THE UNITED STATES BEGINS WORK
The probable failure of the French became apparent some years before the
actual collapse occurred and public opinion in the United States was
quite ready for the assumption of the work and its expense by our
government. Of course that opinion was not wholly spontaneous--public
opinion rarely is, notwithstanding the idealists. There were many
parties in interest who found it profitable to enlist various agencies
for awakening public opinion in this country to the point of buying the
French property and saving something out of the wreck for the French
stockholders. But, as a matter of fact, little artificial agitation was
needful. The people of the United States readily agreed that a
trans-isthmian canal should be built and owned by the United States
government. There was honest difference of opinion as to the most
practicable route and even today in the face of the victory over nature
at Panama there are many who hold that the Nicaragua route would have
been better.
Naturally the start made by the French had something to do with turning
the decision in favor of the Isthmus, but it was not decisive. The
French had no rights that they could sell except the right of veto
conferred by their ownership of the Panama Railroad. Their franchise
from Colombia expressly prohibited its transfer to any other government,
so it was unsalable. But the charter of the Panama Railroad, which the
French had acquired, provided that no interoceanic canal should be built
in Colombia without the consent of the railroad corporation. This to
some extent gave the French the whiphand. What they had to sell was the
controlling stock of the railroad company, the land they had acquired in
Colombia, the machinery on the spot and the work they had completed. But
all of this was of little value without a franchise from Colombia and
the one the French held could not be transferred to a government, and
was of little worth anyway as it would expire in 1910, unless the canal
were completed by that year--a physical impossibility.
[Illustration: _Photo by Underwood & Underwood_
PANAMA SOLDIERS GOING TO CHURCH]
In 1898 the race of the battleship “Oregon” around Cape Horn to join the
United States fleet off Cuba in the Spanish-American war offered just
the graphic and specific argument necessary to fix the determination of
the American people to dig that canal and to own it. That voyage of
10,000 miles which might have been avoided by a ditch fifty miles long
revolted the common sense of the nation, and the demand for instant
action on the canal question was universal. Accordingly in 1899
President McKinley appointed what was known as the Walker Commission,
because headed by Admiral John G. Walker, to investigate all Central
American routes. They had the data collected during almost a century at
their disposal and very speedily settled down to the alternative between
the Panama and the Nicaragua routes. Over this choice controversy raged
long and noisily. While it was in progress the bullet of an assassin
ended the life of President McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt succeeded
him.
The Isthmian Canal was precisely the great, epoch-marking spectacular
enterprise to enlist the utmost enthusiasm and energy of this peculiarly
dynamic President. A man of strong convictions he favored the Panama
route--and got it. He believed in a lock canal--and enforced his beliefs
over the report of the engineers whose expert professional opinions he
invited. Of a militant temperament he thought the canal should be dug by
the army--and that is the way it was built. Not over tolerant of other
people’s rights he thought the United States should have a free hand
over the canal and adjacent territory--and when Colombia, which happened
to own that territory, was slow in accepting this view he set up out of
nothing over night the new Republic of Panama, recognized it as a
sovereign state two days afterwards, concluded a treaty with it, giving
the United States all he thought it should have, and years later, in a
moment of frankness declared “I took Panama, and left Congress to debate
it later.”
[Illustration: THE OFFICIAL UMPIRE, COCLE]
About the political morality and the personal ethics of the Roosevelt
solution of the diplomatic problem there will ever be varying opinions.
Colombia is still mourning for her ravished province of Panama and
refuses to be comforted even at a price of $10,000,000 which has been
tentatively offered as salve for the wound. But that the canal in 1913
is just about ten years nearer completion than it would be had not
Roosevelt been President in 1903 is a proposition generally accepted.
History--which is not always moral--is apt to applaud results regardless
of methods, and the Republic and Canal of Panama are likely to be
Roosevelt’s most enduring monuments--though the canal may outlast the
Republic.
[Illustration: _Photo by Underwood & Underwood_
THE MAN AND THE MACHINE
President Roosevelt and the monster steam shovel figure largely in the
story of Panama]
Prior to this time there had been several sporadic negotiations opened
with different nations of Central America for canal rights. The most
important one was a treaty signed at Bogotá in 1870 by an envoy
especially authorized by President Grant. But this treaty was never
ratified by our Senate, and was amended out of acceptable form by the
Colombian Senate. For the purposes of this narrative we may well
consider the diplomatic history of the canal to begin with the passage
of the Spooner act in 1902. This act, written by Senator John C. Spooner
of Wisconsin, authorized the Panama route if the French property could
be bought for $40,000,000 and the necessary right of way secured from
Colombia. Failing this the Commission of seven members created by the
act was authorized to open negotiations with Nicaragua. Events made it
quite apparent that the Nicaragua clause was inserted merely as a club
to be used in the negotiations with Colombia and the French company.
With the latter it proved highly effective, for although the American
attorney for the company, Mr. William Nelson Cromwell, fixed a price at
first upon the property of $101,141,500 an apparently active opening of
negotiations with Nicaragua caused an immediate drop to the prescribed
$40,000,000. With that offer in hand the Commission unanimously reported
to the President in favor of the Panama route.
[Illustration: _Photo by Underwood & Underwood_
LANDING PIGS FOR MARKET]
The Republic of Colombia was less tractable, and naturally so as it held
a stronger hand. When negotiations began the French concession had but
seven years more of life. If their progress could be prolonged for that
period practically all that the United States would have paid the French
would be paid to Colombia. Meanwhile the French property was wholly
unsalable without a Colombian franchise. The one weak point in the
Colombian armor was the possibility that the United States might finally
turn to Nicaragua, but this contingency was made unlikely by the report
of the Commission, and by the general desire of the American people
which was undoubtedly for the Panama route.
[Illustration: THE TRAIL NEAR CULEBRA]
In 1903 the Colombian Minister at Washington negotiated with Senator Hay
a treaty which by a lucky chance failed of ratification in the Panama
Senate. It never reached our Senate, but it is quite incredible that it
could have succeeded there, for it had several features that would have
led to endless disagreement between the two countries--might indeed have
resulted in the United States annexing Colombia altogether. For example
the Canal Zone was to be governed by a joint commission of the two
countries--Colombia remaining sovereign over the territory. The United
States was to explicitly guarantee the sovereignty of Colombia against
all the world. Colombia was to police the Zone. Each of these sections
was big with possibilities of trouble. That Colombia did not speedily
ratify this treaty would be inexplicable, for it was all to the
Colombian good, except for the fact that by delaying any action for
seven years the French property along the line of the canal, valued at
$40,000,000, would drop into the Colombian treasury.
[Illustration: IN THE BANANA COUNTRY, ON THE COAST NEAR BOCAS DEL TORO]
Delay, however, while good enough for the Colombians, did not suit the
Panamanians, nor did it please Theodore Roosevelt, whom Providence,
while richly endowing him otherwise, had not invested with patience in
the face of opposition. The Panamanians, by whom for the purposes of
this narrative I mean chiefly the residents of Colon and the city of
Panama, wanted to see some American money spent in their various marts
of trade. The French were rapidly disappearing. The business of all
their commercial institutions from dry goods stores down to saloons was
falling off. Even the lottery did not thrive as of yore and the
proprietors of the lesser games of chance, that in those days were run
quite openly, were reduced to the precarious business of robbing each
other. All these and other vested interests called for immediate
negotiation of any sort of a treaty which would open the spigots of
Uncle Sam’s kegs of cash over the two thirsty Isthmian towns. It was
irksome too to think that the parent state of Colombia would make the
treaty and handle the cash accruing under it. The Yankees were ready to
pay $10,000,000 down, and it was believed a further rental of $250,000
for the right to build a canal every foot of which would be on the
territory of the Province of Panama. If Panama was a sovereign state
instead of merely a province, all this money would be used for the
benefit of but 400,000 people, including Indians and negroes, who of
course could not be expected to have much to say about its use. If
employed in public works, it would only have to spread over about 32,000
square miles, or a territory a little smaller than Indiana. But of
course it would chiefly go to the two cities. On the other hand if
Colombia made this treaty the capital city Bogotá would get the lion’s
share of the spoil, and for that matter all the provinces would share in
the division with Panama, which had the goods for sale.
[Illustration: _Photo by Underwood & Underwood_
THE BEST RESIDENCE SECTION, COLON]
What more natural than that the Panamanians should turn their thoughts
toward secession from Colombia? It was no novel channel for their
meditations, for, as has been pointed out already, there had been 53
revolutions in Colombia in 57 years. Red revolution had become a
commonplace except for the poor fellows who got themselves killed in
them, or the widows and children thrown on the charity of a rather
uncharitable people. Always hitherto the result of the revolutions had
been the same--Panama had either been whipped into subjection, or had
voluntarily returned to the domination of Colombia. But that was before
there was a $10,000,000 prize at stake.
[Illustration: THE OLD FIRE CISTERN, PANAMA]
In several of these revolutions the United States had interfered, always
in behalf of Colombia and always with fatal effect upon the hopes of the
revolutionists. For the key to the military situation in Panama was the
railroad. In every well ordered revolution--for the business of
revolting had become a science--the conspirators began by corrupting the
federal soldiers at Panama City where alone any garrison was maintained.
This done they proclaimed Panama a free and independent state. As there
was no land communication between Bogotá and the Isthmus the federal
government was compelled to send its troops to Colon and thence across
the Isthmus to Panama by railroad. If the revolutionists could destroy
or obstruct the railroad their chances for success would be greatly
enhanced.
But under a treaty with Colombia in 1846 the United States guaranteed
the neutrality of the railroad and this guarantee was sensibly
constructed to include the task of keeping the line open for traffic. In
several revolutions, therefore, United States marines were detailed to
guard the line, and Colombia being thus enabled to pour its superior
forces into Panama crushed out rebellion with comparative ease. If the
experience of the 53 revolutions counted for anything, it indicated that
Panama could not throw off the Colombian yoke as long as the United
States kept the railroad open for Colombian troops.
Let us consider the situation toward the midsummer of 1903. In
Washington was the Roosevelt administration keenly eager to have the
canal work begun as a great deed to display to the nation in the coming
presidential campaign. In New York was Mr. William Nelson Cromwell,
representing the French company and quite as keen for action which would
enable him to sell the United States $40,000,000 worth of French
machinery and uncompleted canal. At Bogotá was the Colombian legislature
talking the Hay-Herrara treaty to death and giving every indication of a
purpose of killing it. Spanning the Isthmus was the all important
railroad which was part of the property the French so greatly desired to
sell. And at Panama and Colon were groups of influential men, high
financiers in a small way--a leader among them was the owner of the
Panama lottery--exceedingly anxious to have the handling of that
$10,000,000 which the United States would pay for a franchise, and quite
desirous to have the country tributary to those two towns suddenly
populated by 40,000 to 50,000 canal workmen, all drawing money from the
United States and spending it there.
[Illustration: COPYRIGHT, 1913, BY F. E. WRIGHT
ANCON HILL FROM HARBOR OF PANAMA
The town nestles under the northeast side of the hill which is
precipitous and cuts of the sun’s rays early in the afternoon. From the
crest the most beautiful view in Panama may be enjoyed.]
What happened was inevitable. Under the conditions existing only two
things could have prevented the successful revolution which did
occur--the quick ratification of a satisfactory treaty between the
United States and Colombia, or an observance by the United States of the
spirit as well as the letter of neutrality in the inevitable revolution.
Neither of these things happened. The Congress at Bogotá failed to
ratify the treaty. In Panama and Colon the revolutionary Junta
conspired, and sent emissaries to Washington to sound the government
there on its attitude in case of a revolution. To their aid came Mr.
Cromwell and M. Bunau-Varilla, a highly distinguished French engineer
also interested in the plight of his countrymen. Dr. Amador was chosen
to sound the then Secretary of State John Hay. He was told, according to
trustworthy reports, that while the United States guaranteed Colombia
against foreign aggression it did not bind itself to protect the
sovereignty of that state against domestic revolution. In the event of
such an uprising all it was bound to do was to see that traffic over the
railroad was unimpeded. This sounded and still sounds fair enough, but
there were minds among the revolutionists to see that this policy opened
the way for a successful revolution at last.
For this is the way in which the policy worked when put to the test--and
indeed some of the incidents indicate that the Roosevelt administration
went somewhat beyond the letter of the rule Secretary Hay had laid down.
Our government knew before the revolutionary blow was struck that it
was imminent. It is said indeed that when the revolutionists suggested
September 22nd as the date for the spontaneous uprising of the people
the Secretary sagaciously suggested that the Congress of Colombia would
not then have adjourned and that it might seem irregular to base a
revolution on the omission of the legislature to act when it was still
in session and could correct that omission. For this, or some other
reason, the revolution was postponed until November 5th. The Colombian
minister at Washington kept his government advised of the suspicious
activity there of the agents of the Junta and warmly advised the heavy
reënforcement of the garrison at Panama. But his home government was
slow to follow his advice. When it did move it was checked by the French
managers of the railroad.
[Illustration: _Photo by Underwood & Underwood_
THE TWO PRESIDENTS; ROOSEVELT AND AMADOR]
Colombia’s only considerable seaport on the Pacific is Buenaventura and
at this point troops were collected to reënforce Panama. Two Colombian
gunboats in harbor at Panama were ordered to go after the troops. Coal
was needed for the voyage. The only source of coal supplies on the
Isthmus was the Panama Railroad which had long made a practice of
selling the fuel to all comers. But to the request of the Colombian navy
for coal at this time the railroad agent, evidently primed for the
occasion, put in a reluctant negative. All his coal was at Colon, and
the pressure of commercial business was so great that he could not move
it across the Isthmus in season to be of use to the gunboats. So those
troops stayed at Buenaventura and the Junta at Panama went on with its
plotting.
Now Colombia tried another plan to reënforce its Panama garrison--or to
replace it, for by this time the troops that had been there were won
over to the smoldering conspiracy. About four hundred soldiers were sent
down by the Gulf and landed at Colon. That they were landed at all seems
like a slight error in carrying out the Roosevelt policy, for in the
harbor of Colon lay the United States cruiser “Nashville” and gunboat
“Dixie” whose commanders had this despatch from the Secretary of the
Navy:
“Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption is
threatened by armed force occupy line of railroad. Prevent landing of
any armed force with hostile intent either government or insurgent,
either at Colon, Porto Bello or other points.”
Now there are some curious features about this despatch. On November
2nd, its date, there was no insurrection, therefore no insurgents. If
the administration intended to take official cognizance of the
activities of the Junta it must have known that the conspirators had no
ships and could not therefore plan landing any forces. The order then
was plainly designed to prevent Colombia from landing troops in its own
territory--a most extraordinary policy to adopt toward a friendly
nation. It was furthermore an order equivalent to assuring the success
of the foreshadowed revolution, for as there was no way except by sea
for Colombia to send troops to put down the insurgents, it was evident
that for the United States by its superior force to close the sea
against her was to give Panama over to the revolutionists.
[Illustration: CHOLO CHIEF AND HIS THIRD WIFE
The Chief is said to have poisoned her two predecessors]
However 400 troops were landed on the 3rd of November. The commander of
the “Nashville” probably thought his orders only operative in case of an
outbreak of insurrection and thus far there had been none. It became
time for the railroad company to declare its second check--which in this
case was checkmate. When the two generals in command of the Colombian
forces ordered special trains to transport their men to Panama the agent
blandly asked for prepayment of the fares--something above $2000. The
generals were embarrassed. They had no funds. It was of course the
business of the road, under its charter from Colombia, to transport the
troops on demand, and it was the part of the generals to use their
troops to compel it to do so. Taking the matter under advisement they
went alone across to Panama to investigate the situation. There they
were met by Gen. Huertas, in command of the garrison who first gave them
a good dinner and then put them under arrest informing them that Panama
had revolted, was now an independent republic, and that he was part of
the new régime. There was no more to it in Panama. The two generals
submitted gracefully. The Junta arrested all the Colombian officials in
Panama, who thereupon readily took oath of fealty to the new government.
A street mob, mainly boys, paraded cheering for Panama Libre. The Panama
flag sprang into being, and the revolution was complete.
[Illustration: _Photo by Prof. Lutz_
NATIVE HOUSE AND GROUP AT PUERTA PINAS]
[Illustration: WHAT THEY CALL A STREET IN TOBAGA]
Out in the harbor lay three Colombian gunboats. Two swiftly displayed
Panama flags which by singular good fortune were in their lockers. The
third with a fine show of loyalty fired two shells over the insurgent
city, one of which, bursting, slew an innocent Chinaman smoking opium in
his bunk. The city responded with an ineffective shot or two from the
seawall and the sole defender of the sovereignty of Colombia pulled down
its flag.
At the other end of the line the situation was more serious and might
well have caused bloodshed. Col. Torres, in charge of the troops there,
on hearing the news from Panama demanded a train at once, threatening
that unless it was furnished he would attack the Americans in the town.
He had more than 400 armed men, while on the “Nashville” were but 192
marines. In such a contest the Colombians could have relied upon much
assistance from the natives. With a guard of 42 marines employees of the
railroad prepared its stone freight house for defense while American
women and children were sent to vessels in the harbor. The Colombian
colonel had fixed two o’clock as the hour for beginning hostilities but
when that time arrived he invited a conference, and it was finally
agreed that both parties should retire from Colon, while he went to
Panama to consult with the jailed generals. During his absence the
“Dixie” arrived with 400 marines, and a little later the “Atlanta” with
1000. With this overwhelming force against him Col. Torres recognized
that the United States was back of the railroad’s refusal of
transportation and so yielded. With his troops he sailed again for
Cartagena.
[Illustration: HINDOO MERCHANTS ON THE ZONE]
Two days after the revolution--bloodless save for the sleeping
Chinaman--the United States recognized the Republic of Panama. Twelve
days later, with M. Bunau-Varilla who had by cable been appointed
minister to Washington, a treaty was concluded by which the United
States was granted all it desired for the furtherance of the canal
project. Much of the subsequent time of President Roosevelt was taken up
in arguing that he had not gone beyond the proper bounds of diplomacy in
getting this advantage, but the world though accepting the result has
ever been incredulous of his protestations of good faith. And the end is
not yet. Colombia has not condoned the part taken by the United States,
and the State Department has long been endeavoring to discover some way,
not too mortifying to our national self-esteem, by which we may allay
Colombia’s discontent. And as for that nation it has persistently
refused to recognize Panama as independent, one of the results of which
has been that the perpetrators of crime on the Isthmus may skip blithely
over the line to Bogotá or Cartagena and enjoy life free from dread of
extradition.
[Illustration: CHAME BEACH, PACIFIC COAST
Where sand is obtained for locks on the Pacific division]
Briefly summarized the terms of the treaty thus expeditiously secured
are:
1. The guaranty of the independence of the Republic of Panama.
2. The grant to the United States of a strip of land from ocean to
ocean, extending for five miles on each side of the canal, to be called
the Canal Zone and over which the United States has absolute
jurisdiction. From this Zone the cities of Panama and Colon are
explicitly excluded.
3. All railway and canal rights in the Zone are ceded to the United
States and its property therein is exempted from taxation.
4. The United States has the right to police, garrison and fortify the
Zone.
5. The United States is granted sanitary jurisdiction over the cities of
Panama and Colon, and is vested with the right to preserve order in the
Republic, should the Panamanian government in the judgment of the United
States fail to do so.
6. As a condition of the treaty the United States paid to Panama
$10,000,000 in cash, and in 1913 began the annual payment of $250,000 in
perpetuity.
Thus equipped with all necessary international authority for the work of
building the canal President Roosevelt plunged with equal vehemence and
audacity into the actual constructive work. If he strained to the
breaking point the rights of a friendly nation to get his treaty, he
afterwards tested even further the elasticity of the power of a
President to act without Congressional authority.
[Illustration: _Photo by Underwood & Underwood_
FRENCH DRY DOCK, CRISTOBAL]
We may hastily pass over the steps forward. Mr. Cromwell was paid the
$40,000,000 for the French stockholders, and at once there arose a
prodigious outcry that the Frenchmen got but little out of it; that
their stock had been bought for a few cents on the dollar by speculative
Americans; that these Americans had financed the “revolution” and that
some of the stock was held by persons very close to the administration.
None of these charges was proved, but all left a rather bad impression
on the public mind. However the United States received full value for
the money. April 28, 1904, Congress appropriated the $10,000,000 due
Panama, and with the title thus clear Lieutenant Mark Brooke, U. S. A.,
at 7:30 A. M. May 4th, formally took over the territory in the name of
the United States. An excellent opportunity for pomp and ceremony, for
fuss and feathers was thus wasted. There were neither speeches, nor
thundering salutes and the hour was obviously unpropitious for
champagne. “They order these things better in France,” as “Uncle Toby”
was wont to say.
[Illustration: WHAT THE WORK EXPENDED ON THE CANAL MIGHT HAVE DONE
Build a Chinese wall from San Francisco to New York, or dig a ditch 10
feet deep and 55 feet wide across the United States at its widest part]
When little more than a decade shall have rolled away after that wasted
ceremonial moment the visitor to the Isthmus will gaze upon the greatest
completed public work of this or any other past age. To conceive of some
task that man may accomplish in future that will exceed in magnitude
this one is in itself a tax upon the most vivid imagination. To what
great work of the past can we compare this one of the present?
[Illustration: _Courtesy Scientific American_
A GRAPHIC COMPARISON
The “spoil” taken from the canal would build 63 pyramids the size of
Cheops in Broadway from the Battery to Harlem]
The great Chinese wall has been celebrated in all history as one of
man’s most gigantic efforts. It is 1500 miles long and would reach from
San Francisco to St. Louis. But the rock and dirt taken from the Panama
Canal would build a wall as high and thick as the Chinese wonder, 2500
miles long and reach from San Francisco to New York in a bee-line.
[Illustration: WHAT THE PANAMA CONCRETE WOULD DO]
We cross thousands of miles of ocean to see the great Pyramid of Cheops,
one of the Seven Wonders of the ancient world. But the “spoil” taken
from the canal prism would build sixty-three such pyramids which put in
a row would fill Broadway from the Battery to Harlem, or a distance of
nine miles.
The Panama Canal is but fifty miles long, but if we could imagine the
United States as perfectly level, the amount of excavation done at
Panama would dig a canal ten feet deep and fifty-five feet wide across
the United States at its broadest part.
New York City boasts of its great Pennsylvania terminal, and its
sky-piercing Woolworth Building; Washington is proud of its towering
Washington Monument, the White House and the buildings adjacent thereto.
But the concrete used in the locks and dams of the canal would make a
pyramid 400 feet high, covering the great railway station; the material
taken from Culebra cut alone would make a pyramid topping the Woolworth
tower by 100 feet, and covering the city from Chambers to Fulton Street,
and from the City Hall to West Broadway; while the total soil excavated
in the Canal Zone would form a pyramid 4200 feet or four fifths of a
mile high, and of equal base line obliterating not only the Washington
Monument but the White House, Treasury, the State, War and Navy
Buildings and the finest part of official Washington as well.
Jules Verne once, in imagination, drove a tunnel through the center of
the earth, but the little cylindrical tubes drilled for the dynamite
cartridges on “the line” (as people at Panama refer to the Canal Zone)
would, if placed end to end, pierce this great globe of ours from side
to side; while the dirt cars that have carried off the material would,
if made up in one train, reach four times around the world.
[Illustration: _Courtesy Scientific American_
PROPORTIONS OF SOME OF THE CANAL WORK]
But enough of the merely big. Let us consider the spectacle which would
confront that visitor whom, in an earlier chapter, we took from Colon to
view Porto Bello and San Lorenzo. After finishing those historical
pilgrimages if he desired to see the canal in its completed state--say
after 1914--he would take a ship at the great concrete docks at
Cristobal which will have supplanted as the resting places for the
world’s shipping the earlier timber wharves at Colon. Steaming out into
the magnificent Limon Bay, the vessel passes into the channel dredged
out some three miles into the turbulent Caribbean, and protected from
the harsh northers by the massive Toro Point breakwater. The vessel’s
prow is turned toward the land, not westward as one would think of a
ship bound from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but almost due south. The
channel through which she steams is 500 feet wide at the bottom, and 41
feet deep at low tide. It extends seven miles to the first interruption
at Gatun, a tide water stream all the way. The shores are low, covered
with tropical foliage, and littered along the water line with the débris
of recent construction work. After steaming about six miles someone
familiar with the line will be able to point out over the port side of
the ship the juncture of the old French canal with the completed one,
and if the jungle has not grown up too thick the narrow channel of the
former can be traced reaching back to Colon by the side of the Panama
Railroad. This canal was used by the Americans throughout the
construction work.
[Illustration: _Courtesy Scientific American_
THE “SPOIL” FROM CULEBRA CUT WOULD DO THIS]
At this point the shores rise higher and one on the bridge, or at the
bow, will be able to clearly discern far ahead a long hill sloping
gently upward on each side of the canal, and cut at the center with
great masses of white masonry, which as the ship comes nearer are seen
to be gigantic locks, rising in pairs by three steps to a total height
of 85 feet. For 1000 feet straight out into the center of the canal
extends a massive concrete pier, the continuation of the center wall, or
partition, between the pairs of locks, while to right and left side
walls flare out, to the full width of the canal, like a gigantic U, or a
funnel guiding the ships toward the straight pathway upward and onward.
A graceful lighthouse guides the ships at night, while all along the
central pier and guide wall electric lights in pairs give this outpost
of civilization in the jungle something of the air at night of a
brightly lighted boulevard.
[Illustration: _Photo by Underwood & Underwood_
IN A TYPICAL LOCK
The bridge across is temporary, for construction purposes only. Gates
are still skeletonized awaiting the steel sheathing]
Up to this time the ship had been proceeding under her own steam and at
about full speed. Now slowing down she gradually comes to a full stop
alongside the central guide wall. Here will be waiting four electric
locomotives, two on the central, two on the side wall. Made fast, bow
and stern, the satellites start off with the ship in tow. It will take
an hour and a half to pass the three locks at Gatun and arrangements
will probably be made for passengers to leave the ship and walk by its
side if desired, as it climbs the three steps to the waters of Gatun
Lake 85 feet above.
Probably the first thing the observant passenger will notice is that as
the ship steams into the open lock the great gates which are to close
behind her and hold the water which flows in from below, slowly lifting
her to the lock above, are folded flush with the wall, a recess having
been built to receive them. The chamber which the vessel has entered is
1000 feet long, if the full water capacity be employed, 110 feet wide
and will raise the ship 28¹⁄₃ feet. If the ship is a comparatively small
one the full length of the lock will not be used, as intermediate gates
are provided which will permit the use of 400 or 600 feet of the lock as
required--thus saving water, which means saving power, for the water
that raises and lowers the ships also generates electric power which
will be employed in several ways.
Back of each pair of gates is a second pair of emergency gates folded
back flush with the wall and only to be used in case of injury to the
first pair. On the floor of the canal at the entrance to the lock lies a
great chain, attached to machinery which, at the first sign of a ship’s
becoming unmanageable, will raise it and bar the passage. Nearly all
serious accidents which have occurred to locks have been due to vessels
of which control has been lost, by some error in telegraphing from the
bridge to the engine room. For this reason at Panama vessels once in the
locks will be controlled wholly by the four locomotives on the lock
walls which can check its momentum at the slightest sign of danger.
Their own engines will be shut down. Finally at the upper entrance to
the locks is an emergency dam built on the guide wall. It is evident
that if an accident should happen to the gates of the upper lock the
water on the upper level would rush with destructive force against the
lower ones, perhaps sweeping away one after the other and wrecking the
canal disastrously. To avert this the emergency dams are swung on a
pivot, something like a drawbridge, athwart the lock and great plates
let down one after the other, stayed by the perpendicular steel
framework until the rush of the waters is checked. A caisson is then
sunk against these plates, making the dam complete.
The method of construction and operation of these locks will be more
fully described in a later chapter. What has been outlined here can be
fully observed, by the voyager in transit. The machinery by which all is
operated is concealed in the masonry crypts below, but the traveler may
find cheer and certainty of safety in the assurance of the engineer who
took me through the cavernous passages--“It’s all made fool proof”.
[Illustration: _Photo by Underwood & Underwood_
LOCK AT PEDRO MIGUEL UNDER CONSTRUCTION
The picture shows strikingly the construction of the locks in pairs, the
inner pair being for precautionary purposes]
[Illustration: RANGE TOWER AT PACIFIC ENTRANCE]
Leaving the Gatun locks and going toward the Pacific the ship enters
Gatun Lake, a great artificial body of water 85 feet above tide water.
This is the ultimate height to which the vessel must climb, and it has
reached it in the three steps of the Gatun locks. To descend from Gatun
Lake to the Pacific level she drops down one lock at Pedro Miguel, 30¹⁄₃
feet; and two locks at Miraflores with a total descent of 54²⁄₃ feet.
Returning from the Pacific to the Atlantic the locks of course are taken
in reverse order, the ascent beginning at Miraflores and the complete
descent being made at Gatun. Gatun Lake constitutes really the major
part of the canal, and the channel through it extends in a somewhat
tortuous course for about twenty-four miles. So broad is the channel
dredged--ranging from 500 to 1000 feet in width and 45 to 85 in
depth--that vessels will proceed at full speed, a very material
advantage, as in ordinary canals half speed or even less is prescribed
in order to avoid the erosion of the banks.
The lake which the voyager by Panama will traverse will in time become a
scenic feature of the trip that cannot fail to delight those who gaze
upon it. But for some years to come it will be ghastly, a living
realization of some of the pictures emanating from the abnormal brain of
Gustave Doré. On either side of the ship gaunt gray trunks of dead trees
rise from the placid water, draped in some instances with the Spanish
moss familiar to residents of our southern states, though not abundant
on the Isthmus. More of the trees are hung with the trailing ropes of
vines once bright with green foliage and brilliant flowers, now gray and
dead like the parent trunk. Only the orchids and the air plants will
continue to give some slight hint of life to the dull gray monotony of
death. For a time, too, it must be expected that the atmosphere will be
as offensive as the scene is depressing, for it has been found that the
tropical foliage in rotting gives out a most penetrating and
disagreeable odor. The scientists have determined to their own
satisfaction that it is not prejudicial to health, but the men who have
been working in the camps near the shores of the rising lake declare it
emphatically destructive of comfort.
The unfortunate trees are drowned. Plunging their roots beneath the
waters causes their death as infallibly, but not so quickly, as to fill
a man’s lungs with the same fluid brings on his end. The Canal
Commission has not been oblivious to the disadvantages, both aesthetic
and practical, of this great body of dead timber standing in the lake,
but it has found the cost of removing it prohibitive. Careful estimates
fix the total expense for doing quickly what nature will do gratis in
time at $2,000,000. The many small inlets and backwaters of the lake
moreover will afford breeding places for the mosquitos and other
pestilent insects which the larvacide man with his can and pump can
never reach, and no earthly ingenuity can wholly purify.
[Illustration: BIRD’S EYE VIEW OF PEDRO MIGUEL LOCKS]
One vegetable phenomenon of the lake, now exceedingly common, will
persist for some time after the ocean-going steamers begin to ply those
waters, namely the floating islands. These range from a few feet to
several acres in extent, and are formed by portions of the spongy bed of
the lake being broken away by the action of the water, and carried off
by the current, or the winds acting upon the aquatic plants on the
surface. They gradually assume a size and consistency that will make
them, if not combated, a serious menace to navigation. At present the
sole method of dealing with them is to tow them down to the dam and send
them over the spillway, but some more speedy and efficacious method is
yet to be devised. However as the trees now standing fall and
disintegrate, and the actual shores of the lake recede further from the
canal the islands will become fewer, and the space in which they can
gather without impediment to navigation greater. Another menace to a
clear channel which has put in an appearance is the water hyacinth which
has practically destroyed the navigability of streams in Florida and
Louisiana. Conditions in Gatun Lake are ideal for it and the officials
are studying methods of checking its spread from the very beginning.
[Illustration: _Photo by Critchlow_
THE VEGETABLE MARTYRS
The trees in the district flooded by Gatun Lake are being slowly drowned
and will finally disappear]
The waters of the lake cover 164 square miles and are at points
eighty-five feet deep. In the main this vast expanse of water, one of
the largest of artificial reservoirs, containing about 183 billion cubic
feet of water, is supplied by the Chagres River, though several smaller
streams add to its volume. Before the dam was built two or three score
yards measured the Chagres at its widest point. Now the waters are
backed up into the interior far beyond the borders of the Canal Zone,
along the course of every little waterway that flowed into the Chagres,
and busy launches may ply above the sites of buried Indian towns. The
towns themselves will not be submerged, for the cane and palm-thatched
huts will float away on the rising tide. Indeed from the ships little
sign of native life will appear, unless it be Indians in cayucas making
their way to market. For the announced policy of the government is to
depopulate the Zone. All the Indian rights to the soil have been
purchased and the inhabitants remorselessly ordered to move out beyond
the five-mile strip on either side of the canal. This is unfortunate as
it will rob the trip of what might have been a scenic feature, for the
Indians love to build their villages near the water, which is in fact
their principal highway, and but for this prohibition would probably
rebuild as near the sites of their obliterated towns as the waters would
permit.
In passing through the lake the canal describes eight angles, and the
attentive traveler will find interest in watching the range lights by
which the ship is guided when navigating the channel by day or by
night--for there need be no cessation of passage because of darkness.
These range lights are lighthouses of reënforced concrete so placed in
pairs that one towers above the other at a distance back of the lower
one of several hundred feet. The pilot keeping these two in line will
know he is keeping to the center of his channel until the appearance of
two others on either port or starboard bow warns him that the time has
come to turn. The towers are of graceful design, and to come upon one
springing sixty feet or more into the air from a dense jungle clustering
about its very base is to have a new experience in the picturesque. They
will need no resident light keepers, for most are on a general electric
light circuit. Some of the more inaccessible however are stocked with
compressed acetylene which will burn over six months without recharging.
The whole canal indeed from its beginning miles out in the Atlantic to
its end under the blue Pacific will be lighted with buoys, beacons,
lighthouses and light posts along the locks until its course is almost
as easily followed as a “great white way.”
Sportsmen believe that this great artificial lake will in time become a
notable breeding place for fish and game. Many of our migratory northern
birds, including several varieties of ducks, now hibernate at the
Isthmus, and this broad expanse of placid water, with its innumerable
inlets penetrating a land densely covered with vegetation, should become
for them a favorite shelter. The population will be sparse, and mainly
as much as five miles away from the line of the canal through which the
great steamers will ceaselessly pass.
[Illustration: NATIVE STREET AT TABOGA]
During the period of its construction that portion of the canal which
will lie below the surface of Gatun Lake was plentifully sprinkled with
native villages, and held two or three considerable construction towns.
Of the latter Gorgona was the largest, which toward the end of canal
construction attained a population of about 4000. In the earlier history
of the Isthmus Gorgona was a noted stopping place for those crossing the
neck, but it seems to have been famed chiefly for the badness of its
accommodations. Otis says of it, “The town of Gorgona was noted in the
earlier days of the river travel as the place where the wet and jaded
traveler was accustomed to worry out the night on a rawhide, exposed to
the insects and the rain, and in the morning, if he was fortunate regale
himself on jerked beef and plantains.”
The French established railroad shops here which the Americans greatly
enlarged. As a result this town and the neighboring village of Matachin
became considerable centers of industry and Gorgona was one of the
pleasantest places of residence on “the line.” Its Y. M. C. A. clubhouse
was one of the largest and best equipped on the whole Zone, and the town
was well supplied with churches and schools. By the end of 1913 all this
will be changed. The shop will have been moved to the great new port of
Balboa; such of the houses and official buildings as could economically
be torn down and reërected will have been thus disposed of. Much of the
two towns will be covered by the lake, but on the higher portions of the
site will stand for some years deserted ruins which the all-conquering
jungle will finally take for its own. The railroad which once served its
active people will have been moved away to the other side of the canal
and Gorgona will have returned to the primitive wilderness whence
Pizarro and the gold hunters awakened it. Near its site is the hill
miscalled Balboa’s and from the steamships’ decks the wooden cross that
stands on its summit may be clearly seen.
[Illustration: _Photo by Underwood & Underwood_
GAMBOA BRIDGE WITH CHAGRES AT FLOOD
For contrasting picture showing the river in dry season, see page 192]
Soon after passing Gorgona and Matachin the high bridge by which the
railroad crosses the Chagres at Gamboa, with its seven stone piers will
be visible over the starboard side. This point is of some interest as
being the spot at which the water was kept out of the long trench at
Culebra. A dyke, partly artificial, here obstructed the canal cut and
carried the railroad across to Las Cascadas, Empire, Culebra and other
considerable towns all abandoned, together with that branch of the road,
upon the completion of the canal.
[Illustration: THE Y. M. C. A. CLUB HOUSE AT GATUN]
Now the ship passes into the most spectacular part of the voyage--the
Culebra Cut. During the process of construction this stretch of the work
vied with the great dam at Gatun for the distinction of being the most
interesting and picturesque part of the work. Something of the
spectacular effect then presented will be lost when the ships begin to
pass. The sense of the magnitude of the work will not so greatly impress
the traveler standing on the deck of a ship, floating on the surface of
the canal which is here 45 feet deep, as it would were he standing at
the bottom of the cut. He will lose about 75 feet of the actual height,
as commanded by the earlier traveler who looked up at the towering
height of Contractors Hill from the very floor of the colossal
excavation. He will lose, too, much of the almost barbaric coloring of
the newly opened cut where bright red vied with chrome yellow in
startling the eye, and almost every shade of the chromatic scale had its
representative in the freshly uncovered strata of earth.
[Illustration: _Photo by Underwood & Underwood_
WORKING IN CULEBRA CUT
The picture is taken at a comparatively quiet time, only two dirt trains
being visible]
The tropical foliage grows swiftly, and long before the new waterway
will have become an accustomed path to the ships of all nations the
sloping banks will be thickly covered with vegetation. It is indeed the
purpose of the Commission to encourage the growth of such vegetation by
planting, in the belief that the roots will tie the soil together and
lessen the danger of slides and washouts. The hills that here tower
aloft on either side of the canal form part of the great continental
divide that, all the way from Alaska to the Straits of Magellan divides
the Pacific from the Atlantic watershed. This is its lowest point. Gold
Hill, its greatest eminence, rises 495 feet above the bottom of the
canal, which in turn is 40 feet above sea level. The story of the
gigantic task of cutting through this ridge, of the new problems which
arose in almost every week’s work, and of the ways in which they were
met and overcome will necessitate a chapter to itself. Those who float
swiftly along in well-appointed steamships through the almost straight
channel 300 feet wide at the bottom, between towering hills, will find
the sensation the more memorable if they will study somewhat the figures
showing the proportions of the work, the full fruition of which they are
enjoying.
[Illustration: _Photo by Underwood & Underwood_
MIRAFLORES LOCK IN MARCH, 1913
This lock is in two stories with a total lift of 56²⁄₃ feet; the Pacific
tides rise in the canal to the lower lock]
At Pedro Miguel a single lock lets the ship down to another little lake
hardly two miles across to Miraflores where two more locks drop it down
to tide water. From Miraflores the traveler can see the great bulk of
Ancon Hill looming up seven miles away, denoting the proximity of the
city of Panama which lies huddled under its Pacific front. Practically
one great rock is Ancon Hill, and its landward face is badly scarred by
the enormous quarry which the Commission has worked to furnish stone for
construction work. At its base is the new port of Balboa which is
destined to be in time a great distributing point for the Pacific coast
of both North and South America. For the vessels coming through the
canal from the Atlantic must, from Balboa, turn north or south or
proceed direct across the Pacific to those Asiatic markets of which the
old-time mariners so fondly dreamed. Fleets of smaller coastwise vessels
will gather here to take cargoes for the ports of Central America, or
for Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and other Pacific states of South America.
The Canal Commission is building great docks for the accommodation of
both through and local shipping; storage docks and pockets for coal and
tanks for oil. The coaling plant will have a capacity of about 100,000
tons, of which about one-half will be submerged. One dry dock will take
a ship 1000 feet long and 105 feet wide--the width of the dock itself
being 110 feet. There will be also a smaller dock. One pier, of the most
modern design, equipped with unloading cranes and 2200 feet long is
already complete, and the plans for additional piers are prepared. The
estimated cost of the terminals at Balboa is $15,000,000.
[Illustration: NAOS, PERICO AND FLAMENCO ISLANDS TO BE FORTIFIED]
The Suez Canal created no town such as Balboa is likely to be, for
conditions with it were wholly different. Port Said at the Mediterranean
end and Aden at the Red Sea terminus are coaling stations, nothing more.
Geographical considerations however are likely to give to both Balboa
and Cristobal--particularly the former--prime importance as points of
transshipment.
[Illustration: BEGINNING OF NEW BALBOA DOCKS]
The machine shops long in Gorgona and Matachin have been removed to
Balboa, and though since the completion of the canal the number of their
employes has been greatly decreased, the work of repairing and
outfitting vessels may be expected to maintain a large population of
mechanics. The administration offices now at Culebra will also be moved
to Balboa, which in fact is likely to become the chief town of the Canal
Zone. Here is to be an employes’ club house, built of concrete blocks at
a cost of $52,000. Like the other club houses established during the
construction period it will be under the direct administration of the Y.
M. C. A. The town of Balboa, and the club house will be in no small
degree the fruit of the earnest endeavor of Col. Goethals to build there
a town that shall be a credit to the nation, and a place of comfort for
those who inhabit it. His estimate presented to Congress of the cost and
character of the houses to be furnished to officers of various grades
and certain public buildings may be interesting here. The material is
all to be concrete blocks:
Governor’s house $25,000
Commissioners’ and high officials’ houses, each 15,000
Houses of this type to have large center room, a sitting
room, dining room, bath, kitchen and four bed rooms.
Families drawing $200 a month 6,000
Families drawing less, in 4-family buildings 4,000
Bachelor quarters, for 50 50,000
Besides these buildings for personal occupance Balboa will
contain--unless the original plans are materially modified:
Hotel $22,500
Commissary 63,000
School 32,000
Police station and court 37,000
[Illustration: THE OLD PACIFIC MAIL DOCKS AT BALBOA]
When Col. Goethals was presenting his estimates to Congress in 1913 the
members of the Committee on Appropriations looked somewhat askance on
the club-house feature of his requests, and this colloquy occurred:
“The Chairman: ‘A $52,000 club house?’
“Col. Goethals: ‘Yes, sir. We need a good club house, because we
should give them some amusement, and keep them out of Panama. I
believe in the club-house principle.’
“The Chairman: ‘That is all right, but you must contemplate a very
elaborate house?’
“Col. Goethals: ‘Yes, sir. I want to make a town there that will be a
credit to the United States government.’”
Looking out to sea from the prow of a ship entering the Pacific Ocean
you will notice three conical islands rising abruptly from the waves,
to a height of three or four hundred feet. To be more precise the one
nearest the shore ceased to be an island when the busy dirt trains of
the Canal Commission dumped into the sea some millions of cubic yards of
material taken from the Culebra Cut, forming at once a great area of
artificial land which may in ensuing centuries have its value, and a
breakwater which intercepts a local current that for a time gave the
canal builders much trouble by filling the channel with silt. The three
islands, Naos, Flamenco, and Perico are utilized by the United States as
sites for powerful forts. The policy of the War Department necessarily
prevents any description here of the forts planned or their armament.
Every government jealously guards from the merely curious a view of its
defensive works, and the intruder with a camera, however harmless and
inoffensive he may be, is severely dealt with as though he had profaned
the Holy of Holies. Despite these drastic precautions against the
harmless tourist it is a recognized fact that every government has in
its files plans and descriptions of the forts of any power with which it
is at all likely to become involved in war.
[Illustration: _Photo by Underwood & Underwood_
THE PACIFIC GATEWAY
The gun points to canal entrance; high hills in the background are
beyond the canal]
It may be said, however, without entering into prohibited details, that
by the fortifications on the islands, and on the hills adjacent to the
canal entrance, as well as by a permanent system of submarine mines the
Pacific entrance to the canal is made as nearly impregnable as the art
of war permits. The locks at Miraflores are seven miles inland and the
effective range of naval guns is fourteen miles, so that but for the
fortifications and a fleet of our own to hold the hostile fleet well out
to sea the very keystone of the canal structure would be menaced. Our
government in building its new terminal city at Balboa had before it a
very striking illustration of the way in which nations covet just such
towns. Russia on completing her trans-Siberian railroad built at Port
Arthur a terminal even grander and more costly than our new outpost on
the Pacific. But the Japanese flag now waves over Port Arthur--and
incidentally the fortifications of that famous terminal were also
considered impregnable. Perhaps the impregnable fort like the unsinkable
ship is yet to be found.
At Balboa the trip through the completed canal will be ended. It has
covered a fraction over fifty miles, and has consumed, according to the
speed of the ship and the “smartness” of her handling in locks, from
seven to ten hours. He who was fortunate enough to make that voyage may
well reflect on the weeks of time and the thousands of tons of coal
necessary to carry his vessel from Colon to Balboa had the canal not
existed.
[Illustration: _Photo by Underwood & Underwood_
COMPLETED CANAL AT COROZAL]
From Balboa to the ancient and yet gay city of Panama runs a trolley
line by which the passenger, whose ship remains in port for a few days,
or even a few hours, may with but little cost of time or money visit one
of the quaintest towns on the North American continent. If the climate,
or the seemingly ineradicable sluggishness of the Panamanian do not
intervene the two towns should grow into one, though their governments
must remain distinct, as the Republic of Panama naturally clings to its
capital city. But seemingly the prospect of a great new port at his
doors, open to the commerce of all the world, where ships from Hamburg
and Hong Kong, from London and Lima, from Copenhagen and from Melbourne
may all meet in passing their world-wide ways, excites the Panamanian
not a whit. He exists content with his town as it is, reaching out but
little for the new trade which this busy mart next door to him should
bring. No new hotels are rising within the line of the old walls; no new
air of haste or enterprise enlivens the placid streets and plazas.
Perhaps in time Balboa may be the big town, and Panama as much outworn
as that other Panama which Morgan left a mere group of ruins. It were a
pity should it be so, for no new town, built of neat cement blocks, with
a Y. M. C. A. club house as its crowning point of gaiety, can ever have
the charm which even the casual visitor finds in ragged, bright-colored,
crowded, gay and perhaps naughty Panama.