Whether Modesty Is Only About Outward Actions?
Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is only about outward
actions. For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to
other persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty
be known to all men." Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.
Obj. 2: Further, the virtues that are about the passions are
distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is
seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it
will not be concerned with inward passions.
Obj. 3: Further, no one same virtue is both about things pertaining
to the appetite--which is proper to the moral virtues--and about
things pertaining to knowledge--which is proper to the intellectual
virtues--and again about things pertaining to the irascible and
concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it
cannot be about all these things.
_On the contrary,_ In all these things it is necessary to observe the
"mode" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all
of them.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), modesty differs from
temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where
restraint is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that
present less difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various
opinions about modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of
good or a special difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the
province of modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is
clear to all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a
special difficulty: wherefore all distinguished temperance from
modesty.
In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)
considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of
punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held
modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require
moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. One is the movement of
the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by
_humility._ The second is the desire of things pertaining to
knowledge, and this is moderated by _studiousness_ which is opposed
to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which
require to be done becomingly and honestly [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1],
whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show,
for instance in dress and the like.
To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed
certain special virtues: thus Andronicus [*De Affectibus] mentions
"meekness, simplicity, humility," and other kindred virtues, of which
we have spoken above (Q. 143); while Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7)
assigned _eutrapelia_ to pleasures in games, as stated above (I-II,
Q. 60, A. 5). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by
Tully; and in this way modesty regards not only outward but also
inward actions.
Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding externals.
Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by certain
outward signs.
Reply Obj. 2: Various virtues assigned by various authorities are
comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from
regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not
so great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there
is between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which
is about passions, because in actions and passions that present no
great difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of
moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of
moderation.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.
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