THE BRITISH IN MOROCCO
Not very many of the European residents of Morocco are fond of the
French invaders. Even, in many instances, Frenchmen hate them. They
condemn consistently the disorders that the armies of France--the
Spanish are not very active--have brought to Morocco; and still more
they lament the influx of other Europeans, generally, as they point
out, of the worst sort; dishonest speculators, adventurers and ‘dive’
keepers, unfortunately the usual vanguard of Western civilisation.
Frenchmen of the old days are wont to sentimentalise about the ‘Moghreb
defiled’; Germans have no love for the soldiers of France; Englishmen
resent the subordinate position, which for three years they have been
required to take.
In Eastern countries where Europeans are few, there is always intense
rivalry and much bitter feeling between the races. In Morocco the
great jealousy, until the signing of the Anglo-French agreement, was
between the British and the French. For many years the agents of France
and those of England, consuls as well as diplomatists, merchants, and
even simple residents, had struggled against each other for trade, for
social prestige, and for greater influence with the Sultan and the
Moorish government. When the British Minister would go to Fez, the
Frenchman was always prompt on his heels; nor did the former--though
perhaps with more show of modesty--ever allow the Minister of France to
get to his credit an extra visit or a larger present.
The intimacy between Kaid Maclean and the Sultan grievously annoyed
the French, and they accused the Kaid of exploiting Abdul Aziz. On
the other hand, though the Kaid was in the employ of the Sultan,
he was engaged also to act as agent of the British government at
the Maghzen. In loans and contracts the conflict was generally more
between the Germans and the French; and on these occasions scandals
of rival bribery and of diplomatic influence being brought to bear
in the interests of the rival bankers or contractors, as the case
might be, were always rife. British Ministers do not often aid the
subjects of the King in gathering private contracts, and British
interest in Morocco has always been primarily political. British trade
with Morocco, actual or potential, was never of any considerable
importance--except to the British traders in the towns of the coast, to
whom the rivalry of course extended, growing often more acute.
In 1904 all this was changed by a stroke of the pen. England and France
came to an understanding, the one waiving claims in Egypt, the other
withdrawing politically from Morocco. The following year the German
Emperor, who had not been consulted, volunteered an objection to the
French scheme for policing certain coast cities and border towns and
organising a Morocco State Bank. Intimidating the French--though
Great Britain ‘agreed to support them in any attitude they should
take,’ which meant, I am convinced, even to the extent of war with
Germany--the Kaiser brought about a conference of the Powers, which
came to be known by the name of the Spanish town at which it was held.
The Algeciras Conference, after deliberating for months, finally in
compromise decreed that France should be accompanied by Spain in her
scheme, which was definitely limited.
The accord between France and England was a blow to British residents
in Morocco. As long as they had been in the land they had held, in the
fear and the regard of the Moors, the paramount position, and now that
position was handed over to their foremost rivals. They felt that
they as Englishmen could not consistently change their attitude at the
dictation of their Government at home--nor did they change except for
the worse.
Their jealousy has now turned to enmity, which is often intense. In the
smaller towns French and British consular agents are not on speaking
terms and avoid each other in the streets. Englishmen are friendly with
the Germans, upholding the anti-French policy of the German Government
and decrying the ‘weakness’ of their own, all the while sympathising
with the unfortunate Moor and his disintegrating empire. To the large
towns new consuls have been sent out, generally from both France and
England, and new Ministers have gone to Tangier, and this makes things
easier in diplomatic circles, where the French policy is supported
consistently. Otherwise the same old merchants and residents are there,
both French and English, with the same old hates.
How the Englishman rails against his Government! How he storms at the
English Press! How he writes, in passionate language, in his _Moghreb
al Aksa_, the little weekly English paper! I have in mind a thin, wiry
little man, past middle age, who wears a helmet and dresses in a brown
suit of tweeds. Having plenty of leisure he puts in much of his time
writing for London papers; but they will have none of his spirited
essays. So he prints them in the _Moghreb_. They are headed, ‘How
Long Will England Close Her Eyes?’ ‘How Long Will the English Press
Refuse to Print the Truth?’ ‘How Long Will the Patient Moor Refrain
from Massacre?’--and such like. I suggested to him one evening as we
sat with several other Europeans at a table at a new French café (it
was not thoroughly consistent for the little man to patronise the
place) that in all Morocco there were hardly enough Europeans to make
a massacre, as massacres go in the East; were there fifty bonâ-fide
Britishers in the land?
Fifty or a million, he replied vehemently, they had been sold by the
Government at home. What an absurd thing to do, to hold the high hand
in Morocco and pass it over to the French for relinquishing some paper
claim on Egypt! But what could be expected from a man like the Earl
of Lansdowne, himself half French? It was no use pointing out that
the British Government on this occasion had sacrificed a few British
subjects for what appeared to be the good of the many; that British
exports to Morocco had never amounted to more than two millions a year;
that the potential value of the country is not promising; that the
French are treaty-bound to keep the open door; that the cost to France
in money, to say nothing of blood, may never be repaid with revenues or
even with trade.
That the French will ever withdraw from Morocco is exceedingly
doubtful, and this is a sore grievance to British residents, who long
hoped that one day England might control the country. Only a European
war, or the serious danger of one that would defeat France, would
cause her now to take leave. It is the custom of European Governments,
when invading conquerable territory coveted by others, to protest the
temporary character of their ‘mission’; and if other proof were needed
of the intentions of France the very constant repetitions of the French
Government that it will adhere to the Act of Algeciras would tend to
rouse suspicion.
But there is reason for the French, indeed necessity for them, to
control Morocco. Europe is too near Morocco for the country to be left
to anarchy and ignorance and their consequences. Some European Power
or Powers must represent Europe there, while the establishment of one
other than France would be a constant menace to Algeria and would throw
upon France the obligation of devoting to the expense of her colony
a greater outlay than it would cost to conquer the Moorish Empire.
France must remain in Morocco; and the French--those soldiers and
diplomatists whom I have seen and talked with, at any rate--welcome
the opportunity that the Shawia tribes have given them, and make the
most of it. The assurances of the French Government are of course only
diplomatic. Assurances of a temporary occupation were vouchsafed when
Tunis was invaded. Nor is it only France that follows this diplomacy.
It is for the reason that events threaten to make permanent a certain
French occupation that a few Britishers would like to create a
difference between France and Great Britain, to annul the Anglo-French
agreement. For, should France be stopped--as she is likely to be
without British support--it will mean that no country shall regulate
Morocco and that another situation like that of the Turk in Europe will
be established, to run on an untold term of years. This is what these
partisans would like to bring about, because their hostility to the
French, beginning in trade and political rivalry, has become now one
of sentimental sympathy with the Moors.
The case for Morocco is put by the Sultan Mulai Hafid himself in an
appeal to the Powers of Europe presented to their Ministers at Tangier
in February (1908). The argument has the Eastern fault of waiving
rather than undermining the case for France, as, in one instance, where
it speaks of peace with Europeans in provinces and cities where there
are no foreign troops, a peace that obtains in the interior because the
few European residents have left, and in the coast towns because of the
lesson of Casablanca. In a ‘free rendering’ of the Arabic original, the
correspondent of the _Morning Post_, R. L. N. Johnson, an authority
on Morocco and the author of several literary books pertaining to the
country, interprets this picturesque document as follows:--
‘In the name of the Most Merciful God, save from whom is neither
device nor might. (Here follow the royal seal, the name of the
Foreign Minister addressed, and the customary salutations.)
‘On behalf of the people of Morocco, one and all, many of whom are
actual sufferers from what has befallen their dwellings, their
brethren, and their families, I lay before you my plaint.
‘What has been done to them is an offence against Treaties and common
justice. He who demands his right has no pretext for needless,
inhuman violence and brutality, nor is such action compatible with
dealings between the nations. Nor is there wrong to any (Power) in
our nation deposing its Monarch on reasonable grounds. He has proved
his incapacity, he has neglected every interest of the State, and
he has followed a line of conduct which would not be tolerated by
the believers of any faith. I call your attention to the terrible
calamity which has afflicted the people of Morocco, relying upon your
well-known frank recognition of the truth. Thus you can hardly keep
silence on what has happened and is happening in this country. From
time immemorial your folk have lived among us, for trade and other
purposes, without any object of filching our land, exactly as they
would live in other friendly countries, and in the manner laid down
in the Madrid Convention, which was framed upon a knowledge of the
conditions of life in Morocco.
‘It may be you have heard rumours of a declaration of war (_Jehad_).
That declaration was made solely with the object of calming the
exasperation of my people at the wholly unjust invasion of their
land and the occupation of their soil. These invaders are to-day
preventing our people from carrying on their everyday affairs
according to our time-honoured customs. I was desirous of appointing
Governors in Shawia who should be responsible to myself for the
preservation of order, but obstacles [the French army--F.M.] were
placed in my way, and to avoid a conflict which would have led
to terrible bloodshed I abstained. My one desire is to restore
tranquillity among my people, so as to bring back general welfare.
‘As to the army now occupying the Casablanca district on the pretext
of pacifying it and protecting foreigners, this is my duty towards
the whole of Morocco--that is to say, to protect both Moslems and
Europeans in their lives and property. I ask nothing better than
to follow the path of justice, that these troops may evacuate that
land and leave it to its lawful owners. They have but to depart and
no further trouble need be feared. But assuredly so long as they
remain peace is impossible. You have watched this going on for six
months. Have you also watched the conditions of the other provinces
and cities where no other intervention has taken place? Are not the
people, yours and mine, living in peace and harmony? Absolutely
nothing has occurred to hurt any person or place, nor, thank God,
has any European been molested, despite all that our brethren have
suffered. The wiser among the French nation recognise this, without
being able to remedy the mischief done. As to those of lesser
understanding who declare us to be anti-European, they speak falsely
and without a shadow of reason. Our acts speak for themselves, and
disprove the lies which have been thrown broadcast over the world.
The wise know this, and that the authors of such calumnies are
monsters rather than human.
‘As for the dethronement of Mulai Abdul Aziz, this was not only the
will of the nation, but was done by the decision of the lawful court
of Ulema, who judged him. Surely there is no crime in deposing a
Sultan on the just ground that he is unfit to govern. It was done not
long ago in Turkey. It has happened among the other Powers.
* * * * *
‘I now ask you to give me a faithful answer, and I will abide by the
truth. On what principle of international law can there be armed
intervention between a nation and the monarch it has deposed? I wait
for your reply in the firm belief that, on careful review of the
situation, your answer cannot fail to reflect a bright lustre upon
your judgment and justice.
‘In peace. This 24th Haeja, 1325.’
Europeans in Morocco are mostly sympathisers with Mulai Hafid; and
their hopes for the success of his Holy War lead them often--no doubt
unconsciously--to exaggerate the difficulties of the French and to
enlarge upon the numbers of the tribesmen opposing them. Though Hafid
declared that his purpose in proclaiming the _Jehad_ was only to unite
the tribes in support of him, he has been drawn by this proclamation
into war with the French. The forces that have been recruited by his
deception have either pressed him or have taken upon themselves to
combat the French invasion; and their opposition would seem to make it
impossible for the French to recognise Hafid as Sultan. For this would
be tantamount to a defeat of the French in the minds of the ignorant
Moors. On the other hand Hafid’s position is now exceedingly difficult;
for him it is either to fight or to surrender to his brother.
* * * * *
In leaving Morocco it would be picturesque to say with Pierre Loti:
‘Farewell, dark Moghreb, Empire of the Moors, mayst thou remain yet
many years immured, impenetrable to the things that are new! Turn thy
back upon Europe! Let thy sleep be the sleep of centuries, and so
continue thine ancient dream! May Allah preserve to the Sultan his
unsubdued territories and his waste places carpeted with flowers, there
to do battle as did the Paladins in the old times, there to gather in
his rebel heads! May Allah preserve to the Arab race its mystic dreams,
its immutability scornful of all things, and its grey rags; may He
preserve to the Moorish ruins their shrouds of whitewash, and to the
mosques inviolable mystery!’
But for my part there is no sentimental feeling for Morocco. That a
government is old is no reason, for me, that it should be maintained.
Because the Moors have always ridden horses, I see no reason why they
should not ride in carriages or even in trains. In fact, I sympathise
with the unfortunate beasts of burden and with the suffering Moors
themselves. I was not affected, like the great French writer, more
by the beauty and the romance of the country than by the horror and
distress; and, instead of his fair sentiment, I say: Let in the French!
For the Moghreb I should like to see a little less of crime, a little
less of base corruption, a little less of ignorance and needless
suffering, a little less of cruelty, a little less of bestial vice. The
French can do some little for Morocco, and no other Power can go in. I
say, Let in the French!
[Illustration: MAP OF MOROCCO]
Yet a last word, to the French: You boast your knowledge of
Mohammedans; do you know that the Moors dread you for what they have
heard from their fathers you did in the early days in Algeria? Nor have
your methods about Casablanca reassured them. You have slain wantonly,
even under General Drude. General d’Amade has penetrated the country
time after time and accomplished ‘enormous slaughter.’ But for what
purpose? This is all unnecessary. It would seem that your object has
been to provoke further hostility, that you may have excuse to continue
your occupation and to extend it. This is undoubtedly good politics;
but rather unfair to the ignorant Moors, don’t you think? And is it
good for your soldiers, Algerians or Europeans, to use them in this
fashion?
THE END.
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES:
Italicized text is surrounded by underscores: _italics_.
Superscripted text is preceded by a carat character: Geog^l.
Obvious typographical errors have been corrected.
Inconsistencies in hyphenation have been standardized.