"We knew that for every boat we had working in an area, you had two
looking for us."
The latter statement shows an error in the officer's calculations. The
odds were very much the other way; but his error shows that moral
effect goes for a good deal in war.
In actions between submarines, guns have also been used, as have
rifles, pistols, and--at short range in the dark--verbal abuse; but no
definite sinkings on either side can be traced to these causes. In our
boats it was the rule to attack submerged, if possible--in the U-boats
it was rare to find an inclination to pursue a gun-action to its
logical end. A submarine, when nearly hit, can refuse action at any
time by diving. This, of course, forces the opponent left on the
surface to dive also, as it would be unhealthy then to remain on the
surface in that locality. Our submarines were always more lightly
gunned than the U-boats. Few of them carried more than one small
gun--and that one usually an anti-aircraft weapon. This was for two
reasons. Firstly, our boats are meant for warship-destroying as opposed
to commerce-destroying. The attacking of warships implies speed under
water (one should have, roughly, at least half the speed of the class
of ship one is after). Big guns are bad for stream-line, and therefore
militate against high submerged speed. Secondly, we were supplying guns
to Allies, our own Army, and to all our merchant ships and "mystery
ships," and the submarines had to take their turn at the supply with
the rest.
The British officer always had an inclination to use the ram if he got
a chance. A submarine can ram almost anything, and still, as the U.S.
Navy puts it, "Get away with it." Our boats have a ten-inch razor-edged
cast-steel stem fitted to them for net-cutting and other purposes. They
can also, by their system of compartments, stand damage forward to the
extent of a crushed bow, as far back as the bow hydroplanes, with no
great risk to themselves. Add to these things the delightful idea of
being able to thoroughly damage your ship and to be praised instead of
court-martialed for the action, and it is obvious that a number of
attempts along this line have been made. There is no record of one
having been successful to the extent of sinking an enemy, but in some
cases U-boats were damaged in this way. A curious case of accidental
ramming was that in which "E 50" (Lieutenant-Commander Michell), when
diving near the N. Hinder Light-vessel, sighted a periscope close
aboard on the bow. A moment later the two boats collided heavily at 25
feet by gauge. "E 50's" Captain, deciding that the other boat was
underneath him, put his hydroplanes "hard-to-dive," and flooded tanks
with the idea of carrying the enemy to the bottom (at that point 180
feet away) and crushing him. The U-boat, however, broke away, and after
showing her stern and conning-tower a moment on the surface, sank
again. It was later discovered that the enemy got home damaged. "E 50"
came out of the affair with the loss of her port-bow hydroplane and a
few dents. On such an occasion, there is no time to inspect your own
boat for damage before making up your mind if you should or should not
instantly rise to the surface. It is a natural action to bring your own
boat up as soon as possible, in case the chance of ever getting her up
at all goes by. The Captain of "E 50" acted on the rule that a dead
U-boat is a primary consideration, whatever one's natural inclinations
may be; his crew, though not consulted, were in full agreement with
him.
Again, I must quote an irrelevant incident. There were two of our
submarines in the Heligoland Bight patrol, diving in adjacent areas.
They both returned to harbour slightly damaged--one under the
impression that, while diving at 55 feet, he had been run over by a
surface vessel; the other reporting that, while diving at 25 feet, he
had bumped over a submarine. On meeting in harbour they found the times
of the mysterious collisions tallied to the minute.
In April 1915, the idea of using a fishing trawler as a decoy
originated in the _Vulcan's_ flotilla (C-class submarines)--based
on Leith. The U-boats had been sinking our fishing-boats at their
leisure, and it was clear that if a few U-boats were mysteriously lost
on this duty, it would be a discouraging thought for the remainder. It
must be remembered that a "missing" boat has a certain moral effect--a
boat openly sunk by gun fire, etc., serves only as an example for
others to be more careful. If a certain duty or a certain area becomes
unhealthy for U-boats without any explanation, it tends to make the
enemy chary of sending boats out on similar work, until the matter is
cleared up. Hence the secretiveness of the Admiralty during the war on
the losses of enemy submarines. Prisoners taken from U-boats were
prevented from explaining to anybody how their boats were sunk. It may
have been from humanity, or it may have been from the consideration
that U-boat prisoners were usually communicative in a useful way, but
orders were strict that as many prisoners as possible were to be saved
from the water when U-boats were sunk.
The _Vulcan's_ idea was of masterly simplicity. The U-boats found a
fishing fleet easy prey; therefore a fishing fleet with a "catch" on
it would get results. One trawler of each fleet was to tow, instead of
a trawl, a C-class submarine. The submarine would keep well submerged
at the end of the hawser, and need not necessarily keep a periscope
look-out, in view of the fact that the critical moment for her to slip
tow (a tow can be slipped while submerged) would be notified to her by
telephone from the trawler's bridge. Submarine "C 24" was the first to
show that the theory worked out in practice.
It will be seen, however, that she did the work under a considerable
handicap, and had the most aggravating experience a submarine can
have--that of doing an attack with "something wrong with the works."