XXVIII.

_MADAM,_

Your desire is to know, since I say Nature is Wise, Whether all her

parts must be wise also? To which, I answer; That (by your favour) all

her parts are not fools: but yet it is no necessary consequence, that

because Nature is infinitely wise, all her parts must be so too, no

more then if I should say, Nature is Infinite, therefore every part

must be Infinite: But it is rather necessary, that because Nature

is Infinite, therefore not any single part of hers can be Infinite,

but must be finite. Next, you desire to know, Whether Nature or the

self-moving matter is subject to err, and to commit mistakes? I answer:

Although Nature has naturally an Infinite wisdom and knowledg, yet she

has not a most pure and intire perfection, no more then she has an

absolute power; for a most pure and intire perfection belongs onely

to God: and though she is infinitely naturally wise in her self, yet

her parts or particular creatures may commit errors and mistakes; the

truth is, it is impossible but that parts or particular Creatures must

be subject to errors, because no part can have a perfect or general

knowledg, as being but a part, and not a whole; for knowledg is in

parts, as parts are in Matter: Besides several corporeal motions, that

is, several self-moving parts do delude and oppose each other by their

opposite motions; and this opposition is very requisite in Nature to

keep a mean, and hinder extreams; for were there not opposition of

parts, Nature would run into extreams, which would confound her, and

all her parts. And as for delusion, it is part of Natures delight,

causing the more variety; but there be some actions in Nature which

are neither perfect mistakes, nor delusions, but onely want of a clear

and thorow perception: As for example; when a man is sailing in a

Ship, he thinks the shore moves from the ship, when as it is the ship

that moves from the shore: Also when a man is going backward from a

Looking-glass, he thinks, the figure in the Glass goeth inward, whereas

it is himself that goes backward, and not his figure in the glass. The

cause of it is, That the perception in the eye perceives the distanced

body, but not the motion of the distance or medium; for though the man

may partly see the motion of the visible parts, yet he doth not see the

parts or motion of the distance or medium, which is invisible, and not

subject to the perception of sight; and since a pattern cannot be made

if the object be not visible, hence I conclude, that the motion of the

medium cannot make perception, but that it is the perceptive motions

of the eye, which pattern out an object as it is visibly presented

to the corporeal motions in the eye; for according as the object is

presented, the pattern is made, if the motions be regular: For example;

a fired end of a stick, if you move it in a circular figure, the

sensitive corporeal motions in the eye pattern out the figure of fire,

together with the exterior or circular motion, and apprehend it as a

fiery circle; and if the stick be moved any otherwise, they pattern

out such a figure as the fired end of the stick is moved in; so that

the sensitive pattern is made according to the exterior corporeal

figurative motion of the object, and not according to its interior

figure or motions. And this, _Madam_, is in short my answer to your

propounded questions, by which, I hope, you understand plainly the

meaning of,

Madam,

_Your Faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy · 第 163 / 169 题