Certainly it presents itself to us as a singular coincidence--

I. That we are _most conscious of_, _and have most control over_, such

habits as speech, the upright position, the arts and sciences--which are

acquisitions peculiar to the human race, always acquired after birth, and

not common to ourselves and any ancestor who had not become entirely

human.

II. That we are _less conscious of_, _and have less control over_, the

use of teeth, swallowing, breathing, seeing and hearing--which were

acquisitions of our prehuman ancestry, and for which we had provided

ourselves with all the necessary apparatus before we saw light, but which

are still, geologically speaking, recent, or comparatively recent.

ill. That we are _most unconscious of_, _and have least control over_,

our digestion, which we have in common even with our invertebrate

ancestry, and which is a habit of extreme antiquity.

There is something too like method in this for it to be taken as the

result of mere chance--chance again being but another illustration of

Nature's love of a contradiction in terms; for everything is chance, and

nothing is chance. And you may take it that all is chance or nothing

chance, according as you please, but you must not have half chance and

half not chance--which, however, in practice is just what you _must_

have.

Does it not seem as though the older and more confirmed the habit, the

more unquestioning the act of volition, till, in the case of the oldest

habits, the practice of succeeding existences has so formulated the

procedure, that, on being once committed to such and such a line beyond a

certain point, the subsequent course is so clear as to be open to no

further doubt, and admit of no alternative, till the very power of

questioning is gone, and even the consciousness of volition? And this

too upon matters which, in earlier stages of a man's existence, admitted

of passionate argument and anxious deliberation whether to resolve them

thus or thus, with heroic hazard and experiment, which on the losing side

proved to be vice, and on the winning virtue. For there was passionate

argument once what shape a man's teeth should be, nor can the colour of

his hair be considered as even yet settled, or likely to be settled for a

very long time.

It is one against legion when a creature tries to differ from his own

past selves. He must yield or die if he wants to differ widely, so as to

lack natural instincts, such as hunger or thirst, or not to gratify them.

It is more righteous in a man that he should "eat strange food," and that

his cheek should "so much as lank not," than that he should starve if the

strange food be at his command. His past selves are living in unruly

hordes within him at this moment and overmastering him. "Do this, this,

this, which we too have done, and found our profit in it," cry the souls

of his forefathers within him. Faint are the far ones, coming and going

as the sound of bells wafted on to a high mountain; loud and clear are

the near ones, urgent as an alarm of fire. "Withhold," cry some. "Go on

boldly," cry others. "Me, me, me, revert hitherward, my descendant,"

shouts one as it were from some high vantage-ground over the heads of the

clamorous multitude. "Nay, but me, me, me," echoes another; and our

former selves fight within us and wrangle for our possession. Have we

not here what is commonly called an _internal tumult_, when dead

pleasures and pains tug within us hither and thither? Then may the

battle be decided by what people are pleased to call our own experience.

Our own indeed! What is our own save by mere courtesy of speech? A

matter of fashion. Sanction sanctifieth and fashion fashioneth. And so

with death--the most inexorable of all conventions.

However this may be, we may assume it as an axiom with regard to actions

acquired after birth, that we never do them automatically save as the

result of long practice, and after having thus acquired perfect mastery

over the action in question.

But given the practice or experience, and the intricacy of the process to

be performed appears to matter very little. There is hardly anything

conceivable as being done by man, which a certain amount of familiarity

will not enable him to do, unintrospectively, and without conscious

effort. "The most complex and difficult movements," writes Mr. Darwin,

"can in time be performed without the least effort or consciousness." All

the main business of life is done thus unconsciously or

semi-unconsciously. For what is the main business of life? We work that

we may eat and digest, rather than eat and digest that we may work; this,

at any rate, is the normal state of things; the more important business

then is that which is carried on unconsciously. So again, the action of

the brain, which goes on prior to our realising the idea in which it

results, is not perceived by the individual. So also all the deeper

springs of action and conviction. The residuum with which we fret and

worry ourselves is a mere matter of detail, as the higgling and haggling

of the market, which is not over the bulk of the price, but over the last

halfpenny.

Shall we say, then, that a baby of a day old sucks (which involves the

whole principle of the pump, and hence a profound practical knowledge of

the laws of pneumatics and hydrostatics), digests, oxygenises its blood

(millions of years before Sir Humphry Davy discovered oxygen), sees and

hears--all most difficult and complicated operations, involving an

unconscious knowledge of the facts concerning optics and acoustics,

compared with which the conscious discoveries of Newton sink into utter

insignificance? Shall we say that a baby can do all these things at

once, doing them so well and so regularly, without being even able to

direct its attention to them, and without mistake, and at the same time

not know how to do them, and never have done them before?

Such an assertion would be a contradiction to the whole experience of

mankind. Surely the _onus probandi_ must rest with him who makes it.

A man may make a lucky hit now and again by what is called a fluke, but

even this must be only a little in advance of his other performances of

the same kind. He may multiply seven by eight by a fluke after a little

study of the multiplication table, but he will not be able to extract the

cube root of 4913 by a fluke, without long training in arithmetic, any

more than an agricultural labourer would be able to operate successfully

for cataract. If, then, a grown man cannot perform so simple an

operation as that, we will say, for cataract, unless he have been long

trained in other similar operations, and until he has done what comes to

the same thing many times over, with what show of reason can we maintain

that one who is so far less capable than a grown man, can perform such

vastly more difficult operations, without knowing how to do them, and

without ever having done them before? There is no sign of "fluke" about

the circulation of a baby's blood. There may perhaps be some little

hesitation about its earliest breathing, but this, as a general rule,

soon passes over, both breathing and circulation, within an hour after

birth, being as regular and easy as at any time during life. Is it

reasonable, then, to say that the baby does these things without knowing

how to do them, and without ever having done them before, and continues

to do them by a series of lifelong flukes?

It would be well if those who feel inclined to hazard such an assertion

would find some other instances of intricate processes gone through by

people who know nothing about them, and who never had any practice

therein. What _is_ to know how to do a thing? Surely to do it. What is

proof that we know how to do a thing? Surely the fact that we can do it.

A man shows that he knows how to throw the boomerang by throwing the

boomerang. No amount of talking or writing can get over this; _ipso

facto_, that a baby breathes and makes its blood circulate, it knows how

to do so; and the fact that it does not know its own knowledge is only

proof of the perfection of that knowledge, and of the vast number of past

occasions on which it must have been exercised already. As has been said

already, it is less obvious when the baby could have gained its

experience, so as to be able so readily to remember exactly what to do;

_but it is more easy to suppose that the necessary occasions cannot have

been wanting_, _than that the power which we observe_, _should have been

obtained without practice and memory_.

If we saw any self-consciousness on the baby's part about its breathing

or circulation, we might suspect that it had had less experience, or had

profited less by its experience, than its neighbours--exactly in the same

manner as we suspect a deficiency of any quality which we see a man

inclined to parade. We all become introspective when we find that we do

not know our business, and whenever we are introspective we may generally

suspect that we are on the verge of unproficiency. Unfortunately, in the

case of sickly children we observe that they sometimes do become

conscious of their breathing and circulation, just as in later life we

become conscious that we have a liver or a digestion. In that case there

is always something wrong. The baby that becomes aware of its breathing

does not know how to breathe and will suffer for his ignorance and

incapacity, exactly in the same way as he will suffer in later life for

ignorance and incapacity in any other respect in which his peers are

commonly knowing and capable. In the case of inability to breathe, the

punishment is corporal, breathing being a matter of fashion, so old and

long settled that nature can admit of no departure from the established

custom, and the procedure in case of failure is as much formulated as the

fashion itself. In the case of the circulation, the whole performance

has become one so utterly of rote, that the mere discovery that we could

do it at all was considered one of the highest flights of human genius.

It has been said a day will come when the Polar ice shall have

accumulated, till it forms vast continents many thousands of feet above

the level of the sea, all of solid ice. The weight of this mass will, it

is believed, cause the world to topple over on its axis, so that the

earth will be upset as an ant-heap overturned by a ploughshare. In that

day the icebergs will come crunching against our proudest cities, razing

them from off the face of the earth as though they were made of rotten

blotting-paper. There is no respect now of Handel nor of Shakespeare;

the works of Rembrandt and Bellini fossilise at the bottom of the sea.

Grace, beauty, and wit, all that is precious in music, literature, and

art--all gone. In the morning there was Europe. In the evening there

are no more populous cities nor busy hum of men, but a sea of jagged ice,

a lurid sunset, and the doom of many ages. Then shall a scared remnant

escape in places, and settle upon the changed continent when the waters

have subsided--a simple people, busy hunting shellfish on the drying

ocean beds, and with little time for introspection; yet they can read and

write and sum, for by that time these accomplishments will have become

universal, and will be acquired as easily as we now learn to talk; but

they do so as a matter of course, and without self-consciousness. Also

they make the simpler kinds of machinery too easily to be able to follow

their own operations--the manner of their own apprenticeship being to

them as a buried city. May we not imagine that, after the lapse of

another ten thousand years or so, some one of them may again become

cursed with lust of introspection, and a second Harvey may astonish the

world by discovering that it can read and write, and that steam-engines

do not grow, but are made? It may be safely prophesied that he will die

a martyr, and be honoured in the fourth generation.

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