Whether the Daughters of Lust Are Fittingly Described?
Objection 1: It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly
reckoned to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy,
rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence
or despair of a future world." For mental blindness, thoughtlessness
and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every
sin, even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not
be reckoned especially as daughters of lust.
Obj. 2: Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated
above (Q. 128, ad 6; Q. 137, A. 3). But lust is contrary, not to
fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter
of lust.
Obj. 3: Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is the
origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28).
Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.
Obj. 4: Further, Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four,
namely, "obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking."
There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.
_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).
_I answer that,_ When the lower powers are strongly moved towards
their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and
disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that
the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently
intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of
the vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely
the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.
Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is
simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act
is hindered by lust, according to Dan. 13:56, "Beauty hath deceived
thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart." In this respect we have
"blindness of mind." The second act is counsel about what is to be
done for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the
concupiscence of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1),
speaking of lecherous love: "This thing admits of neither counsel nor
moderation, thou canst not control it by counseling." In this respect
there is "rashness," which denotes absence of counsel, as stated
above (Q. 53, A. 3). The third act is judgment about the things to be
done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the
lustful old men (Dan. 13:9): "They perverted their own mind . . .
that they might not . . . remember just judgments." In this respect
there is "thoughtlessness." The fourth act is the reason's command
about the thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so
far as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered
from doing what his reason ordered to be done. [To this "inconstancy"
must be referred.] [*The sentence in brackets is omitted in the
Leonine edition.] Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man
who declared that he would leave his mistress: "One little false tear
will undo those words."
On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One
is the desire for the end, to which we refer "self-love," which
regards the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the
other hand there is "hatred of God," by reason of His forbidding the
desired pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed
to the end. With regard to this there is "love of this world," whose
pleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is
"despair of a future world," because through being held back by
carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since
they are distasteful to him.
Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5),
intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices
opposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal
species of intemperance.
Reply Obj. 2: The constancy which is a part of fortitude regards
hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from
pleasures pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as
stated above (Q. 143). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto
is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first
named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter enfeebles
a man's heart and renders it effeminate, according to Osee 4:11,
"Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay:
'understanding']." Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that "the
less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death."
Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the
daughters of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf. Q. 35, A.
4, ad 2; Q. 118, A. 8, ad 1; Q. 148, A. 6).
Reply Obj. 3: Self-love in respect of any goods that a man desires
for himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the special
point of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a
daughter of lust.
Reply Obj. 4: The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate external
acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold
inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this we refer
"obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of the heart the
mouth speaketh" (Matt. 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full
of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly,
on account of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and
rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or
giving a thought to his words, which are described as "scurrilous."
Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks
pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to
"wanton words." Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by
his words, for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a
man's sentiments, and so he gives way "to foolish talking," for
instance, by expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to
anything else.
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