THE HOLY WAR
When the Shawia tribesmen made their first attacks upon the French at
Casablanca they were thoroughly confident of their own prowess and
of the protection of Allah. They had often, before the coming of the
French, called the attention of Europeans to the fact that salutes of
foreign men-of-war entering port were not nearly so loud as the replies
from their own antiquated guns--always charged with a double load of
powder for the sake of making noise. But they have come to realise now
that Christian ships and Christian armies have bigger guns than those
with which they salute, and the news that Allah, whatever may be His
reason, is not on the side of the noisy guns has spread over a good
part of Morocco.
The Arabs now seldom try close quarters with the French, except
when surrounded or when the French force is very small and they are
numerous; and as I have indicated before, their defence is most
ineffective. One morning on a march towards Mediuna I sat for an hour
with the Algerians, under the war balloon, watching quietly an absurd
attack of the tribesmen. From the crest of a hill, behind which they
were lodged, they would ride down furiously to within half a mile of
us, and turning to go back at the same mad pace, discharge a gun,
without taking aim, at the balloon, their special irritation. It was
all picturesque, but like the gallant charge of the brave Bulgarian
in ‘Arms and the Man,’ entirely ridiculous. If the Algerians had been
firing at the time, not one of them would have got back over their hill.
[Illustration: ARAB PRISONERS WITH A WHITE FLAG.]
[Illustration: A COLUMN OF THE FOREIGN LEGION.]
The reports in the London papers of serious resistance on the part
of the Moors are seldom borne out by facts. Most of the despatches,
passing through excitable Paris, begin with startling adjectives and
end with ‘Six men wounded.’ Here, for instance, are the first and the
last paragraphs of the Paris despatch describing the first taking of
Settat, which is over forty miles inland and among the homes of the
Shawia tribesmen. It is headed:
‘_A Sixteen-Hour Fight._
‘At eight a.m. yesterday the French columns opened battle in the
Settat Pass. The enemy offered a stubborn resistance, but was finally
repulsed, after a fight lasting until midnight. Settat was occupied
and Muley Rechid’s camp destroyed.
‘There were several casualties on the French side.... The enemy’s
losses were very heavy. The fight has produced a great impression
among the tribes.’
The Arab losses under the fire of the French 75-millimètre guns and
the fusillade of the Foreign Legion and the Algerians, many of them
sharpshooters, are usually heavy where the Arabs attempt a serious
resistance. I should say it would average a loss on the part of the
Moors of fifty dead to one French soldier wounded. Moreover, when a
Moor is badly wounded he dies, for the Moors know nothing of medicine,
and the only remedies of which they will avail themselves are bits of
paper with prayers upon them, written by shereefs; these they swallow
or tie about a wound while praying at the shrine of some departed
saint. It has seemed to me a wanton slaughter of these ignorant
creatures, but if the French did not mow them down, the fools would say
they could not, and would thank some saint for their salvation.
The arms of the Arabs are often of the most ineffective sort, many of
them, indeed, made by hand in Morocco. While I was with the French army
on one occasion we found on a dead Moor (and it is no wonder he was
dead) a modern rifle, of which the barrel had been cut off, evidently
with a cold chisel, to the length of a carbine. The muzzle, being bent
out of shape and twisted, naturally threw the first charge back into
the face of the Moor who fired it. I have seen bayonets tied on sticks,
and other equally absurd weapons.
There are in Morocco many Winchester and other modern rifles, apart
from those with which the Sultan’s army is equipped. Gun-running has
long been a profitable occupation amongst unscrupulous Europeans of the
coast towns, the very people for whose protection the French invasion
is inspired. A man of my own nationality told me that for years he got
for Winchesters that cost him 3_l._ as much as 6_l._ and 8_l._ The
authorities, suspecting him on one occasion, put a Jew to ascertain
how he got the rifles in. Suspecting the Jew, the American informed
him confidentially, ‘as a friend,’ that he brought in the guns in
barrels of oil. In a few weeks five barrels of oil and sixteen boxes of
provisions arrived at ---- in one steamer. The American went down to
the custom-house, grinned graciously, and asked for his oil, which the
Moors proceeded to examine.
‘No, no,’ said the American.
The Moors insisted.
The American asked them to wait till the afternoon, which they
consented to do; and after a superficial examination of one of the
provision boxes, a load of forty rifles, the butts and barrels in
separate boxes, covered with cans of sardines, tea, sugar, etc., went
up to the store of the American.
It was more profitable to run in guns that would bring 8_l._, perhaps
more, than to run in 8_l._ worth of cartridges, and after the Moors
had secured modern rifles they found great difficulty in obtaining
ammunition, which for its scarcity became very dear. For that reason
many of them have given up the European gun and have gone back to the
old flintlock, made in Morocco, cheaper and more easily provided with
powder and ball.
Ammunition is too expensive for the poverty-stricken Moor to waste
much of it on target practice, and when he does indulge in this vain
amusement it is always before spectators, servants and men too poor to
possess guns; and in order to make an impression on the underlings--for
a Moor is vain--he places the target close enough to hit. The Moor
seldom shoots at a target more than twenty yards off.
Even the Sultan is economical with ammunition. It is never supplied to
the Imperial Army--for the reason that soldiers would sell it--except
just prior to a fight. It is told in Morocco that when Kaid Maclean
began to organise the army of Abdul Aziz he was informed that he might
dress the soldiers as he pleased--up to his time they were a rabble
crew without uniforms--but that he need not teach them to shoot. Nor
have they since been taught to shoot.
I am of opinion that the French army under General d’Amade, soon
to number 12,000 or 13,000 men, could penetrate to any corner of
Morocco with facility, maintaining at the same time unassailable
communication with their base. A body of the Foreign Legion three
hundred strong could cut their way across Morocco. With 60,000 men
the French can occupy, hold, and effectively police--as policing goes
in North Africa--the entire petty empire. Such an army in time could
make the roads safe for Arabs and Berbers as well as for Europeans,
punishing severely, as the French have learned to do, any tribe that
dares continue its marauding practices and any brigand who essays to
capture Europeans; and as for the rest, the safety of life and property
within the towns and among members of the same tribes, the instinct of
self-preservation among the Moors themselves is sufficient. There is
no danger for the French in Morocco.
Nevertheless, their task is not an easy one. Conservatism at home
and fear of some foreign protest has kept them from penetrating the
country, as they must, in order to subdue it. So far they have made
their power felt but locally, and though they have slain wantonly
thousands of Moors, their position to-day is to all practical purposes
the same as it was after the first engagements about Casablanca. For
four months General Drude held Casablanca, with tribes defeated but
unconquered all about him. With the new year General Drude retired and
General d’Amade took his place, and the district of operations was
extended inland for a distance of fifty miles. But beyond that there
are again many untaught tribes ranging over a vast territory.
If the French, from fear of Germany, do not intend to occupy all
Morocco I can see for them no alternative but to recognise Mulai el
Hafid, who as Sultan of the interior is inspiring the tribesmen to war.
Hafid’s position, though criminal from our point of view, is undeniably
strong.
On proclaiming himself sultan, he sought to win the support of the
country by promising a Government like that of former sultans, one
that cut off heads, quelled rebellions, and kept the tribes united
and effective against the Christians. This was the message that his
criers spread throughout the land; and the people, told that the French
had come as conquerors, gave their allegiance to him who promised to
save them. Hafid’s attitude towards the European Powers was by no
means so defiant as he professed to his people. Emissaries were sent
from Marakesh to London and Berlin to plead for recognition, but were
received officially at neither capital. He then tried threats, and at
last, in January, declared the _Jehad_, or Holy War. But that he really
contemplated provoking a serious anti-Christian, or even anti-French,
uprising could hardly be conceived of so intelligent a man; and hard
after the news of this came an assuring message--unsolicited, of
course--to the Legations at Tangier that his object was only to unite
the people in his cause against his brother. Later, when one of his
_m’hallas_ took part in a battle against the French he sent apologies
to them.
The Moors, the country over, have heard of the disasters to the Shawia
tribes, at any rate, of the fighting. Knowing the hopelessness of
combating the French successfully, the towns of the coast are willing
to leave their future in the diplomatic hands of Abdul Aziz, in spite
of their distaste for him and his submission to the Christians. Those
of the interior, however, many of whom have never seen a European, have
a horror of the French such as we should have of Turks, and they will
probably fight an invasion with all their feeble force.
Because of the harsh yet feeble policy of the French, the trouble in
Morocco, picturesque and having many comic opera elements, will drag on
its bloody course yet many months.