There have been many vicissitudes in France, and many a crisis of
different kinds during the last hundred years in the struggle
between Liberalism and Roman Catholicism; the former has often
committed errors, made mistakes, by which Romanism has adroitly
profited; but at every reverse Romanism has recognised her own
defeat, and accepted some part of its consequences.
{38}
The Constituent Assembly by the civil organisation of the clergy,
the National Convention by its proscriptions, had endeavoured,
the one to enslave, the other to abolish the Catholic Church; the
great master of the revolution, Napoleon, raised it up again by
the Concordat of 1802; but the Concordat at the same time
consecrated many of the fundamental principles of the liberal
regime, and the Catholic Church of Rome consecrated Napoleon and
signed the Concordat, even whilst protesting against some of its
consequences. At the Restoration some wished to discuss again the
question of the Concordat, and to re-establish the relation
between Church and State upon their ancient foundations; but the
attempt encountered, in the ranks of the Royalists themselves, a
decisive resistance, and totally failed. Under the Government of
1830, Roman Catholicism regained its ground and resumed fresh
vigour by both using the name of Liberty and claiming its right.
{39}
When the Republic again appeared in 1848, Roman Catholicism
treated it with as much tenderness as it experienced itself from
the Republic. I pause before the actual relations of the Church
of Rome to the new Empire; Rome has paid a dear price for all
that she has received from the Empire; but even here she showed,
and appears disposed still to show, a large measure of patience
and resignation. She is right.
One fact particularly arrests my attention in the course of this
stormy history. In the midst of her reverses and her concessions,
Roman Catholicism has displayed rare and energetic virtues of
fidelity and independence. She has opposed to the bloody
persecution of Terrorism, the inexhaustible blood of her martyrs,
bishops, priests, monks, men and women; that Clergy of France,
once so vacillating in faith and so mundane in morals, bore their
cross with an indomitable sentiment of Christian honour.
{40}
The despotism of the Emperor Napoleon encountered in the person
of Pope Pius VII., in some Cardinals, and some Bishops, a passive
but firm resistance, which neither the power of the Despot, nor
the contagious servility of their contemporaries, could surmount.
And again, in these days, who can fail to perceive with what
activity and devotedness, with what sacrifices and efficacy,
Roman Catholicism, by the mere force of its native energy,
upholds the cause of its chief and of itself? If civil society
had defended its liberties and its dignities as the Church of
Rome defends hers, Liberalism in France would be farther advanced
on its road and towards its object.
But let not Romanists deceive themselves: one cannot make use of
Liberty without being forced to enter into an engagement and
compromise with Liberty; one cannot appeal to Liberty without
doing homage to her; she lays her hand upon those to whom she
lends her aid. The great fact which I before invoked, the work of
reconciliation between modern society and Roman Catholicism, is
more advanced than those believe who still stand aloof from it
and oppose it.
{41}
This is proved by two facts. In the very bosom of Roman
Catholicism, and from amongst its most zealous defenders, that
group of liberal Catholics was formed which has played and which
continues to play so active a part in struggling for the
Liberties of their church, and for the rights of their chief:
these are at once the ornaments of then church, and its
intellectual sword; and the publication which supports their
views, the "Correspondant," is, next to the "Revue des deux
Mondes," the periodical which meets with most success and has the
greatest circulation. Passing from this brilliant group to the
more modest ranks of the Roman Catholic clergy, I ask what is the
disposition, the attitude, the conduct of those faithful and
humble priests who exercise the Christian ministry in our
provinces and in the inferior quarters of our cities; they have
not always all the science, all the mental culture, which one
might desire; but whilst adhering to Catholic faith and giving
the example of Christian lives, they live in the midst of the
people;
{42}
they know it, they understand it; they are aware what the
conditions are which permit them to live with and to exercise an
influence upon the people; they enter by degrees into its
sentiments and its instincts; without premeditation, almost
without perceiving it, they become each day more and more men of
their time and country, more familiar with the ideas and liberal
tendencies of modern society. Thus at the two poles of Roman
Catholicism, in its most elevated ranks and in its popular
militia, the same result is obtained, in the one case by men of
enlightened views and of superior ability, and in the other case
by men of good sense and honesty of purpose; and thus in the
Roman Church those moral and political principles of 1789 make
their way, which form the basis of the new social edifice, of its
laws, and of its liberties.
I do not dispute, neither do I attack; I record facts as I
observe and appreciate them. And in my opinion, with reference to
French institutions,--for I speak only of France,--the essential
consequences from these facts, as far as they bear upon the
relations of Christianity to Liberty, are as follows.
{43}
I have here not a word to say respecting the Protestant Church in
France; the questions which have agitated her for some time past
are questions of faith and internal discipline, entirely aloof
from any incertitude or differences of opinion as to the rights
of conscience or of religious society in their relations to civil
society. Protestantism in France, whether orthodox or not, adopts
and upholds the largest maxims as to religious liberty, and as to
the guarantee for it, in the separation of religious life from
civil life. The most zealous Liberals have nothing more in this
respect to demand from even the most orthodox Protestants; these
are indeed of their church the most urgent in claiming for
religious society the right to have its internal autonomy, and to
stand independently of the state. It is, on the contrary, Roman
Catholics, and the advocates of the essential principles of
modern society, who most dispute about the general question of
liberty.
{44}
The more I reflect, the more I am convinced that henceforth this
question can only be seriously and efficaciously dealt with in
one of two ways: the one is by the alliance of Church and State,
on conditions which, whilst distinguishing civil life from
religious life, shall guarantee to individuals religious liberty
in civil society, and to the church itself its internal autonomy
in matters of faith and of religious discipline. The other
solution is the complete separation of Church and State, and
their mutual independence.
That the Church prefers the system of an Alliance with the State
to that of the Church's Liberty and isolation from the State, I
well understand.
She is right. Alliance with the State is to her a sign of
strength, a means of influence, a pledge for her dignity and her
stability. The complete separation of the two societies leaves
religious institutions, and particularly their clergy, in a
fluctuating and precarious situation: a system essentially
democratic, it rather places the ecclesiastical magistracy under
the opinions and wills of its lay members, than these under the
influence of the religious authorities.
{45}
This system is especially alien to the origin, the fundamental
principle, and the Hierarchy, of the Roman Catholic Church; it is
impossible for this Church to accept it unless urgently demanded
by the interests of moral authority, independence, and liberty.
But let not the Roman Catholic Church misapprehend; an alliance
of Church with State has also conditions without which a Church
would vainly expect any advantage; for the alliance to be serious
and effectual, there must be between Church and State a large
measure of harmony as to the essential principles of the
religious society and of the civil society which the Church and
the State respectively represent: if the two societies and those
who govern them, do not mutually admit their respective
principles, if they disavow each other incessantly, and carry on
in the bosom of their alliance, a war, open or secret, all the
good effect of such alliance disappears, and the alliance itself
is soon compromised.
{46}
The treaties concluded at different epochs, under the name of
Concordats, between Chambers and States in different countries of
Christendom, have only been possible and efficacious, because
there was a great basis of harmony in the fundamental
institutions of the two contracting parties; they differed upon
some points; they had reciprocally to make concessions and grant
guarantees; but taken altogether they approved of each other and
were sincere in supporting each other; peace was the point from
which their alliance started, and the dissentiments which existed
on each side had no reference to any vital questions. It suffices
for us to cast a glance at the history of Catholicism in France,
of the Anglican Church in England, of the Lutheran Church in
Germany and in Sweden, to acknowledge this truth; and what is
occurring and forming matter of negotiation in our days in Italy
and in Austria, upon the subject of the relations of the Church
with the State, furnishes a further striking confirmation.
{47}
In an age of liberty, of publicity, and of continual discussion,
when it is possible for anything to be thought or said, and for
any opinion to be maintained or attacked, it is more than ever
indispensable that any treaty between Church and State should be
serious and sincere; that is to say, that the two contracting
parties should recognise and accept in each other, without
equivocation and without subterfuge, the character which each
really possesses. This is the only condition upon which an
alliance can be real, becoming, and advantageous. In presence of
the undisguised movements and the ever recurring and daring
ventures of Liberty, a policy of reticence and procrastination,
obscure and dim reservations, inconsistent expedients, and secret
warfare, is no longer practicable; such policy, far from lending
any help, discredits and weakens the power which places its trust
in it.
{48}
As for me, I believe that the Catholic Church, if not without
endangering her habits, at least without endangering her
essential principles, has it in her power to set herself at peace
with the fundamental principles of modern society and of actual
civil governments; but should she either not wish or not know how
to march towards this object and to obtain it, let her not give
way to any illusion; alliance with the State would be rather a
source of weakness and of peril to her than an advantage, and she
would only eventually be driven to seek a refuge in the system of
separation and complete independence.
As for the State, the system which separates the two societies
would free it from many a burthen and much embarrassment; but it
would cause her other embarrassments, and lead to the loss of
many advantages. It is convenient to discourse of the principle
of a "Free church in a free country," but after the long alliance
which has existed between them, it is easier to proclaim such
principle than to apply it: not only is it impossible to divorce
Church from State without violently wrenching asunder previous
bonds, but more lasting consequences ensue; once disengaged from
every connection with the civil power, ministers of religion busy
themselves no longer about the interests of civil society; their
thoughts are exclusively absorbed by questions of religion and
its affairs.
{49}
Governments have long been accustomed to derive, and derive at
the present day, a moral influence of great value from an
alliance with the Church: but this influence supposes one
condition which is not only especially important in our days, but
of capital importance: in the actual state of opinion and of
manners, no good results can be politically looked for from the
alliance, if the civil power do not abstain from all interference
in questions purely religious; the complete independence of the
church and of its chiefs, in matters of faith and of religious
discipline, is the only condition which can justify their giving
their indirect support to the state government, and which can
purge their support of all impure motives.
{50}
The alliance of the two powers could formerly, in a certain
degree, co-exist with no inconsiderable confusion in their
respective attributes, and a somewhat earnest claim on the part
of each to domineer over the other; nothing similar can occur at
the present day; neither Church nor State can any longer be the
master or the servant of the other. Let neither princes nor
priests deceive themselves; their reciprocal independence, and
their uncontested empire, each in its own province, can alone
give to their alliance the dignity which the alliance requires,
if it is to be real, efficacious, and lasting.
Every road leads me to the same point; to every question the
facts give me the same answer. Liberty has need of Christianity,
Christianity has need of Liberty. As modern society demands to be
free, the religion of Christ is its most necessary ally.
Christianity and civil society have mutually, I admit it, a grave
feeling of disquietude and distrust; but this disquietude and
distrust are not natural and inevitable results of principles
essential to civil society and religious society, of any
compulsory relations existing between them; they spring from the
faults which the two institutions have committed towards each
other, and from the contest which each has forced upon the other.
{51}
Liberty alone can effectually combat such sentiments which have
become habitual and traditional. To dissipate them entirely,
something besides Liberty is requisite; but without Liberty
neither religious society nor civil society will obtain their
legitimate objects, these objects being peace in their relations
to each other, and the moral progress of man, and of the State,
whether allied with or independent of the Church.
{52}
Second Meditation.
Christianity And Morality.
Two attempts are now being simultaneously made, of different
characters, although, of the same origin and tendency. Seriously
minded men, who persist in believing and calling themselves
Christians, are labouring to separate Christian morals from
Christian dogmas, and although they make Jesus their moral idea
of humanity, are stripping him of his miracles and divinity.
Others, who declare openly that they are no Christians, endeavour
to separate morality in the abstract from religion in the
abstract, and place the source of morality, as well as its
authority, in human nature, and in it alone. On the one side we
find a Christian morality independent of Christian faith; on the
other a Morality independent of all religious belief, either
natural or revealed: these two doctrines are in our days
proclaimed and propagated with ardour.
{53}
I frankly admit that their defenders are sincere in adopting and
upholding them, and that they do so in the name of truth alone.
In philosophy, as in politics, I believe error and honest
intentions to be more general than falsehood and evil design.
Moreover, who would discuss convictions, unless himself convinced
that they are serious and earnest? Opinions founded on interested
or hypocritical motives are not worth the honour of a discussion;
they merit only to be attacked and unmasked. In the name of truth
alone I combat the two doctrines to which I have alluded, and
which some now strive to accredit.
The true cause of this twofold attempt is the incredulity and the
scepticism which prevail with regard to religion. Non-Christians
are numerous; few Deists are quite sure of their belief and of
its efficacy.
{54}
A necessity for morality is felt to exist; its right to regulate
the actions of man is acknowledged; it is in order to preserve to
it its integrity and its force that efforts are made to separate
it from religion, from all religious creeds, all of which, it is
here assumed, are either ruined or tottering. Thus, Independent
Morality is, as it were, a raft, offered to the human soul, and
to human society, to save their time-worn vessel from being
wrecked.
The idea is false, the attempt of evil consequence. They who
flatter themselves that they can leave Christian morality
standing, after wrenching it from Christian dogmas,--and they who
believe it possible to preserve morality, after detaching it from
religion,--err alike, for they fail to recognise the essential
facts of human nature and of human society.
Both doctrines are derived from an inexact and incomplete
observation of these facts. I have already stated in these
Meditations what I think of the isolation of Christian morality
from Christianity, and the reason why I reject it.
{55}
At present I apply myself to the idea of independent morality,
and in the name of a psychology, pure at once and severe, I
affirm that there exists an intimate, legitimate, and necessary
union between morality and religion.
A preliminary observation occurs to me. Those who adopt the
theory of an independent morality, start from the idea that there
is a moral law, strange to and superior to all interested
motives, to all selfish passions; these rank duty above, and
treat it as independent of, every other motive of action.
I am far from contesting this principle with them, but they
forget that it _has_ been, and still _is_, strongly
contested: contested by both ancient and modern philosophers.
Some have considered the pursuit of happiness, and the
satisfaction of individual interests, as the right and legitimate
aims of human life. Others have placed the rule of man's conduct,
not in personal interests, but in general utility, in the common
welfare of all mankind. Others have thought that they could
perceive the origin and the guarantee for morals in the sympathy
of human sentiments.
{56}
The moral and obligatory law, or duty, is far from being the
recognised and generally accepted basis of morality; systems the
most varied have arisen, and are incessantly forming themselves,
with respect to the principles of morals, as with respect to
other great questions of our nature; and the human understanding
fluctuates no less in this corner of the philosophic arena than
in the others. Let the moralists of the new school not deceive
themselves; in proclaiming morality to be independent of
religion, they mean to give it one fixed basis, the same for all,
and they believe that they succeed in the attempt. They deceive
themselves: morality, thus isolated, remains as much as ever a
prey to the disputes of man.
I pass over this grave misconception on the part of the defenders
of the system, and I examine the system itself. Let us see if it
is the faithful and full expression of human morality, if it
contains all the facts which constitute its natural and essential
elements.
{57}
These facts I sum up as follows: the distinction between moral
good and evil; the obligation of doing good and avoiding evil;
the faculty of accomplishing or not this obligation. In brief and
philosophic terms the Moral Law, Duty, and Liberty. These are the
natural, primitive, and universal facts which constitute human
morality; it is by reason and by virtue of these facts that man
is a moral being.
I have not here to enter into a discussion of these same facts; I
do not occupy myself at this moment with systems which disregard
or deny them, in whole or in part; all the three facts, or any
one of the three. The partisans of the system of independent
morality admit them all, as I do; the question between them and
myself is this, whether or not, whilst rendering homage to the
true principle of morality, they fully comprehend its
signification, and accept its results.
{58}
It is the characteristic and the honour of man that he is not
satisfied with merely gathering facts which relate either to
himself or to the external world, but that he seeks to know their
origin and object, their import and bearing.
In morals, as in physics, statistics are only the point from
which science sets out; it is only after having well observed
facts, and having verified them, that we have to discuss the
questions which they raise, and the further ultimate facts which
the facts already ascertained contain and reveal. The fact of
human morality, such as I have just described it in its three
constituent elements, the Moral Law, Duty, and Liberty, cannot
fail to suggest these two questions: Whence proceeds the moral
law, and whence is its authority? What is the sense, and what the
ultimate result to the moral being himself, of the fulfilment or
violation of his duty; that is to say, of the use which he makes
of his liberty? No philosophical system can either suppress or
elude these questions; they present themselves to the mind of man
as soon as he directs his attention to the moral character of
man's nature. I propose to consider in succession the three
constituent elements of this great truth, so as to determine
rightly its source and bearing.
{59}
Moral law has neither been invented by man, nor does it spring
from any human convention; man, by acknowledging it, admits that
he has not created it, that he cannot abolish or change it.
Political and civil laws are diverse and ever varying; they
depend in a great measure upon time, place, social circumstances,
or human will; when men adopt or reject them, they do so with the
feeling that they are the masters of them, to deal with them
accordingly as their interests or their fancies suggest.
But when a law presents itself to them in the form of a moral
law, they feel that this is not dependent on them, that it takes
its source and derives its authority elsewhere than from their
own opinion or volition. They may mistake in rendering or in
refusing homage to a particular precept of conduct; they may
attach to laws a moral value which they do not intrinsically
possess, or pass unnoticed the really moral character of another
law, and the obligations which it imposes upon them; but wherever
they believe that they perceive the character of a moral law,
they bow before it as before something which does not emanate
from them, and before a power of a different nature from man's.
{60}
The moral law no more belongs to the general mechanism of the
world, than to the invention of man; it has none of the
characteristics that mark the laws of physical order; none of the
results which follow from them; it is by no means inherent in the
forms or combinations of matter; it does not govern the relations
or movements of bodies; obligatory, and fixed as fate, it
addresses itself solely to that intelligent and free being, of
whom Pascal said, in his grand language, "If the universe were to
crush him, still man would be more noble than that which
destroyed him, because he knows that he dies; and of the
advantage that the universe has over him, the universe knows
nothing." Man does much more than know that he dies; it happens,
sometimes, that he encounters death voluntarily--that he chooses
to die in obedience to the moral law. It is the law of Liberty.
{61}
What mean these words, Law of Liberty? How does this law, called
Duty, come to establish itself in the human mind, and command
man's Liberty to respect it?
Some essay to found Duty upon Right, and to derive its authority
solely from the independence and dignity of humanity. Man, it is
said, feels and knows that he is a free agent; as such it is his
right that no human being shall attack his independence or his
dignity. He finds in every other human being the same nature, and
therefore the same right as he possesses himself. Thus mutual
right is derived from individual right, and "Duty is nothing but
the right which it is recognised that another possesses."
[Footnote 14]
[Footnote 14: La Morale Independante,
a weekly journal, No. 1, 6th August, 1865.]
{62}
There is here a profound mistake, and a strange forgetfulness.