_MADAM,_
I am not of your _Authors_[1] opinion, That _Time hath no relation to
Motion, but that Time and Motion are as unlike and different from each
other as Finite from Infinite, and that it hath its own essence or
being Immoveable, Unchangeable, Individable, and unmixed with things,
nay, that Time is plainly the same with Eternity._ For, in my opinion,
there can be no such thing as Time in Nature, but what Man calls Time,
is onely the variation of natural motions; wherefore Time, and the
alteration of motion, is one and the same thing under two different
names; and as Matter, Figure, and Motion, are inseparable, so is Time
inseparably united, or rather the same thing with them, and not a
thing subsisting by it self; and as long as Matter, Motion and Figure
have been existent, so long hath Time; and as long as they last, so
long doth Time. But when I say, Time is the variation of motion, I
do not mean the motion of the Sun or Moon, which makes Days, Months,
Years, but the general motions or actions of Nature, which are the
ground of Time; for were there no Motion, there would be no Time; and
since Matter is dividable, and in parts, Time is so too; neither hath
Time any other Relation to Duration, then what Nature her self hath.
Wherefore your _Author_ is mistaken, when he says, Motion is made in
Time, for Motion makes Time, or rather is one and the same with Time;
and Succession is no more a stranger to Motion, then Motion is to
Nature, as being the action of Nature, which is the Eternal servant of
God. _But_, says he, _Certain Fluxes of Formerlinesses and Laternesses,
have respect unto frail moveable things in their motions, wherewith
they hasten unto the appointed ends of their period, and so unto their
own death or destruction; but what relation hath all that to Time: for
therefore also ought Time to run with all and every motion? Verily so
there should be as many times and durations as there are motions._ I
answer: To my Reason, there are as many times and durations as there
are motions; for neither time nor duration can be separated from
motion, no more then motion can be separated from them, being all one.
But Time is not Eternity, for Eternity hath no change, although your
_Author_ makes Time and Eternity all one, and a being or substance by
it self: Yet I will rather believe _Solomon_, then him, who says, that
there is a time to be merry, and a time to be sad; a time to mourn, and
a time to rejoyce, and so forth: making so many divisions of Time as
there are natural actions; whenas your _Author_ makes natural actions
strangers to Nature, dividing them from their substances: Which seemeth
very improbable in the opinion of,
Madam,
_Your Ladiships_
_faithful Friend, and humble Servant._
[1] In his Treatise of Time.