_MADAM,_
Your Authour going on in his discourse of Imagination, says,[1] _That,
as we have no Imagination, whereof we have not formerly had sense, in
whole or in parts; so we have not Transition from one Imagination to
another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses_. To which
my answer is in short, that the Rational part of Matter in One composed
figure, as in Man, or the like Creature, may make such figures, as
the senses did never make in that composed Figure or Creature; And
though your Authour reproves those that say,[2] _Imaginations rise
of themselves_; yet, if the self-moving part of Matter, which I call
Rational, makes Imaginations, they must needs rise of themselves; for
the Rational part of matter being free and self-moving, depends upon
nothing, neither Sense nor Object, I mean, so, as not to be able to
work without them. Next, when your Author, defining _Understanding_,
says that it is nothing else, but[3] _an Imagination raised by words or
other voluntary signs_, My Answer is, that Understanding, and so Words
and Signs are made by self-moving Matter, that is, Sense and Reason,
and not Sense and Reason by Words and Signs; wherefore Thoughts are
not like[4] _Water upon a plain Table, which is drawn and guided by
the finger this or that way_, for every Part of self-moving matter is
not alwayes forced, perswaded or directed, for if all the Parts of
Sense and Reason were ruled by force or perswasion, not any wounded
Creature would fail to be healed, or any disease to be cured by outward
Applications, for outward Applications to Wounds and Diseases might
have more force, then any Object to the Eye: But though there is great
affinity and sympathy between parts, yet there is also great difference
and antipathy betwixt them, which is the cause that many objects
cannot with all their endeavours work such effects upon the Interiour
parts, although they are closely press'd, for Impressions of objects
do not always affect those parts they press. Wherefore, I am not of
your Author's opinion, that all Parts of Matter press one another; It
is true, _Madam_, there cannot be any part single, but yet this doth
not prove, that parts must needs press each other: And as for his
_Train of Thoughts_, I must confess, that Thoughts for the most part
are made orderly, but yet they do not follow each other like Geese,
for surely, man has sometimes very different thoughts; as for Example,
a man sometime is very sad for the death of his Friend, and thinks
of his own death, and immediately thinks of a wanton Mistress, which
later thought, surely, the thought of Death did not draw in; wherefore,
though some thought may be the Ring-leader of others, yet many are made
without leaders. Again, your Author in his description of the Mind
sayes, that _the discourse of the mind, when it is govern'd by design,
is nothing but seeking, or the Faculty of Invention; a hunting out of
the Causes of some Effects, present or past; or of the Effects of some
present or past Cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he has lost, and from
that Place and Time wherein he misses it, his mind runs back from place
to place, and time to time, to find where and when he had it, that is
to say, to find some certain and limited Time and Place, in which to
begin a method of Seeking. And from thence his thoughts run over the
same places and times to find what action or other occasion might make
him lose it. This we call Remembrance or calling to mind. Sometimes
a man knows a place determinate, within the compass whereof he is to
seek, and then his thoughts run over all the Parts thereof in the same
manner as one would sweep a room to find a Jewel, or as a Spaniel
ranges the field till he find a sent; or as a Man should run over the
Alphabet to start a Rime._ Thus far your Author: In which discourse I
do not perceive that he defineth what the Mind is, but I say, that if,
according to his opinion, nothing moves it self, but one thing moves
another, then the Mind must do nothing, but move backward and forward,
nay, onely forward, and if all actions were thrusting or pressing of
parts, it would be like a crowd of People, and there would be but
little or no motion, for the crowd would make a stoppage, like water in
a glass, the mouth of the Glass being turned downwards, no water can
pass out, by reason the numerous drops are so closely press'd, as they
cannot move exteriously. Next, I cannot conceive how the Mind can run
back either to Time or Place, for as for Place, the mind is inclosed
in the body, and the running about in the parts of the body or brain
will not inform it of an Exterior place or object; besides, objects
being the cause of the minds motion, it must return to its Cause, and
so move until it come to the object, that moved it first, so that the
mind must run out of the body to that object, which moved it to such
a Thought, although that object were removed out of the World (as the
phrase is:) But for the mind to move backward, to Time past, is more
then it can do; Wherefore in my opinion, Remembrance, or the like, is
onely a repetition of such Figures as were like to the Objects; and for
Thoughts in Particular, they are several figures, made by the mind,
which is the Rational Part of matter, in its own substance, either
voluntarily, or by imitation, whereof you may see more in my Book of
Philosophical Opinions. Hence I conclude, that Prudence is nothing
else, but a comparing of Figures to Figures, and of the several actions
of those Figures; as repeating former Figures, and comparing them to
others of the like nature, qualities, proprieties, as also chances,
fortunes, &c. Which figuring and repeating is done actually, in and
by the Rational Matter, so that all the observation of the mind on
outward Objects is onely an actual repetition of the mind, as moving
in such or such figures and actions; and when the mind makes voluntary
Figures with those repeated Figures, and compares them together, this
comparing is Examination; and when several Figures agree and joyn,
it is Conclusion or Judgment: likewise doth Experience proceed from
repeating and comparing of several Figures in the Mind, and the more
several Figures are repeated and compared, the greater the experience
is. One thing more there is in the same Chapter, which I cannot let
pass without examination; Your Authour says, That _things Present
onely have a being in Nature, things Past onely a being in the Memory,
but things to come have no being at all_; Which how it possibly can
be, I am not able to conceive; for certainly, if nothing in nature is
lost or annihilated, what is past, and what is to come, hath as well
a being, as what is present; and, if that which is now, had its being
before, why may it not also have its being hereafter? It might as well
be said, that what is once forgot, cannot be remembred; for whatsoever
is in Nature, has as much a being as the Mind, and there is not any
action, or motion, or figure, in Nature, but may be repeated, that is,
may return to its former Figure, When it is altered and dissolved;
But by reason Nature delights in variety, repetitions are not so
frequently made, especially of those things or creatures, which are
composed by the sensitive corporeal motions in the inanimate part of
Matter, because they are not so easily wrought, as the Rational matter
can work upon its own parts, being more pliant in its self, then the
Inanimate matter is; And this is the reason, that there are so many
repetitions of one and the same Figure in the Rational matter, which
is the Mind, but seldom any in the Gross and inanimate part of Matter,
for Nature loves ease and freedom: But to conclude, _Madam_, I perceive
your Author confines Sense onely to Animal-kind, and Reason onely to
Man-kind: Truly, it is out of self-love, when one Creature prefers his
own Excellency before another, for nature being endued with self-love,
all Creatures have self-love too, because they are all Parts of Nature;
and when Parts agree or disagree, it is out of Interest and Self-love;
but Man herein exceeds all the rest, as having a supernatural Soul,
whose actions also are supernatural; To which I leave him, and rest,
Madam,
_Your faithful Friend,_
_and Servant._
[1] _Leviathan, part._ 1. _c._ 3.
[2] _part._ 1. _c._ 2.
[3] _ibid. c._ 3.
[4] _ibid._