_MADAM,_
I have discharged my duty thus far, that in obedience to your commands,
I have given you my answers to the opinions of three of those famous
and learned _Authors_ you sent me, _viz. Hobbes, Des Cartes_, and
_More_, and explained my own opinions by examining theirs; My onely
task shall be now to proceed in the same manner with that famous
Philosopher and Chymist, _Van Helmont_; But him I find more difficult
to be understood then any of the forementioned, not onely by reason
of the Art of Chymistry, which I confess myself not versed in, but
especially, that he has such strange terms and unusual expressions
as may puzle any body to apprehend the sense and meaning of them:
Wherefore, if you receive not that full satisfaction you expect
from me, in examining his opinions and arguments, I beg your pardon
before-hand, and desire you to remember, that I sent you word in the
beginning, I did undertake this work more out of desire to clear my
own opinions, then a quarrelsome humor to contradict others; which
if I do but obtain, I have my aim. And so to the business: When as
your _Author_ discourses of the causes and beginnings of Natural
things, he is pleased to say,[1] That _Souls and Lives, as they know
no Degrees, so they know no Parts_; which opinion is very different
from mine: For although I confess, that there is but one kind of Life,
and one kind of Soul in Nature, which is the sensitive Life, and the
rational Soul, both consisting not onely of Matter, but of one kind of
Matter, to wit, Animate; nevertheless they are of different degrees,
the matter of the rational Soul being more agil, subtil and active,
then the matter of the sensitive Life; which is the reason that the
rational can act in its own substance or degree of matter, and make
figures in it self, and its own parts; when as the sensitive, being
of somewhat a grosser degree then the rational, and not so subtil
and active, is confined to work with and upon the Inanimate matter.
But mistake me not, _Madam_, for I make onely a difference of the
degrees of Subtilty, Activity, Agility, Purity, betwixt rational and
sensitive Matter; but as for the rational Matter it self, it has no
degrees of Purity, Subtilty and Activity in its own Nature or Parts,
but is always one and the same in its substance in all Creatures, and
so is the sensitive. You will ask me, How comes then the difference
of so many Parts and Creatures in Nature, if there be no degrees of
Purity, Activity, and Subtilty in the substance of the rational, and in
the substance of the sensitive Matter? As for example: if there were
no such degrees of the Parts of rational Matter amongst themselves,
as also of the Parts of the sensitive, there would be no difference
betwixt Animals, Vegetables, Minerals, and Elements, but all Creatures
would be alike without distinction, and have the same manner of sense
and reason, life and knowledg. I answer, That although each sort or
degree of animate Matter, rational as well as sensitive, has in it self
or its own substance no degrees of purity, rarity, and subtilty, but
is one and the same in its nature or essence; nevertheless, each has
degrees of quantity, or parts, which degrees of quantity do make the
onely difference betwixt the several creatures or parts of Nature, as
well in their general, as particular kinds; for both the rational and
sensitive matter being corporeal, and so dividable into parts, some
creatures do partake more, some less of them, which makes them to have
more or less, and so different sense and reason, each according to the
nature of its kind: Nay this difference of the degrees of quantity or
parts in the substance of the rational and sensitive Matter, makes
also the difference betwixt particulars in every sort of Creatures, as
for example, between several particular Men: But as I said, the nature
or essence of the sensitive and rational Matter is the same in all;
for the difference consists not in the Nature of Matter, but onely in
the degrees of quantity, and parts of Matter, and in the various and
different actions or motions of this same Matter. And thus Matter being
dividable, there are numerous lives and souls in Nature, according to
the variousness of her several Parts and Creatures. Next your _Author_,
mentioning the _Causes and Principles of natural Bodies_, assigns two
first or chief beginnings and corporeal causes of every Creature,
to wit, the _Element of Water_, and the _Ferment or Leaven_; which
Ferment he calls a formal created being; neither a substance, nor an
accident, but a neutral thing. Truly, _Madam_, my reason is not able
to conceive this neutral Being; for it must either be something or
nothing in Nature: and if he makes it any thing betwixt both, it is a
strange Monster; and will produce monstrous effects: and for Water,
if he doth make it a Principle of Natural things, I see no reason
why he excludes the rest of the Elements: But, in my opinion, Water,
and the rest of the Elements, are but effects of Nature, as other
Creatures are, and so cannot be prime causes. The like the Ferment,
which, to my sense and reason, is nothing else, but a natural effect of
natural matter. Concerning his opinion, That _Causes and Beginnings_
are all one, or that there is but little difference betwixt them, I
do readily subscribe unto it; but when he speaks of those _things,
which are produced without life_, my reason cannot find out, what, or
where they should be; for certainly, in Nature they are not, Nature
being Life and Soul her self, and all her parts being enlivened and
soulified, so that there can be no generation or natural production
without Life. Neither is my sense and reason capable to understand his
meaning, when he says, That the _Seeds of things, and the Spirits,
as the Dispensers thereof, are divided from the Material Cause_: For
I do see no difference betwixt the Seed, and the material Cause, but
they are all one thing, it being undeniable, that the seed is the
matter of that which is produced. But your _Author_ was pleased to say
heretofore, that there are but two beginnings or causes of natural
things, and now he makes so many more; for, says he, Of _Efficient
and Seminal Causes, some are efficiently effecting, and others
effectively effecting_: which nice distinctions, in my opinion, do
but make a confusion in natural knowledg, setting a mans brain on the
rack; for who is able to conceive all those _Chymæras_ and Fancies of
the _Archeus, Ferment,_ various _Ideas, Blas, Gas,_ and many more,
which are neither something nor no-thing in Nature, but betwixt both,
except a man have the same Fancies, Visions and Dreams, your _Author_
had? Nature is easie to be understood, and without any difficulty,
so as we stand in no need to frame so many strange names, able to
fright any body. Neither do natural bodies know many prime causes and
beginnings, but there is but one onely chief and prime cause from which
all effects and varieties proceed, which cause is corporeal Nature,
or natural self-moving Matter, which forms and produces all natural
things; and all the variety and difference of natural Creatures arises
from her various actions, which are the various motions in Nature;
some whereof are Regular, some Irregular: I mean Irregular, as to
particular Creatures, not as to Nature her self, for Nature cannot
be disturbed or discomposed, or else all would run into confusion;
Wherefore Irregularities do onely concern particular Creatures, not
Infinite Nature; and the Irregularities of some parts may cause the
Irregularities of other Parts, as the Regularities of some parts do
cause the Regularities of others: And thus according as Regularities
and Irregularities have power, they cause either Peace or War, Sickness
or Health, Delight and Pleasure, or Grief and Pain, Life or Death, to
particular Creatures or parts of Nature; but all these various actions
are but various Effects, and not prime Causes; which is well to be
observed, lest we confound Causes with Effects. And so leaving this
discourse for the present, I rest,
Madam,
_Your Faithful Friend_
_and Servant._
[1] Van Helm, _in his Book intituled_, Physick Refined, _ch._ 4. _of
the Causes and beginning of natural things._