_MADAM,_
It seems, my former Letter concerning Motion, has given you occasion to
propound this following question to me, to wit, _When I throw a bowl,
or strike a ball with my hand; whether the motion, by which the bowl
or ball is moved, be the hands, or the balls own motion? or whether
it be transferred out of my hand into the ball?_ To which I return
this short answer: That the motion by which (for example) the bowl is
moved, is the bowls own motion, and not the hands that threw it: for
the hand cannot transfer its own motion, which hath a material being,
out of it self into the bowl, or any other thing it handles, touches,
or moves; or else if it did, the hand would in a short time become weak
and useless, by losing so much substance, unless new motions were as
fast created, as expended. You'll say, perhaps, that the hand and the
bowl may exchange motions, as that the bowls own motion doth enter
into the hand, and supply that motion which went out of the hand into
the bowl, by a close joyning or touch, for in all things moving and
moved, must be a joyning of the mover to the moved, either immediate,
or by the means of another body. I answer: That this is more probable,
then that the hand should give out, or impart motion to the bowl, and
receive none from the bowl; but by reason motion cannot be transferred
without matter, as being both inseparably united, and but one thing;
I cannot think it probable, that any of the animate or self-moving
matter in the hand, quits the hand, and enters into the bowl; nor
that the animate matter, which is in the bowl, leaves the bowl, and
enters into the hand, because that self-moving substance is not readily
prepared for so sudden a Translation or Transmigration. You may say,
It may as easily be done as food is received into an animal body and
excrement discharged, or as air is taken in, and breath sent out, by
the way of respiration; and that all Creatures are not onely produced
from each other, but do subsist by each other, and act by each others
assistance. I answer: It is very true, that all Creatures have more
power and strength by a joyned assistance, then if every part were
single, and subsisted of it self. But as some parts do assist each
other, so on the other side, some parts do resist each other; for
though there be a unity in the nature of Infinite Matter, yet there are
divisions also in the Infinite parts of Infinite Matter, which causes
Antipathy as much as Sympathy; but they being equal in assistance as
well as in resistance, it causes a conformity in the whole nature of
Infinite Matter; for if there were not contrary, or rather, I may
say, different effects proceeding from the onely cause, which is the
onely matter, there could not possibly be any, or at least, so much
variety in Nature, as humane sense and reason perceives there is.
But to return to our first argument: You may say, that motion may be
transferred out of one body into another, without transferring any
of the Matter. I answer: That is impossible, unless motion were that
which some call No-thing, but how No-thing can be transferred, I cannot
imagine: Indeed no sense and reason in Nature can conceive that which
is No-thing; for how should it conceive that which is not in Nature
to be found. You'll say, perhaps, It is a substanceless thing, or an
incorporeal, immaterial being or form. I answer: In my opinion, it is
a meer contradiction, to say, a substanceless thing, form, or being,
for surely in Nature it cannot be. But if it be not possible that
motion can be divided from matter, you may say, that body from whence
the motion is transferred, would become less in bulk and weight, and
weaker with every act of motion; and those bodies into which corporeal
motion or self-moving matter was received, would grow bigger, heavier,
and stronger. To which, I answer: That this is the reason, which denies
that there can be a translation of motion out of the moving body into
the moved; for questionless, the one would grow less, and the other
bigger, that by loosing so much substance, this by receiving. Nay if it
were possible, as it is not, that motion could be transferred without
matter, the body out of which it goes, would nevertheless grow weaker;
for the strength lies in the motion, unless you believe, this motion
which is transferred to have been useless in the mover, and onely
useful to the moved; or else it would be superfluous in the moved,
except you say, it became to be annihilated after it was transferr'd
and had done its effect; but if so, then there would be a perpetual and
infinite creation and annihilation of substanceless motion, and how
there could be a creation and annihilation of nothing, my reason cannot
conceive, neither is it possible, unless Nature had more power then
God, to create Nothing, and to annihilate Nothing. The truth is, it is
more probable for sense and reason to believe a Creation of Something
out of Nothing, then a Creation of Nothing out of Nothing. Wherefore
it cannot in sense and reason be, that the motion of the hand is
transferr'd into the bowl. But yet I do not say, that the motion of the
hand doth not contribute to the motion of the bowl; for though the bowl
hath its own natural motion in itself, (for Nature and her creatures
know of no rest, but are in a perpetual motion, though not always
exterior and local, yet they have their proper and certain motions,
which are not so easily perceived by our grosser senses) nevertheless
the motion of the bowl would not move by such an exterior local motion,
did not the motion of the hand, or any other exterior moving body give
it occasion to move that way; Wherefore the motion of the hand may
very well be said to be the cause of that exterior local motion of the
bowl, but not to be the same motion by which the bowl moves. Neither
is it requisite, that the hand should quit its own motion, because it
uses it in stirring up, or putting on the motion of the bowl; for it
is one thing to use, and another to quit; as for example, it is one
thing to offer his life for his friends service, another to imploy it,
and another to quit or lose it. But, _Madam_, there may be infinite
questions or exceptions, and infinite answers made upon one truth; but
the wisest and most probable way is, to rely upon sense and reason,
and not to trouble the mind, thoughts, and actions of life, with
improbabilities, or rather impossibilities, which sense and reason
knows not of, nor cannot conceive. You may say, A Man hath sometimes
improbable, or impossible Fancies, Imaginations, or Chymæra's, in
his mind, which are No-things. I answer, That those Fancies and
Imaginations are not No-things, but as perfectly imbodied as any other
Creatures; but by reason, they are not so grossly imbodied, as those
creatures that are composed of more sensitive and inanimate matter, man
thinks or believes them to be no bodies; but were they substanceless
figures, he could not have them in his mind or thoughts: The truth is,
the purity of reason is not so perspicuous and plain to sense, as sense
is to reason, the sensitive matter being a grosser substance then the
rational. And thus, _Madam_, I have answered your proposed question,
according to the ability of my Reason, which I leave to your better
examination, and rest in the mean while,
Madam,
_Your Faithful Friend_
_and Servant._