Now we have to consider the last strong defense of this policy which the

British government has seen fit to offer to a protesting world, the report

of the Royal Commission on Opium. Against this stout defense of the opium

traffic in all its branches, we are able to set not only the findings of

other governments, such as those of Japan, the Philippines, and Australia,

which have opium problems of their own to deal with, but also the

curious attitude of a certain British colony, amounting almost to what

might be called an opium panic, on that occasion when the Oriental drug

found its way near enough home to menace British subjects and British

children.

[Illustration: WEIGHING OPIUM IN A GOVERNMENT FACTORY, INDIA]

The men who administer the government of India have a chronically

difficult job on their hands. In order to keep it on their hands they have

got to please the British public; and that is not so easy as it perhaps

sounds. It would apparently please both the government and the public if

the whole opium question could be thrown after the twenty thousand chests

of Canton--into the sea. But the British public is hard-headed, and proud

of it; and the spectacle of the magnificent, panoplied government of India

gone bankrupt, or so embarrassed as to be calling upon the Home government

for aid, would not please it at all. Of the two evils, debauching China or

gravely impairing the finances of India, there has been reason to believe

that it would prefer debauching China. That, at least, is what successive

governments of Britain and of India seem to have concluded. It has seemed

wiser to endure a known quantity of abuse for sticking to opium than to

risk the cold British scorn for the bankrupt; and, accordingly, the Indian

government with the approval of one Home government after another, has

stuck to opium. The only alternative course, that of developing a new,

healthy source of revenue to supplant opium, the unhealthy, would involve

real ideas and an immense amount of trouble; and these two things are only

less abhorrent to the administrative mind than political annihilation

itself.

But there came a time, not so long ago, when a wave of "anti-opium"

feeling swept over England, and the British public suddenly became very

hard to please. Parliament agreed that the idea of a government opium

monopoly in India was "morally indefensible," and even went so far as to

send out a "Royal Commission" to investigate the whole question. Now this

commission, after travelling twenty thousand miles, asking twenty-eight

thousand questions, and publishing two thousand pages (double columns,

close print) of evidence, arrived at some remarkable conclusions. "Opium,"

says the Royal Commission, "is harmful, harmless, or even beneficial,

according to the measure and discretion with which it is used.... It is

[in India] the universal household remedy.... It is extensively

administered to infants, and the practice does not appear, to any

appreciable extent, injurious.... It does not appear responsible for any

disease peculiar to itself." As to the traffic with China, the Commission

states--"Responsibility mainly lies with the Chinese government." And,

finally (which seems to bring out the pith of the matter), "In the present

circumstances the revenue derived from opium is indispensable for carrying

on with efficiency the government of India."

To one familiar with this extraordinary summing-up of the evidence, it

seems hardly surprising that the Rt. Hon. John Morley, the present

Secretary of State for India, should have said in Parliament (May,

1906)--"I do not wish to speak in disparagement of the Commission, but

somehow or other its findings have failed to satisfy public opinion in

this country and to ease the consciences of those who have taken up the

matter."

The methods employed by a Royal Commission which could arrive at such

remarkable conclusions could hardly fail to be interesting. The Government

opium traffic was a scandal. Parliament was on record against it. There

was simply nothing to be said for opium or for the opium monopoly. It was

"morally indefensible"--officially so. It was agreed that the Indian

government should be "urged" to cease to grant licenses for the

cultivation of the poppy and for the sale of opium in British India. This

was interesting--even gratifying. There was but one obstacle in the way of

putting an end to the whole business; and that obstacle was, in some

inexplicable way, this same British government. The opium monopoly,

morally indefensible or not, seemed to be going serenely and steadily on.

If the Indian government was urged in the matter, there was no record of

it.

Two years passed. Mr. Gladstone, the great prime minister, deplored the

opium evil--and took pains not to stop or limit it. Like the House of

Peers in the Napoleonic wars, he "did nothing in particular--and did it

very well." So the vigilant crusaders came at the government again. In

June, 1893, Mr. Alfred Webb moved a resolution which (so ran the hopes of

these crusaders) the most nearly Christian government could not resist or

evade. Sure of the anti-opium majority, the new resolution, "having regard

to the opinion expressed by the vote of this House on the 10th of April,

1891, that the system by which the Indian opium revenue is raised is

morally indefensible,... and recognizing that the people of India ought

not to be called upon to bear the cost involved in this change of policy,"

demanded that "a Royal Commission should be appointed ... to report as to

(1) What retrenchments and reforms can be effected in the military and

civil expenditures of India; (2) By what means Indian resources can be

best developed; and (3) What, if any, temporary assistance from the

British Exchequer would be required in order to meet any deficit of

revenue which would be occasioned by the suppression of the opium

traffic."

The crusaders had underestimated the parliamentary skill of Mr. Gladstone.

He promptly moved a counter resolution, proposing that "this House press

on the Government of India to continue their policy of greatly diminishing

the cultivation of the poppy and the production and sale of opium, and

demanding a Royal Commission to report as to (1) Whether the growth of the

poppy and the manufacture and sale of opium in British India should be

prohibited.... (4) The effect on the finances of India of the prohibition

... taking into consideration (a) the amount of compensation payable; (b)

the cost of the necessary preventive measures; (c) the loss of revenue....

(5) The disposition of the people of India in regard to (a) the use of

opium for non-medical purposes; (b) their willingness to bear in whole or

in part the cost of prohibitive measures."

Mr. Gladstone's resolution looked, to the unthinking, like an anti-opium

document. He doubtless meant that it should, for in his task of

maintaining the opium traffic he had to work through an anti-opium

majority. Mr. Webb's resolution, starting from the assumption that the

government was committed to suppressing the traffic, called for a

commission merely to arrange the necessary details. Mr. Gladstone's

resolution raised the whole question again, and instructed the commission

not only to call particular attention to the cost of prohibition (the

shrewd premier knew his public!), not only to find out if the victims of

opium in India wished to continue the habit, but also threw the whole

burden of cost on the poverty-stricken people of India--which he knew

perfectly well they could not bear. The original resolution had sprung

out of a moral outcry against the China trade. Mr. Gladstone, in beginning

again at the beginning, ignored the China trade and the effects of opium

on the Chinese.

But more interesting, if less significant than this attitude, was the

suggestion that the Indian government "continue their policy of greatly

diminishing the cultivation of the poppy." Now this suggestion conveyed an

impression that was either true or false. Either the Indian government was

putting down opium or it was not. In either event, if Mr. Gladstone was

not fully informed, it was his own fault, for the machinery of government

was in his hands. The best way to straighten out this tangle would seem to

be to consult the report of Mr. Gladstone's commission. This commission,

on its arrival in India, found no trace of a policy of suppressing the

trade. Sir David Balfour, the head of the Indian Finance Department, said

to the commission: "I was not aware that that was the policy of the Home

government until the statement was made.... The policy has been for some

time to sell about the same amount every year, neither diminishing that

amount nor increasing it. I should say decidedly, that at present our

desire is to obtain the maximum revenue from the opium consumed in India."

As regarded the China trade, Sir David added: "We will not largely

increase the cultivation because we shall be attacked if we do so." And

this--"We have adopted a middle course and preserved the _status quo_ with

reference to the China trade."

Mr. Gladstone's resolution was adopted by 184 votes to 105, the anti-opium

crusaders voting against it. And the Royal Commission, with instructions

not, as had been intended, to arrange the details of a plan for stopping

the opium traffic, but with instructions to consider whether it would pay

to stop it, and if not, whether the people of India could be made to stand

the loss, started out on its rather hopeless journey.

One thing the crusaders had succeeded in accomplishing--they had forced

the government to send a commission to India. They had got one or two of

their number on the body. The commission would have to hear the evidence,

would be forced to air the situation thoroughly, showing a paternal

government not only manufacturing opium for the China trade, but actually,

since 1891, manufacturing pills of opium mixed with spices for the

children and infants of India. If the Indian government, now at last

brought to an accounting, wished to keep the opium business going, they

could do two things--they could see that the "right" sort of evidence was

given to the commission, and they could try to influence the commission

directly. They adopted both courses; though it appears now, to one who

goes over the attitude of the majority of the commission and especially of

Lord Brassey, the chairman, as shown in the records, that little direct

influence was necessary. Lord Brassey and his majority were pro-opium,

through and through. The Home government had seen to that.

The problem, then, of the administrators of the Indian government and of

this pro-opium commission was to defend a "morally indefensible" condition

of affairs in order to maintain the revenue of the Indian government. It

was a problem neither easy nor pleasant.

The Viceroy of India was Lord Lansdowne. He went at the problem with

shrewdness and determination. His attitude was precisely what one has

learned to expect in the viceroys of India. A later viceroy, Lord Curzon,

has spoken with infinite scorn of the "opium faddists." Lord Lansdowne

approached the business in the same spirit. He began by sending a telegram

from his government to the British Secretary of State for India, which

contained the following passage: "We shall be prepared to suggest

non-official witnesses, who will give independent evidence, but we cannot

undertake to specially search for witnesses who will give evidence against

opium. We presume this will be done by the Anti-Opium Society." This

message had been sent in August, 1893, but it was not made public until

the 18th of the following November. On November 20th Lord Lansdowne sent a

letter to Lord Brassey, "which," says Mr. Henry J. Wilson, M. P., in his

minority report, "was passed around among the members [of the commission]

for perusal. It contained a statement in favour of the existing opium

system, and against interference with that system as likely to lead to

serious trouble. This appeared to me a departure from the judicial

attitude which might have been expected from Her Majesty's

representatives."

From this Mr. Wilson goes on, in his report, to lay bare the methods of

the Indian government in preparing evidence for the commission. To say

that these methods show a departure from the expected "judicial attitude"

is to speak with great moderation. It is not necessary, I think, to weary

the reader with the details of these extended operations. That is not the

purpose of this writing. It should be enough to say that Lord Lansdowne

and his Indian government ordered that all evidence should be submitted to

the commission through their offices; that only pro-opium evidence was

submitted; that a government official travelled with the commission and

openly worked up the evidence in advance; that the minority members were

hindered and hampered in their attempts at real investigation, and were

shadowed by detectives when they travelled independently in the

opium-producing regions; and, finally, that Lord Brassey abruptly closed

the report of the commission without giving the minority members an

opportunity to discuss it in detail. The result of these methods was

precisely what might have been expected. Opium was declared a mild and

harmless stimulant for all ages. No home, in short, was complete without

it.

There is an answer to the report of the Royal Commission on opium more

telling than can be found in speeches or in minority reports. In an

earlier article we examined into the beginnings of opium. We saw how it is

grown and manufactured; how it passes out of the hands of the British

government into the currents of trade; how it is carried along on these

currents--small quantities of it washing up in passing the Straits and the

Malay Archipelago--to China; how it blends at the Chinese ports in the

flood of the new native-grown opium and divides among the trade currents

of that great empire until every province receives its supply of the

"foreign dirt." Now let us follow it farther; for it does not stop there.

The Chinese are great traders and great travellers. The weight of the

national misery presses them out into whatever new regions promise a

reward for industry. They swarmed over the Pacific to America in a yellow

cloud until America, in sheer self-defense, barred them out. They swarmed

southward to Australia until Australia closed the doors on them. They

swarm to-day into the Philippines and into Malaysia. In the Straits

Settlement, in a total population of a little over half a million, more

than half (282,000) are Chinese. When America would build the Panama

Canal, her first impulse is to import the cheap Chinese labourer, who is

always so eager to come. When Britain took over the Transvaal she imported

70,000 Chinese labourers. And where the Chinese travel, opium travels too.

The real answer to the Royal Commission on opium should be found in the

attitude of these countries which have had to face the opium problem along

with the Chinese problem. Let us include in the list Japan, a country

which has had a remarkable opportunity to view the opium menace at short

range. What Japan thinks about opium, what Australia and the Transvaal and

the United States think, what the Philippines think, is more to the point

than any first-hand statements of a magazine reporter. We will take Japan

first. Does Japan think that opium is invaluable as a general household

remedy? Does Japan think that opium is good for children?

Here is what the Philippine Opium Commission, whose report is accepted

to-day as the most authoritative survey of the opium situation, has to say

about opium in Japan:

"Japan, which is a non-Christian country, is the only country visited by

the committee where the opium question is dealt with in the purely moral

and social aspect.... Legislation is enacted without the distraction of

commercial motives and interest.... No surer testimony to the reality of

the evil effects of opium can be found than the horror with which China's

next-door neighbour views it.... The Japanese to a man fear opium as we

fear the cobra or the rattlesnake, and they despise its victims. There has

been no moment in the nation's history when the people have wavered in

their uncompromising attitude towards the drug and its use, so that an

instinctive hatred possesses them. China's curse has been Japan's warning,

and a warning heeded. An opium user in Japan would be socially a leper.

"The opium law of Japan forbids the importation, the possession, and the

use of the drug, except as a medicine; and it is kept to the letter in a

population of 47,000,000, of whom perhaps 25,000 are Chinese. So rigid are

the provisions of the law that it is sometimes, especially in interior

towns, almost impossible to secure opium or its alkaloids in cases of

medical necessity.... The government is determined to keep the opium

habit strictly confined to what they deem to be its legitimate use, which

use even, they seem to think, is dangerous enough to require special

safeguarding.

"Certain persons are authorized by the head official of each district to

manufacture and prepare opium for medicinal purposes.... That which is up

to the required standard (in quality) is sold to the government: and that

which falls short is destroyed. The accepted opium is sealed in proper

receptacles and sold to a selected number of wholesale dealers

(apothecaries) who in turn provide physicians and retail dealers with the

drug for medicinal uses only. It can reach the patient for whose relief it

is desired only through the prescription of the attending physician. The

records of those who thus use opium in any of its various forms must be

preserved for ten years.

"The people not merely obey the law, but they are proud of it; they would

not have it altered if they could. It is the law of the government, but it

is the law of the people also.... Apparently, the vigilance of the police

is such that even when opium is successfully smuggled in, it cannot be

smoked without detection. The pungent fumes of cooked opium are

unmistakable, and betray the user almost inevitably.... There is an

instance on record where a couple of Japanese lads in North Formosa

experimented with opium just for a lark; and though they were guilty only

on this occasion, they were detected, arrested, and punished."

That is what Japan thinks about opium.

The conclusions of this Philippine Commission formed the basis of the new

opium prohibition in the Philippines, which went into effect March 1,

1908. The plan is a modification of the Japanese system of dealing with

the evil.

Australia and New Zealand have also been forced to face the opium problem.

New Zealand, by an act of 1901, amended in 1903, prohibits the traffic,

and makes offenders liable to a penalty not exceeding $2,500 (L500) for

each offense. In the Australian Federal Parliament the question was

brought to an issue two or three years ago. Petitions bearing 200,000

signatures were presented to the parliament, and in response a law was

enacted absolutely prohibiting the importation of opium, except for

medicinal uses, after January 1, 1906. All the state governments of

Australia lose revenue by this prohibition. The voice of the Australian

people was apparently expressed in the Federal Parliament by Hon. V. L.

Solomon, who said: "In the cities of the Southern States anybody going to

the opium dens would see hundreds of apparently respectable Europeans

indulging in this horrible habit. It is a hundredfold more damaging, both

physically and morally, than the indulgence in alcoholic liquors."

That is what Australia and New Zealand think about opium.

The attitude of the United States is thus described by the Philippine

Commission: "It is not perhaps generally known that in the only instance

where America has made official utterances relative to the use of opium in

the East, she has spoken with no uncertain voice. By treaty with China in

1880, and again in 1903, no American bottoms are allowed to carry opium in

Chinese waters. This ... is due to a recognition that the use of opium is

an evil for which no financial gain can compensate, and which America will

not allow her citizens to encourage even passively." By the terms of this

treaty, citizens of the United States are forbidden to "import opium into

any of the open ports of China, or transport from one open port to any

other open port, or to buy and sell opium in any of the open ports of

China. This absolute prohibition ... extends to vessels owned by the

citizens or subjects of either power, to foreign vessels employed by them,

or to vessels owned by the citizens or subjects of either power and

employed by other persons for the transportation of opium." Thus the

United States is flatly on record as forbidding her citizens to engage, in

any way whatever, in the Chinese opium traffic.

The last item of expert evidence which I shall present from the countries

most deeply concerned in the opium question is from that British colony,

the Transvaal. Were the subject less grim, it would be difficult to

restrain a smile over this bit of evidence--it is so human, and so

humorous. For a century and more, Anglo-Indian officials have been kept

busy explaining that opium is a heaven-sent blessing to mankind. It is

quite possible that many of them have come to believe the words they have

repeated so often. Why not? China was a long way off--and India certainly

did need the money. The poor official had to please the sovereign people

back home, one way or another. If a choice between evils seemed

necessary, was he to blame? We must try not to be too hard on the

government official. Perhaps opium _was_ good for children. Keep your

blind eye to the telescope and you can imagine anything you like.

[Illustration: WHERE THE CHINAMAN TRAVELS, OPIUM TRAVELS TOO A Consignment

of Opium from China to the United States, Photographed in the Custom

House, San Francisco]

The situation was given its grimly humorous twist when the monster opium

began to invade regions nearer home. It came into the Transvaal after the

Boer War, along with those 70,000 Chinese labourers. The result can only

be described as an opium panic. I quote, regarding it, from that

"Memorandum Concerning Indo-Chinese Opium Trade," which was prepared for

the debate in Parliament during May, 1906:

"The Transvaal offers a striking illustration of the old proverb as to

chickens coming home to roost.

"On the 6th of September, 1905, Sir George Farrar moved the adjournment of

the Legislative Council at Pretoria, to call attention to 'the enormous

quantity of opium' finding its way into the Transvaal. He urged that

'measures should be taken for the immediate stopping of the traffic.' On

6th October, an ordinance was issued, restricting the importation of opium

to registered chemists, only, according to regulations to be prescribed

by permits by the lieutenant-governor--under a penalty not exceeding L500

($2,500), or imprisonment not exceeding six months.

"Any person in possession of such substance ... except for medicinal

purposes, unless under a permit, is liable to similar penalties. Stringent

rights of search are given to police, constables, under certain

circumstances, without even the necessity of a written authority.

"The under-secretary for the colonies has also stated, 'that the Chinese

Labour Importation Ordinance, 1904, has been amended to penalize the

possession by, and supply to, Chinese labourers of opium.'"

Drugging a Nation: The Story of China and the Opium Curse · 第 7 / 10 段