Whether the Subject of Pride Is the Irascible Faculty?
Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of pride is not the
irascible faculty. For Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17): "A swollen
mind is an obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the light."
Now the knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible but to the
rational faculty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.
Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that "the proud
observe other people's conduct not so as to set themselves beneath
them with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with
pride": wherefore it would seem that pride originates in undue
observation. Now observation pertains not to the irascible but to the
rational faculty.
Obj. 3: Further, pride seeks pre-eminence not only in sensible
things, but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while it
consists essentially in the contempt of God, according to Ecclus.
10:14, "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God."
Now the irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive appetite,
cannot extend to God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot
be in the irascible.
Obj. 4: Further, as stated in Prosper's _Liber Sententiarum,_ sent.
294, "Pride is love of one's own excellence." But love is not in the
irascible, but in the concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the
irascible.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes pride to the gift
of fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is in the
irascible.
_I answer that,_ The subject of any virtue or vice is to be
ascertained from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act
cannot be other than the object of the power, which is the subject of
both. Now the proper object of pride is something difficult, for
pride is the desire of one's own excellence, as stated above (AA. 1,
2). Wherefore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible
faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First in a
strict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even
as anger, strictly speaking, is a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Secondly, the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to
belong also to the intellective appetite, to which also anger is
sometimes ascribed. It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the
angels, not as a passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice
pronouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood in this
broad sense is not distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated
above in the First Part (Q. 59, A. 4; I-II, Q. 82, A. 5, ad 1 and 2).
Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride,
were merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite
might tend, pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of
the sensitive appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has
in view is common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must
needs say that the subject of pride is the irascible not only
strictly so called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in
its wider acceptation, as applicable to the intellective appetite.
Wherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons.
Reply Obj. 1: Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely
speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause.
For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may
receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Matt. 11:25,
"Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent," i.e. from
the proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, "and hast
revealed them to little ones," i.e. to the humble.
Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written
(Ecclus. 6:34): "If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive
instruction." The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is
directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in
their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory
says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that "the proud, although certain hidden
truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their
sweetness: and if they know of them they cannot relish them." Hence
it is written (Prov. 11:2): "Where humility is there also is wisdom."
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 161, AA. 2, 6), humility observes
the rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-esteem. Now
pride does not observe this rule of right reason, for he esteems
himself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an inordinate
desire for his own excellence, since a man is ready to believe what
he desires very much, the result being that his appetite is borne
towards things higher than what become him. Consequently whatsoever
things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to pride: and
one of those is the observing of other people's failings, just as, on
the other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17), "holy
men, by a like observation of other people's virtues, set others
above themselves." Accordingly the conclusion is not that pride is in
the rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in the reason.
Reply Obj. 3: Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of the
sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general signification,
as stated above.
Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), "love
precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause,"
wherefore it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It
is in this sense that pride is said to be "love of one's own
excellence," inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his
superiority over others, and this belongs properly to pride.
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