On the eve of the Guadalcanal landing, Gen. A. A. Vandegrift's final

order to his command ended with the stirring and now celebrated

phrase: "God favors the bold and strong of heart." Yet in the

afterglow of later years, the Nation read a character sketch of him

which included this: "He is so polite and so soft spoken that he is

continually disappointing the people whom he meets. They find him

lacking in the fire-eating traits they like to expect of all marines,

and they find it difficult to believe that such a mild-mannered man

could really have led and won the bloody fight." When another officer

spoke warmly of Vandegrift's coolness under fire, his "grace under

pressure," to quote Hemingway's phrase, he replied: "I shouldn't be

given any credit. I'm built that way."

The point is beautifully taken. Too often the man with great inner

strength holds in contempt those less well endowed by nature than

himself.

While there are no perfect men, there are those who become relatively

perfect leaders of men because something in their makeup brings out in

strength the highest virtues of all who follow them. That is the way

of human nature. Minor shortcomings do not impair the working loyalty,

or growth, of the follower who has found someone whose strengths he

deems worth emulating. On the other hand, to recognize merit, you must

yourself have it. _The act of recognizing the worthwhile traits in

another person is both the test and the making of character._ The man

who scorns all others, and thinks no one else worth following, parades

his own inferiority before the world. He puts his own character into

bankruptcy just as surely as does that other sad camp follower of whom

Thomas Carlyle wrote: "To recognize false merit, and crown it as true,

because a long tail runs after it, is the saddest operation under the

sun."

Sherman, Logan, Rawlins and the many others hitched their wagons to

Grant's star because they saw in him a man who had a way with other

men, and who commanded them not less by personal courage than by

patient work in their interest. Had Grant spent time brooding over his

civilian failures, he would have been stuck with a disorderly camp and

would never have gotten out of Illinois.

The nobility of the private life and influence of Gen. Robert E. Lee

and the grandeur of his military character are known to every American

school boy. His peerless gifts as a battle leader have won the tribute

of celebrated soldiers and historians throughout the English-speaking

world. Likewise, the deep religiosity of his great lieutenant,

Stonewall Jackson, the latter's fiery zeal and the almost evangelical

power with which he lifted the hearts of all men who followed him, are

hallmarks of character that are vividly remembered in whatever context

his name happens to be mentioned.

If we turn for a somewhat closer look at Grant it is because he, more

than any other American soldier, left us a full, clear narrative of

his own growth, and of the inner thoughts and doubts pertaining to

himself which attended his life experience. There was a great deal of

the average man in Grant. He was beset by human failings. He could not

look impressive. He had no sense of destiny. In his great hours, it

was sweat, rather than inspiration, dogged perseverance, rather than

the aura of power, which made the hour great.

Average though he was in many things, there was nothing average about

the strong way in which he took hold, applying massive common sense to

the complex problems of the field. That is why he is worth close

regard. His virtues as a military leader were of the simpler sort

which plain men may understand and hope to emulate. He was direct in

manner. He never intrigued. His speech was homely. He was

approachable. His mind never deviated from the object. Though a

stubborn man, he was always willing to listen to his subordinates. He

never adhered to a plan obstinately, but nothing could induce him to

forsake the idea behind the plan.

History has left us a clear view of how he attained to greatness in

leadership by holding steadfastly to a few main principles.

At Belmont, his first small action, he showed nothing to indicate that

he was competent as a tactician and strategist. But the closing scene

reveals him as the last man to leave the field of action, risking his

life to see that none of his men had been left behind.

At Fort Donelson, where he had initiated an amphibious campaign of

highly original daring, he was not on the battlefield when his army

was suddenly attacked. He arrived to find his right wing crushed and

his whole force on the verge of defeat. He blamed no one. Without more

than a passing second's hesitation, he said quietly to his chief

subordinates: "Gentlemen, the position on the right must be retaken."

Then he mounted his horse, and galloped along the line shouting to his

men: "Fill your cartridge cases quick; the enemy is trying to escape

and he must not be permitted to do so." Control and order were

immediately reestablished by his presence.

At Shiloh, the same thing happened, only this time it was worse; the

whole Union Army was on the verge of rout. Grant, hobbling on crutches

from a recent leg injury, met the mob of panic-stricken stragglers as

he left the boat at Pittsburgh Landing. Calling on them to turn back,

he mounted and rode toward the battle, shouting encouragement and

giving orders to all he met. Confidence flowed from him back into an

already beaten Army and in this way a field near lost was soon

regained.

The last and best picture of Grant is on the evening after he had

taken his first beating from General Lee in the campaign against

Richmond. He was newly with the Army of the Potomac. His predecessors,

after being whipped by Lee, had invariably retreated to safe distance.

But this time as the defeated army took the road of retreat out of the

Wilderness, its columns got only as far as the Chancellorsville House

crossroad. There the soldiers saw a squat, bearded man, sitting

horseback, and drawing on a cigar. As the head of each regiment came

abreast him, he silently motioned it to take the right-hand fork--back

toward Lee's flank and deeper than ever into the Wilderness. That

night for the first time the Army sensed an electric change in the air

over Virginia. It had a man.

"I intend to fight it out on this line" is more revealing of the one

supreme quality which put the seal on all other of U. S. Grant's great

gifts for military leading than everything else that the historians

have written of him. He was the epitome of that spirit which moderns

call "seeing the show through." He was sensitive to a fault in his

early years, and carried to his tomb a dislike for military uniform,

caused by his being made the butt of ridicule the first time he ever

donned a soldier suit. As a junior lieutenant in the Mexican War, he

sensed no particular aptitude in himself. But he had participated in

every engagement possible to a member of his regiment, and had

executed every small duty to the hilt, with particular attention to

conserving the lives of his men. This was the school and the course

which later enabled him to march to Richmond, when men's lives had to

be spent for the good of the Nation. In more recent times, one of the

great statesmen and soldiers of the United States, Henry L. Stimson,

has added his witness to the value of this force in all enterprise: "I

know the withering effect of limited commitments and I know the

regenerative effect of full action." Though he was speaking

particularly of the larger affairs of war and nation policy, his words

apply with full weight to the personal life. The truth seen only

halfway is missed wholly; the thing done only halfway had best not be

attempted at all. Men can be fooled but they can't be fooled on this

score. They will know every time when the bolt falls short for lack of

a worthwhile effort. And when that happens, confidence in the leader

is corroded, even among those who themselves were unwilling to try.

There have been great and distinguished leaders in our military

services at all levels, who had no particular gifts for

administration, and little for organizing the detail of decisive

action either within battle or without. They excelled because of a

superior ability to utilize the brains and command the loyalty of

well-chosen subordinates. Their particular function was to judge the

mark according to their resources and audacity, and then to hold the

team steady until the mark was gained. So doing, they complemented the

power of the faithful lieutenants who might have put them in the shade

in any I. Q. test. Wrote Grant: "I never knew what to do with a paper

except put it in a side pocket or pass it to a clerk who understood it

better than I did." There was nothing unfair or irregular about this;

it was as it should be. All military achievement develops out of unity

of action. The laurel goes to the man whose powers can most surely be

directed toward the end purposes of organization. _The winning of

battles is the product of the winning of men._ That aptitude is not an

endowment of formal education, though the man who has led a football

team, a class, a fraternity or a debating society is the stronger for

the experience which he has gained. It is not uncustomary in those who

have excelled in scholarship to despise those who have excelled merely

in sympathetic understanding of the human race. But in the military

services, though there are niches for the pedant, character is at all

times at least as vital as intellect, and the main rewards go to him

who can make other men feel toughened as well as elevated.

_Quiet resolution._

_The hardihood to take risks._

_The will to take full responsibility for decision._

_The readiness to share its rewards with subordinates._

_An equal readiness to take the blame when things go adversely._

_The nerve to survive storm and disappointment and to face toward

each new day with the scoresheet wiped clean, neither dwelling on

one's successes nor accepting discouragement from one's failures._

In these things lie a great part of the essence of leadership, for

they are the constituents of that kind of moral courage which has

enabled one man to draw many others to him in any age.

It is good, also, to look the part, not only because of its effect on

others, but because from out of the effort made to _look it_, one may

in time come _to be it_. One of the kindliest and most penetrating

philosophers of our age, Abbe Ernest Dimnet, has assured us that this

is true. He says that by trying to look and act like a socially

distinguished person, one may in fact attain to the inner disposition

of a gentleman. That, almost needless to say, is the _real_ mark of

the officer who takes great pains about the manner of his dress and

address, for as Walt Whitman has said: "All changes of appearances

without a change in that which underlies appearance, are without

avail." All depends upon the spirit in which one makes the effort. By

his own account, U. S. Grant, as a West Point cadet, was more stirred

by the commanding appearance of General Winfield Scott than by any man

he had ever seen, including the President. He wrote that at that

moment there flashed across his mind the thought that some day he

would stand in Scott's place. Grant was unkempt of dress. His physical

endowments were such that he could never achieve the commanding air of

Scott, but he left us his witness that Scott's military bearing helped

kindle his own desire for command, even though he knew that he could

not be like Scott.

Much is said in favor of modesty as an asset in leadership. It is

remarked that the man who wishes to hold the respect of others will

mention himself not more frequently than a born aristocrat mentions

his ancestor. However, the point can be labored too hard. Some of the

ablest of the Nation's battlefield commanders have been anything but

shrinking violets; we have had now and then a hero who could boast

with such gusto that this very characteristic somehow endeared him to

his men. But that would be a dangerous tack for all save the most

exceptional individual. Instead of speaking of modesty as a charm that

will win all hearts, thereby risking that through excessive modesty a

man will become tiresome to others and rated as too timid for high

responsibility, it would be better to dwell upon the importance of

being natural, which means neither concealing nor making a vulgar

display of one's ideals and motives, but acting directly according to

their dictations.

This leads to another point. In several of the most celebrated

commentaries written by higher commanders on the nature of

generalship, the statement is made rather carelessly that to be

capable of great military leadership a man must be something of an

actor. If that were unqualifiedly true, then it would be a desirable

technique likewise in any junior officer that he too should learn how

to wear a false face, and play a part which cloaks his real self. The

hollowness of the idea is proved by the lives of such men as Robert E.

Lee, W. T. Sherman, George C. Marshall, Omar N. Bradley, Carl A.

Spaatz, William H. Simpson, Chester A. Nimitz, and W. S. Sims. As

commanders, they were all as natural as children, though some had

great natural reserve, and others were warmer and more outgiving. They

expressed themselves straightforwardly rather than by artful striving

for effect. There was no studied attempt to appear only in a certain

light. To use the common word for it, their people did not regard them

as "characters." This naturalness had much to do with their hold on

other men.

Such a result will always come. He who concentrates on the object at

hand has little need to worry about the impression he is making on

others. Even though they detect the chinks in the armor, they will

know that the armor will hold.

On the other hand, a sense of the dramatic values, coupled with the

intelligence to play upon them skillfully, is an invaluable quality in

any military leader. Though there was nothing of the "actor" in Grant,

he understood the value of pointing things up. _To put a bold or

inspiring emphasis where it belongs is not stagecraft, but an integral

part of the military fine art of communications._ System which is only

system is injurious to the mind and spirit of any normal person. One

can play a superior part well, and maintain prestige and dignity,

without being under the compulsion to think, speak and act in a

monotone. In fact, when any military commander becomes over-inhibited

along these lines because of the illusion that this is the way to

build a reputation for strength, he but doubles the necessity that his

subordinates will act at all times like human beings rather than

robots.

Coupled with self-control, recollection and thoughtfulness will carry

a man far. Men will warm toward a leader when they come to believe

that all the energy he stores up by living somewhat within himself is

at their service. But when they feel that this is not the case, and

that his reserve is simply the outward sign of a spiritual miserliness

and concentration on purely personal goals, no amount of restraint

will ever win their favor. This is as true of him who commands a whole

service as of the leader of a picket squad.

To speak of the importance of a sense of humor would be unavailing if

it were not that what cramps so many men isn't that they are by nature

humorless but that they are hesitant to exercise what humor they

possess. Within the military profession, it is as unwise as to let the

muscles go soft and to spare the mind the strain of original thinking.

Great humor has always been in the military tradition. The need of it

is nowhere more delicately expressed than in Kipling's lines:

My son was killed while laughing at some jest,

I would I knew

What it was, and it might serve me in a time

When jests are few.

Marcus Aurelius, Rome's soldier philosopher, spoke of his love for the

man who "could be humorous in an agreeable way." No reader of Grant's

_Memoirs_ (one of the few truly great autobiographies ever written by

a soldier) could fail to be impressed by his light touch. A delicate

sense of the incongruous seems to have pervaded him; he is at his

whimsical best when he sees himself in a ridiculous light. Lord

Kitchener, one of the grimmest warriors ever to serve the British

Empire, warmed to the man who made him the butt of a practical joke.

There is the unforgettable picture of Admiral Beatty at Jutland. The

_Indefatigable_ has disappeared beneath the waves. The _Queen Mary_

had exploded. The _Lion_ was in flames. Then word came that the

_Princess Royal_ was blown up. Said Beatty to his Flag Captain

"Chatfield, there seems to be something wrong with our ... ships

today. Turn two points nearer the enemy." Admiral Nimitz, surveying

the terrible landscape of the Kwajalein battlefield for the first

time, said gravely to his Staff: "It's the worst devastation I've ever

seen except for that last Texas picnic in Honolulu." There is a

characteristic anecdote of General Patton. He had just been worsted by

higher headquarters in an argument over strategy. So he sat talking to

his own Staff about it, his dog curled up beside him. Suddenly he said

to the animal: "The trouble with you, too, Willy, is that you don't

understand the big picture." General Eisenhower, probably more than

any other American commander, had the art of winning with his humor.

He would have qualified under Sydney Smith's definition: "The meaning

of an extraordinary man is that he is eight men in one man; that he

has as much wit as if he had no sense, and as much sense as if he had

no wit; that his conduct is as judicious as if he were the dullest of

human beings, and his imagination as brilliant as if he were

irretrievably ruined."

There is hardly a soldier, marine, or bluejacket who has been long in

battle but can tell some tale of an experience under fire when the

pressure became almost unbearable, and then was suddenly relieved

because somebody made a wisecrack or pulled something that was good

for a laugh. At Bastogne the American headquarters was being shelled

out of its position in the Belgian Barracks. The Commanding General

called in his Chief Signal Officer and asked when it would be

convenient to move. Said Lt. Col. Sid Davis, "Right now, while I've

got one line left and you can still give the order." When the garrison

was surrounded, and higher headquarters requested a description of the

situation, the young G-3 of the operation, Col. H. W. O. Kinnard,

radioed: "Think of a doughnut: we're the hole."

Who hasn't heard of the top kick who got his men forward by yelling:

"Come on you ----! Do you want to live forever?" Both the Army and the

Marine Corps claim him for their own, and it is possible that he was

twins.

If the American fighting man did not have an instinctive feeling for

the moral value of that kind of thing, the story would be long since

buried, for it is as ancient as the other tale which ends: "That was

no lady; that was my wife."

CHAPTER TEN

MAINSPRINGS OF LEADERSHIP

To what has been said, just a few things should be added so that the

problem of generating greater powers of leadership within the officer

corps may be seen in its true light.

The counselor says: "Be forthright! Be articulate! Be confident! Be

positive! Possess a commanding appearance!" The young man replies:

"All very good, so far as it goes. I will, if I can. But tell me, how

do I get that way?" He sees rightly enough the main point, that these

things are but derivatives of other inner qualities which must be

possessed, if the leader is to travel the decisive mile between

wavering capacity and resolute performance.

So the need is to get down to a few governing principles. Finding

them, we may be able to resolve finally any argument as to whether

leadership is a God-given power, or may be bestowed through earnest

military teaching.

Two great American commanders have spoken their thoughts on this

subject. The weight of their comment is enhanced by the conspicuous

success of both men in the field of moral leading.

Said Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations: "I concur

that we _can_ take average good men and, by proper training, develop

in them the essential initiative, confidence, and magnetism which are

necessary in leadership. I believe that these qualities are present in

the average man to a degree that he can be made a good leader if his

native qualities are properly developed; whether or not he becomes a

_great_ leader depends upon whether or not he possesses that _extra_

initiative, magnetism, moral courage, and force which makes the

difference between the average man and the above-average man."

Said Gen. C. B. Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps: "Leadership is

intangible, hard to measure and difficult to describe. Its qualities

would seem to stem from many factors. But certainly they must include

a measure of inherent ability to control and direct, _self-confidence

based on expert knowledge_, initiative, loyalty, pride, _and a sense

of responsibility_. Inherent ability obviously cannot be instilled,

but that which is latent or dormant can be developed. Other

ingredients can be acquired. They are not easily taught or easily

learned. _But leaders can be and are made._ The average good man in

our service is and must be considered a potential leader."

There are common denominators in these two quotations which clearly

point in one main direction. When we accent the importance of extra

initiative, expert knowledge and a sense of responsibility, we are

saying in other words that out of unusual application to duty comes

the power to lead others in the doing of it.

The matter is as simple and as profound as that, and if we will

consider for but a moment, we will see why it could hardly be

otherwise.

No normal young man is likely to recognize in himself the qualities

which will persuade others to follow him. On the other hand, any man

who can carry out orders in a cheerful spirit, complete this work step

by step, use imagination in improving it, and then when the job is

done, can face toward his next duty with anticipation, need have no

reason to doubt his own capacity for leadership.

The psychologists assure us that there is a sound scientific basis for

what enlightened military trainers have long held to be true--that the

first-class follower and the leader are one and the same. They say

that this is literally true, and that their tests prove it so.

But it does not follow that every man can be taught to lead. In the

majority of men, success or failure is caused more by mental attitude

than by mental capacity. Many are unwilling to face the ordeal of

thinking for themselves and of accepting responsibility for others.

But the man determined to excel at his own work has already climbed

the first rung of the ladder; in that process he perforce learns to

think for himself while setting an example to those who are around

him. Out of application to work comes capacity for original and

creative progress. The personality characteristics, emotional balance,

etc., which give him excellence in those things which he does with his

own brain and hand will enable him to command the respect, and in

turn, the service of other men.

To this extent, certainly leadership can be learned! It is a matter of

mastering simple techniques which will give more effective expression

to the character and natural talents of the individual.

Said one of this Nation's great political leaders: "There is no more

valuable subordinate than the man to whom you can give a piece of work

and then forget it, in the confident expectation that the next time it

is brought to your attention it will come in the form of a report that

the thing has been done. When this self-reliant quality is joined to

executive power, loyalty and common sense, the result is a man whom

you can trust."

Yes, indeed, and that is as it should be. For while no man can be sure

of the possibilities of his influence over other men, every man knows

by his own conscience when he is putting forth his best effort, and

when he is slacking.

The Armed Forces Officer Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-2 · 第 7 / 22 段