XLV.

_MADAM,_

I understand by your last, that you are very desirous to know, _Whether

there be not in nature such animal creatures both for purity and size,

as we are not capable to perceive by our sight._ Truly, _Madam_, in

my opinion it is very probable there may be animal creatures of such

rare bodies as are not subject to our exterior senses, as well, as

there are elements which are not subject to all our exterior senses:

as for example, fire is onely subject to our sight and feeling, and

not to any other sense, water is subject to our sight, taste, touch

and hearing, but not to smelling; and earth is subject to our sight,

taste, touch and smelling, but not to our hearing; and vapour is onely

subject to our sight, and wind onely to our hearing; but pure air

is not subject to any of our senses, but onely known by its effects:

and so there may likewise be animal creatures which are not subject

to any of our senses both for their purity and life; as for example,

I have seen pumpt out of a water pump small worms which could hardly

be discerned but by a bright Sun-light, for they were smaller then

the smallest hair, some of a pure scarlet colour and some white, but

though they were the smallest creatures that ever I did see, yet they

were more agil and fuller of life, then many a creature of a bigger

size, and so small they were, as I am confident, they were neither

subject to tast, smell, touch nor hearing, but onely to sight, and

that neither without difficulty, requiring both a sharp sight and a

clear light to perceive them; and I do verily believe that these small

animal creatures may be great in comparison to others which may be

in nature. But if it be probable that there may be such small animal

creatures in nature, as are not subject to our exterior senses, by

reason of their littleness; it is also probable, that there may be

such great and big animal creatures in nature as are beyond the reach

and knowledg of our exterior senses; for bigness and smallness are not

to be judged by our exterior senses, onely; but as sense and reason

inform us, that there are different degrees in Purity and Rarity, so

also in shapes, figures and sizes in all natural creatures. Next you

desired to know, _Whether there can be an artificial Life, or a Life

made by Art?_ My answer is, Not; for although there is Life in all

natures parts, yet not all the parts are life, for there is one part of

natural matter which in its nature is inanimate or without life, and

though natural Life doth produce Art, yet Art cannot produce natural

Life, for though Art is the action of Life, yet it is not Life it self:

not but that there is Life in Art, but not art in life, for Life is

natural, and not artificial; and thus the several parts of a watch

may have sense and reason according to the nature of their natural

figure, which is steel, but not as they have an artificial shape, for

Art cannot put Life into the watch, Life being onely natural, not

artificial. Lastly your desire was to know, _Whether a part of matter

may be so small, as it cannot be made less?_ I answer, there is no such

thing in nature as biggest or least, nature being Infinite as well in

her actions as in her substance; and I have mentioned in my book of

Philosophy, and in a letter, I sent you heretofore concerning Infinite,

that there are several sorts of Infinites, as Infinite in quantity or

bulk, Infinite in number, Infinite in quality, as Infinite degrees

of hardness, softness, thickness, thinness, swiftness, slowness, &c.

as also Infinite compositions, divisions, creations, dissolutions,

&c. in nature; and my meaning is, that all these Infinite actions

do belong to the Infinite body of nature, which being infinite in

substance must also of necessity be infinite in its actions; but

although these Infinite actions are inherent in the power of the

Infinite substance of nature, yet they are never put in act in her

parts, by reason there being contraries in nature, and every one of

the aforementioned actions having its opposite, they do hinder and

obstruct each other so, that none can actually run into infinite; for

the Infinite degrees of compositions hinder the infinite degrees of

divisions; and the infinite degrees of rarity, softness, swiftness,

&c. hinder the infinite degrees of density, hardness, slowness, &c.

all which nature has ordered with great wisdom and Prudence to make an

amiable combination between her parts; for if but one of these actions

should run into infinite, it would cause a horrid confusion between

natures parts, nay an utter destruction of the whole body of nature, if

I may call it whole: as for example, if one part should have infinite

compositions, without the hinderance or obstruction of division, it

would at last mount and become equal to the Infinite body of nature,

and so from a part change to a whole, from being finite to infinite,

which is impossible; Wherefore, though nature hath an Infinite natural

power, yet she doth not put this power in act in her particulars;

and although she has an infinite force or strength, yet she doth not

use this force or strength in her parts. Moreover when I speak of

Infinite divisions and compositions, creations and dissolutions, &c.

in nature, I do not mean so much the infinite degrees of compositions

and divisions, as the actions themselves to be infinite in number;

for there being infinite parts in nature, and every one having its

compositions and divisions, creations and dissolutions, these actions

must of necessity be infinite too, to wit, in number, according to the

Infinite number of parts, for as there is an Infinite number of parts

in nature, so there is also an infinite number and variety of motions

which are natural actions. However let there be also infinite degrees

of these natural actions, in the body or substance of infinite nature;

yet, as I said, they are never put in act, by reason every action

hath its contrary or opposite, which doth hinder and obstruct it from

running actually into infinite. And thus I hope, you conceive cleerly

now, what my opinion is, and that I do not contradict my self in my

works, as some have falsly accused me, for they by misapprehending my

meaning, judge not according to the truth of my sense, but according

to their own false interpretation, which shews not onely a weakness in

their understandings and passions, but a great injustice and injury

to me, which I desire you to vindicate when ever you chance to hear

such accusations and blemishes laid upon my works, by which you will

Infinitely oblige,

Madam,

_Your humble and faithful Servant._

Sect. II.

Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy · 第 53 / 169 题