Whether Prophecy Can Be Natural?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy can be natural. For Gregory
says (Dial. iv, 26) that "sometimes the mere strength of the soul is
sufficiently cunning to foresee certain things": and Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 13) that the human soul, according as it is
withdrawn from the sense of the body, is able to foresee the future
[*Cf. I, Q. 86, A. 4, ad 2]. Now this pertains to prophecy. Therefore
the soul can acquire prophecy naturally.
Obj. 2: Further, the human soul's knowledge is more alert while one
wakes than while one sleeps. Now some, during sleep, naturally
foresee the future, as the Philosopher asserts (De Somn. et Vigil.
[*De Divinat. per Somn. ii, which is annexed to the work quoted]).
Much more therefore can a man naturally foreknow the future.
Obj. 3: Further, man, by his nature, is more perfect than dumb
animals. Yet some dumb animals have foreknowledge of future things
that concern them. Thus ants foreknow the coming rains, which is
evident from their gathering grain into their nest before the rain
commences; and in like manner fish foreknow a coming storm, as may be
gathered from their movements in avoiding places exposed to storm.
Much more therefore can men foreknow the future that concerns
themselves, and of such things is prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes
from nature.
Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 29:18): "When prophecy shall
fail, the people shall be scattered abroad"; wherefore it is evident
that prophecy is necessary for the stability of the human race. Now
"nature does not fail in necessaries" [*Aristotle, _De Anima_ iii,
9]. Therefore it seems that prophecy is from nature.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Pet. 1:21): "For prophecy came
not by the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke,
inspired by the Holy Ghost." Therefore prophecy comes not from
nature, but through the gift of the Holy Ghost.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 171, A. 6, ad 2) prophetic
foreknowledge may regard future things in two ways: in one way, as
they are in themselves; in another way, as they are in their causes.
Now, to foreknow future things, as they are in themselves, is proper
to the Divine intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as
stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13). Wherefore such like
foreknowledge of the future cannot come from nature, but from Divine
revelation alone. On the other hand, future things can be foreknown
in their causes with a natural knowledge even by man: thus a
physician foreknows future health or death in certain causes, through
previous experimental knowledge of the order of those causes to such
effects. Such like knowledge of the future may be understood to be in
a man by nature in two ways. In one way that the soul, from that
which it holds, is able to foreknow the future, and thus Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "Some have deemed the human soul to
contain a certain power of divination." This seems to be in accord
with the opinion of Plato [*Phaed. xxvii; Civit. vi], who held that
our souls have knowledge of all things by participating in the ideas;
but that this knowledge is obscured in them by union with the body;
yet in some more, in others less, according to a difference in bodily
purity. According to this it might be said that men, whose souls are
not much obscured through union with the body, are able to foreknow
such like future things by their own knowledge. Against this opinion
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "How is it that the soul
cannot always have this power of divination, since it always wishes
to have it?"
Since, however, it seems truer, according to the opinion of
Aristotle, that the soul acquires knowledge from sensibles, as stated
in the First Part (Q. 84, A. 6), it is better to have recourse to
another explanation, and to hold that men have no such foreknowledge
of the future, but that they can acquire it by means of experience,
wherein they are helped by their natural disposition, which depends
on the perfection of a man's imaginative power, and the clarity of
his understanding.
Nevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future differs in two
ways from the former, which comes through Divine revelation. First,
because the former can be about any events whatever, and this
infallibly; whereas the latter foreknowledge, which can be had
naturally, is about certain effects, to which human experience may
extend. Secondly, because the former prophecy is "according to the
unchangeable truth" [*Q. 171, A. 3, Obj. 1], while the latter is not,
and can cover a falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and not the
latter, properly belongs to prophecy, because, as stated above (Q.
171, A. 3), prophetic knowledge is of things which naturally surpass
human knowledge. Consequently we must say that prophecy strictly so
called cannot be from nature, but only from Divine revelation.
Reply Obj. 1: When the soul is withdrawn from corporeal things, it
becomes more adapted to receive the influence of spiritual substances
[*Cf. I, Q. 88, A. 4, ad 2], and also is more inclined to receive the
subtle motions which take place in the human imagination through the
impression of natural causes, whereas it is hindered from receiving
them while occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says (Dial.
iv, 26) that "the soul, at the approach of death, foresees certain
future things, by reason of the subtlety of its nature," inasmuch as
it is receptive even of slight impressions. Or again, it knows future
things by a revelation of the angels; but not by its own power,
because according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13), "if this were
so, it would be able to foreknow the future whenever it willed,"
which is clearly false.
Obj. 2: Knowledge of the future by means of dreams, comes either from
the revelation of spiritual substances, or from a corporeal cause, as
stated above (Q. 95, A. 6), when we were treating of divination. Now
both these causes are more applicable to a person while asleep than
while awake, because, while awake, the soul is occupied with external
sensibles, so that it is less receptive of the subtle impressions
either of spiritual substances, or even of natural causes; although
as regards the perfection of judgment, the reason is more alert in
waking than in sleeping.
Reply Obj. 3: Even dumb animals have no foreknowledge of future
events, except as these are foreknown in their causes, whereby their
imagination is moved more than man's, because man's imagination,
especially in waking, is more disposed according to reason than
according to the impression of natural causes. Yet reason effects
much more amply in man, that which the impression of natural causes
effects in dumb animals; and Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy
assists man still more.
Reply Obj. 4: The prophetic light extends even to the direction of
human acts; and in this way prophecy is requisite for the government
of a people, especially in relation to Divine worship; since for this
nature is not sufficient, and grace is necessary.
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