Whether the Active Life Is of Greater Merit Than the Contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is of greater merit
than the contemplative. For merit implies relation to meed; and meed
is due to labor, according to 1 Cor. 3:8, "Every man shall receive
his own reward according to his own labor." Now labor is ascribed to
the active life, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory says
(Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "Whosoever is converted to God must first of
all sweat from labor, i.e. he must take Lia, that afterwards he may
rest in the embraces of Rachel so as to see the principle." Therefore
the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative.
Obj. 2: Further, the contemplative life is a beginning of the
happiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on John 21:22, "So
I will have him to remain till I come," says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan.):
"This may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect works follow Me
conformed to the example of My passion, and let contemplation begun
here remain until I come, that it may be perfected when I shall
come." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "contemplation
begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home." Now the
life to come will be a state not of meriting but of receiving the
reward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative life would seem to
have less of the character of merit than the active, but more of the
character of reward.
Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.) that "no sacrifice
is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls." Now by the zeal for
souls a man turns to the occupations of the active life. Therefore it
would seem that the contemplative life is not of greater merit than
the active.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Great are the
merits of the active life, but greater still those of the
contemplative."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4), the root of
merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), charity
consists in the love of God and our neighbor, the love of God is by
itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated
above (Q. 27, A. 8). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to
the love of God is generically more meritorious than that which
pertains directly to the love of our neighbor for God's sake. Now the
contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of
God; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the love of" the
Divine "truth seeks a holy leisure," namely of the contemplative
life, for it is that truth above all which the contemplative life
seeks, as stated above (Q. 181, A. 4, ad 2). On the other hand, the
active life is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbor,
because it is "busy about much serving" (Luke 10:40). Wherefore the
contemplative life is generically of greater merit than the active
life. This is moreover asserted by Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "The
contemplative life surpasses in merit the active life, because the
latter labors under the stress of present work," by reason of the
necessity of assisting our neighbor, "while the former with heartfelt
relish has a foretaste of the coming rest," i.e. the contemplation of
God.
Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of
the active life than another by the works of the contemplative life.
For instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then
suffer separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the
time being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake.
Thus the Apostle says (Rom. 9:3): "I wished myself to be an anathema
from Christ, for my brethren"; which words Chrysostom expounds as
follows (De Compunct. i, 7 [*Ad Demetr. de Compunct. Cordis.]): "His
mind was so steeped in the love of Christ that, although he desired
above all to be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he
pleased Christ."
Reply Obj. 1: External labor conduces to the increase of the
accidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the
essential reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor
borne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign
thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this
life, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation.
Reply Obj. 2: In the state of future happiness man has arrived at
perfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and
if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the
greater charity. But in the present life contemplation is not without
some imperfection, and can always become more perfect; wherefore it
does not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on
account of the practice of greater Divine charity.
Reply Obj. 3: A sacrifice is rendered to God spiritually when
something is offered to Him; and of all man's goods, God specially
accepts that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in
sacrifice. Now a man ought to offer to God, in the first place, his
soul, according to Ecclus. 30:24, "Have pity on thy own soul,
pleasing God"; in the second place, the souls of others, according to
Apoc. 22:17, "He that heareth, let him say: Come." And the more
closely a man unites his own or another's soul to God, the more
acceptable is his sacrifice to God; wherefore it is more acceptable
to God that one apply one's own soul and the souls of others to
contemplation than to action. Consequently the statement that "no
sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls," does not
mean that the merit of the active life is preferable to the merit of
the contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer to
God one's own soul and the souls of others, than any other external
gifts.
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