Whether Six Species Are Fittingly Assigned to Lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned
to lust, namely, "simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction,
rape, and the unnatural vice." For diversity of matter does not
diversify the species. Now the aforesaid division is made with regard
to diversity of matter, according as the woman with whom a man has
intercourse is married or a virgin, or of some other condition.
Therefore it seems that the species of lust are diversified in this
way.
Obj. 2: Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not
differentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery
does not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man
having intercourse with one who is another's, so that he commits an
injustice. Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a
species of lust.
Obj. 3: Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with a
woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen that
a man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow.
Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust, even as
adultery is.
Obj. 4: Further, a married man sins not only if he be with another
woman, but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter
sin is comprised under lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among
the species thereof.
Obj. 5: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21): "Lest again, when I
come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them that sinned
before, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication
and lasciviousness that they have committed." Therefore it seems that
also uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned species of
lust, as well as fornication.
Obj. 6: Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among
its parts. But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is
written (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are
fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: 'luxury']."
Therefore it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species
of lust.
_On the contrary,_ The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals
36, qu. i [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa].
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 153, A. 3), the sin of lust
consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right
reason. This may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter
wherein this pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due
matter, other due circumstances are not observed. And since a
circumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose species is
derived from its object which is also its matter, it follows that the
species of lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object.
Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways.
First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act.
In this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the
_vice against nature,_ which attaches to every venereal act from
which generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing
and advancement of the child when born, there is _simple
fornication,_ which is the union of an unmarried man with an
unmarried woman. Secondly, the matter wherein the venereal act is
consummated may be discordant with right reason in relation to other
persons; and this in two ways. First, with regard to the woman, with
whom a man has connection, by reason of due honor not being paid to
her; and thus there is _incest,_ which consists in the misuse of a
woman who is related by consanguinity or affinity. Secondly, with
regard to the person under whose authority the woman is placed: and
if she be under the authority of a husband, it is _adultery,_ if
under the authority of her father, it is _seduction,_ in the absence
of violence, and _rape_ if violence be employed.
These species are differentiated on the part of the woman rather than
of the man, because in the venereal act the woman is passive and is
by way of matter, whereas the man is by way of agent; and it has been
stated above (Obj. 1) that the aforesaid species are assigned with
regard to a difference of matter.
Reply Obj. 1: The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected with a
formal difference of object, which difference results from different
modes of opposition to right reason, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 7), nothing hinders
the deformities of different vices concurring in the one act, and in
this way adultery is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is this
deformity of injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the lust
that obeys concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice, is thereby
shown to be more grievous.
Reply Obj. 3: Since a woman, by vowing continence, contracts a
spiritual marriage with God, the sacrilege that is committed in the
violation of such a woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner,
the other kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced
to other species of lust.
Reply Obj. 4: The sin of a husband with his wife is not connected
with undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not
constitute the species of a moral act, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18,
A. 2).
Reply Obj. 5: As a gloss says on this passage, "uncleanness" stands
for lust against nature, while "lasciviousness" is a man's abuse of
boys, wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also
reply that "lasciviousness" relates to certain acts circumstantial to
the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth.
Reply Obj. 6: According to a gloss on this passage "lust" there
signifies any kind of excess.
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