_He may have started out sitting on a dud 16-inch Navy shell, enjoying
a smoke while emptying sand from his “boondockers,” but by the end of
the campaign, three weeks later, he had had too little sleep, too many
fire fights, and too many buddies dead._]
[Illustration: “_Patrol, Saipan._”
By Richard Gibney in Marine Corps Art Collection
]
The commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, Lieutenant
Colonel Hollis U. (“Musty”) Mustain was nearest the crisis. Chambers
went on:
Mustain’s executive officer was a regular major by the name of
Fenton Mee. Musty and I were together, and when radio operators
told us what was going on, Musty turned to Mee and said, “Get some
people there and get those tanks out.”
Mee turned around to his battalion CP, who were all staff people.
He just pointed and said, “Let’s get going.” He turned and took
off. I can still see his face--he figured he was going to get
killed. They got there and the Japs pulled out. This let the tanks
get out, and they were saved. It was one of the bravest things I
ever saw people do.
Chambers also noted that, by D+19, out of 28 officers and 690 enlisted
men in his rifle companies at the start of the campaign, he now had
only 6 officers and 315 men left in those companies. Counting his
headquarters company, he had just 468 men remaining of the battalion’s
original total strength of 1,050, so one rifle company simply had to be
disbanded. The grim toll was repeated in another battalion which had
had 22 out of 29 officers and 490 enlisted men either killed or wounded
in action.
Next to the 4th Marine Division was the 27th Infantry Division in the
center of the line of attack. It, too, had a far easier time than in
the grinding experiences it had just come through. Its advance also
veered left, and was “against negligible resistance” with “the enemy
in full flight.” Thus it reached the west coast, pinching off the 2d
Marine Division and allowing it to go into reserve.
[Illustration: SAIPAN