The sinking of U-C 65 by "C 15" (Lieutenant E. H. Dolphin) provides an
odd case. There is a story behind the official despatch:--
"2.43 P.M.: Sighted enemy submarine on the surface five points on
the port bow. Dived and flooded both tubes.
"3.12: Sighted submarine in periscope steering estimated course of
N. 70 E, bearing 40° on starboard bow.
"3.15: Fired double shot at 400 yards--one torpedo hit--the other
appeared to pass under.
"Submarine sank immediately--noise of explosion slight.
"3.17: Surface--picked up five survivors of U-C 65."
The position was about 25´ south of Beachy Head. "C 15" was on patrol
in rather misty weather, and at the time of sighting the enemy both
boats were on the surface, U-C 65 steering home up Channel, "C 15"
steering N. by E. across her bows. Both boats saw each other at the
same time, and the German watched the English boat go under to attack.
The obvious reply was to either dive also or to alter course and pass
round the "danger-radius" of the torpedoes on the surface. The German
Captain had two mental handicaps--over-confidence and (having just
finished a long trip) over-anxiety to get home on leave. He decided not
to alter course or delay his passage, but explained to his First
Lieutenant that it was quite easy to dodge a torpedo if a good look-out
was kept and the helm moved quickly. The First Lieutenant appears to
have had philosophic doubts as to the wisdom of the proceeding, his
doubting being justified when, on seeing the firing-splash as "C 15"
fired, the Captain neatly dodged one torpedo and received the other
fairly amidships. Lieutenant Dolphin had fired two--"spread" slightly
for deflection; not having "declared to win" with either, the question
of which one hit did not trouble him. U-C 65 probably won a moral
victory, but--"C 15" sank her.
The C boats working round the N. Hinder Light-vessel were liable to
make sudden "contacts" with the enemy, usually in thick weather or at
night. Both sides would be trying to make the lightship to fix their
positions, and on occasions two belligerent submarines would make the
lightship together.
On March 1st, 1917, "C 19" (Lieutenant A. C. Bennett) was steering east
from the Hinder Light, when she sighted (by moonlight) a small
submarine right ahead steering straight at her. "C 19" decided that
this looked like another British C boat, several of which were in the
vicinity. Each boat turned to north and flashed a challenge. The German
then made I.M.I. (the Morse signal to "repeat," common knowledge to all
nations). The boats were then beam to beam at 100 yards' range, and the
German hailed in his own language. "C 19" had no gun, and was trying to
swing round to bring the bow tubes to bear, having no doubt as to what
to do in the matter. The enemy continued to make I.M.I., and turned
away to get out of the line of fire. This made it a stern-chase with "C
19" close up and gaining; the German then fired a starshell, and "C 19"
replied with rifles and automatic pistols. That was too much for the
Hun; he kicked his tail up and dived, with the bullets smacking on his
conning-tower as he went, and "C 19's" starboard torpedo--fired as he
dived--racing over the top of him. The U-boat's periscope showed once
on the bow, and "C 19" turned to ram and passed over it, without,
unfortunately, hitting anything solid. "C 19," on the 5th March, met
another Flanders Flotilla boat, this time with a heavy sea running,
which prevented torpedoes being fired with any hope of accuracy. The C
boat charged at once, using rifles and pistols as she came in. The
enemy dived, and "C 19" passed over her, the bump being slightly felt
below. It is possible that the German's periscope was damaged, but he
saved his skin by getting under in time.
On the 14th May 1917, in thick weather, "C 6" (Lieutenant Brookes) was
feeling for the Hinder Light-vessel. She found it at 7.30 A.M. close
aboard, and at the same time a German submarine found it, and,
appearing 300 yards away, dived at once. "C 6" went under also and
pursued by the use of hydrophones. In about half an hour the enemy's
motors were heard to slow up and stop, and "C 6," thinking he had gone
to the bottom to avoid the chase, came to the surface to get the mast
down, as it had been left standing in the hurry of getting under. The
visibility was only 200 yards, and there was nothing in sight. "C 6"
dived again, and, as she did so, heard the rattle and hum of
propellers as a torpedo missed her over the top. The German had
evidently come up for a look instead of taking bottom. The exasperated
"C 6" pursued by hydrophone for another quarter of an hour, but the
sound of the enemy's motors was then lost.
The list of "Contacts" with enemy submarines shows that in seven cases
the enemy was sunk less than five miles from a headland or navigational
mark. When proceeding between mine-fields, or when bound for dangerous
waters, it is natural for submarines to get a good departure or
landfall if possible, but all such strategic points are unhealthy to
approach. The following two cases illustrate this. In each of them the
U-boat Captain closed a light in order to get a good navigational
departure, and in each case his precaution had fatal results:--
On the 5th April 1917, "C 7" (Lieutenant A. W. Forbes) was waiting
at the Schouwen Bank gas-buoy, watching the channel that led to
Zeebrugge. She lay on the surface with half-buoyancy, and was
undoubtedly, as can be guessed from the despatch, on the "top-line"
in the matter of being ready for action. Lieutenant Forbes' First
lieutenant was on the sick-list most of the trip, so that he
himself was pretty well worn out on his return to harbour by
continual watch-keeping and anxiety.
"3.32 A.M.: Sighted submarine on port quarter steering about
north, distant 400 yards. Turned and at once fired port
torpedo at a range of about 250 yards. Torpedo hit forward
with loud explosion, sending up a large column of water.
Submarine turned to port and sank in a few seconds. The night
was very dark and misty, and no survivors or debris could be
seen."
In "E 52's" (Lieutenant P. Phillips) case, U-C 63 was caught as she
passed a well-known light-buoy north of the Dover Net Barrage. "E
52" (with her conning-tower only showing) attacked so as to keep
the enemy against the moonlight. The only survivor was a Petty
Officer, who gave the following account:--
"The night being very cold, the Navigating Warrant Officer, who
was on watch, sent the A.B. below to get some coffee. In the
meantime the engineer of the boat came on the bridge and stood
talking to the officer of the watch, who, in consequence,
failed to keep a proper look-out. The Petty Officer himself,
chancing to look to port, suddenly saw a submarine on the
surface.... U-C 63 had just started to turn when she was struck
by a torpedo amidships."
And that survivor's statement would be a good thing to frame and
put on every ship's bridge in war-time! The critical time when a
bad look-out was being kept could not have been more than a few
seconds, but it was long enough to cause death to all but one of
the submarine's crew.
The U-boats during the war torpedoed five of our boats, viz.: "E 3" in
the Bight in August 1914, "E 20" in the Sea of Marmora in November
1915, "E 22" in April 1916 off Yarmouth, "C 34" off the Shetlands in
July of 1917, and "D 6" in the Channel in June of 1918. Of these, "C
34" was hit when almost under--the German U 52 firing at the top of his
conning-tower as it went down. "E 22" was attacked while beating up and
down waiting for orders to proceed to any threatened area on the day of
the Yarmouth raid. She saw U-B 18's periscope and tried to ram it,
actually bending down the enemy's bow "net-cutters" (the big steel saw
that stands up in the bows of U-boats). The German, however, passed
under her and got his torpedo in as she turned back.
As far as is known, none of our boats were sunk by enemy submarines
apart from the five named. On several occasions U-boats fired torpedoes
and used guns against our boats, but the low hulls of English
submarines provide very small targets. I suppose the majority of shells
fired at English submarines came from English guns. Certainly the boats
were far more nervous about approaching our own harbours than they were
of working in enemy waters. The shooting was usually wild and could be
treated as amusing, but on occasions fatal results precluded any
joking. The surface anti-submarine vessels drew no fine distinctions,
and the submarines at times used to deplore their own side's excessive
zeal. There is a short extract from a certain boat's signal-log which
begins, "Can you give me my position?" and which continues, punctuated
by nine rounds of gun-fire, by way of injured protests, to "What did
you do in the Great War, Daddy?" as, her identity established and the
patrol ship's attentions deflected, the submarine continued her way up
harbour.
Out on the patrol areas, however, a British boat diving had to stand
her chance. No surface ship could be expected to differentiate between
our own and enemy periscopes, and the potency of British depth charges
was highly spoken of by those of our boats that had experience of them.