CHAPTER III

THE MEN OF BUSINESS AND THEIR METHODS

The highest class in the social scale at Rome was divided, roughly

rather than exactly, into two sections, according as they did or did

not aim at being elected to magistracies and so entering the senate.

To the senatorius ordo, which will be dealt with in the next chapter,

belonged all senators, and all sons of senators whether or no they had

as yet been elected to the quaestorship, which after Sulla was the

magistracy qualifying for the senate. But outside the senatorial ranks

there were numbers of wealthy and well educated men, most of whom

were engaged in one way or another in business; by which term is here

meant, not so much trading and mercantile operations, as banking,

money-lending, the undertaking of State contracts, and the raising of

taxes. The general name for this class was, strange to say, equites,

or knights, as they are often but unfortunately called in modern

histories of Rome. They were in fact at this time the most unmilitary

part of the population, and they inherited the title only because the

property qualification for the equites equo privato, i.e. the cavalry

who served with their horses, had been taken as the qualification also

for equestrian judices, to whom Gaius Gracchus had given the decision

of cases in the quaestio de repetundis.[97] This law of Gracchus had

had the result of constituting an ordo equester alongside of the ordo

senatorius, with a property qualification of 400,000 sesterces, or

about £3200, not of income but of capital. Any one who had this sum

could call himself an eques, provided he were not a senator, even if

he had never served in the cavalry or mounted a horse.

We are concerned here with the business which these men carried on,

not with their history as a body in the State; this latter difficult

subject has been handled by Dr. Greenidge in his _Roman Public

Life_, and by many other writers. We have to take them here as the

representatives of capital and the chief uses to which it was put in

the age of Cicero; for, as a matter of fact, they were then doing by

far the greatest part of the money-making of the Empire. They were not

indeed always doing it for themselves; they often represented men of

senatorial rank, and acted as their agents in the investment of money

and in securing the returns due. For the senator was not allowed, by

the strict letter of the law, to engage in business which would take

him out of Italy;[98] his services were needed at home, and if indeed

he had performed his proper work with industry and energy he never

could have found time to travel on his own business. At the time of

which we are speaking there were ways in which he could escape

from his duties,--ways only too often used; but many senators did

undoubtedly employ members of the equestrian order to transact their

business abroad, so that it is not untrue to say that the equites

had in their hands almost the whole of the monetary business of the

Empire.

The property qualification may seem to us small enough, but it is of

course no real index to the amount of capital which a wealthy eques

might possess. Nothing is more astonishing in the history of the last

century of the republic than the vast sums of money in the hands of

individuals, and the enormous sums lent and borrowed in private by the

men whose names are familiar to us as statesmen. It is told of Caesar

that as a very young man he owed a sum equivalent to about £280,000;

of Crassus that he had 200 million sesterces invested in land

alone.[99] Cicero, though from time to time in difficulties, always

found it possible to borrow the large sums which he spent on houses,

libraries, etc. These are men of the ordo senatorius; of the equites

proper, the men who dealt rather in lending than borrowing, we have

not such explicit accounts, because they were not in the same degree

before the public. But of Atticus, the type of the best and highest

section of the ordo equester, and of the amount and the sources of his

wealth, we happen to know a good deal from the little biography of him

written by his contemporary and friend Cornelius Nepos, taken together

with Cicero's numerous letters to him. His father had left him the

moderate fortune of £16,000. With this he bought land, not in Italy

but in Epirus, where it was probably to be had cheap. The profits

arising from this land, with which he took no doubt much trouble and

pains, he invested again in other ways. He lent money to Greek cities:

to Athens indeed without claiming any interest; to Sicyon without much

hope of repayment; but no doubt to many others at a large profit. He

also undertook the publishing of books, buying slaves who were skilled

copyists; and in this, as in so many other ways, his friendship was of

infinite value to Cicero. When we reflect that every highly educated

man at this time owned a library and wished to have the last new

book, we can understand how even this business might be extensive and

profitable, and are not astonished to find Cicero asking Atticus to

see that copies of his Greek book on his own consulship were to be had

in Athens and other Greek towns.[100] This shrewd man also invested in

gladiators, whom he could let out at a profit, as no doubt he would

let out his library slaves.[101] Lastly, he owned houses in Rome; in

fact he must have been making money in many different ways, spending

little himself, and attending personally and indefatigably to all his

business, as indeed with true and disinterested friendship he

attended to that of Cicero In him we see the best type of the Roman

businessman: not the bloated millionaire living in coarse luxury, but

the man who loved to be always busy for himself or his friends, and

whose knowledge of men and things was so thorough that he could make

a fortune without anxiety to himself or discomfort to others. What

amount of capital he realised in these various ways we do not know,

but the mass of his fortune came to him after he had been pursuing

them for many years, in the form of a legacy from an uncle. This uncle

was a typical capitalist and money-lender of a much lower and coarser

type than his nephew; Nepos aptly describes him as "familiarem L.

Luculli, divitem, _difficillima natura_." The nephew was the only man

who could get on with this Peter Featherstone of Roman life, and this

simple fact tells us as much about the character and disposition of

Atticus as anything in Cicero's correspondence with him. The happy

result was that his uncle left him a sum which we may reckon at about

£80,000 (_centies sestertium_),[102] and henceforward he may be

reckoned, if not as a millionaire, at any rate as a man of large

capital, soundly invested and continually on the increase.

There is no doubt then as to the fact of the presence of capital on a

large scale in the Rome of the last century B.C., or of the business

talents of many of its holders, or again of the many profitable ways

in which it might be invested. But in order to learn a little more of

the history of capital at Rome, which is of the utmost importance for

a proper understanding not only of the economic, but of the social and

ethical characteristics of the age, it is necessary to go as far back

as the war with Hannibal at least.

That there had been surplus capital in the hands of individuals long

before the war with Hannibal is a well known fact, proved by the old

Roman law of debt, and by the traditions of the unhappy relations

of debtor and creditor. But in order not to go back too far, we may

notice a striking fact which meets us at the very outset of that

momentous war. In 215 B.C., and again the next year, the treasury was

almost empty; then for the first time, so far as we know, private

individuals came to the rescue, and lent large sums to the State;[103]

these were partners in certain associations to be described later on

in this chapter, which had made money by undertaking State contracts

in the previous wars. The presence of Hannibal in Italy strained the

resources of the State to the utmost in every way; it cut the Romans

off from their supply of the precious metals, forced them to reduce

the weight of the _as_ to one ounce, and, curiously enough, also to

issue gold coins for the first time,--a measure probably taken on

account of the dearth of silver,--and to make use of the uncoined gold

in the treasury or in private hands. At the end of the war the supply

of silver was recovered; henceforward all reckonings were made in

silver, and the gold coinage was not long continued.

At this happy time, when Rome felt that she could breathe again after

the final defeat of her deadly enemy, began the great inpouring of

wealth of which the capitalism of Cicero's time is the direct result.

The chief sources of this wealth, so far as the State was concerned,

were the indemnities paid by conquered peoples, especially Carthage

and Antiochus of Syria, and the booty brought home by victorious

generals. Of these Livy has preserved explicit accounts, and the best

example is perhaps that of the booty brought by Scipio Asiaticus

from Asia Minor in 189 B.C., of which Pliny remarks that it first

introduced luxury into Italy.[104] It has been roughly computed that

the total amount from indemnities may be taken at six million of our

pounds, in the period of the great wars of the second century B.C.,

and from booty very much the same sum. Besides this we have to take

account of the produce of the Spanish silver mines, of which the

Romans came into possession with the Carthaginian dominions in Spain;

the richest of these were near Carthago Nova, and Polybius tells us

that in his day they employed 40,000 miners, and produced an immense

revenue.[105]

All this went into the aerarium, except what was distributed out of

the booty to the soldiers, both Romans and socii, the former naturally

taking as a rule double the amount paid to the latter. But the influx

of treasure into the State coffers soon began to tell upon the

financial welfare of the whole citizen community; the most striking

proof of this is the fact that, in 167 B.C., after the second

Macedonian war, the _tribulum_ or property-tax was no longer imposed

upon all citizens. Henceforward the Roman citizen had hardly any

burdens to bear except the necessity of military service, and there

are very distinct signs that he was beginning to be unwilling to

bear even that one. He saw the prominent men of his time enriching

themselves abroad and leading luxurious lives, and the spirit of ease

and idleness began inevitably to affect him too. Polybius indeed,

writing about 140-130 B.C., declines to state positively that the

great Romans were corrupt or extortionate,[106] and those who were his

intimate friends, Aemilius Paullus and his sons, were distinguished

for their "abstinentia": but the mere occurrence of this word

"abstinentia" in the epitomes of Livy's lost books which dealt with

this time, betrays the fact too obviously. In 149 was passed the

first of the long series of laws intended, but in vain, to check the

tendency of provincial governors to extort money from their subjects;

and as this law established for the first time a standing court to try

offences of this kind, the inference is inevitable that such offences

were common and on the increase.

The remarkable fact about this inpouring of wealth is its

extraordinary suddenness. Within the lifetime of a single individual,

Cato the Censor, who died an old man in 149 B.C., the financial

condition of the State and of individuals had undergone a complete

change. Cato loved to make money and knew very well how to do it, as

his own treatise on agriculture plainly shows; but he wished to do it

in a legitimate way, and to spend profitably the money he made, and

he spared no pains to prevent others from making it illegally and

spending it unprofitably. He saw clearly that the sudden influx of

wealth was disturbing the balance of the Roman mind, and that the

desire to make money was taking the place of the idea of duty to the

State. He knew that no Roman could serve two masters, Mammon and the

State, and that Mammon was getting the upper hand in his views of

life. If the accumulation of wealth had been gradual instead of

sudden, natural instead of artificial, this could hardly have

happened; as in England from the fourteenth century onwards, the

steady growth of capital would have produced no ethical mischief, no

false economic ideas, because it would have been an _organic_ growth,

resting upon a sound and natural economic basis.[107] As the French

historian has said with singular felicity,[108] "Money is like water

of a river: if it suddenly floods, it devastates; divide it into a

thousand channels where it circulates quietly, and it brings life and

fertility to every spot."

It was in this period of the great wars, so unwholesome and perilous

economically, that the men of business, as defined at the beginning of

this chapter--the men of capital outside the ordo senatorius--first

rose to real importance. In the century that followed, and as we see

them more especially in Cicero's correspondence, they became a great

power in the State, and not only in Rome, but in every corner of the

Empire. We have now to see how they gained this importance and

this power, and what use they made of their capital and their

opportunities. This is not usually explained or illustrated in the

ordinary histories of Rome, yet it is impossible without explaining it

to understand either the social or the public life of the Rome of this

period.

The men of business may be divided into two classes, according as they

undertook work for the State or on their own account entirely. It does

not follow that these two classes were mutually exclusive; a man might

very well invest his money in both kinds of undertaking, but these two

kinds were totally distinct, and called by different names. A public

undertaking was called _publicum_,[109] and the men who undertook it

_publicani_; a private undertaking was _negotium_, and all private

business men were known as _negotiatores_. The publicani were always

organised in joint-stock companies (_societates publicanorum_);

the negotiatores might be in private partnership with one or more

partners,[110] but as a rule seem to have been single individuals. We

will deal first with the publicani.

In a passage of Livy quoted just now it is stated that at the

beginning of the Hannibalic war money was advanced to the State by

societates publicanorum; Livy also happens to mention that three of

these competed for the privilege. Thus it is clear that the system of

getting public work done by contract was in full operation before that

date, together with the practice on the part of the contractors of

uniting in partnerships to lessen the risk. System and practice are

equally natural, and it needs but a little historical imagination to

realise their development. As the Roman State became involved in wars

leading to the conquest of Italy, and in due time to the acquisition

of dominions beyond sea, armies and fleets had to be equipped and

provisioned, roads had to be made, public rents to be got in, new

buildings to be erected for public convenience or worship, corn had to

be procured for the growing population, and, above all, taxes had

to be collected both in Italy and in the provinces as these were

severally acquired.[111] The government had no apparatus for carrying

out these undertakings itself; it had not, as we have, separate

departments or bureaux with a permanent staff of officials attached to

each, and even if it had been so provided, it would still have

found it most convenient, as modern governments also do, to get the

necessary work carried out in most cases by private contractors. Every

five years the censors let the various works by auction to contracting

companies, who engaged to carry them out for fixed sums, and make what

profit they could out of the business (_censoria locatio_). This saved

an immense amount of trouble to the senate and magistrates, who were

usually busily engaged in other matters; nor was there at first any

harm in the system, so long as the Romans were morally sound, and

incapable of jobbing or scamping their work. The very fact that they

united into companies for the purpose of undertaking these contracts

shows that they were aware of the risk involved, and wished as far as

possible to neutralise it; it did not mean greed for money, but rather

anxiety not to lose the capital invested.

But as Rome advanced her dominion in the second century B.C., and

had to see to an ever-increasing amount of public business, it was

discovered that the business of contracting was one which might indeed

be risky, but with skill and experience, and especially with a trifle

of unscrupulousness, might be made a perfectly safe and paying

investment. This was especially the case with the undertakings for

raising the taxes in the newly acquired provinces as well as in Italy,

more particularly in those provinces, viz. Sicily and Asia, which paid

their taxes in the form of tithe and not in a lump sum. The collection

of these revenues could be made a very paying concern seeing that it

was not necessary to be too squeamish about the rights and claims of

the provincials. And, indeed, by the time of the Gracchi all these

joint-stock companies had become the one favourite investment in

which every one who had any capital, however small, placed it without

hesitation. Polybius, who was in Rome at this time for several years,

and was thoroughly acquainted with Roman life, has left a valuable

record in his sixth book (ch. xvii.) of the universal demand for

shares in these companies; a fact which proves that they were believed

to be both safe and profitable.

These societates were managed by the great men of business, as our

joint-stock companies are directed by men of capital and consequence.

Polybius tells us that among those who were concerned, some took the

contracts from the censors: these were called _mancipes_, because

the sign of accepting the contract at the auction was to hold up the

hand.[112] Others, Polybius goes on, were in association with these

mancipes, and, as we may assume, equally responsible with them; these

were the _socii_. It was of course necessary that security should be

given for the fulfilment of the contract, and Polybius does not omit

to mention the _praedes_ or guarantors[113]. Lastly, he says that

others again gave their property on behalf of these official members

of the companies, or in their name, for the public purpose in hand.

These last words admit of more than one interpretation, but as in the

same passage Polybius tells us that all who had any money put it into

these concerns, we may reasonably suppose that he means to indicate

the _participes_, or small holders of shares, which were called

_partes_, or if very small, _particulae_[114]. The socii and

participes seem to be distinguished by Cicero in his Verrine orations

(ii. 1. 55), where he quotes an addition made by Verres illegally as

praetor to a lex censoria: "qui de censoribus redemerit, eum socium ne

admittito neve partem dato." If this be so, we may regard the socius

as having a share both in the management and the liability, while the

particeps merely put his money into the undertaking[115]. The actual

management, on which Polybius is silent, was in Rome in the hands of a

_magister_, changing yearly, like the magistrates of the State, and

in the provinces of a _pro-magister_ answering to the pro-magistrate,

with a large staff of assistants[116]. Communications between

the management at home and that in the provinces were kept up by

messengers (_tabellarii_), who were chiefly slaves; and it is

interesting incidentally to notice that these, who are constantly

mentioned in Cicero's letters, also acted as letter-carriers for

private persons to whom their employers were known.

Such a business as this, involving the interests of so many citizens,

must have necessitated something very like the Stock Exchange or

Bourse of modern times; and in fact the basilicas and porticoes which

we met with in the Forum during our walk through Rome did actually

serve this purpose.[117] The reader of Cicero's letters will have

noticed how often the Forum is spoken of as the centre of life at

Rome--going down to the Forum was indeed the equivalent of "going into

the City," as well as of "going down to Westminster." All who had

investments in the societates would wish to know the latest news

brought by _tabellarii_ from the provinces, e.g. of the state of the

crop in Sicily or Asia, or of the disposition of some provincial

governor towards the publicani of his province, or again of the

approach of some enemy, such as Mithridates or Ariovistus, who by

defeating a Roman army might break into Roman territory and destroy

the prospects of a successful contractual enterprise. Assuredly

Cicero's love for the Forum was not a political one only; he loved it

indeed as the scene of his great triumphs as an advocate, but also

no doubt because he was concerned in some of the companies which had

their headquarters there. When urging the people to give Pompeius

extraordinary powers to drive Mithridates out of reach of Roman Asia,

where he had done incalculable damage, he dwells both with knowledge

and feeling on the value of the province, not only to the State, but

to innumerable private citizens who had their money invested in its

revenues[118]. "If some," he pleads, "lose their whole fortunes,

they will drag many more down with them. Save the State from such a

calamity: and believe me (though you see it well enough) that the

whole system of credit and finance which is carried on here at Rome in

the Forum, is inextricably bound up with the revenues of the Asiatic

province. If those revenues are destroyed, our whole system of credit

will come down with a crash. See that you do not hesitate for a moment

to prosecute with all your energies a war by which the glory of the

Roman name, the safety of our allies, our most valuable revenues,

and the fortunes of innumerable citizens, will be effectually

preserved.[119]"

This is a good example of the way in which political questions might

be decided in the interests of capital, and it is all the more

striking, because a few years earlier Sulla had done all he could to

weaken the capitalists as a distinct class. Pompeius went out with

abnormal powers, and might be considered for the time as their

representative; the result in this case was on the whole good, for the

work he did in the East was of permanent value to the Empire. But the

constitution was shaken and never wholly recovered, and nothing that

he was able to do could restore the unfortunate province of Asia

to its former prosperity. Four years later the company which had

contracted for raising the taxes in the province sought to repudiate

their bargain. This was disgraceful, as Cicero himself expressly

says;[120] but it is quite possible that they had great difficulty

in getting the money in, and feared a dead loss,[121] owing to

the impoverishment of the provincials. This matter again led to a

political crisis; for the senate, urged by Cato, was disposed to

refuse the concession, and the alliance between the senatorial class

and the business men (_ordinum concordia_), which it had been Cicero's

particular policy to confirm, in order to mass together all men of

property against the dangers of socialism and anarchy, was thereby

threatened so seriously that it ceased to be a factor in politics.

These companies and their agents were indeed destined to be a thorn in

Cicero's side as a provincial governor himself. When called upon to

rule Cilicia in 51 B.C. he found the people quite unable to pay their

taxes and driven into the hands of the middleman in order to do

so;[122] his sympathies were thus divided between the unfortunate

provincials, for whom he felt a genuine pity, and the interests of

the company for collecting the Cilician taxes, and of those who had

invested their money in its funds. In his edict, issued before his

entrance into the province, he had tried to balance the conflicting

interests; writing of it to Atticus, who had naturally as a capitalist

been anxious to know what he was doing, he says that he is doing all

he can for the publicani, coaxing them, praising them, yielding to

them--but taking care that they do no mischief;[123] words which

perhaps did not altogether satisfy his friend. All honest provincial

governors, especially in the Eastern provinces, which had been the

scene of continual wars for nearly three centuries, found themselves

in the same difficulty. They were continually beset by urgent appeals

on behalf of the tax-companies and their agents--appeals made

without a thought of the condition of a province or its tax-paying

capacity--so completely had the idea of making money taken possession

of the Roman mind. Among the letters of Cicero are many such appeals,

sent by himself to other provincial governors, some of them while he

was himself in Cilicia. We may take two as examples, before bringing

this part of our subject to a close.

The first of these letters is to P. Silius Nerva, propraetor of

Bithynia, a province recently added to the Empire by Pompeius. Cicero

here says that he is himself closely connected with the partners

in the company for collecting the pasture-dues (scriptura) of the

province, "not only because that company as a body is my client, but

also because I am very intimate with most of the individual partners."

Can we doubt that he was himself a shareholder? He urges Nerva to do

all he can for Terentius Hispo, the pro-magister of the company,

and to try to secure for him the means of making all the necessary

arrangements with the taxed communities--relying, we are glad to find,

on the tact and kindness of the governor.[124] The second letter, to

his own son-in-law, Furius Crassipes, quaestor of Bithynia, shall be

quoted here in full from Mr. Shuckburgh's translation:[125]

"Though in a personal interview I recommended as earnestly as I could

the publicani of Bithynia, and though I gathered that by your own

inclination no less than from my recommendation, you were anxious to

promote the advantage of that company in every way in your power, I

have not hesitated to write you this, since those interested thought

it of great importance that I should inform you what my feeling

towards them was. I wish you to believe that, while I have ever had

the greatest pleasure in doing all I can for the order of publicani

generally, yet this particular company of Bithynia has my special

good wishes. Owing to the rank and birth of its members, this company

constitutes a very important part of the state: for it is made up of

members of the other companies: and it so happens that a very large

number of its members are extremely intimate with me, and especially

the man who is at present at the head of the business, P. Rupilius,

its pro-magister. Such being the case, I beg you with more than common

earnestness to protect Cn. Pupius, an employé of the company,[126] by

every sort of kindness and liberality in your power, and to secure, as

you easily may, that his services shall be as satisfactory as possible

to the company, while at the same time securing and promoting the

property and interests of the partners--as to which I am well aware

how much power a quaestor possesses. You will be doing me in this

matter a very great favour, and I can myself from personal experience

pledge you my word that you will find the partners of the Bithynia

company gratefully mindful of any services you can do them."

If Cicero, the most tender-hearted of Roman public men, could urge

the claims of the companies so strongly, and, as in this last letter,

without any allusion to the interests of the province and its people,

we may well imagine how others, less scrupulous, must have combined

with the capitalists to work havoc in regions that only needed peace

and mild government to recover from centuries of misery. Such a letter

is the best comment we can have on the pernicious system of raising

taxes by contract--a system which was to be modified, regulated, and

eventually reduced to harmless dimensions under the benevolent and

scientific government of the early Empire.

We must now turn to the other department of the activity of the men of

business, that of banking and money-lending (_negotiatores_).

On the north or sunny side of the Forum we noticed in our walk round

the city the shops of the bankers (_tabernae argentariae_).

The _argentarii_ were originally, as their name suggests, only

money-changers, a class of small business men that arose in response

to a need felt as soon as increasing commerce and extended empire

brought foreign coin in large quantities to Rome. The Italian

communities outside the Roman State issued their own coinage until

they were admitted to the civitas after the Social War,--a fact which

alone is sufficient to show the need of men who made it their business

to know the current value of various coins in Roman money; and as

Rome became involved in the affairs of the East, there were always

circulating in the city the tetradrachms of Antioch and Alexandria,

the Rhodian drachmas, and the cistophori of the kings of Pergamus,

afterwards coined in the province of Asia.[127] No doubt the

money-changing business was a profitable one, and itself led to the

formation of capital which could be used in taking deposits and making

advances; and, as Professor Purser puts it,[128] the mere possession

of a quantity of coin for purposes of change would be likely to

develop spontaneously the profession of banking. In the same way the

_nummularii_, or assayers of the coin, having a mass of it in their

hands, would tend to develop a private business as well as their

official public one. All these, argentarii or nummularii, might be

called _foeneratores_, from the interest (_foenus_) which they charged

in their transactions. The profession was a respectable one, for

honesty and exactness in accounts were absolutely necessary to success

in it.[129] If the reader will turn to Cicero's speech in defence

of Caecina (6. 16), he will find these accounts appealed to, though

apparently not actually produced in court; but in the _Noctes Atticae_

of Aulus Gellius (xiv. 2) a judge who is describing a civil case which

came before him, mentions, among the documents produced, _mensae

rationes_, i.e. the accounts kept by the banker.

Your argentarius seems to have been ready to undertake for you almost

all that a modern banker will do for his customer. He would take

deposits of money, either for the depositor's use or to bear interest,

and would make payments on his behalf on receipt of a written order,

answering to our cheque;[130] this was a practice probably introduced

from Greece, for in the Eastern Mediterranean the whole business of

credit and exchange had long been reduced to a system. Again, if you

wished to be supplied with money during a journey, or to pay a sum to

any one at a distance, e.g. in Greece or Asia, your argentarius

would arrange it for you by giving you letters of credit or bills of

exchange on a banker at such towns as you might mention, and so save

you the trouble of carrying a heavy weight of coin with you. When,

Cicero sent his son to the University of Athens, he wished to give

him a generous allowance,--too generous, as we should think, for it

amounted to about £640 a year,--and he asked Atticus whether it could

be managed for him by _permutatio_, i.e. exchange, and received an

affirmative answer[131]. So too when his beloved freedman secretary

Tiro fell ill of fever at Patrae, Cicero finds it easy to get a local

banker there to advance him all the money he needed, and to pay the

doctor, engaging himself to repay the money to any agent whom the

banker might name[132].

Your argentarius would also attend for you, or appoint an agent to

attend, at any public auction in which you were interested as seller

or purchaser, and would pay or receive the money for you,--a practice

which must have greatly helped him in getting to know the current

value of all kinds of property, and indeed in learning to understand

human nature on its business side. In the passage from the _pro

Caecina_ quoted just now, a lady, Caesennia, wished to buy an estate;

she employs an agent, Aebutius, no doubt recommended by her banker,

and to him the estate is knocked down. He undertakes that the

argentarius of the vendor, who is present at the auction, shall be

paid the value, and this is ultimately done by Caesennia, and the sum

entered in the banker's books (tabulae).

But perhaps the most important part of the business was the finding

money for those who were in want of it, i.e. making advances on

interest. The poor man who was in need of ready money could get it

from the argentarius in coin if he had any security to offer, and,

as we saw in the last chapter, might get entangled more and more

hopelessly in the nets of the money-lender. Whether the same

argentarius did this small business and also the work of supplying the

rich man with credit, we do not know; it may have been the case that

the great money-lenders like Atticus themselves employed argentarii,

and so kept them going. That Atticus would undertake, anyhow, for a

friend like Cicero, any amount of money-finding, we know well from

many letters of Cicero, written when he was anxious to buy a piece

of land at any cost on which to erect a shrine to his beloved

daughter[133]; and we may be pretty sure that Atticus could not have

done all that Cicero importunately pressed upon him if he had not had

a number of useful professional agents at command. From these same

letters we also learn that finding money by no means necessarily meant

finding coin; in a society where every one was lending or borrowing,

and probably doing both at the same time, what actually passed was

chiefly securities, mortgages, debts, and so on. If you wanted to hand

over a hundred thousand or so to a creditor, what your agent had as

often as not to do was to persuade that creditor to accept as payment

the debts owing to yourself from others, i.e. you would hand over to

him, if he would accept them, the bonds or other securities given you

by your own debtors.[134]

It is plain then that the money-lenders had an enormous business, even

in Rome alone, and risky as it undoubtedly was, it must often have

been a profitable one. And it was not only at Rome that men were

borrowing and lending, but over the whole Empire. For reasons which it

would need an economic treatise to explain, private men, cities, and

even kings were in want of money; it was needed to meet the increased

cost of living and the constantly increasing standard of living among

the educated;[135] it was needed by the cities of Greece and the East

to repair the damages done in the wars of the last three hundred

years; it was needed by the poorer provincials to pay the taxes for

which neither the publicani nor the Roman government could afford to

wait; and it was needed by the kings who had come within the dismal

shadow of the Roman Empire, in order to carry on their own government,

or to satisfy the demands of the neighbouring provincial governor, or

to bribe the ruling men at Rome to get some decree passed in their

favour. Cicero, at the end of his life, looking back to his own

consulship in 63, says that at no time in his recollection was the

whole world in such a condition of indebtedness,[136] and in a famous

passage in his second Catilinarian oration he has drawn a picture of

the various classes of debtors in Rome and Italy at that time (_Cat._

ii. § 18 foll.). He tells us of those who have wealth and yet will not

pay their debts; of those who are in debt and look to a revolution to

absolve them; of the veterans of the Sullan army, settled in colonies

such as Faesulae, who had rushed into debt in order to live luxurious

lives; of old debtors of the city, getting deeper and deeper into the

quagmire, who joined the conspiracy as a last desperate venture. There

was in fact in that famous year a real social fermentation going on,

caused by economic disturbance of the most serious kind; the germs of

the disease can be traced back to the Hannibalic war and its effects

on Italy, but all the symptoms had been continually exacerbated by the

negligence and ignorance of the government, and brought to a head by

the Social and Civil Wars in 90-82 B.C. In 63 the State escaped an

economic catastrophe through the vigilance of Cicero and the alliance

of the respectable classes under his leadership. In 49, and again in

48, it escaped a similar disaster through the good sense of Caesar and

his agents, who succeeded in steering between Scylla and Charybdis by

saving the debtors without ruining the lenders.[137]

Wonderful figures are given by later writers, such as Plutarch, of the

debts and loans of the great men of this time, and they may stand as

giving us a general impression of private financial recklessness. But

the only authentic information that has come down to us is what

Cicero drops from time to time in his correspondence about his own

affairs,[138] and even this needs much explanation which we are unable

to apply to it. What is certain is that Cicero never had more than a

very moderate income on which he could depend, and that at times he

was hard up for money, especially of course after his exile and the

confiscation of his property; and that on the other hand he never had

any difficulty in getting the sums he needed, and never shows the

smallest real anxiety about his finances. His profession as a

barrister only brought him a return indirectly in the form of an

occasional legacy or gift, since fees were forbidden by a lex Cincia;

his books could hardly have paid him, at least in the form of money;

his inherited property was small, and his Italian villas were not

profitable farms, nor was it the practice to let such country houses,

as we do now, when not occupying them; he declined a provincial

government, the usual source of wealth, and when at last compelled

to undertake one, only realised what was then a paltry sum,--some

£17,500, all of which, while in deposit at Ephesus, was seized by

the Pompeians in the Civil War.[139] Yet even early in life he could

afford the necessary expenses for election to successive magistracies,

and could live in the style demanded of an important public man.

Immediately after his consulship he paid £28,000 for Crassus' house

on the Palatine, and it is here that we first discover how he managed

such financial operations. Here are his own words in a letter to a

friend of December 62 B.C.:[140] "I have bought the house for 3,500

sestertia ... so you may now look on me as so deeply in debt as to be

eager to join a conspiracy if any one would admit me! ... Money is

plentiful at 6 per cent, and the success of my measures (in the

consulship) has caused me to be regarded as a good security."

The simple fact was that Cicero was always regarded as a safe man to

lend money to, by the business men and the great capitalists; partly

because he was an honest man,--a _vir bonus_ who would never dream of

repudiation or bankruptcy; partly because he knew every one, and had

a hundred wealthy friends besides the lender of the moment and among

them, most faithful of all, the prudent and indefatigable Atticus.

Undoubtedly then it was by borrowing, and regularly paying interest

on the loans, that he raised money whenever he wanted it. He may have

occasionally made money in the companies of tax-collectors; we have

seen that he probably had shares in some of their ventures. But there

is no clear evidence in his letters of this source of wealth,[141] and

there is abundant evidence of the borrowing. After his return from

exile, though the senate had given him somewhat meagre compensation

for the loss of his property, he began at once to borrow and to build:

"I am building in three places," he writes to his brother,[142] "and

am patching up my other houses. I live somewhat more lavishly than I

used to do; I am obliged to do so." Here again we know from whom he

borrowed,--it was this same brother, who of course had no more certain

income than his own, probably less. But he had been governor of Asia

for three years (61-58 B.C.), and must have realised large sums even

in that exhausted province; and at this moment he was legatus to

Pompeius as special commissioner for organising the supply of

corn, and thus was in immediate contact with one of the greatest

millionaires of the day. In order to repay his brother all Marcus

had to do was to borrow from other friends. "In regard to money I am

crippled. But the liberality of my brother I have repaid, in spite of

his protests, by the aid of my friends, that I might not be drained

quite dry myself" (_ad Att._ iv. 3). Two years later an unwary reader

might feel some astonishment at finding that Quintus himself was now

deep in debt;[143] but as he continues to read the correspondence his

astonishment will vanish. With the prospect before him of a prolonged

stay in Gaul with Caesar, Quintus might doubtless have borrowed to any

extent; and in fact with Caesar's help--the proceeds of the Gallic

wars--both brothers found themselves in opulence. The Civil War, and

the repayment of his debts to Caesar, nearly ruined Marcus towards the

end of his life, but nothing prevented his contriving to find money

for any object on which he had set his heart; when in his grief for

the loss of his daughter he wishes to buy suburban gardens where a

shrine to her memory may (strange to say) attract public notice, he

tells Atticus to buy what is necessary _at any cost_. "Manage the

business your own way; do not consider what my purse demands--about

that I care nothing--but what I _want_."[144]

Such being the financial method of Cicero and his brother, we cannot

be surprised to find that the younger generation of the family

followed faithfully in the footsteps of their elders. We have seen

that the young Marcus had a large allowance at Athens and on the whole

he seems to have kept fairly well within it, in spite of some trouble;

but his cousin the younger Quintus, coming to see his uncle in

December 45, showed him a gloomy countenance, and on being asked the

meaning of it, said that he was going with Caesar to the Parthian war

in order to avoid his creditors, and presumably to make money to pay

them with.[145] He had not even enough money for the journey out. His

uncle did not offer to give him any, but he does not seem to have

thought very seriously of the young man's embarrassments.

One more example of the financial dealings of the business men of this

extraordinary age, and we will bring this chapter to an end. It is a

story which has luckily been preserved in Cicero's speech in defence

of a certain Rabirius Postumus in the year 54, who was accused under

Caesar's law de pecuniis repetundis (extortion in the provinces). It

is a remarkable revelation of all the most striking methods of making

and using money in the last years of the Republic.

The father of this Rabirius, says Cicero, had been a distinguished

member of the equestrian order, and "fortissimus et maximus

publicanus"; not greedy of money, but most liberal to his friends--in

other words, he was not a miser, for that character was rare in this

age, but lent his money freely in order to acquire influence and

consideration. The son took up the same line of business, and engaged

in a wide sphere of financial operations. He dealt largely in the

stock of the tax-companies; he lent money to cities in several

provinces; he lent money to Ptolemy Auletes, King of Egypt, both

before he was expelled from his kingdom by sedition, and afterwards

when he was in Rome in 59 and 58, intriguing to induce the senate

to have him restored. Rabirius never doubted that he would be so

restored, and seems to have failed to see the probability of such a

policy being contested or quarrelled about, as actually happened in

the winter of 57-56. He lent, and persuaded his friends to lend:[146]

he represented the king's cause as a good investment; and then, like

the investing agent of to-day who slips so easily from carelessness

into crime, he had to go on lending more and more, because he feared

that if he stopped the king might turn against him.

He had staked the mass of his substance on a desperate venture. But

time went on and Ptolemy was not restored, and without the revenues of

his kingdom he of course could not pay his creditors. At last, at the

end of the year 56, Gabinius, then governor of Syria, had pressure

put on him by the creditors--among them perhaps both Caesar and

Pompeius--to march into Egypt without the authority of the senate. He

took Rabirius with him, and, in order to secure the repayment,

the latter was made superintendent (dioikaetaes) of the Egyptian

revenues[147]. Unluckily for him, his wily debtor did after all turn

against him, and he escaped from Egypt with difficulty and with the

loss of all his wealth. When Gabinius was accused de repetundis and

found guilty of accepting enormous sums from Ptolemy, Rabirius was

involved in the same prosecution as having received part of the money;

Cicero defended him, and as it seems with success, on the plea that

equites were not liable to prosecution under the lex Julia. Towards

the end of his speech he drew a clever picture of his unlucky client's

misfortunes, and declared that he would have had to quit the Forum,

i.e. to leave the Stock Exchange in disgrace, if Caesar had not come

to his rescue by placing large sums at his disposal.

What Rabirius did was simply to gamble on a gigantic scale, and get

others to gamble with him. The luck turned against him, and he came

utterly to grief. There seems indeed to have been a perfect passion

for dealing with money in this wild way among the men of wealth and

influence; it was the fancy of the hour, and no disgrace attached to

it if a man could escape ruin. Thus the vast capital accumulated--the

sources of which were almost entirely in the provinces and the

kingdoms on the frontiers--was hardly ever used productively. It never

returned to the region whence it came, to be used in developing

its resources; the idea of using it even in Italy for industrial

undertakings was absent from the mind of the gambler. Those numberless

villas, of which we shall speak in another chapter, were homes of

luxury and magnificence, not centres of agricultural industry. There

are indeed some signs that in this very generation the revival of

Italian agriculture was beginning, and more especially the cultivation

of the olive and the vine; Varro, some twenty years later, could claim

that Italy was the best cultivated country in the world.[148] It may

be that the din of the "insanum forum" and its wild speculation has

prevented our hearing of the quiet efforts in the country to put

capital to a legitimate productive use. But of the social life of the

city the Forum was the heart, and of any prudent or scientific use of

capital the Forum knew hardly anything.

Of the two classes of business men we have been describing, the

tax-farmers and the money-lenders, it is hard to say which wrought the

most mischief in the Empire; they played into each other's hands in

wringing money out of the helpless provincials. Together too they did

incalculable harm, morally and socially, among the upper strata of

Roman society at home. Economic maladies react upon the mental, and

moral condition of a State. Where the idea of making money for its

own sake, or merely for the sake of the pleasure derivable from

excitement, is paramount in the minds of so large a section of

society, moral perception quickly becomes warped. The sense of justice

disappears, because when the fever is on a man he does not stop to ask

whether his gains are ill-gotten; and in this age the only restriction

on the plundering of the subjects of the Empire was a legal one, and

that of no great efficacy. There are many repulsive things in the

exquisite poetry of Catullus, but none of them jar on the modern mind

quite so sharply as his virulent attacks on a provincial governor in

whose suite he had gone to Bithynia in the hope of enriching himself,

and under whose just administration he had failed to do so. There

is lost also the sense of a duty arising out of the possession of

wealth--the feeling that it should do some good in the world, or at

least be in part applied to some useful purpose. Lastly, the exciting

pursuit of wealth helps to produce a curious restlessness and

instability of character, of which we have many examples in the age

we are studying. "Unstable as water, thou shalt not excel," are words

that might be applied to many a young man among Cicero's acquaintance,

and to many women also.

No sudden operation could cure these evils--they needed the careful

and gradual treatment of a wise physician. As in so many other ways,

so here Augustus showed his wonderful instinct as a social reformer.

The first requisite of all was an age of comparative peace--a healthy

atmosphere in which the patient could recover his natural tone. Next

in importance was the removal of the incitement to enrich yourself and

to spend illegally or unprofitably, and the revival of a sense of duty

towards the State and its rulers. Provincial governors were made

more really responsible, and a scientific census revealed the actual

tax-paying capacity of the provincials; tax-farming was more closely

superintended and gradually disappeared. It is true enough that even

under the Empire great fortunes were made and lost, but the gambling

spirit, the wild recklessness in monetary dealings, are not met with

again. The Roman Forum ceased to be insane, and Italy became once more

the home of much happy and useful country life. The passionate and

reckless self-consciousness of Catullus is succeeded in the next

generation by the calm sweet hopefulness of Virgil; in passing from

the one poet to the other, we feel that we are leaving behind us an

age of over-sensitive self-seeking and entering on one in which duty

and honour, labour on the land and hard work for the State, may be

reckoned as things more likely to make life worth living than all the

accumulated capital of a Crassus.

Social life at Rome in the Age of Cicero · 第 3 / 12 章