XXII.

_MADAM,_

Your _Author_ having assigned Indivisibility to the Soul or Spirit that

moves and actuates matter, I desire to know, how one Indivisible Spirit

can be in so many dividable parts? For there being Infinite parts in

Nature, they must either have one Infinite Spirit to move them, which

must be dilated infinitely, or this Spirit must move severally in

every part of Nature: If the first, then I cannot conceive, but all

motion must be uniform, or after one and the same manner; nay, I cannot

understand, how there can be any dilation and contraction, or rather

any motion of the same spirit, by reason if it dilate, then, (being

equally spread out in all the parts of Matter,) it must dilate beyond

Matter; and if it contract, it must leave some parts of matter void,

and without motion. But if the Spirit moves every part severally, then

he is divisible; neither can I think, that there are so many Spirits

as there are Parts in Nature; for your _Author_ says, there is but

one Spirit of Nature; I will give an easie and plain example: When a

Worm is cut into two or three parts, we see there is sensitive life

and motion in every part, for every part will strive and endeavour

to meet and joyn again to make up the whole body; now if there were

but one indivisible Life, Spirit, and Motion, I would fain know, how

these severed parts could move all by one Spirit. Wherefore, Matter,

in my opinion, has self-motion in it self, which is the onely soul

and life of Nature, and is dividable as well as composable, and full

of variety of action; for it is as easie for several parts to act

in separation, as in composition, and as easie in composition as in

separation; Neither is every part bound to one kind or sort of Motions;

for we see in exterior local motions, that one man can put his body

into several shapes and postures, much more can Nature. But is it not

strange, _Madam_, that a man accounts it absurd, ridiculous, and a

prejudice to Gods Omnipotency, to attribute self-motion to Matter,

or a material Creature, when it is not absurd, ridiculous, or any

prejudice to God, to attribute it to an Immaterial Creature? What

reason of absurdity lies herein? Surely I can conceive none, except

it be absurd and ridiculous to make that, which no man can know or

conceive what it is, _viz._ an immaterial natural Spirit, (which is

as much as to say, a natural No-thing) to have motion, and not onely

motion, but self-motion; nay, not onely self-motion, but to move,

actuate, rule, govern, and guide Matter, or corporeal Nature, and to

be the cause of all the most curious varieties and effects in nature:

Was not God able to give self-motion as well to a Material, as to an

Immaterial Creature, and endow Matter with a self-moving power? I do

not say, _Madam_, that Matter hath motion of it self, so, that it is

the prime cause and principle of its own self-motion; for that were

to make Matter a God, which I am far from believing; but my opinion

is, That the self-motion of Matter proceeds from God, as well as the

self-motion of an Immaterial Spirit; and that I am of this opinion, the

last Chapter of my Book of Philosophy will enform you, where I treat of

the Deitical Centre, as the Fountain from whence all things do flow,

and which is the supream Cause, Author, Ruler and Governor of all.

Perhaps you will say, it is, because I make Matter Eternal. 'Tis true,

_Madam_, I do so: but I think Eternity doth not take off the dependance

upon God, for God may nevertheless be above Matter, as I have told you

before. You may ask me how that can be? I say, As well as any thing

else that God can do beyond our understanding: For I do but tell you my

opinion, that I think it most probable to be so, but I can give you no

Mathematical Demonstrations for it: Onely this I am sure of, That it is

not impossible for the Omnipotent God; and he that questions the truth

of it, may question Gods Omnipotency. Truly, _Madam_, I wonder how

man can say, God is Omnipotent, and can do beyond our Understanding,

and yet deny all that he is not able to comprehend with his reason.

However, as I said, it is my opinion, That Matter is self-moving by the

power of God; Neither can Animadversion, and Perception, as also the

variety of Figures, prove, that there must be another external Agent or

Power to work all this in Matter; but it proves rather the contrary;

for were there no self-motion in Matter, there would be no Perception,

nor no variety of Creatures in their Figures, Shapes, Natures,

Qualities, Faculties, Proprieties, as also in their Productions,

Creations or Generations, Transformations, Compositions, Dissolutions,

and the like, as Growth, Maturity, Decay, &c. and for Animals, were not

Corporeal Matter self-moving, dividable and composable; there could not

be such variety of Passions, Complexions, Humors, Features, Statures,

Appetites, Diseases, Infirmities, Youth, Age, &c. Neither would they

have any nourishing Food, healing Salves, soveraign Medicines, reviving

Cordials, or deadly Poysons. In short, there is so much variety in

Nature, proceeding from the self-motion of Matter, as not possible to

be numbred, nor thorowly known by any Creature: Wherefore I should

labour in vain, if I endeavoured to express any more thereof; and this

is the cause that I break off here, and onely subscribe my self,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy · 第 75 / 169 题