"At the very outset of inquiry into the origin and true
character of Christianity we are brought face to face with the
supernatural. Christianity professes to be a Divine Revelation
of truths which the human intellect could not otherwise have
discovered. It is not a form of religion developed by the wisdom of man
and appealing to his reason, but a system miraculously communicated to
the human race, the central doctrines of which are either supernatural
or untenable. If the truths said to be revealed were either of
an ordinary character, or naturally attainable they would at once
discredit the claim to divine origin. No one could maintain that a
system discoverable by reason would be supernaturally communicated. The
whole argument for Christianity turns upon the necessity of such a
revelation, and the consequent probability that it would be made. * * *
"The spontaneous offer of miraculous evidence, indeed, has
always been advanced as a special characteristic of Christianity
logically entitling it to acceptance in contradistinction to all other
religions. 'It is an acknowledged historical fact,' says Bishop Butler,
'that Christianity offered itself to the world, and demanded to be
received, upon the allegation, that is, as unbelievers would speak,
upon the pretence of miracles, publicly wrought to attest the truth of
it in such an age; ... and Christianity, including the dispensation
of the Old Testament, seems distinguished by this from all other
religions.'
"Having then ascertained that miracles are absolutely necessary
to attest the reliability of a Divine Revelation we may proceed
to examine them more closely, and for the present we shall confine
ourselves to the representation of these phenomena which are in the
Bible. Throughout the Old Testament the doctrine is inculcated that
supernatural communications must have supernatural attestation. God
is described as arming his servants with power to perform wonders, in
order that they may thus be accredited as his special messengers. The
Patriarchs and the people of Israel generally are represented as
demanding 'a sign' of the reality of the communications said to come
from God, without which, we are led to suppose, they not only would
not have believed, but would have been justified in disbelieving,
that the messengers actually came from him. Thus Gideon asks for a
sign that the Lord talked with him.
'And the Lord said unto him, Surely I will be with thee, and thou
shalt smite the Midianites as one man.'
'And he (Gideon) said unto him, If now I have found grace in thy sight,
then show me a sign that thou talkest with me.' (Judges 6 : 16, 17.)
"And Hezekiah demands proof of the truth of Isaiah's prophecy that
he should be restored to health.
'And Hezekiah said unto Isaiah, What shall be the sign that the Lord
will heal me, and that I shall go up unto the house of the Lord the
third day?' (2 Kings 20 : 8.)
"It is, however, unnecessary to refer to instances, for it may be
affirmed that upon all occasions, miraculous evidence of an alleged
divine mission is stated to have been required and accorded.
"The startling information is at the same time given, however, that
miracles may be wrought to attest what is false as well as to accredit
what is true. In one place, it is declared that if a prophet actually
gives a sign or wonder and it comes to pass, but teaches the people
on the strength of it, to follow other gods, they are not to hearken
to him, and the prophet is to be put to death.
'If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth
thee a sign or wonder, and the sign or wonder come to pass, whereof he
spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods which thou hast
not known, and let us serve them; thou shalt not hearken unto the
words of that prophet or that dreamer of dreams.' (Deut. 13 : 1, 2, 3.)
"The false miracle is here attributed to God himself.
'For the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether you love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul.' (Deut. 13 : 3.)
"In the book of the prophet Ezekiel the case is stated in a still
stronger way, and God is represented as directly deceiving the prophet.
'And if the prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord
have deceived that prophet, and I will stretch out my hand upon him,
and will destroy him from the midst of my people Israel.' (Ezek.
14 : 9.)
"The narrative of God's hardening Pharaoh's heart in order to bring
more plagues upon the land of Egypt is in this vein. God, in fact, is
represented as exerting his almighty power to deceive a man and then
destroying him for being deceived. In the same spirit is the passage
in which Micaiah describes the Lord as putting a lying spirit into
the mouths of the prophets who incited Ahab to go to Ramoth-gilead. (1
Kings 22 : 14-23.)
"The miracles wrought by the Egyptian sorcerers in competing with
Moses were done by another power than God. We have notable instances
of the belief in signs and wonders wrought by this other power. Jesus
is represented as warning his disciples against false prophets,
who work signs and wonders.
'Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied
in thy name? and in thy name cast out devils? and in thy name done
many wonderful works? of whom he should say, I never knew you, depart
from me, ye that work iniquity.' (Mat. 7 : 22, 23.)
And again in another place:
'For false prophets shall arise, and shall work signs and wonders,
to seduce, if it were possible, the elect.' (Mark 13: 22.)
Also, when the Pharisees accuse him of casting out devils by Beelzebub,
the prince of the devils, Jesus asks: 'By whom do your children cast
them out?' a reply which would lose all its point if they were not
admitted to be able to cast out devils. In another passage John
is described as saying: 'Master, we saw one casting out devils
in thy name, who followeth not us, and we forbade him.' Without
multiplying instances, however, there can be no doubt of the fact
that the reality of false miracles and lying wonders is admitted in
the Bible. The obvious deduction from this representation of miracles
is that the source and purpose of such supernatural phenomena must
always be exceedingly uncertain. Their evidential value is, therefore,
profoundly affected, 'it being,' as Dr. Newman has said of ambiguous
miracles, 'antecedently improbable that the Almighty should rest
the credit of his Revelation upon events which but obscurely implied
his immediate presence.' As it is affirmed that other supernatural
beings exist, as well as an assumed personal God, by whose agency
miracles are performed, it is impossible to argue with reason that
such phenomena are at any time especially due to the intervention of
the Deity. Dr. Newman recognizes this, but passes over the difficulty
with masterly lightness of touch. After advancing the singular argument
that our knowledge of spirits is only derived from scripture, and
that their existence cannot be deduced from nature, whilst he asserts
that the being of a God--a personal God be it remembered--can be
so discovered, and that, therefore, miracles can only properly be
attributed to him, he proceeds: 'Still it may be necessary to show
that on our own principles we are not open to inconsistency. That is,
it has been questioned whether, in admitting the existence and power
of the spirits on the authority of Revelation, we are not in danger
of invalidating the evidence upon which that authority rests. For the
cogency of the argument for miracles depends on the assumption, that
interruptions in the course of nature must ultimately proceed from God;
which is not true, if they may be effected by other beings without
his sanction. And it must be conceded, that, explicit as scripture
is in considering miracles as signs of divine agency, it still does
seem to give created spirits some power of working them; and even,
in its most literal sense, intimates the possibility of their working
them in opposition to the true doctrine (Deut. 13 : 1-3; Mat. 24 :
24; 2 Thes. 2 : 9-11).' (Dr. Newman's Two Essays on Miracles, p. 31.)
"Dr. Newman repudiates the attempts of various writers to overcome
this difficulty by making a distinction between great miracles and
small, many miracles and few, or by referring to the nature of the
doctrine attested in order to determine the author of the miracles,
or by denying the power of spirits altogether, and explaining away
scripture statements of demoniacal possession and the narrative of the
Lord's temptation. 'Without having recourse to any of these dangerous
modes of answering the objection,' he says, 'it may be sufficient to
reply, that, since, agreeably to the antecedent sentiment of reason,
God has adopted miracles as the seal of a divine message, we believe
he will never suffer them to be so counterfeited as to deceive the
humble inquirer.' (Ibid. p. 51.)
"This is the only reply which even so powerful a reasoner as Dr. Newman
can give to an objection based on distinct statements of scripture
itself. He cannot deny the validity of the objection, he can only
hope or believe in spite of it. Personal belief independent of
evidence is the most common and the weakest of arguments; at best
it is prejudice masked in the garb of reason. It is perfectly clear
that miracles being thus acknowledged to be common both to God and to
other spirits they cannot be considered a distinctive attestation of
divine intervention; and as Spinoza finely argued, not even the mere
existence of God, can be inferred from them; for as a miracle is a
limited act and never expressed more than certain and limited power,
it is certain that we cannot from such an effect, conclude even the
existence of a cause whose power is infinite.
"This dual character obviously leads to many difficulties in defining
the evidential function and force of miracles, and we may best
appreciate the dilemma which is involved by continuing to follow
the statements and arguments of divines themselves. To the question
whether miracles are absolutely to command the obedience of those in
whose sight they are performed, and whether upon their attestation,
the doer and his doctrine are to be accepted as of God, Archbishop
French unhesitatingly replies: 'It cannot be so, for side by side
with the miracles which serve for the furthering of the kingdom of
God runs another line of wonders, the counter-workings of him who is
ever the ape of the Most High.' (Dr. French's 'Notes on the Miracles
of Our Lord.') Eighth ed., p. 22.
"'This fact,' he says, 'that the kingdom of lies has its wonders no
less than the kingdom of truth, is in itself sufficient evidence that
miracles cannot be appealed to absolutely and finally, in proof of
the doctrine which the worker of them proclaims.'
"This being the case, it is important to discover how miracles
perform their function as the indispensible evidence for a Divine
Revelation, for with this disability they do not seem to possess much
potentiality. Archbishop French then offers the following definition
of the function of miracles: 'A miracle does not prove the truth of
a doctrine or the divine mission of him that brings it to pass. That
which alone it claims for him at the first is a right to be listened
to; it puts him in the alternative of being from heaven or from
hell. The doctrine must first commend itself to the conscience as being
good, and only then can the miracle seal it as divine.' But the first
appeal is from the doctrine to the conscience, to the moral nature
of man. Under certain circumstances, he maintains their evidence is
utterly to be rejected. 'But the purpose of the miracle' he says,
'being as we have seen, to confirm that which is good, so, upon the
other hand, where conscience and mind witness against the doctrine,
not all the miracles in the world have a right to demand submission
to the word which they seal. On the contrary, the great act of faith
is to believe, against, and in despite of them all, in what God has
revealed to, and implanted in the soul of the holy and the true;
not to believe another gospel, though an angel from heaven, or one
transformed into such should bring it (Deut. 13 : 3; Gal. 1 : 8);
and instead of compelling assent, miracles are then rather warnings
to us that we keep aloof, for they tell us that not merely lies are
here, for to that the conscience bore witness already, but that he who
utters them is more than a common deceiver, is eminently a liar and
anti-Christ, a false prophet; standing in more immediate connection
than other deceived and evil men to the kingdom of darkness, so that
Satan has given him his power (Rev. 13 : 2); is using him to be an
especial organ of his, and to do a special work for him.' And he
lays down the distinct principle that: 'The miracle must witness for
itself, and then, and then only, the first is capable of witnessing
for the second.'
"These opinions are not peculiar to the Archbishop of Dublin, but
are generally held by divines, although Dr. French expresses them
with unusual absence of reserve. Dr. Mozley emphatically affirms the
same doctrine when he says: 'A miracle cannot oblige us to accept
any doctrine which is contrary to our moral nature or a fundamental
principle of religion.' Dr. Mansel speaks to the same effect: 'If
a teacher claiming to work miracles proclaims doctrines contrary
to previously established truths, whether to the conclusions of
natural religion or to the teaching of a former revelation, such
a contradiction is allowed even by the most zealous defenders of
the evidential value of miracles, to invalidate the authority of the
teacher. But the right conclusion from this admission is not that true
miracles are invalid an evidences, but that the supposed miracles in
this case are not true miracles at all; that is, are not the effects
of divine power, but of human deception or of some other agency.' A
passage from a letter written by Dr. Arnold, which is quoted by
Dr. French in support of his views, both illustrates the doctrine
and the necessity which has led to its adoption. 'You complain,'
says Dr. Arnold, writing to Dr. Hawkins, 'of those persons who judge
of a revelation not by its evidence, but by its substance. It has
always seemed to me that its substance is a most essential part of
its evidence; and that miracles wrought in favor of what was foolish
or wicked would only prove Manicheism. We are so perfectly ignorant
of the unseen world, that the character of any supernatural power
can only be judged by the moral character of the statements which it
sanctions. Thus only can we tell whether it be a revelation from God
or from the Devil.' In another place Dr. Arnold declares: 'Miracles
must not be allowed to overrule the gospel; for it is only through
our belief in the gospel that we accord our belief in them.'
"It is obvious that the mutual dependence which is thus established
between miracles and the doctrines in connection with which they are
wrought destroys the evidential force of miracles, and that the first
and final appeal is made to reason. The doctrine in fact proves the
miracles instead of the miracle attesting the doctrine. Divines, of
course, attempt to deny this, but no other deduction from their own
statements is logically possible. Miracles according to scripture
itself, are producible by various supernatural beings and may be
satanic as well as divine: man on the other hand, is so ignorant of
the unseen world that avowedly, he cannot, from the miracle itself,
determine the agent by whom it was performed; the miracle, therefore,
has no intrinsic evidential value. How, then, according to divines,
does it attain any potentiality? Only through a favorable decision on
the part of reason on the 'moral nature of man' regarding the character
of the doctrine. The result of the appeal to reason respecting the
morality and credibility of the doctrine determines the evidential
status of the miracle. The doctrine therefore, is the real criterion
of the miracle which, without it, is necessarily an object of doubt
and suspicion.
"We have already casually referred to Dr. Newman's view of such a
relation between miracle and doctrine, but may here more fully quote
his suggestive remarks. 'Others by referring to the nature of the
doctrine attested,' he says, 'in order to determine the author of the
miracle, have exposed themselves to the plausible charge of adducing,
first the miracle to attest the divinity of the doctrine, and then
the doctrine to prove the divinity of the miracle.' This argument he
characterizes as one of the 'dangerous modes' of removing a difficulty,
although he does not himself point out a safer, and in a note, he adds:
'There is an appearance of doing honor to the Christian doctrines in
representing them as intrinsically credible, which leads many into
supporting opinions which, carried to their full extent, supercede
the need of miracles altogether. It must be recollected, too, that
they who are allowed to praise have the privilege of finding fault,
and may reject, according to their a priori notions, as well as
receive. Doubtless the divinity of a clearly immoral doctrine could
not be evidenced by miracles; for our belief in the moral attributes of
God, is much stronger than our conviction of the negative proposition,
that none but he can interfere with the system of nature. But there
is always the danger of extending this admission beyond its proper
limits, of supposing ourselves judges of the tendency of doctrines;
and because, unassisted reason informs us what is moral and immoral
in our own case, of attempting to decide on the abstract morality of
actions.... These remarks are in nowise inconsistent with using (as was
done in a former section) our actual knowledge of God's attributes,
obtained from a survey of nature and human affairs, in determining
the probability of certain professed miracles having proceeded from
him. It is one thing to infer from the experience of life another
to imagine the character of God from the gratuitous conceptions of
our own minds.' Although Dr. Newman apparently fails to perceive
that he himself thus makes reason the criterion of miracles and
therefore incurs the condemnation with which our quotation opens,
the very indecision of his argument illustrates the dilemma in
which divines are placed. Dr. Mozley, however, still more directly
condemns the principle we are discussing, that the doctrine must
be the criterion of the miracle, although he also, as we have seen
elsewhere, substantially affirms it. He says: 'The position that the
revelation proves the miracle, and not the miracles the revelation,
admits of a good qualified meaning; but taken literally, it is a
double offense against the rule, that things are properly proved by
the proper proof of them; for a supernatural fact is the proper proof
of supernatural doctrine, while a supernatural doctrine on the other
hand is certainly not a proper proof of a supernatural fact.'
"This statement is obviously true, but it is equally undeniable that,
their origin being uncertain, miracles have no evidential force. How
far then, we may inquire in order thoroughly to understand the
position, can doctrines prove the reality of miracles or determine
the agency by which they are performed? In the case of moral truths
within the limits of reason, it is evident that doctrines, which
are in accordance with our idea of what is good and right do not
require miraculous evidence at all. They can secure acceptance by
their own merits alone. At the same time it is universally admitted
that the truth or goodness of a doctrine could not attest the divine
origin of a miracle. Such truths, however, have no proper connection
with revelation at all. 'These truths,' to quote the words of Bishop
Atterbury, 'were of themselves sufficiently obvious and plain, and
needed not a divine testimony to make them plainer. But the truths
which are necessary in this manner to be attested, are those which
are of positive institution; those which if God had not pleased to
reveal them, human reason could not have discovered; and those, which,
even now, they are revealed, human reason cannot fully account for,
and perfectly comprehend.' How is it possible then that reason,
or the 'moral nature of man' can approve as good, or appreciate
the fitness of, doctrines which in their very nature are beyond
the criterion of reason. What reply, for instance, can reason give
to any appeal to it regarding the doctrine of the trinity or of
the incarnation? If doctrines, the truth and goodness of which are
apparent, do not afford any evidence of divine revelation, how can
doctrines which reason can neither discover nor comprehend attest the
divine origin of miracles? Dr. Mozley clearly recognizes that they
cannot do so. 'The proof of a revelation,' he says, and we may add,
the proof of a miracle--itself a species of revelation--'which is
contained in the substance of a revelation has this inherent check or
limit in it; namely: that it cannot reach to what is undiscoverable by
reason.' 'Internal evidence is itself an appeal to reason, because at
every step the test is our own appreciation of such and such an idea or
doctrine, our own perception of its fitness; but human reason cannot
in the nature of the case prove that which, by the very hypotheses,
lies beyond reason.' It naturally follows that no doctrine which lies
beyond reason, and therefore requires the attestation of miracles,
can possibly afford that indication of the source and reality of
miracles which is necessary to endow them with evidential value,
and the supernatural doctrine must, therefore, be rejected in the
absence of miraculous evidence of a decisive character.
"Canon Mozley labors earnestly, but unsuccessfully, to restore to
miracles as evidence some part of that potentiality of which these
unfortunate limitations have deprived them. 'Whilst on the one hand,'
he says, 'we must admit indeed an inherent modification in the function
of a miracle as an instrument of proof,' he argues that this is only a
limitation, and no disproof of it, and he contends that: 'The evidence
of miracles is not negatived because it has conditions.' His reasoning,
however, is purely apologetic, and attempts by the unreal analogy of
supposed limitations of natural principles and evidence to excuse the
disqualifying limitations of the supernatural. He is quite conscious
of the serious difficulty of the position: 'The question' he says,
'may at first sight create a dilemma.--If a miracle is nugatory on the
side of one doctrine, what cogency has it on the side of another? Is
it legitimate to accept its evidence when we please and reject it
when we please?' The only reply he seems able to give to these very
pertinent questions is the remark which immediately follows them:
'But in truth a miracle is never without an argumentative force,
although that force may be counterbalanced.' In other words, a miracle
is always an argument, although it is often a bad one. It is scarcely
necessary to go to the supernatural for bad arguments.
"It might naturally be expected that the miraculous evidence selected
to accredit a divine revelation should possess certain unique and
marked characteristics. It must at least, be clearly distinctive of
divine power and exclusively associated with divine truth. It is
inconceivable that the Deity, deigning thus to attest the reality
of a communication from himself of truths beyond the criterion of
reason, should not make the evidence simple and complete, because
the doctrines proper to such a revelation, not being appreciable
from internal evidence, it is obvious that the external testimony
for them,--if it is to be of any use--must be unmistakable and
decisive. The evidence which is actually produced, however, so far
from satisfying these legitimate anticipations, lacks every one of the
qualifications which reason antecedently declares necessary. Miracles
are not distinctive of divine power but are common to Satan, and they
are admitted to be performed in support of falsehood as well as in the
service of truth. They bear, indeed, so little upon them the impress
of their origin and true character, that they are dependent for their
recognition upon our judgment of the very doctrines to attest which
they are said to have been designed.
"Even taking the representation of miracles, therefore, which
divines themselves give, they are utterly incompetent to perform
their contemplated functions. If they are superhuman they are not
supersatanic, and there is no sense in which they can be considered
miraculously evidential of anything. To argue as theologians do,
that the ambiguity of their testimony is intended as a trial of
our faith is absurd, for reason being unable to judge of the nature
either of supernatural fact or of supernatural doctrine it would be
mere folly and injustice to subject to such a test beings avowedly
incapable of sustaining it. Whilst it is absolutely necessary, then,
that a divine revelation should be attested by miraculous evidence to
justify our believing it the testimony so called seems in all respects
unworthy of the name, and presents anomalies much more suggestive of
human invention than divine originality. We are, in fact, prepared by
the scriptural account of miracles to expect that further examination
will supply an explanation of such phenomena which will wholly remove
them from the region of the supernatural.
"We have seen that a divine revelation is such only by virtue of
communicating to us something which we could not know without it, and
which is in fact undiscoverable by human reason; and that miraculous
evidence is absolutely requisite to establish its reality. It is
admitted that no other testimony could justify our believing the
specific revelation which we are considering, the very substance of
which is supernatural and beyond the criterion of reason, and that its
astounding announcements, if not demonstrated to be miraculous truths,
must inevitably be pronounced 'the wildest delusions.' On examining
the supposed miraculous evidence, however, we find that not only is it
upon general grounds antecedently incredible, but that the testimony by
which its realty is supported, so far from establishing the inferences
drawn from the supposed supernatural phenomena, is totally insufficient
even to certify the actual occurrence of the events narrated.
"Even if the reality of miracles could be substantiated, their value
as evidence for the divine revelation is destroyed by the necessary
admission that miracles are not limited to one source, but that there
are miracles satanic which are to be disbelieved, as well as divine
and evidential ones to be believed.
"Similar miracles to those which are supposed to attest it are reported
long antecedent to the promulgation of Christianity, and continued
to be performed for centuries after it.
"A stream of miraculous pretension, in fact, has flowed through all
human history, deep and broad as it has passed through the darker ages,
but dwindling down to a thread as it has entered days of enlightenment.
"The true character of miracles is at once betrayed by the fact that
their supposed occurrence has been confined to ages of ignorance and
superstition, and that they are absolutely unknown in any time or
place where science has provided witnesses fitted to appreciate and
ascertain the nature of such exhibitions of supernatural power.
"There is no uncertainty as to the origin of belief in supernatural
interference with nature. The assertion that spurious miracles have
sprung up round a few instances of genuine miraculous power has not
a single valid argument to support it.
"When we turn from more general arguments to examine the documentary
evidence for the reality of the supposed miraculous occurrences,
and of the divine revelation which they accredit, we meet with the
characteristics which might have been expected. We do not find any
trace even of the existence of our gospels for a century and a half
after the events they record. They are anonymous narratives, and there
is no evidence of any value connecting these works with the writers
to whom they are popularly attributed. The miraculous evidence upon
which alone, it is admitted, we could be justified in believing its
astounding doctrines being thus nugatory, the claims of Christianity to
be considered a divine revelation must necessarily be disallowed, and
its supernatural elements, which are, in fact, the very substance of
the system, inevitably sharing the same fate as the supposed miraculous
evidence, must, therefore, be rejected as incredible and opposed to
reason and complete induction." ("Supernatural Religion," p. 698.)
"A miracle as evidence can establish no fact, for the reason that the
miracle does not exist. The miracle itself must be attested. As we
have no evidence of miracles, we are not called on to believe them,
but to believe the story which relates them. 'But the miracle is above
and beyond reason.' To this we reply: It is absurd to assume what is
beyond reason, to account for what is opposed to reason." (Ibid.)
David Hume's Argument on Miracles.
"A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and
unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a
miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument
from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable
that all men must die; that lead cannot of itself remain suspended in
the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless
it be that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature,
and there is required a violation of these laws, or, in other words,
a miracle, to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle if it ever
happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man
seemingly in good health should die suddenly; because such a kind of
death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently
observed to happen. But it is a miracle that a dead man should come to
life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There
must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous
event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as
a uniform experience amounts to a proof there is here a direct and
full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any
miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed or the miracle rendered
credible but by an opposite proof which is superior. (2.)
"The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our
attention), 'that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle,
unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be
more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish; and
even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the
superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force
which remains after deducting the inferior.' When any one tells me that
he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself
whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive
or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates should really have
happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other, and according to
the superiority which I discover I pronounce my decision, and always
reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would
be more miraculous than the event which he relates, then, and not
till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.
"In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed that the testimony upon
which a miracle is founded may possibly amount to an entire proof,
and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy; but
it is easy to show that we have been a great deal too liberal in our
concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established
on so full an evidence.
"For, first, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle
attested by a sufficient number of men of such unquestioned good
sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion
in themselves; of such undoubted integrity as to place them beyond
all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and
reputation in the eyes of mankind as to have a great deal to lose
in case of their being detected in any falsehood; and, at the same
time, attesting facts performed in such a public manner, and in so
celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable;
all which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in
the testimony of men.
"Secondly. We may observe in human nature a principle which, if
strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the assurance
which we might, from human testimony, have in any kind of prodigy. The
maxim by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings is,
that the objects of which we have no experience resemble those of
which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is always
most profitable, and that where there is an opposition of argument we
ought to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest
number of past observations; but though, in proceeding by this rule,
we readily reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an
ordinary degree, yet in advancing further the mind observes not
always the same rule, but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd
and miraculous it rather the more readily admits of such a fact,
upon account of that very circumstance which ought to destroy all its
authority. The passion of surprise and wonder arising from miracles,
being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency toward the
belief of those events from which it is derived. And this goes so
far, that even those who can not enjoy this pleasure immediately,
nor can believe those miraculous events of which they are informed,
yet love to partake of the satisfaction at second-hand or by rebound,
and take pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others.
"With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travelers
received, their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations
of wonderful adventures, strange men and uncouth manners! But if the
spirit of religion joins itself to the love of wonder, there is an end
of common sense, and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses
all pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast,
and imagine he sees what has no reality; he may know his narrative
to be false, and yet persevere in it with the best intentions in the
world, for the sake of promoting so holy a cause; or even where this
delusion has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation,
operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any
other circumstances, and self-interest with equal force. His auditors
may not have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgment to canvass
his evidence; what judgment they have, they renounce by principle,
in these sublime and mysterious subjects; or if they were ever so
willing to employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the
regularity of its operations. Their credulity increases his impudence,
and his impudence overpowers their credulity.
"Eloquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for
reason or reflection, but, addressing itself entirely to the fancy
or the affections, captivates the willing hearers and subdues their
understanding. Happily, this pitch it seldom attains. But what a
Tully or a Demosthenes could scarcely effect over a Roman or Athenian
audience, every Capuchin, every itinerant or stationary teacher,
can perform over the generality of mankind, and in a higher degree,
by touching such gross and vulgar passions.
"The many instances of forged miracles and prophecies, and
supernatural events, which in all ages have either been detected by
contrary evidence or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove
sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and
the marvelous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all
relations of this kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with
regard to the most common and most credible events. For instance, there
is no kind of report which rises so easily and spreads so quickly,
especially in country places and provincial towns, as those concerning
marriages: insomuch that two young persons of equal condition never
see each other twice but the whole neighborhood immediately join them
together. The pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting,
of propagating it, and of being the first reporters of it, spreads
the intelligence. And this is so well known that no man of sense
gives attention to these reports till he finds them confirmed by
some greater evidence. Do not the same passions, and others still
stronger, incline the generality of mankind to believe and report,
with the greatest vehemence and assurance, all religious miracles?
"Thirdly. It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and
miraculous relations that they are observed chiefly to abound among
ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever
given admission to any of them, that people will be found to have
received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted
them with that inviolable sanction and authority which always attend
received opinions. When we peruse the first histories of all nations,
we are apt to imagine ourselves transported into some new world, where
the whole frame of nature is disjointed, and every element performs its
operations in a different manner from what it does at present. Battles,
revolutions, pestilence, famine, and death, are never the effect of
those natural causes which we experience. Prodigies, omens, oracles,
judgments, quite obscure the few natural events that are intermingled
with them. But as the former grow thinner every page, in proportion
as we advance nearer the enlightened ages, we soon learn that there is
nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds
from the usual propensity of mankind toward the marvelous; and that
though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense
and learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature.
"It is strange, a judicious reader is apt to say upon the perusal of
those wonderful historians, that such prodigious events never happen in
our days. But it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in all
ages. You must surely have seen instances enough of that frailty. You
have yourself heard many such marvelous relations started, which,
being treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at least
been abandoned even by the vulgar. Be assured that those renowned
lies, which have spread and flourished to such a monstrous height,
arose from like beginnings; but being sown in a more proper soil,
shot up at last into prodigies almost equal to those which they relate.
"It was a wise policy in that false prophet Alexander, who, though
now forgotten, was once so famous, to lay the first scene of his
impostures in Paphlagonia, where, as Lucian tells us, the people
were extremely ignorant and stupid, and ready to swallow even the
grossest delusion. People at a distance who are weak enough to think
the matter at all worth inquiry have no opportunity of receiving
better information. The stories come magnified to them by a hundred
circumstances. Fools are industrious in propagating the imposture;
while the wise and learned are contented, in general, to deride its
absurdity, without informing themselves of the particular facts by
which it may be distinctly refuted. And thus the imposture above
mentioned was enabled to proceed, from his ignorant Paphlagonians, to
the enlisting of votaries even among the Grecian philosophers and men
of the most eminent rank and distinction in Rome; nay, could engage the
attention of that sage emperor Marcus Aurelius, so far as to make him
trust the success of a military expedition to his delusive prophecies.
"The advantages are so great of starting an imposture among an ignorant
people that, even though the delusion should be too gross to impose
on the generality of them, which, though seldom, is sometimes the
case, it has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries
than if the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and
knowledge. The most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry
the report abroad. None of their countrymen have a large correspondence
of sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the
delusion. Men's inclination to the marvelous has full opportunity to
display itself. And thus a story, which is universally exploded in the
place where it was first started, will pass for certain at a thousand
miles distant. But had Alexander fixed his residence at Athens, the
philosophers of that renowned mart of learning would have spread,
throughout the whole Roman empire, their sense of the matter; which,
being supported by so great an authority, and displayed by all the
force of reason and eloquence, would have entirely opened the eyes of
mankind. It is true Lucian, passing by chance through Paphlagonia,
had an opportunity of performing this good office. But though much
to be wished, it does not always happen that every Alexander meets
with a Lucian ready to expose and detect his impostures.
"I may add as a fourth reason which diminishes the authority of
prodigies, that there is no testimony for any, even those which have
not been expressly detected, that is, not opposed by any infinite
number of witnesses; so that not only the miracle destroys the credit
of testimony, but the testimony destroys itself. To make this the
better understood, let us consider that in matters of religion,
whatever is different is contrary; and it is impossible that the
religions of ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Siam, and of China, should
all of them be established on any solid foundation. Every miracle,
therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of those religions
(and all of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to
establish the particular system to which it is attributed, so has
it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other
system. In destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit
of those miracles on which that system was established; so that all
the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary
facts; and the evidences of these prodigies, whether weak or strong,
as opposite to each other. According to this method of reasoning,
when we believe any miracle of Mahomet or his successors, we have
for our warrant the testimony of a few barbarous Arabians: and on the
other hand, we are to regard the authority of Titus, Livius, Plutarch,
Tacitus, and, in short, of all the authors and witnesses--Grecian,
Chinese, and Roman Catholic, who have related any miracle in their
particular religion; I say we are to regard their testimony in
the same light as if they had mentioned that Mahometan miracle,
and had in express terms contradicted it, with the same certainty
as they have for the miracle they relate. This argument may appear
over subtile and refined; but is not in reality different from the
reasoning of a judge who supposes that the credit of two witnesses,
maintaining a crime against any one is destroyed by the testimony of
two others who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues distant
at the same instant when the crime is said to have been committed.
"One of the best-attested miracles in all profane history is that
which Tacitus reports of Vespasian, who cured a blind man in
Alexandria by means of his spittle, and a lame man by the mere
touch of his foot, in obedience to a vision of the god Serapis,
who had enjoined them to have recourse to the emperor for these
miraculous cures. The story may be seen in the works of that historian
(Hist. lib. v. cap. 8. Suetonius gives nearly the same account in
Vitia Vesp.), where every circumstance seems to add weight to the
testimony, and might be displayed at large with all the force of
argument and eloquence, if any one were now concerned to enforce the
evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition: The gravity,
solidity, age, and probity of so great an emperor, who, through
the whole course of his life conversed in a familiar manner with
his friends and courtiers, and never affected those extraordinary
airs of divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius. The historian,
a contemporary writer, noted for candor and veracity, and, withal,
the greatest and most penetrating genius perhaps of all antiquity,
and so free from any tendency to credulity that he even lies under
the contrary imputation of Atheism and profaneness. The persons from
whose authority he related the miracle, of established character
for judgment and veracity, as we may well presume; eye witnesses of
the fact, and confirming their testimony after the Flavian family
was despoiled of the empire, and could no longer give any reward as
the price of a lie. Utrumque, qui interfuere, nunc quoque memorant,
postquam nullum, mendacio pretium. To which if we add the public
nature of the facts as related, it will appear that no evidence can
well be supposed stronger for so gross and palpable a falsehood.
"There is also a memorable story related by Cardinal de Retz, which
may well deserve our consideration. When that intriguing politician
fled into Spain to avoid the persecution of his enemies, he passed
through Saragossa, the capital of Arragon, where he was shown, in the
cathedral, a man who had served seven years as a doorkeeper, and was
well known to everybody in town that had ever paid his devotions at
that church. He had been seen, for so long a time, wanting a leg;
but recovered that limb by the rubbing of holy oil upon the stump;
and the cardinal assures us that he saw him with two legs. This
miracle was vouched by all the canons of the church; and the whole
company in town were appealed to for a confirmation of the fact;
whom the cardinal found by their zealous devotion, to be thorough
believers of the miracle. Here the relater was also contemporary to
the supposed prodigy, of an incredulous and libertine character, as
well as of great genius, the miracle of so singular a nature as could
scarcely admit of a counterfeit, and the witnesses very numerous, and
all of them, in a manner spectators, of the fact to which they gave
their testimony. And what adds mightily to the force of the evidence,
and may double our surprise on this occasion, is that the cardinal
himself, who relates the story, seems not to give any credit to it,
and consequently can not be suspected of any concurrence in the holy
fraud. He considered, justly, that it was not requisite, in order to
reject a fact of this nature, to be able accurately to disprove the
testimony, and to trace its falsehood through all the circumstances
of knavery and credulity which produced it. He knew that as this
was commonly altogether impossible at any small distance of time and
place, so was it extremely difficult, even where one was immediately
present, by reason of the bigotry, ignorance, cunning, and roguery of
a great part of mankind. He therefore concluded, like a just reasoner,
that such an evidence carried falsehood upon the very face of it,
and that a miracle supported by any human testimony was more properly
a subject of derision than of argument.
"There surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one
person than those which were lately said to have been wrought in France
upon the tomb of Abbe Paris, the famous Jansenist, with whose sanctity
the people were so long deluded. The curing of the sick, giving hearing
to the deaf, and sight to the blind, were everywhere talked of as the
usual effects of that holy sepulcher. But, what is more extraordinary,
many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the spot, before
judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of credit and
distinction, in a learned age, and on the most eminent theater that
is now in the world. Nor is this all: a relation of them was published
and dispersed everywhere; nor were the Jesuits, though a learned body,
supported by the civil magistrate, and determined enemies to those
opinions in whose favor the miracles were said to have been wrought,
ever able distinctly to refute or detect them. (3.) Where shall we
find such a number of circumstances agreeing to the corroboration of
one fact? And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses but
the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events which
they relate? And this, surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people,
will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation.
"Is the consequence just, because some human testimony has the
utmost force and authority in some cases--when it relates the battle
of Phillipi or Pharsalia, for instance--that therefore all kinds of
testimony must, in all cases, have equal force and authority? Suppose
that the Cæsarean and Pompeian factions had, each of them, claimed
the victory in these battles, and that the historians of each
party had uniformly ascribed the advantage to their own sides; how
could mankind, at this distance, have been able to determine between
them? The contrariety is equally strong between the miracles related
by Herodotus or Plutarch, and those delivered by Mariana, Bede,
or any monkish historian.
"The wise lend a very academic faith to every report which favors
the passion of the reporter, whether it magnifies his country, his
family, or himself, or in any other way strikes in with his natural
inclinations and propensities. But what greater temptation than
to appear a missionary, a prophet, an embassador from heaven. Who
would not encounter many dangers and difficulties in order to obtain
so sublime a character. Or if, by the help of vanity and a heated
imagination, a man has first made a convert of himself and entered
seriously into the delusion, who ever scruples to make use of pious
frauds in support of so holy and meritorious a cause.
"The smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest flame: because
the materials are always prepared for it. The avidum genus auricularum
(Lucretius)--the gazing populace receive greedily, without examination,
whatever soothes superstition and promotes wonder.
"How many stories of this nature have, in all ages, been detected
and exploded in their infancy. How many more have been celebrated
for a time and have afterward sunk into neglect and oblivion. Where
such reports, therefore, fly about, the solution of the phenomenon
is obvious; and we judge in conformity to regular experience and
observation when we account for it by the known and natural principles
of credulity and delusion. And shall we, rather than have recourse
to so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of the most
established laws of nature?
"I need not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in
any private or even public history at the place where it is said
to happen; much more when the scene is removed to ever so small
a distance. Even a court of judicature, with all the authority,
accuracy, and judgment which they can employ, find themselves often
at a loss to distinguish between truth and falsehood in the most
recent actions. But the matter never comes to any issue if trusted
to the common method of altercation and debate and flying rumors,
especially when men's passions have taken part on either side.
"In the infancy of new religions the wise and learned commonly
esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or
regard. And when afterward they would willingly detect the cheat,
in order to undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past,
and the records and witnesses which might clear up the matter have
perished beyond recovery.
"No means of detection remain but those which must be drawn from
the very testimony itself of the reporters; and these, though always
sufficient with the judicious and knowing, are commonly too fine to
fall under the comprehension of the vulgar.
"Upon the whole, then, it appears that no testimony for any kind of
miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof;
and that even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by
another proof, derived from the very nature of the fact which it would
endeavor to establish. It is experience only which gives authority to
human testimony; and it is the same experience which assures us of
the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience
are contrary, we have nothing to do but subtract the one from the
other, and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with
that assurance which arises from the remainder. But according to
the principle here explained, this subtraction, with regard to all
popular religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore
we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such
force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any
such system of religion.
"I beg the limitations here made may be remarked when I say that
a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a
system of religion. For I own that, otherwise, there may possibly be
miracles or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind
as to admit of proof from human testimony; though perhaps it will
be impossible to find any such in all the records of history. Thus,
suppose all authors, in all languages, agree that from the first of
January, 1600, there was a total darkness over the whole earth for
eight days; suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event
is still strong and lively among the people; that all travelers who
return from foreign countries bring us accounts of the same tradition,
without the least variation or contradiction--it is evident that our
present philosophers, instead of doubting the fact, ought to receive
it as certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it might be
derived. The decay, corruption, and dissolution of nature is an event
rendered probable by so many analogies, that any phenomenon which seems
to have a tendency toward that catastrophe comes within the reach of
human testimony, if that testimony be very extensive and uniform.
"But suppose that all the historians who England treat of should
agree that on the first day of January, 1600, Queen Elizabeth died;
that both before and after her death she was seen by her physicians
and the whole court, as is usual with persons of her rank; that her
successor was acknowledged and proclaimed by the parliament; and that
after being interred a month she again appeared, resumed the throne,
and governed England for three years--I must confess that I should be
surprised at the concurrence of so many odd circumstances, but should
not have the least inclination to believe so miraculous an event. I
should not doubt of her pretended death, and of those other public
circumstances that followed it; I should only assert it to have been
pretended, and that it neither was nor possibly could be real. You
would in vain object to me the difficulty, and almost impossibility,
of deceiving the world in an affair of such consequence. The wisdom
and solid judgment of that renowned queen, with the little or no
advantage she could reap from so poor an artifice--all this might
astonish me; but I would still reply that the knavery and folly of
men are such common phenomena, that I should rather believe the most
extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence than admit of
so signal a violation of the laws of nature.
"But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion,
men in all ages have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of
that kind that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat,
and sufficient with all men of sense not only to make them reject the
fact, but even reject it without further examination. Though the being
to whom the miracle is ascribed be in this case Almighty, it does not
upon that account become a whit more probable, since it is impossible
for us to know the attributes or actions of such a being otherwise
than from the experience which we have of his productions in the
usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past observation,
and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth
in the testimony of men with those of the violation of the laws of
nature by miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely and
probable. As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony
concerning religious miracles than in that concerning any other matter
of fact, this must diminish very much the authority of the former
testimony, and make us form a general resolution never to lend any
attention to it, with whatever specious pretense it may be covered.
"Lord Bacon seems to have embraced the same principles of
reasoning. 'We ought,' says he, 'to make a collection or particular
history of all monsters and prodigious births or productions, and,
in a word, of everything new, rare, and extraordinary in nature. But
this must be done with the most severe scrutiny, lest we depart from
truth. Above all, every relation must be considered as suspicious which
depends in any degree upon religion, as the prodigies of Livy: and,
no less so, every thing that is to be found in the writers of natural
magic or alchemy, or such authors who seem, all of them, to have an
unconquerable appetite for falsehood and fable.' (Nov. Org. lib. 2,
aph. 9.)
"I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered,
as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or
disguised enemies to the Christian religion who have undertaken to
defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is
founded on faith, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it
to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure. To
make this more evident, let us examine those miracles related in
scripture; and, not to lose ourselves in too wide a field, let us
confine ourselves to such as we find in the Pentateuch, which we shall
examine according to the principles of these pretended Christians,
not as the word or testimony of God himself, but as the production
of a mere human writer and historian. Here, then, we are first to
consider a book, presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people,
written in an age when they were still more barbarous, and in all
probability long after the facts which it relates, corroborated by
no concurring testimony, and resembling those fabulous accounts
which every nation gives of its origin. Upon reading this book,
we find it full of prodigies and miracles. It gives an account of a
state of the world and of human nature entirely different from the
present: of our fall from that state; of the age of man extended to
near a thousand years; of the destruction of the world by a deluge;
of the arbitrary choice of one people as the favorites of heaven, and
that people the countrymen of the author; of their deliverance from
bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imaginable: I desire anyone
to lay his hand upon his heart, and, after a serious consideration,
declare whether he thinks that the falsehood of such a book, supported
by such a testimony, would be more extraordinary and miraculous than
all the miracles it relates; which is, however, necessary to make it
be received according to the measures of probability above established.
"What we have said of miracles may be applied, without any variation,
to prophecies; and, indeed, all prophecies are real miracles, and as
such only can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not
exceed the capacity of human nature to foretell future events, it would
be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine mission or
authority from heaven; so that upon the whole we may conclude that the
Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but
even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without
one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity; and
whoever is moved by faith to assent to it is conscious of a continued
miracle in his own person which subverts all the principles of his
understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most
contrary to custom and experience."
"For hundreds of years, miracles were about the only things that
happened. They were wrought by thousands of Christians, and testified
to by millions. The saints and martyrs, the best and greatest,
were the witnesses and workers of wonders. Even heretics, with the
assistance of the Devil, could suspend the 'laws of nature.' Must
we believe these wonderful accounts because they were written
by 'good men,' by Christians, 'who made their statements in the
presence and expectation of death?' The truth is that these 'good
men' were mistaken. They expected the miraculous. They breathed the
air of the marvelous. They fed their minds on prodigies, and their
imaginations feasted on effects without causes. They were incapable
of investigating. Doubts were regarded as 'rude disturbers of the
congregation.' Credulity and sanctity walked hand in hand. Reason
was danger. Belief was safety. As the philosophy of the ancients was
rendered almost worthless by the credulity of the common people,
so the proverbs of Christ, his religion of forgiveness, his creed
of kindness, were lost on the mist of miracle and the darkness of
superstition." (Ingersoll's Reply to Black.)
"Believers in miracles should not try to explain them. There is but
one way to explain anything, and that is to account for it by natural
agencies. The moment you explain a miracle it disappears. You should
depend not upon explanation, but assertion. You should not be driven
from the field because the miracle is shown to be unreasonable. You
should reply that all miracles are unreasonable. Neither should you
be in the least disheartened if it is shown to be impossible. The
possible is not miraculous. You should take the ground that if
miracles were reasonable, and possible, there would be no reward
for believing them. The Christian has the goodness to believe, while
the sinner asks for evidence. It is enough for God to work miracles
without being called upon to substantiate them for the benefit of
unbelievers." (Ingersoll's "Mistakes of Moses," p. 146.)
"So when we are told that wine was made out of water, and bread and
fish out of nothing in large quantities, we know that we are listening
to statements that simply go out of the field of credible testimony
into the realm of supreme credulity. Such assertions require you to
believe not only what you have not seen, but what all reason and
experience tell you, you never can see. They ask you not only to
believe in a past event, but in a past event outside of all reason,
unsupported by nature, opposed to all natural laws, beneath the
realm of reason, out of the light of experience, under the shadow
of superstition. The great electric light of the intellect is turned
off at the church door." (Helen H. Gardener. "Men, Women, and Gods.")
Some Extra Miracles.
A snake talks, reasons, and has more knowledge than Adam and Eve. See
third chapter of Genesis.
God talks to the snake in the same chapter. On another occasion God
spoke to a fish. "And the Lord spake unto the fish, and it vomited
out Jonah upon dry land." (Jonah 2 : 10.)
Balaam's ass seems to have been able to talk, and to see angels. "And
the Lord opened the mouth of the ass, and she said unto Balaam,
What have I done unto thee, that thou hast smitten me these three
times?" (Numbers 22 : 28.)
The Great Quail Story.
"And there went forth a wind from the Lord, and brought quails from
the sea, and let them fall by the camp, as it were a day's journey
on this side (thirty-three and one-fifth miles), and as it were a
day's journey (thirty-three and one-fifth miles) on the other side,
round about the camp and as it were two cubits (three feet and four
inches) high upon the face of the earth. And while the flesh was
yet between their teeth, ere it was chewed the wrath of the Lord was
kindled against the people, and the Lord smote the people with a very
great plague." (Numbers 11 : 31, 33.) And the people quailed before
the Lord; that is they quailed outwardly, but not inwardly.
A Suit of Clothes Lasting Forty Years, and even then Not Old.
"Yea forty years didst thou sustain them in the wilderness, so that
they lacked nothing; their clothes waxed not old, and their feet
swelled not." (Neh. 9 : 21.)
Lot's Wife turned into a Pillar of Salt.
The Boston Transcript knows of an erudite clergyman who spoke of the
unfortunate woman of Sodom as "Lot's lady who was transformed into
a monolith of chloride of sodium."
Cattle which were Killed Several Times After they were Dead.
"And the Lord did that thing on the morrow, and all the cattle of
Egypt died, but of the cattle of the children of Israel died not
one." (Ex. 9 : 6.)
This is the first time they were killed, so far as we know of. The
immediate cause of their taking off is ascribed to "Murrain." In
the twenty-fifth verse of the same chapter it is fully implied that
they were killed again: "And the hail smote throughout all the land
of Egypt all that was in the field, both man and beast; and the hail
smote every herb of the field, and brake every tree of the field." Now
it is fair to infer that a hail which "brake every tree of the field"
was destructive enough to kill animals. This makes the second time
they were killed.
In the twelfth chapter of Exodus and twenty-ninth verse we read that
some of the same cattle were killed again, making three times that
they died: "And it came to pass that at midnight the Lord smote all
the first born of the land of Egypt, from the first born of Pharaoh
that sat upon the throne unto the first born of the captive in the
dungeon; and the first born of cattle." After these repeated deaths
of the cattle, we find Pharaoh and his horsemen in full pursuit of the
fleeing Hebrews, and Pharaoh and his horsemen and horses, were drowned
in the sea. Of course it is difficult for one who is carnally minded,
to understand how cattle can be killed so many times. Possibly the
"Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Dumb Animals" might have
done good service had it been in full working order in those days.
People Get Up in the morning Dead.
"And when they arose, behold they were all dead corpses." (Isaiah
37 : 36.)
Elisha Returns to Life.
"And it came to pass, as they were burying a man, that, behold,
they spied a band of men; and they cast the man unto the sepulcher
of Elisha: and when the man (the corpse) was let down, and touched
the bones of Elisha, he revived, and stood up on his feet." (2 Kings
13 : 21.)
It would have been a great consolation to us, if the writer had only
added a few lines more, and told us what Elisha did after he stood
up on his feet. Of course if he stood up, he could not stand on any
one else's feet than his own, but did he climb out of the sepulcher
and go on his way rejoicing? Execrable historian to leave us in the
dark when we so greatly need light! We fear the writer of Matthew
had this story in his mind, when speaking of the earthquake at the
crucifixion of Christ. He says, "And the graven were opened; and many
bodies of the saints which slept, arose, and came out of the graves
after his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared
unto many."--"Came out of the graves after his resurrection"; but
they arose at the time of the earthquake, and the resurrection did
not take place until the third day afterward. What were they doing
all this time? Standing up in their graves, dressed in their funeral
wardrobe? If they appeared unto many there is no mention of the fact
made by either Jew or Gentile.