TREATIES IN THE PACIFIC
There is one actual alliance between two Pacific Powers, Great Britain
and Japan: an _entente_ between Great Britain and Russia: and an
instinct towards friendliness between Great Britain and the United
States. There are several other possible combinations affecting the
ocean in the future. But no Power of the Triple Alliance, nor yet
France, can be considered a factor in the Pacific except in so far as it
may help or hinder a Power already established there. Germany, for
instance, might enter the Pacific as an ally of Japan or the United
States; but she could not without an alliance bring naval or military
force there unless Great Britain had first been humbled in a European
war.
To the alliance between Great Britain and Japan not very much importance
can be ascribed since its revision in 1911. It threatens to die now of
inanition, as it becomes clear that British aims and Japanese aims in
the Pacific do not move towards a common end. The first British-Japanese
treaty, signed on January 30, 1902, had for its main provisions--
"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire
to maintain the _status quo_ and general peace in the extreme East,
being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and
territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Corea,
and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce
and industry of all nations, hereby agree as follows:--
"The High Contracting Parties, having mutually recognised the
independence of China and of Corea, declare themselves to be entirely
uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in
view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain
relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests
which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree
politically, as well as commercially and industrially, in Corea, the
High Contracting Parties recognise that it will be admissible for either
of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to
safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action
of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Corea, and
necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties
for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.
"If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their respective
interests as above described, should become involved in war with another
Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict
neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in
hostilities against its ally.
"If in the above event any other Power or Powers should join in
hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will
come to its assistance and will conduct the war in common, and make
peace in mutual agreement with it.
"The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without
consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another
Power to the prejudice of the interests above described.
"Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the
above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will
communicate with one another fully and frankly."
A letter covering the treaty, addressed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to
the British Minister at Tokio, Sir C. Macdonald, explained the fact that
there was to be no disturbance of Chinese or Corean territory: "We have
each of us desired that the integrity and independence of the Chinese
Empire should be preserved, that there should be no disturbance of the
territorial _status quo_ either in China or in the adjoining regions,
that all nations should, within those regions, as well as within the
limits of the Chinese Empire, be afforded equal opportunities for the
development of their commerce and industry, and that peace should not
only be restored, but should, for the future, be maintained. We have
thought it desirable to record in the preamble of that instrument the
main objects of our common policy in the Far East to which I have
already referred, and in the first Article we join in entirely
disclaiming any aggressive tendencies either in China or Corea."
But that stipulation did nothing to safeguard Corea's independence,
which was soon sacrificed to Japanese ambition. There was a widespread
feeling of uneasiness in the British Dominions in the Pacific when this
treaty was announced. At the time Canada was having serious trouble on
her Pacific Coast with Japanese immigrants, and the Canadian Pacific
provinces were anxious to prohibit absolutely the entry of more Japanese
to their territory.[8] Australia in 1901 had made the first great deed
of her new national organisation a law practically prohibiting all
coloured immigration, and making the entry of Japanese colonists
impossible. The Act certainly veiled its hostility to the Asiatic races
by a subterfuge. It was not stated in so many words that black skin,
brown skin, and yellow skin were prohibited from entry, but an
educational standard was set up which might be applied to any immigrant,
but needed to be applied to none. In practice it is never applied to the
decent White but always to the coloured man: and its application is such
that the coloured man can never be sure that his standard of education
will be sufficiently high to satisfy the fastidious sense of culture of
an Australian Customs officer. He may be a learned Baboo, B.A. of
Oxford, and Barrister of the Inner Temple, and yet fail to pass the
Australian Education Test, for the ordeal is to take dictation in any
European language, not necessarily English, but perhaps Russian or
modern Greek. New Zealand, without going so far by her legislation,
shows an equal repugnance to any form of Asiatic immigration.
The "official" view of the British Alliance with Japan, advocated with
some energy, was that it was a benefit to the White Dominions in the
Pacific, for it made them secure against the one aggressive Asiatic
Power. But nevertheless the policy of making the wolf a guardian of the
sheep-fold was questioned in many quarters. The question was asked:
"Presuming a Pacific war in which the United States was the enemy of
Japan?" The answer in the minds of many, in Australia at any rate, and
probably also in Canada and New Zealand, was that in such event the
sympathy, if not the active support, of the British Dominions in the
Pacific would be with the United States, whether Great Britain kept to
her Treaty or not. It was recognised, however, as almost unthinkable
that Great Britain would go to war by the side of Japan against the
American Republic.
Great Britain is very sensitive to the opinions of her Dominions in
these days of the industrious promulgation of Imperialist sentiment in
Great Britain: and a Canadian or an Australian voter--though he has no
vote for the House of Commons--has far more influence on the destinies
of the Empire than his British compeer. The overseas objection to the
Treaty with Japan had its full effect in the British Cabinet, and that
effect was seen in subsequent modifications of the Treaty.
On August 12, 1905, the British-Japanese Treaty was renewed, and the
chief articles of the new treaty were:--
"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing
the agreement concluded between them on the 30th January, 1902, by fresh
stipulations, have agreed upon the following articles, which have for
their object--
"(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the
regions of Eastern Asia and of India;
"(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by
insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the
principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all
nations in China;
"(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting
Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of
their special interests in the said regions:--
"It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or
Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of
this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate
with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the
measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or
interests.
"If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever
arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers, either Contracting
Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or
special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other
Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and
will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with
it.
"Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests
in Corea, Great Britain recognises the right of Japan to take such
measures of guidance, control, and protection in Corea as she may deem
proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided
always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal
opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.
"Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the
security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognises her right to take such
measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for
safeguarding her Indian possessions.
"The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without
consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another
Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this
Agreement.
"The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either
Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present
Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made
available, will be arranged by the naval and military authorities of the
Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another
fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.
"The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VI.,
come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain
in force for ten years from that date."
It will be noted that there is, as regards the general responsibility
under the Treaty, some watering down. One Power is bound to come to the
help of the other Power only by reason of "unprovoked attack or
aggressive action" on the part of another Power. The fiction of
preserving the independence of Corea is abandoned.
On April 3, 1911, a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was entered into
between Great Britain and Japan. The Japanese Government had revised its
tariff in such a way as to prejudice seriously foreign trade. It was
announced in Japan that certain nations would have the benefit of
"most-favoured nation" rates under the new tariff, but that Great
Britain would not have that benefit, since, being a Free Trade country,
she was able to give no concessions in return. Then the diplomatic
Treaty of 1905 was used by the British Government as an argument for
securing more favoured treatment for British merchants. If the Trade
Treaty of 1911 is closely studied, it will be found that the trade
advantages given to Japan by Great Britain, in return for some real
concessions on the part of Japan to Great Britain, are wholly illusory.
It is difficult to see how they could have been otherwise, since a Free
Trade country can give nothing better than Free Trade to another
country. But Great Britain, a good deal out of conceit at this time with
the diplomatic value of the Treaty of 1905, did not hesitate to use it
as a means of securing some trade benefits. The effect on Japanese
public opinion was not favourable. But the diplomatic position had so
changed that that was not considered a serious circumstance in Great
Britain.
Two articles of the British-Japanese Trade Treaty of 1911 should be
quoted to show the mutual acceptance by the two Powers of the
independent right of the British overseas Dominions to restrict or
prohibit Japanese immigration:
"The subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have full
liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other,
and, conforming themselves to the laws of the country,
"They shall in all that relates to travel and residence be placed in all
respects on the same footing as native subjects.
"They shall have the right, equally with native subjects, to carry on
their commerce and manufacture, and to trade in all kinds of merchandise
of lawful commerce, either in person or by agents, singly or in
partnerships with foreigners or native subjects.
"They shall in all that relates to the pursuit of their industries,
callings, professions, and educational studies be placed in all respects
on the same footing as the subjects or citizens of the most favoured
nation."
But Article 26 makes this reservation:
"The stipulations of the present Treaty shall not be applicable to any
of His Britannic Majesty's Dominions, Colonies, Possessions, or
Protectorates beyond the seas, unless notice of adhesion shall have been
given on behalf of any such Dominion, Colony, Possession, or
Protectorate by His Britannic Majesty's Representative at Tokio before
the expiration of two years from the date of the exchange of the
ratifications of the present Treaty."
A few weeks after the conclusion of this Trade Treaty the
British-Japanese Alliance was renewed on terms which practically "draw
its sting" and abolish the contingency of a British-Japanese war against
the United States, or against any Power with which Great Britain makes
an Arbitration Treaty. The preamble of the British-Japanese Treaty now
reads:
"The Government of Great Britain and the Government of Japan, having in
view the important changes which have taken place in the situation
since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of the 12th August,
1905, and believing that a revision of that Agreement responding to such
changes would contribute to the general stability and repose, have
agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the Agreement above
mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said
Agreement, namely:
"(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the
regions of Eastern Asia and of India.
"(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by
insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the
principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all
nations in China.
"(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting
Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India and the defence of
their special interests in the said regions."
The chief clauses are:
"If, by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action wherever
arising on the part of any Power or Powers, either High Contracting
Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or
special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other
High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally
and will conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement
with it.
"The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without
consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another
Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this
Agreement.
"Should either High Contracting Party conclude a Treaty of General
Arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this
Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go
to war with the Power with whom such Treaty of Arbitration is in force.
"The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date
of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date."
It will be recognised that there is very little left now of the very
thorough Treaty of 1902. It does not suit Japanese foreign policy that
this fact should be accentuated, and public opinion in that country has
been generally muzzled. Nevertheless, some candid opinions on the
subject have been published in the Japanese press. Thus the Osaka
_Mainichi_ last January, discussing evidently a Japanese disappointment
at the failure of Great Britain to join Japan in some move against
Russia, claimed that "for all practical purposes, the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance ended with its revision last July." In the opinion of the
_Mainichi_, "the Alliance no longer furnishes any guarantee for the
preservation of Chinese integrity. So far from Japan and Great Britain
taking, as the terms of the Alliance provide, joint action to protect
the rights and interests of the two nations when the same are
threatened, no measures have been taken at all." According to the
_Mainichi_, "England is no longer faithful to the principle of the
Alliance as regards the territorial integrity of China, and it is even
rumoured that she has intentions on Tibet, similar to those of Russia in
Mongolia. Consequently it is a matter of supreme importance to know
whether the Alliance is to be considered as still alive or not, and the
Japanese Government would do well to make some explicit declaration on
the subject."
This view was supported by the Tokio _Nichi-Nichi_, which wrote: "For a
long time now the feeling between Great Britain and Japan has been
undergoing a change. There is no concealing the fact that it is no
longer what it was before the Russo-Japanese War. At the time of the
Tariff the friendly relations were only maintained by concessions from
the side of the Japanese. The revision of the terms of the Alliance has
reduced it from a real value to this country to a merely nominal value.
The friendship which has been steadily growing between Great Britain and
Russia is something to be watched. The action of Great Britain in the
China trouble has not been true to the Alliance. The tacit consent given
to Russian action in Mongolia is a violation of the integrity of China,
and on top of it we are informed that Great Britain at the right moment
will adopt similar steps in Tibet."
The British-Japanese Treaty, for as much as it stands for, is the only
definite treaty affecting big issues in the Pacific to-day. To attempt
to discuss all possible treaties and combinations in the Pacific would
be, of course, impossible. But some notice must be given of the recent
remarkable hint of the possibilities of an "understanding" between
Germany and the United States on Pacific questions. In February Mr Knox,
the United States Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, communicated
in a formal Note to Germany some views on Pacific questions. Commenting
on this, the _New York Sun_, whose correspondent at Washington is a
great deal in the confidence of the Government, commented: "The
significance of Mr Knox's Note as a warning will, it is thought, be
clearly seen by the other Powers. The fact that the writing and
publication of Mr Knox's Note are the result of an understanding between
Germany and the United States will greatly add to the force of the
document. The other Powers, according to the Washington view, will
hesitate long before embarking upon the policy of advancing their
special interests by taking advantage of China's distress when Germany
and the United States are standing together before the world in
opposition to any such move."
An "understanding" between Germany and the United States to act together
on the Asiatic side of the Pacific littoral would have its strategic
importance in the fact that German power in the Atlantic would help to
lessen certain risks consequent upon the United States concentrating her
naval forces in the Pacific.
Another reasonably possible combination should be noted. As one of three
partners in the Triple Entente, Great Britain has an understanding with
Russia, which might possibly affect one day the position in the Pacific.
It is a fact rumoured among European diplomats that France, with the
idea of maintaining the Triple Entente as a basis of future
world-action, has urged Russia to build a Pacific Fleet, abandoning
naval expansion in the Baltic and the Black Sea. With a strong Pacific
Fleet Russia would certainly be a much more valuable friend to France
and to Great Britain than at present. But that is "in the air." The
actual position is that Great Britain and Russia are on such excellent
terms that they can fish amicably together to-day in the very disturbed
waters of Persia, and are possible future partners in the Pacific.
Those who consider a British-Russian alliance as impossible, forget the
history of centuries and remember only that of a generation. Anciently
the Russian and the Englishman were the best of friends, and Russian aid
was often of very material use to Great Britain. It was in the eleventh
century that King Canute established English naval power in the Baltic,
and thus opened up a great trade with the Russian town of Novgorod. He
helped the young Russian nation much in so doing. After Canute's death
this trade with Russia languished for five centuries. But in the
sixteenth century it was revived, and some centuries later it was said
of this revival: "The discovery of a maritime intercourse with the Great
Empire of Russia, and the consequent extension of commerce and
navigation, is justly regarded by historians as the first dawn of the
wealth and naval preponderance of England." Some indeed hold that the
great exploits of the Elizabethan era of British seamanship would not
have been possible without the maritime supplies--cordage, canvas,
tallow, spars and salt beef--obtained from Russia.
The benefits of the friendship were not all on one side. In the
seventeenth century England helped Russia with arms, supplies and troops
against the Poles. In 1747 England paid Russia to obtain an army of
37,000 troops which was employed in Holland. Later it was agreed that
Russia was to keep ready, on the frontiers of Livonia, an army of 47,000
troops beside forty galleys to be used in the defence of Hanover, for
England, if needed. At a later date Catherine the Great of Russia was
appealed to for 20,000 troops for service against the revolted American
colonies, an appeal which she very wisely rejected. In the wars against
Napoleon, Great Britain and Russia were joint chiefs of the European
coalition, and a Russian Fleet was stationed in British waters doing
good service at the time of the Mutiny of the Nore. A British-Russian
understanding, in short, has been the rule rather than the exception in
European politics since the fifteenth century.
An instinct of friendliness between Great Britain and the United States,
though expressed in no formal bonds, is yet a great force in the
Pacific. There has been at least one occasion on which an American force
in the Pacific has gone to the help of a British naval force engaging an
Asiatic enemy. There are various more or less authentic stories showing
the instinct of the armed forces of both nations to fraternise.
Sometimes it is the American, sometimes the British sailor who is
accused of breaking international law in his bias for the men of his own
speech and race. It would not be wise to record incidents, which were
irregular if they ever happened, and which, therefore, had best be
forgotten. But the fact of the American man-of-war's-men in Apia
Harbour, Samoa, finding time during their own rush to destruction at the
hands of a hurricane to cheer a British warship steaming out to safety,
is authentic, and can be cited without any harm as one instance of the
instinctive friendship of the two peoples in the Pacific of common blood
and common language.
FOOTNOTES:
[8] This proposal has now (1912) been revived in the face of the
disquieting uprise of Chinese power. It is an indication of the stubborn
resolve of the White populations to prohibit Asiatic immigration.