take such steps and issue such orders in the matter as
are most suitable. From Madrid, on the twenty-third day of November
in the year one thousand six hundred and thirty-four.
I the King
"By command of the king our sovereign:
Don Fernando Ruiz de Contreras
"Signed by the Council."
That this suspension of the commerce of Peru is injurious to the
Philipinas is notorious. First: because when the ships from Peru do not
sail to Acapulco the islands are left exposed to the failure of their
[usual] succor in any year when their ships do not make the voyage
(as often happens), either by having to take shelter in some port,
or being wrecked, or by their late arrival [at Acapulco]--three
contingencies which are quite possible, and even usual, as the
islands have found by experience. Since in these cases the failure of
these ships was formerly made up by those which went from Peru--the
necessary supplies of men and money being sent in those vessels--it
follows that if they do not go thither, and the former do not come,
there will be no ships for this purpose; and in one year alone, if
the islands fail to receive the aid which supports them, they run the
risk of being ruined--and this may even occur on an occasion of such
exigency and danger that afterward they cannot be relieved at all. [10]
Second: because the silk that is produced in Nueva Espana (both woven
and in skeins) [11] was exported to Peru, since it was the principal
commodity included in this permission, and in order to [help meet]
the expenses of the country; and Nueva Espana, not being as rich as
Peru, prefers the fabrics from China, which remain at a lower price,
so that all those that come from Philipinas find consumption. If,
then, the market that they formerly had fails, it is necessary that
this [home-grown silk] remain in Nueva Espana, as being their own
product. It follows that so much less will be the use of the silks from
China, which were substituted in the place of the Mexican goods when
those went out of the country with the trade permitted to Peru. On
this account, the commerce of Philipinas has been and is steadily
diminishing--to how great an extent may be easily understood by
finding the country full of silks and its own fabrics, which are no
longer consumed except within it, although foreign goods are brought
in. Even if these last are cheaper, they are a hindrance and obstacle
to those which are or can be called original [in the country]--an
injury which has been already experienced with the last ships from
the islands, which as they failed to come in the preceding year,
did not find an outlet for their wares; nor could they sell even
enough to pay the freight charges and the duties, as is stated in
letters from Nueva Espana, where your illustrious Lordship can learn
the facts in the case.
Third: because, although Nueva Espana has mines of silver--and that
metal is obtained from them in the quantity that is known, since
the greater part of it all is locked up in the royal treasuries for
shipment to Espana--since much goes out for the ordinary trade of
Goathemala, Yucatan, the Windward Islands, and the coasts of Cartagena
and Venezuela, while the bulk of it is laden for these kingdoms,
and even is not sufficient for their trade, it necessarily results
that silver is lacking for that of Philipinas, and that the islands
feel the loss of the 200,000 ducados that Peru was sending, which make
almost 300,000 pesos of silver. This amount is not so small as to be
undeserving of attention, and is sufficiently large to explain why, for
this and the preceding reasons, the islands have experienced so great
a decline in their commerce; and for all those reasons have so much
difficulty in supporting themselves, that it obliges them to demand
relief by all possible and suitable means. Since one of these is,
that the trade permitted to Peru be carried on as it formerly was,
the islands urge that its prohibition, or suspension, shall cease
and be removed.
And since, besides the advantages which have been mentioned, there are
others which support this decision--some on the part of Nueva Espana,
and others on that of Peru--and accordingly it is demanded by both
kingdoms, it must be observed that it seems just and necessary that
there should be intercourse between them; and that, as they are united
naturally and morally, being continuous by the land, subject to one
crown, included under the government of one Council, having the same
laws, and being of the same nationality (that is, the Castilian),
trade and commerce should [not] be totally prohibited to them. Nor,
[on the same grounds, should the amount of trade] permitted to them
be so limited, as it was, to 200,000 ducados--which, considering the
richness of those countries, was very little; indeed, their intercourse
is so restricted that it is less difficult to send a letter from
Lima to Mexico by way of Spain than by the route on which it is now
carried. And when it has been ordained by royal decrees and by the
customary instructions [to royal officials] that the two viceroys
of those countries should aid and favor each other when occasions
therefor arise, and when they so frequently encounter enemies by sea
and disturbances by land, it does not seem consistent that those who
should aid and succor each other cannot hold mutual communication.
Another reason: because with this prohibition opportunity is given
for greater infractions of the law, or that merchandise which went
with registry may go without it; for hardly is there a year when there
are not voyages of prelates and ministers from Peru to Nueva Espana,
and from Nueva Espana to Peru. Very recently Archbishop Don Feliciano
de Vega and Auditor Don Antonio de Ulloa went from Lima to Mexico,
and the bishop of Nueva Vizcaya (who went to fill the see of La Paz)
from Mexico to Lima, as well as the auditors who were transferred
from the Audiencia of Mexico to that of Lima. All these have to go
by the Southern Sea; and it is quite possible that, by undertaking
to sail at different times--and, because each one [of those prelates]
prefers to go as a superior in his own ship, different vessels convey
them--two ships would go from Lima to Acapulco, and three or four
from Acapulco to Lima, without either of the viceroys being able to
prevent the shipment of much silver in the ships from Peru, and much
merchandise in those from Nueva Espana. Moreover, these four or five
ships are double that number, because all of them are chartered by the
voyage, going or returning; so neither does the Peruvian ship care
to remain in Nueva Espana, nor that from Nueva Espana in Peru; thus
there will be ten ships, five from each country. And all these were
rendered superfluous by the ship that belonged to the permitted trade;
for since the latter sailed regularly and provided registry, there was
sufficient cause for ordaining that the prelates and auditors should
journey in it. This is a reason so evident that, even if there were no
other, it would be enough for granting and facilitating this commerce.
On behalf of Nueva Espana, it is mentioned in the said memorial
(no. 92) that more than fourteen thousand persons are occupied in the
culture of silk, who, if that should fail them, would perish. This
industry has two factors: one is, that there be silk from China as
raw material [para labrar] and a market for that of the country. If
the commerce with Peru fail them, that market (which is their
principal one) is cut off; and thus that industry will cease, and
the country will lose the wealth that it has which is based on that
industry. Moreover, since the trade of the provinces is so closely
connected and bound together, that of Espana will experience the
same or a greater deficiency. For, if those who in Nueva Espana
deal in silks, and are engaged in the silk culture and industry,
sustained and enriched themselves with the commerce of Peru, and
whatever they gained in that direction converted into the commerce
of Castilla--consuming, as they necessarily would, the commodities
in which that trade consists--it follows that if the people of Nueva
Espana lack capital, and if that of the 200,000 ducados from Peru
fails them, the wealth of Castilla will be thus diminished.
On behalf of Peru it is also represented that, when that permission
for one ship each year was granted, this matter was examined
and discussed, with reports from the viceroys and audiencias,
and the more intelligent of the officials, and the advantages and
disadvantages on both sides were carefully considered. Moreover,
no new causes have arisen, nor have illegalities occurred [in the
commerce] which compel the suspension of a decision so suitable,
just, and beneficial. And there have only been the proceedings of
Francisco de Victoria, [12] who, without caring for anything except to
make himself singular and conspicuous, and to show himself capable of
what he least understood--with the desire which many have to improve
the government, even though it be by ruining the countries--in affairs
belonging to the commerce of Philipinas and that of Peru strayed so far
from what was fundamental and requisite in them, as may be seen in the
arguments in the said memorial, nos. 1 and 2, and from 93 to 119. And,
granting for the sake of argument that this [course of action] might
have had some foundation: if the suspension of this permission was
for five years, either for the punishment of illegal acts, or for
reasons at the time expedient, when these requirements are fulfilled,
it seems just that those commerces should again continue as before.
Another: because this becomes more expedient in the present
emergencies, in which those kingdoms desire to help meet the new
impositions which have been levied in all of them since the year 1630:
the union of the armies, the windward armada, the sale of new offices,
the half-annat, the stamped paper, the increase of the averia on
both seas, the incorporation and reduction of encomiendas in both
kingdoms, and other matters, which are well known to your illustrious
Lordship. And if [his Majesty's] vassals are not favored in these
exigencies by facilitating their commerce, it will be impossible for
them, even though they desire it (as they all do), to aid in bearing
so great a load. [13]
Another: because this permission was granted to Peru in recompense for
what was taken away from that country in the goods from China. That
trade was free, as I have said, and those stuffs were shipped
from Nueva Espana in abundance; and thus the provinces of Peru
experienced great relief, as the Chinese goods were so cheap that
those of Castilla were estimated at three times their price. It was
expedient to prohibit the Chinese goods, in order that the commerce
of Espana might not diminish for lack of the wealth of Peru. And,
since the welfare of some vassals is not to be gained by destroying
the others, in order to repair the loss which was caused by this
prohibition to the vassals of Peru permission was granted to them for
200,000 ducados in goods from Nueva Espana, which are not so cheap
as those of China, nor so dear as those of Castilla. This is stated
in the royal decrees for the concession, and is inferred from their
being of the same year and date as those for the prohibition. If
this was the cause, and now it does not cease to operate, but rather
is still more active--on account of the commodities which go from
Espana having greatly increased in price, the land being poorer,
and the impositions, expenses, and losses being heavier--it may be
easily understood that this permission ought not to be refused.
Again: because the principal argument which gave cause for the
suspension of this permission was the representation of glaring
infractions of law therein. Sufficient refutations to these were
made in the said memorial, from no. 94 to 117; but as there they are
mingled with those in the commerce of the islands, answer is [here]
made to the former more than to the latter (although the one depends
on the other). The exaggerated statement is made that the ship which
goes every year from Peru to Acapulco carries, instead of the 200,000
ducados of the permission, three millions--an enlargement which is an
act of audacity deserving punishment rather than complaisance. [This is
preposterous:] first, because even in transgressions of this character
there is usually some moderation; and never before has it been seen,
heard, or supposed that where two [pesos' worth] were permitted the
amount concealed would reach thirty. Second, this ship which went to
Acapulco was one of 200 toneladas. The galleons on the India route,
which go only to carry silver, and are of 600 to 800 toneladas,
do not carry more than one million each year; and the capitana and
the almiranta, which are larger, carry a little more. Therefore,
if a galleon of 800 toneladas does not carry a million and a half,
how could a ship of 200 toneladas carry three millions? Third, it may
be asked why all that money went to Nueva Espana. Reply will be made,
"with the royal decree for the permission," and with the argument
(which is very evident) that the money went thither for investment
in merchandise, and not to be left there, or to come by that route
to Espana; for the one would be folly for its owners, and the other
a blunder, since it would involve greater costs and risks. Then if
(as is evident) the money must return invested, and in the same ship,
or in another of equal burden, who ever said or imagined that that
ship, with a burden of 200 toneladas, can carry the investments of
three millions? If this sum be in silver, it is impossible to do so,
as is proved; but the same is true if it be in merchandise. The ships
which come from Eastern India to Lisboa are of 1,500 toneladas, and
some of 2,000; and whatever goes beyond a million in the entire lading
is very profitable, and is largely composed of diamonds, rubies, civet,
and musk, commodities which are not bulky. Then how could a ship of
200 toneladas carry a cargo of taffetas, velvets, silk in skeins,
coverlets, beds, tents, cabinets, and other like articles, to the
extent of three millions of investment, which in Peru would be four
or five millions? Fourth, because it cannot be said that the ship,
since it does not carry three millions of silver, will carry two
millions, or one--which also is a great transgression of the limit
set. It is proved by experience that neither three nor two millions,
nor one, nor [even] half a million can be invested in [the cargo
of] a ship of 200 toneladas--which with 200,000 ducados of silver
converted into merchandise (which in Peru will be worth 300,000),
and with the people, and supplies for three months (the time spent in
going from Acapulco to Callao de Lima) will sail so well laden that no
considerable quantity can be carried outside of the registry. Fifth,
and last, because if this ship carried three millions, we must find a
source for this silver, and a halting-place for it. There is no source
[for that amount], because the silver produced from the mines of
Peru, whether computed at a little more or less, is shipped to Espana
every year, without an error of three millions. But if Peru retained
so much silver, if from the year 1636 no ship has gone to Acapulco
(and it is not to be supposed that the merchants keep their funds
idle) from that time the exports from Peru would be heavier; but if
we abide by experience (which is in this matter the best proof), the
opposite is well-known. As little is a halting-place found for that
silver, since [what there is] remains in Peru, on account of not having
permission. Finally, we say, and it is known, that no more silver comes
[from Peru] than did formerly, nor even as much. When it was going to
Nueva Espana, the necessary effect of carrying three millions would
have been to engross both the commerce of that country with Castilla
and that with Philipinas; that those two should share the greater
part of the silver; and that, when it ceased, both should feel the
lack. The trade of Philipinas has had less return than formerly, not
for lack of silver, but because Don Pedro de Quiroga did not give them
permission to ship the returns for two years, and therefore the silver
remained in Nueva Espana for that reason. As little has the commerce
of Castilla experienced a considerable reduction, and not one in
proportion to the lack of Peru's millions; and thus is proved that this
permission for Peru never had the infringements that are represented,
either in the quantity that is stated, or in any other considerable
amount. [It is clear] that it ought to be decreed that, since the
[term of the] suspension imposed upon that commerce is completed,
it shall again proceed as is demanded in behalf of Philipinas, and
has been requested on behalf of Mexico and Lima--the matter being
referred to the investigation of your illustrious Lordship, who,
after considering the reasons here mentioned, will decide it with
the perspicuity and equity that the matter demands.
His Majesty has also given commission to your illustrious Lordship
that, having heard the citizens in regard to the claim which they
make of not being included in the two compositions of 630,000 pesos,
the share of it which was levied upon them may be returned to them;
since his Majesty says in his royal decree that he does not wish
them to pay what they do not owe. Since all the considerations and
arguments are fully stated in the said decree, I will, in order not
to weary your illustrious Lordship, refer you to it, which also is
very convenient, as will be seen, in serving to throw much light upon
the affairs which your illustrious Lordship has to arrange and settle.
Informatory decree regarding the question to what extent and on what
plan shall the commerce of the islands with Nueva Espana hereafter
proceed.
The King. To the reverend father in Christ, Don Juan de Palafox y
Mendoza, bishop of the cathedral church of the city of Puebla de
los Angeles, member of my royal Council of the Indias, to whom I
have entrusted the visitation of my royal Audiencia of the City of
Mexico in Nueva Espana, and of its tribunals, and that of the port of
Acapulco: on the part of Don Juan Grau y Monfalcon, procurator-general
of the distinguished and ever loyal city of Manila, the capital of
the Philipinas Islands, he has in the name of that city presented to
me a statement that, having set forth to me in another memorial the
wretched condition in which those islands are, and offered various
petitions regarding it, which have been examined in the said my
royal Council of the Indias, they failed to come to a decision in
the principal points, not only on account of their importance, but
in order to wait for the despatches which they were expecting to
come in the trading fleet. And among those which arrived with the
fleet from Nueva Espana there were letters from the city of Manila
and the governor of Philipinas, and from certain intelligent persons,
all of which agree--in which, to judge from the condition of affairs,
those islands were in evident risk of being ruined unless the relief
which they needed were sent to them with the utmost promptness,
by helping to give form to their commerce, on which is based their
preservation and defense, in the returns of silver, in the succors
[that they receive] in fighting men, and in aid from the seamen [who
go there]. The said city of Manila and the governor, as men who so
carefully bear in mind the losses [that the commerce has experienced]
mention them in their letters; and the commissaries of the city (who
reside in Mexico), with even more information of what the people of
the said city did not know, have considered and noted these letters,
since the remonstrances which the citizens have made were caused only
by having received some information in general of the cruel acts of
Don Pedro de Quiroga [y Moya], and that he had prohibited 600,000
pesos to the commerce. And when they knew that, besides the previous
acts of oppression, others had been so recently committed against
them, and such as had never before been known, and another sum of
300,000 pesos taken from them, it can be judged what they suffered,
and the affliction that they experienced. And [I desire] that always,
and in whatever event, it may be seen and known that the said Don Juan
Grau gave information of and proposed to me all that he considered
expedient for preventing the loss of the said islands, which with
so plain indications is menacing them, and ought to be feared--as it
is feared, not only by their citizens, but by all who recognize the
difficulty of preserving them without commerce, or money, or soldiers,
or seamen--continuing in his obligation, which is to communicate what
shall be written to him, to present such requests as the said city
shall order him to make, and to urge forward the decision of the most
important matters. And he regards as settled that the commerce of the
said islands with Nueva Espana is permanent, which is the only way in
which they can be maintained, as he has proved in the said memorial;
and that, if it ceases, they will be ruined and the Dutch enemy will
take possession of them, since for so many years they have with this
desire harassed the islands. [He makes the following statements:]
If they should succeed therein (which may God not permit) all Eastern
India would perish--since, if the enemy should be master of the Straits
of Sincapura, and of the archipelagos of Moluco and Luzon (which
have for their defense only that which Manila and its armed fleets
give them), all the commerce of China would necessarily be hindered,
not only for the Castilians but for the Portuguese; and the factories
which (without other power than that of the commerce and advantage
of many nations which resort to them), I possess in those coasts and
kingdoms, with which I have preserved and sustained them, would come to
an end. And the commerce of the said islands is at present suspended,
if not cut off, as appears from the letters of the city of Manila and
the governor. It must be noted that three-fourths of the merchandise
which the citizens are accustomed to trade is pledged to the Sangleys,
since the commerce has hitherto been sustained on credit alone; and as
in the past year of 1636-37 no money went from Nueva Espana from the
goods which the citizens sent, which the Sangleys had sold on credit,
they have not been able to satisfy these claims. For this reason the
Sangleys have gone away, and say that they are not willing to lose
more than what they have lost; and the Portuguese of Macan have done
the same--who, like the Chinese, have returned to their own country,
ruined. And the citizens having refused, in the past year of 1636,
to lade their goods in the two ships which were ready to sail,
fearing (and with good cause) the severity of Don Pedro de Quiroga,
the governor urged them to lade their goods, and those which they
had procured on credit--assuring them in my name that these would be
expedited at Acapulco in the same manner as formerly, for which purpose
he ordered that all the goods should be registered with the utmost
possible exactness and equity. The effect of this was, that Don Pedro
de Quiroga paid no attention to what the governor had promised in my
name; instead, his harsh nature being thereby irritated, he displayed
greater severity, and, not content with detaining whatever the ships
carried, he weighed and opened registered bales and chests--contrary to
the usage at all the ports, against the regulations provided by royal
decrees; and the appraisement that he made of the merchandise was so
increased and exorbitant that what was at its just price in Mexico
worth 800,000 pesos he rated at four millions. For the commodities
which in Manila cost at the rate of nine pesos, the said Don Pedro
appraised at twenty-two; and much of the cloth was sold in Acapulco,
in his very sight, at six pesos, while he had collected the full amount
of the royal dues, on the basis of twenty-two, at which he had valued
the goods. By this one may judge how considerable a loss the citizens
experienced, not only in paying the dues on so increased a valuation,
but in the loss of the money they had invested. It may easily be judged
that, by making this valuation so contrary to justice and reason, the
registers transgressed the permitted amount; and with this appraisement
he began to inflict new and hitherto unknown injuries on the commerce,
with the sole intent of obtaining another composition, and demanded
for it 500,000 ducados. God permitted that he should die; but, on
account of his death, what he had begun was continued by the marques
de Cadereyta, and continued with no less severity. For he forcibly
extorted from the commerce 300,000 pesos, which the citizens did not
owe according to the document that they signed at the time of their
first agreement; and he made them draw up a document regarding the
commerce, with declarations at the start that they had not entered
protest against signing the document for the 300,000 pesos, by which
act they left themselves no recourse. In order to relieve themselves
from these annoyances they signed the said obligation, although they
knew that it was the utter ruin of the commerce; but with this, and the
damages and losses that their property suffered--for, besides opening
the packages, they remained several days on the beach, with guards,
and other expenses--not only their profit but their principal was
consumed. Another factor in this loss was the necessity of securing
what belonged to the islands out of the 600,000 pesos of the first
composition; and for this, and the composition of 300,000 pesos,
with the half-annat (which is charged to them), they were obliged to
take moneys at a loss, and to sell very cheaply the goods that had
remained. The result was, that of all the investment for the said year
of 1636, when the entire capital of the citizens of the islands was
sent, there remained no considerable amount that could be returned
to them--as they were informed by the commissary through whose hand
the returns were sent. On account of this--even before the second
condemnation of the 300,000 pesos, or all the unfortunate outcome of
their investments, was known in Manila--the citizens who had some
estates in the country, seeing their extreme necessity, asked the
governor's permission to go out [of the city] to live on their lands,
with the little money that remained to them, by cultivating the soil
to support themselves. The rest, who are poor, have asked permission
to enlist in the army as soldiers, and to join expeditions, or go
to Terrenate, as they can find no other means of support; and the
majority of the citizens were discussing whether to entreat me that
I will be pleased to grant them permission so that they can return to
these kingdoms, to die in their own countries, as they can no longer
support themselves in the Philipinas--but the governor, having notice
of this, persuaded them to ask me for relief in this their afflicted
condition, which they have done. Accordingly, they assembled in an
open session of cabildo, and agreed that, until I should be pleased
to form and establish a definite plan for the said commerce, no one
of them should lade or send to Nueva Espana any merchandise, whether
in great or small quantity--with which the said commerce has entirely
ceased and been suspended, and will remain in that condition until a
decision shall be sent them in regard to its plan. [They say] that,
if this be delayed, it may arrive at a time when already no remedy
will avail; that, although the citizens of Manila know that this
course may ruin themselves and their islands, they consider it less
injurious to them to spend their funds in maintaining what they may
hereafter acquire, than in sending them to Nueva Espana in order to
complete the loss of these in one year. They have acted accordingly,
since in a patache which the governor despatched in the year 1637,
with information of these necessities and of others contained in
their letters, there came no merchandise, nor was there any person
who was willing to ship goods; and the same occurred with the two
ships which were despatched in the past year of 1638. And although
the governor made all possible efforts to constrain the citizens to
lade the two ships, he could not succeed in this, which now causes
them to feel their loss still more keenly. It is evident that the
foregoing alone will cause a greater loss of duties to my royal
exchequer in Nueva Espana, besides the licenses of the Sangleys, and
other things in Manila and Nueva Espana, than what has been gained for
it by the 900,000 pesos of the said two compositions--not to mention
the evident risk in which the islands remain; for, if they are lost,
four millions will not be enough to recover them if the Dutch take
possession of them, which is the principal object at which they aim. It
is represented to me that, if that commerce flourishes, my duties in
Nueva Espana on the merchandise will amount to about 300,000 pesos,
with which was provided the amount which I ordered to be sent back as
returns to Manila, for the purposes and preservation of those islands;
and that now all that source of income has fallen at a blow, and the
loss has recoiled upon my royal exchequer, since it is necessary that
the amount of money which is conveyed every year for the succor of
those islands be supplied from my royal treasury of Mexico to that
of Manila, out of the silver and the fifths from the mines. And not
only is this loss occasioned, but all the capital with which commerce
was carried on from Mexico to Philipinas (to which the duties gave
rise) has ceased to exist; for in the year 1638, when no ships save
one patache came [to Acapulco] the dues from it amounted to [only]
4,000 pesos, and in 1639 another 4,000 pesos were collected from the
almiranta which arrived at Acapulco. As the citizens of Manila had no
means to lade merchandise, not only the patache but the almiranta came
without registers--as also did the capitana, which had to go back to
port. According to what the governor writes, he will not send ships
in the year 1640; with this, in three years I shall have lost 900,000
pesos in duties--the same amount which was extorted as composition,
against all reason and justice, by Don Pedro de Quiroga; and it is
he who has caused, by his severe measures, these so irreparable
losses, not only to my royal exchequer but to the commerce. [Don
Juan Grau] entreated me that, since all the above matters are worthy
of such careful attention, I would be pleased, in order to place a
speedy check on these losses--which recoil upon my royal exchequer,
as he represented to me--to furnish a plan for the said commerce,
without entrusting the matter to any judge or official visitor, or
waiting for reports on a matter which is so thoroughly explained and
well understood, in which even one year's delay is enough to render
relief impossible, to judge by the condition in which those islands
now are. [He asks that,] in case this is impracticable, I command
that for six or eight years the usage that has prevailed in regard to
the registration and the appraisement and all the rest be followed,
without making changes in anything, punishing those who transgress the
regulations and orders that have been established by royal decrees;
and that this may and shall be understood without prejudice to what
must and shall be decreed after the documents, reports, and other
papers which shall be demanded or sent have been examined. [He asks
that] I immediately despatch a decree to this effect, since, if a
decision on this point be not at once sent, the commerce will be
ruined in one year more--which, added to what has been already lost,
will be the total destruction of the said islands. This subject has
been discussed in my royal Council of the Indias, and I have taken
into consideration all that has been represented to me, and that it
is just to reward the loyalty, fidelity, and services of vassals who
are continually serving me, arms in hand--defending my crown in lands
so widespread, with so great reputation for my arms; and I desire
in everything their prosperity, comfort, and preservation. By my
decree of September 30 last I thought best to command that in the
appraisements and registrations, and in not opening the bales or
weighing the chests from the ships of the said Philipinas Islands
which arrive at Acapulco--unless such act shall be preceded by the
informations and other requisites that are ordained by decrees that
have been issued on this subject--the custom and usage which were in
vogue before Don Pedro de Quiroga went [there] should be observed,
without infringing the decrees and orders which were issued regarding
these matters; and that this be for the present, and meanwhile nothing
else be ordained by the said my Council until you shall have informed
me (as you will do) about the affairs of Philipinas, since I have
entrusted to you the settlement and enforcement of matters concerning
the commerce of the said islands. I request and charge you, [for all
these reasons,] to inform me about all that I have here mentioned,
with great distinctness and thoroughness, with your opinion and
any suggestions that you can offer regarding the advantages and the
preservation of the said Philipinas Islands--in order that, after
the matter has been examined in the said my Council, I may take such
measures as are most expedient. Done at Madrid, February 14, 1640.
I the King
By command of the king our sovereign:
Don Gabriel de Ocana y Alarcon
Informatory decree upon the augmentation of the amount permitted to
the Philipinas Islands, in both silver and merchandise; and that the
products of the islands shall not be included in the permission for
250,000 pesos.
The King. To the reverend father in Christ Don Juan de Palafox y
Mendoza, bishop of the cathedral church of the city of Puebla de los
Angeles, member of my royal Council of the Indias, to whom I have
committed the visitation of my royal Audiencia of the City of Mexico
in Nueva Espana and of its tribunals, and the visitation of the port
of Acapulco: [Here follows a preamble which is identical with that in
the first of these decrees, as far as the words, "and to urge forward
the decision of the most important matters." This decree then continues
(evidently stating Grau's arguments) as follows:] And as for the lack
of money, this cannot be avoided when the commerce in merchandise
fails, since, if that is not sent, there will be no returns from it;
and the main thing to be considered is that as little can the duties
be collected, which (as is proved in the said larger memorial) on the
said commerce amount to the sum which is sent every year for the aid
of the said islands. If these duties fail, it will be necessary that
all this succor come out of my royal exchequer, and it may be needful
to send much more there; for in the past, when the citizens found
themselves without means to aid (as they do aid) in the support of
the said islands, the deficiency had to be made good from my royal
exchequer, as has been proved by experience. The governor of those
islands, seeing the pressing necessities of the citizens, in the year
1637 lent them from my royal treasury 76,765 pesos, besides what he
lent them in the year 1638, when in the same condition--when formerly
the citizens loaned so great sums, as is known, to my royal treasury;
and this is ascertained, with convincing arguments, that in order
to lessen the occasion [for such loans] it is necessary to aid and
favor the citizens and the commerce, since whatever it has of wealth
[for them] I shall be spared from expending in the maintenance of
continual war in those archipelagos. For it can be understood that if
this does not cease, and those who are supporting it have no means for
doing that, either I must support it or I shall be defeated; and that
it is of the utmost importance to maintain the war. I have already
recognized the great difficulties that result from the cessation of
sending money to those islands; for, on account of the fact that in the
year 1637 not more than 150,000 pesos of the amount in the Count-Duke's
permission was carried [to Mexico], and that the citizens failed to
receive the returns therefrom through the harsh measures and blunders
of Don Pedro de Quiroga, the Chinese merchants have gone from Manila,
and carried away their merchandise, because there is no one who can
buy their goods; and it is known with certainty, according to letters
from the city, that the silk sold by the said Chinese to the Dutch,
since they knew that there was no money in Manila, amounted to more
than 5,000 picos. If the commerce with China is cut off from that
city, it will be impossible again to introduce it, and whatever is
collected there from the licenses given to the said Chinese (which
is a very large item) will be lost; and finally the whole colony
will reach so exhausted a condition that it will be impossible,
[14] even with a million [pesos] of aid a year, to maintain the said
islands. [Don Juan Grau] has entreated that I would be pleased to
command that in the first ships which sail from Acapulco for the said
islands--or, in default of these, in whatever ships shall go to the
islands--shall be transported, besides the usual succor that I send,
all the residues of permissions which there may be in Nueva Espana
belonging to citizens of those islands, and all the money which may
be still due as returns from the permissions, so that in this first
voyage may be made up whatever shall have been deficient in past
ones, according to the amount permitted, and nothing shall remain
to fill out the entire amount of the returns in any year. Moreover,
in order to mitigate somewhat the great injuries and losses for eight
or ten years, [he has asked] that an increase be allowed them in the
permission for the silver, up to the amount of 800,000 pesos instead
of the 500,000 for which they have permission--or such quantity as I
shall be pleased [to grant]; and that I give them permission to carry
to Nueva Espana, besides the 250,000 pesos' worth of cloth from China
which is already allowed to them, all the products of the country--as
they have requested by a special petition in the large memorial, which
Don Juan Grau asks shall be again examined, with the strong arguments
which they present for asking this favor; and he says that at present
there are [even] more reasons for granting it. This matter has been
considered in my royal Council of the Indias, notwithstanding that
I commanded the viceroy and the Audiencia of Mexico, by my decree of
December 8, 1638, to inform me what permission the Philipinas Islands
have, and that which was granted to the Count-Duke; and whether
it would be expedient to enlarge further that of the said islands,
considering their needs and other circumstances. By another decree
of mine, of the same date, I also commanded the said my viceroy
and Audiencia of Mexico, and the governor and Audiencia of Manila,
to inform me regarding the representations made to me, on the part
of the said city of Manila, that all the provinces of the Indias
are permitted to export the products that in them are gathered and
cultivated, without limitation of quantity. Those of the islands,
the proceeds of their collections and labors, are: wax, lampotes,
coverlets, tarlingas, blankets from Ilocos, musk, civet, and other
commodities which are peculiar to the said islands; and it has been
the custom for many years past to ship these products to Nueva Espana
(which is their only market), registered, but not included in the
250,000 pesos of the permission, as it seemed that the citizens did not
need it for these commodities, and that it was granted only for those
from China--which are the ones expressly stated in the royal decrees,
and on which fall the prohibitions and penalties. And [Don Juan Grau]
petitioned that I would command that a declaration be made to this
effect, and that these commodities, coming registered, and paying
my royal duties at their departure from the islands and entrance at
Acapulco, as do the other goods from China, should be (even though
their value and quantity did not come included, and be not included,
in the permission) passed by the customs officers without incurring
penalty of confiscation, or any other. I request and charge you that,
after having thoroughly informed yourself of all that I have mentioned,
you report to me very fully thereon, in order that, when the matter
shall have been discussed in the said my Council, I may take such
measures as shall be most expedient for the relief and preservation
of my vassals in those islands. Done at Madrid, February 14, in the
year 1640.
I the King
By command of the king our sovereign:
Don Gabriel de Ocana y Alarcon
Informatory decree, in regard to opening the commerce between the
kingdoms of Peru and Nueva Espana.
The King. To the reverend father in Christ, Don Juan de Palafox y
Mendoza, bishop of the cathedral church of the city of Puebla de los
Angeles, [etc. Here follows a preamble identical with that of the
first decree, as explained in the second one. This decree continues:]
Both Peru and Nueva Espana oppose the method followed in the commerce
of the said Philipinas Islands, and complain of the above prohibitions,
setting forth certain difficulties which result from closing to them
the commerce which those two most opulent states have maintained
(as it were, by nature) between themselves; the chief of these
is their being entirely deprived of the mutual intercourse and
relations which ought to prevail between them. On this account,
another permission of two ships has been granted to them. One of
these shall sail every year from the port of Callao de Lima, and may
carry to that of Acapulco silver to the amount of 200,000 ducados,
for investment in the products peculiar to Nueva Espana--whether of
agriculture, stock-raising, or manufacture--and no others, even those
sent from these kingdoms. The other ship shall return from Acapulco
to Callao with these proceeds [of the investment], the prohibition
of cloth from China remaining in force; and the decree declares that
none of that cloth may be sent in return for the 200,000 ducados, nor
outside of that amount, enforcing its execution by heavy penalties
[imposed] by the decrees of December 31, 1604, and March 8 and June
20, 1620. By these decrees final shape was given to this permission
which now is suspended; and it was ordered to cease by a decree of
November 23, 1634, without the reason which had given cause for this
act being known--further than the measures which had been proposed
for ruining the islands, and this, that the ships of Peru might not
sail to Acapulco, to the so great harm of the Philipinas Islands,
as this alone would be enough to ruin them. For if ships do not go
from Peru, the islands remain exposed to the failure of their aid,
in the year when their ships do not make the voyage, by having been
wrecked, or forced to put back to port, or having arrived late. As
in such cases, it is usual to make good their deficiency with the
ships from Peru, sending in them the usual succor of men and money,
if the latter do not go, and the others do not come [to Acapulco],
there will not be ships for that purpose, and the islands might
remain for several years without the succor that supports them, at
the evident risk of being ruined. To this may be added, that there
are, as will be stated, in Nueva Espana more than fourteen thousand
persons who sustain themselves with the industry of silk-raising and
silk manufacture, by express permission, and the order that this
industry be preserved. It cannot be maintained with only the silk
that is produced in that country, the total amount of which is very
small, and it therefore employs the silk that comes from Manila,
as being suitable for delicate fabrics. The silk fabrics of Nueva
Espana have always been exported to Peru, as commodities included in
the trade permitted to those countries, which was mainly composed
of these stuffs; while the fabrics of China remained for meeting
the expenses of the country, which regularly consumed all that came
thence. Since the exportation of what formerly went to Peru has ceased,
the necessary result is that these goods remain and are consumed in
Nueva Espana, as being its own product, and that just so much less of
the Chinese silk is required--which is substituted in place of the home
product when the former goods are imported through the permission--and
necessarily less of the other is produced. Besides taking away their
occupation from the people who are engaged in the silk industry,
this will cause an evident diminution in the commerce of Philipinas,
the bulk of which consists in silks; for just so much less of what
the islands export is consumed [in Nueva Espana] as cannot be sold
out of what is produced there--which will be an amount so noticeable
that with this reduction alone that commerce will become excessively
weakened. This has been already proved in regard to the last ships
which came from those islands--for, as they failed to come the previous
year, they found no market for their goods, and could not sell enough
of these even to pay the freight charges and the duties, according to
letters from Nueva Espana and authentic documents; it is, therefore,
very expedient that the permission given to Peru should be revived,
else, by not conceding it, a great reduction is feared in that of
Philipinas. If, when that permission was granted, the matter was
discussed with adequate information, and the advantages which there
might be on either side were considered, and now if no new reasons
or circumstances arise which compel the decision to be suspended
beyond the fact that Francisco de Victoria contrived such expedients,
without heeding other objects, so that it seems as if he cared only
for the abandonment and ruin of the islands, no opportunity should be
given for that suspension. Even if the memorials which [Don Juan Grau]
has furnished on the other topics prove to be sufficiently answered,
and their arguments are shown to be weak or false, it must not be
understood that there are better ones for what concerns the permission
given to Peru; but no answer is made here, save in what pertains to
the Philipinas, for the rest concerns Nueva Espana and Peru, who will
give fuller explanations. And, considering the evident injury and risk
to which the islands are exposed by the lack of freight ships that
can sail thither, since in case the ships belonging to the commerce
are wrecked, or forced to take refuge in other ports, or arrive late,
the islands will perish if there are no other ships in which to send
the usual succor of men and money: and since freight vessels are
not built, which is necessary in all the coasts of Nueva Espana,
this deficiency must be supplied some years by the ships from Peru that
go to Acapulco--which do not sail now, on account of the permission
which was given for that purpose being suspended--from which also
result to the islands the losses which have been set forth in the said
memorial, which are stated anew in this petition, because it is so
expedient that the traffic between Nueva Espana and Peru be restored:
[Don Juan Grau] has petitioned me to consent to raise the suspension,
or prohibition, which is laid or imposed on the said permission of
Peru and Nueva Espana, even though, for its fulfilment and better
observance, the penalties be increased so far as is expedient. This
matter having been considered in my royal Council of the Indias,
as I desire to ascertain the advantages or disadvantages which may
result from the aforesaid measure, whether to my greater service, to
the increase or diminution of my royal dues, to the preservation of my
vassals of the said Philipinas Islands, or to their relief or injury:
I request and charge you to inform me very thoroughly of all that you
shall ascertain and understand to be most expedient, in order that
when I have considered all the reliable information in your report,
I may take such measures as may be most fitting. Done at Madrid,
February 14, in the year 1640.
I the King
By command of the king our sovereign:
Don Gabriel de Ocana y Alarcon
Decree in which his Majesty commands that a hearing be given in a
court of justice to the citizens of the city of Manila, regarding their
claim that they be not included in the condemnations and compositions
of the 900,000 pesos; and [it is declared] that it is his Majesty's
intention that they should not pay what they do not owe.
The King. To the reverend father in Christ, Don Juan de Palafox y
Mendoza, bishop of the cathedral church of Tlaxcala, [15] member of
my royal Council of the Indias, to whom I have entrusted the general
visitation of my royal Audiencia of the City of Mexico in Nueva Espana
and of its tribunals, and the visitation of the port of Acapulco,
and other affairs very important for my service. [Most of this decree
is omitted, as being only a repetition, in the main, of statements
in Grau's memorial preceding. The king rehearses the injuries done
to Philippine commerce, the arguments pro and con an increase of
duties, and the representations by the citizens of Manila in behalf
of their petition for relief; and continues:] What they entreat with
the humility belonging to my vassals, and set forth with arguments of
expediency and good government, subject in everything to what shall
be for my greater service, is that what is past be punished, but not
so as to inflict the same penalty on those whose guilt is unequal;
for if there shall prove to be guilt, it must be because they were
induced to it more by their need and hardships than by the profits on
their investments; and it is the fact that whatever they have acquired
by these is known to be but a small part of the means which they have
at present, and they have spent it and intend to spend it in serving
me and in preserving those islands at the cost of their blood and
property. They ask that for the present attention be given to what
is hidden and concealed, and that this be diminished and reduced to
the amount permitted and regulated; and that, until they know in the
islands what they ought to do, and what new decrees shall be issued,
those penalties be not carried out against the citizens, and that
they shall not be punished for what they have committed through
ignorance. They ask that for the future the duties be not increased
on what shall be found within the amount permitted, whether in silver
or merchandise; that no innovations be made in the appraisement of
the goods, nor by opening the packages or measuring them, through
any different method from that which has been [hitherto] observed and
followed, since (as is very evident) they pay more than they are able
to; and they state that the despatch of the two ships was included
and is still contained in the composition of the 600,000 pesos for
the year 1635--a proposition very plain and undisputed, which does
not admit of doubt, since it is expressly, clearly, and distinctly
stipulated, noted, and agreed in the document which was executed
regarding this matter, the first section of which reads as follows:
"First: that in this agreement shall be set down and included the
two ships which are expected to come from the Philipinas Islands
this present year, or early in this coming year of 1636, to this
Nueva Espana with registry; and if one or both of them shall not have
sailed, or shall not sail, from the said islands, or if they be forced
to put back to port, this agreement shall hold good regarding those
which shall come in the following year, at whatever time therein;
and the ship which shall not sail this year may do so next year,
so that there will be two vessels; and they may land at the port of
Acapulco in this Nueva Espana the goods that they carry, paying to his
Majesty his customary royal dues, without those goods being seized;
nor can anything be confiscated thereon in case each person declares
what he shall carry, in conformity with the proclamation which will
be issued. [This goes] with declaration that if (which may God not
permit) the ship be wrecked at sea, or plundered by enemies, no other
shipment be allowed." It does not seem as if the persons who drew up
and signed this contract could state more contingencies regarding
the voyage of these ships, in order that these might be included
in the document, since they set down the following: sailing in the
year 1635; being obliged to put back to port, and being shipwrecked;
sailing not in that year, but in the following one, that of 1636;
arriving at Acapulco in that year, or in 1637 at whatever time therein;
one ship arriving, and the other being obliged to go back to port, or
not sailing at all; and finally, settling beforehand the account and
despatch of two ships which would arrive after the date of the contract
and agreement, up to the completion of the said year 1637. Moreover,
the necessary declarations were made as to the cargo of the ships:
that it must pay the customary dues, all goods being declared;
and that, if this alone were done, they could not be confiscated,
even though they should come outside of the registry, for this is
meant by declaring them. The facts of the case were, in all these
matters, that the ships did not sail in the year 1635, but in 1636,
and reached Acapulco at the beginning of 1637--a voyage included
and expressly stated in the [aforesaid] document. In this case,
conformably to the section which is here copied, it could not and
cannot be doubted that these two ships were the first to arrive after
the agreement, within the limit set therein, and with the permitted
amount of goods registered--not only as that amount had always come,
but with more rigorous and orderly [inspection]. As for the landing
of the goods, this was done as the above section directed; for Don
Pedro de Quiroga, when the ships cast anchor, caused proclamation
to be made that all should declare whatever goods they carried; with
this, and the severity which he exercised in permitting the goods to
be removed from the ships, not a bale was concealed, or considered as
such, nor was anything seized as contraband. [The king then mentions
Quiroga's rigorous and oppressive measures, almost in Grau's own words,
and continues:]
But it is a fact that, according to that agreement, what had to be done
was to appraise all that came registered--as had been done during the
six years before, to which the commission extended without making any
kind of innovation, since the contract was that they had to collect the
customary dues; and if anything came outside the registry, its owners,
by declaring it in accordance with the proclamation (as they did
declare it), had to pay the same dues, freight charges, and alcavala as
did the registered merchandise--which is the same practice as that in
Sevilla when, at the arrival of the galleons, my royal decree regarding
declarations is issued and proclaimed. And this the proclamation of
Don Pedro de Quiroga could not exceed, because it was of the same
character, not only on account of his own official position, but by
the obligation of the contract. Such was the proper course of action,
according to justice and reason, and conformably to the contract
approved by the viceroy and the visitor and by me; and since, in virtue
of his document, [16] the 400,000 pesos of the two thirds of 1636 and
1637 were already collected. What he did was to contravene all this,
the same as if such usage had not been current; [but in that case]
such a composition would not have been made, nor such a contract
drawn up. For, as if the ships were not included in the agreement,
whatever they carried was immediately seized (as has been stated),
saying that it was confiscated--not for coming outside of registry,
since of this sort there was nothing belonging to the citizens of
the islands; but because the permitted amount came registered, [17]
as it always has come and ought to come, in order to fulfil therein the
condition of the document, which was that each chest be carried as one
pico of silk, to which is introduced the addition of a quarter, from
which Manila has made petition. For if it were not with the express
condition that these ships should be thus despatched, there would
have been no reason for mentioning them in the agreement. Besides,
they conformed to the order of which Don Pedro de Quiroga notified the
islands, as appeared by a section of his letter, inserted in a document
which the governor wrote to the city of Manila, which reads thus:
"We have been expecting the ships which thus far have not arrived,
by which we deem it certain that they have been obliged to take refuge
in port; and in order that the service of his Majesty, to which your
Lordship is always so attentive, may be furthered, it is necessary for
me to express my opinion (as you commanded me, in your instructions)
that all the goods which go registered in the ships, even if there be
more of them than the 250,000 pesos of the permission, should remain
free, by paying the dues at the port of Acapulco; and the same should
be done with those that are not registered, if they are declared in the
said port within twenty-four hours after the vessel casts anchor." This
was the proclamation which I ordered to be made; and that if the said
ships should sail from that city, or after sailing should put back
into port, they might come freely the following year with the said
merchandise; and this was the order that the visitor sent to Manila,
and which the governor executed to the letter. In accordance with it,
the ships sailed, according to the agreement and its first condition;
from this is positively known the notorious injury and injustice which
has been done to all those engaged in this commerce who took part in
the first composition--compelling them by severe measures to enter
upon the second one, and to pay or be obliged to pay for it the said
300,000 pesos, endeavoring to deprive them of having recourse to my
clemency with a protest. For even if there had been (as was not the
case) the same or greater infractions of law in those two ships than
in all the preceding years, as these cannot be of different character
from those of the past, and from those included in the commissions
of Don Pedro de Quiroga, they should in justice, and by obligation
and legitimate contract, agreed to and executed, be included and
contained in the composition of the 600,000 pesos; and in virtue of
that agreement ought to have been despatched as usual, without making
accusation or fixing blame for what they carried registered, or was
declared at Acapulco. The islands therefore claim that they ought
not to be included in the first composition, and that what they have
paid ought to be restored to them and is imposed upon them when they
do not owe it, on account of the said composition. They also claim
that the second composition, to which those who signed the document
were compelled, ought to be declared null and void; that all who were
involved therein be set free from their obligation; and that what
they shall have paid or contributed for its fulfilment and execution
be returned and restored to them. [The king here enumerates (again in
Grau's language) the losses which these rigorous measures have caused
to his royal exchequer, the injuries and dangers thus occasioned
to the Philippines, and the services rendered to the crown by its
citizens;] notwithstanding that in a letter of September 2, 1638, I
thought best to inform the said city of Manila that in regard to the
citizens of those islands being included in the former compositions
made by the said Don Pedro de Quiroga, my royal intention was that
they should not pay what they did not owe. And since this depended
on the acts and the general decision which Don Pedro de Quiroga made
regarding these compositions, in which the citizens of the islands
claim they were not included, the judge was notified to proceed in
those commissions, in order that he might hear them and administer
justice as was fitting, affording redress to those who had been
injured. In conformity therewith, I have considered it well to issue
the present, by which I commission you, and give you all the power and
authority that is required by law in order that, after hearing them,
you may administer justice, and furnish redress to those who shall
have been wronged in whatever has been represented to me; for such
is my will. Done at Madrid, February 14, 1640.
I the King
By command of the king our sovereign:
Don Gabriel de Ocana y Alarcon
HISTORIA DE LA PROVINCIA DEL
SANCTO ROSARIO DE LA ORDEN
DE PREDICADORES
By Diego Aduarte, O.P.; Manila, 1640.
Source: Translated from a copy of the above work in the possession
of Edward E. Ayer, Chicago. This volume comprises pp. 1-167.
Translation: This is made by Henry B. Lathrop, of the University
of Wisconsin; it is partly in synopsis. This work will continue in
VOLS. XXXI and XXXII; this volume comprises chaps. i-xxxvii of book i.
[Translation of title-page: The History of the Province of the
Holy Rosary, of the Order of Preachers, in Philippinas, Japon,
and China. By the Right Reverend Don Fray Diego Aduarte, Bishop
of Nueva Segovia, with additions by the Very Reverend Father
Fray Domingo Goncalez, Commissary of the Holy Office, and Regent
of the College of Sancto Thomas in the same province. With
license, at Manila, in the College of Sancto Thomas, by Luis
Beltran, printer. In the year 1640.]
HISTORY OF THE DOMINICAN PROVINCE OF THE HOLY ROSARY
By Fray Diego Aduarte, O.P.
[Aduarte's work [18] is here presented, partly in full translation,
partly in synopsis--the latter portions being, as usual, printed
within brackets.]
BOOK I
CHAPTER I
How the establishment of the Dominican order in the Philipinas Islands
was undertaken
[Though the Dominican order did not accompany the discovery of these
islands, it was not late in entering them; for it found many entire
provinces still in the night of heathenism, because the preachers,
though good ones, had been few, and because the inhabitants differed
so in their language and were spread over so vast an extent of
territory. The reports which were sent back of the intelligence of the
people, the fertility of the soil, and the amount of the population
moved some religious to come to these regions, in grief that so
many souls should be lost for lack of some one to rescue them from
their errors. The question of establishing the Dominican order was
discussed among the grave and holy fathers of the Province of Mexico;
and to them it seemed unbecoming to our profession that no religious
of our order should be engaged in this new conversion. The first man
to put these pious desires into effect was that noble man of God, Fray
Domingo Betancos, who refused the bishopric of Guatimala, preferring
to be a preacher of the gospel in these islands. By his efforts he
persuaded the viceroy, Don Antonio de Mendoca, to give command that
he should have a vessel and sailors to take him to Philippinas, for
which he had permission of his bishop. But the time determined upon by
our Lord for this had not yet come, and accordingly it was not carried
out. However, he did not give up his desire; and began again in 1580
to discuss the journey. In order that the expedition might be better
supported, he talked over with some fathers the plan of sending some
one to Espana and Roma to obtain the necessary documents. Fray Juan
Chrisostomo was chosen as leader of the expedition, and was sent to
Espana and Roma to obtain the usual licenses for the foundation of
a new province of this order in Philippinas, Japon, and China. Fray
Juan set out in 1581 with letters from various ecclesiastics, among
them the first bishop of the Philippinas, Don Fray Domingo de Salazar,
a religious of the same order, who happened to be in Nueva Espana at
the time, on the way to his new bishopric. The bishop was greatly
pleased with this determination, as he hoped to find through it
reparation for his own unfortunate voyage, in which he had brought
religious from Espana for the same purpose, but had lost so many from
death or sickness that he had remaining only father Fray Christoval de
Salvatierra. The mission of Fray Juan Chrisostomo was successful. [19]
He obtained from the general of the order, the Most Reverend Fray Pablo
Constable de Ferrara, a charter giving him authority to establish
a congregation of thirty brethren of the order for the Philippinas
Islands and the kingdom of China, and directing him to follow the
usages of the province of Santiago of Mexico. The privileges of the
province of Mexico were granted to the new province. The date of this
charter is the fourteenth of July, 1582. The general also gave him
a circular letter to the members of the order, confirming his powers.]